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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The country report provides the data and information on the changes in the financial
system in Turkey since 1980. The report is based on the analysis of data on financial
sector and the relevant literature. After explaining the historical and political
developments since the foundation of the Republic of Turkey, the report provides an
overview of developments within financial sector and its impact upon the non-
financial sector. It deals in detail with the period after the capital account
liberalisation of 1989 and discusses the macroeconomic context in the last two
decades as well as the regulatory framework for the financial sector. The relations
between the financial sector and non-financial sector, the changes in the sources of
funds for the real sector, the increased penetration of financial services in everyday
lives of people and the increasing household indebtedness are discussed with
regards to the financialisation of Turkish economy. The report concludes by giving
brief information on recent responses to the 2008-9 international financial crisis.
Historical Background
The policymakers of the early Republican era have made it explicitly clear that their
major goal was to establish a national economy. In the wake of the Great Depression
the adjustment strategy in Turkey has been étatisme which aimed fostering private
sector through active participation of state in economic life. Etatism was grounded in
a framework which involved the foundation of national banks, laying the ground for
the emergence of a bank-based financial system in Turkey. During the transition to
multi-party democracy after the II. World War the policy dilemma for policymakers
has been to re-integrate Turkish economy against the background of liberalising
international trade relations whilst maintaining the target of industrialisation. The
strategic shift towards adjustment has been accompanied by foundation of new
20
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banks creating a more competitive environment and the first private investment and
development bank in 1950.
Trying to cope with the problems of adjustment, Democrat Party rule during the
1950-1960 witnessed a prolonged balance of payments crisis which led to the
adoption of IMF stabilisation programme in 1958 accompanied by a new Banking Law
that would remain in effect until 1985. The establishment of Bank Association of
Turkey (BAT) as the official representative body of all banks operating in Turkey
would be a result of the same law. It had also paved the way for the emergence of
capital groups that would increasingly characterise the Turkish financial system
from the 1960s onwards by allowing the “holding banks” to extend unlimited loans to
the firms within the group.
1960-1980 period was characterised by import substitution policies attempted to be
pursued in the framework of five-year Development Plans. The idea of planning was
perceived as providing an effective instrument to utilise the scarce resources in a
rational manner. Yet, the Development Plans would fail in accomplishing one major
goal they would prescribe, namely, gradually diminishing the dependency of the
economy on foreign resources. Enhancing the use of public resources for the
realisation of plans’ objectives was deemed indispensable in the light of the
inadequacy of the efforts to increase domestic savings. This led both the
establishment of several “special purpose banks” and the participation of the private
sector banks in newly established industrial firms, while only very few new entries
were allowed into the banking sector. These developments have been perceived as
augmenting the bank-based character of the Turkish financial system.
The crisis of the import substitution regime and the organic crisis of the state in the
late 1970s were followed by transition to export orientation and fundamental
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changes in the political landscape of the country after the 1980 military coup. The
neoliberal governments allowed foundation of new banks and it gradually became
much more preferable for business groups to own financial institutions within their
conglomerates. The decision to complete the capital account liberalisation in 1989
signified the increasing dependence of the economy on private financial sources. The
reliance upon portfolio investments as the main source of money creation made the
economy susceptible to the vagaries of the international financial markets and
Turkey experienced severe financial crises in 1994 and 2000-1.
The report investigates the restructuring of the financial sector in the aftermath of
the 2000-1 crisis. As a result of increased level of capital inflows, the country
experienced relatively high rates of growth until 2008-9. Reversed capital flows had
impacted radically upon the Turkish economy in the crisis years. While the
restructuring of the Turkish financial system was portrayed by international financial
institutions and policymakers as a success story, the profitability of banks did not
mean boosted support for productive investment and maintaining steadily high
growth rates. Turkey’s policy response to the 2008-9 crisis, has been consistent with
an interpretation of Turkey’s current strategies of development as being subordinate
to neoliberal and financial imperatives.
Outlook on Turkish Financial Sector and Financial Flows
The Turkish labour market experienced a significant structural transformation since
the early 1980s. Share of agricultural employment declined, informalization and
labour market flexibility increased whilst labour’s bargaining power plunged. The
share of financial intermediation sector in GDP (at constant prices) increased in the
late 1990s. In the aftermath of 2000-1 crisis, the share of financial intermediation in
GDP further increased in parallel with the new regulations on financial sector,
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aiming to attract a massive inflow of finance capital. Data shows that the ratio
increased from 7.6% in 1998 to about 12.0% in 2011.
Although insurance sector is developing rapidly and non-bank financial institutions
have grown in size and number in recent years, Turkey’s financial sector remain
bank-based and Turkey’s banks have high returns on their assets and the sector is
characterised by monopolistic competition. Banks occupy the most important place
in the financial sector. In 2002-2010, they had a share around 74% - 84% of value
added in financial and insurance activities and production value. As of March 2011,
77.2% of total financial assets belonged to the banks. Among the non-bank financial
institutions, which have been growing in the last decade in number and size,
insurance companies make up the largest segment of value added. The banking
sector is dominated by deposit banks and their number is 31 as of March 2011, out of
48 banks in Turkey. Within the non-bank financial institutions, the number of
financial leasing companies and factoring companies declined considerably, whilst
there is a notable increase in the real estate investment trusts in the last couple of
years.
Private sector securities, mostly composed of common shares, still remain behind
the public sector securities, which are mainly the government bonds and comprise
78% of the total outstanding securities. There has been a significant increase in the
issuance of government bonds starting from the early 2000s onwards and 80% of the
central government debt stock is issued in government domestic bond as of 2011.
Corporate bond market in Turkey is relatively small and deposits compose a
significant part of the bank liabilities, leading to concerns on asset/liability
mismatch.
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The report shows that the balance sheet items of the banking sector have also
undergone change. As of 2010, banking sector total assets / GDP ratio was around
90%. Until 2001, government securities occupied an important place in the banking
sector assets. The distribution of assets, however, gradually changed in the last
decade. As of the end of 2010, 68% of total loans are corporate loans and 32% of
loans are household loans. In the 1990s and the last decade, non-deposit funds have
been the largest share among liabilities, with still high share of short-term deposits.
The positive changes in the capital structure of banks and NPL/gross loans ratio, are
accompanied by the rising proportion of credit card loans in recent years. The ratio
of household financial liabilities to GDP increased after 2005 and reached 15.9% in
2011.
Financial flows gained more importance in the 1990s and have mostly been in the
form of “other” flows or portfolio flows. The increase in foreign direct investment in
the aftermath of 2001, on the other hand was due to the privatisation of major public
companies. The report notes that financial liberalisation has provided opportunities
for Turkish banks and firms to borrow at lower costs and Turkish economy has been
exposed to boom-bust cycles of financial flows. The easy access to the credit during
the boom period increases the foreign liabilities of the firms and the credit crunch or
financial outflow deteriorate the balance sheets of the firms whose earnings are
denominated in TL. The simple correlation between net financial flows and growth
has been found 0.45, 0.66, and 0.75 in the periods of 1980-9, 1990-9, and 2000-12,
respectively. The report indicates that periods of recession are brought by capital
flight and GDP recovers with the rise in capital inflows, as seen in 2010-1.
There is an apparent relationship between financial flows and the nominal exchange
rate over a long time horizon. One can observe from the figures that, apart from very
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rare cases which are mostly related to adverse developments in inflation rate, the
appreciation of the effective exchange rate are mostly translated into appreciation of
the real effective exchange rate. The deregulated and liberalised Turkish capital
account set the exchange rate on a plateau of cheap foreign exchange rate. While the
cheap TL was favourable for the export promotion of the 1980s, the capital account
liberalisation in 1989 put on train the tendency of appreciation of the TL. Reserve
accumulation, as a strategy that would serve for insurance, has been adopted since
2001 by the Central Bank of Republic of Turkey (CBRT) against the volatility of
financial flows. Turkey is able to attract capital inflows with the aid of high financial
arbitrage it offers in international capital markets. Turkey has offered real rates of
80% during the February crisis of 2001; 60% in December 2002; 75% in the summer
of 2003. Despite the declining real interest rates in the last decade Turkey continued
to offer high arbitrage gains over dollar-denominated assets. Under these
conditions, the cumulative increase of external debt has been at the rate of 82.3% in
US dollar terms from the end of 2002 to the third quarter of 2008. The debt of non-
financial private sector increased the most during this period. The short-term
indebtedness remained as a problem as can be seen in the ratio of short-term
foreign debt stock to the gross reserves of the CBRT.
Non-industrial activities have become more and more attractive for industrial firms
in the aftermath of capital account liberalisation as a result of arbitrage
opportunities. The report finds that the ratios of non-operating incomes to total
incomes in crucial sectors such as manufacturing, services, construction, and
energy remained strikingly high between 1998 and 2010. Although the profitability in
financial sector cannot be documented because of data problems, it is clear that the
rate of return of financial investment impacts upon the new investment decisions
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and major companies may prefer short-term financial instruments over fixed
investment.
Financial Regulation
The number of banks increased rapidly in the 1980s, as a result of relaxed regulatory
barriers. Within the economic environment characterised by high interest rates and
increased speculative activities in the aftermath of capital account liberalisation,
banks acted as institutional rentiers. While IMF programmes played an important
role in the banking regulatory reforms as seen in the Banking Law of 1999, it was
during the exchange-rate based stabilisation and disinflation programme that
Turkey faced the biggest crisis in the financial sector. Banking system went through
further restructuring after the 2000-1 crisis. As a result the number of banks
dropped from 81 to 54 from 1999 to 2002, thereby concentrating assets in fewer
banks which increased their ability to maintain adequate capital reserves. State-
owned banks were restructured, and some of them were brought under a joint
management. Turkey experienced cross-border mergers and acquisitions in banking
sector in the same period and became attractive for foreign banks.
Financial sector reform has occupied a noteworthy place also within Turkey’s
ongoing process of accession to the European Union (EU). After Turkey was declared
as a candidate for EU membership in 1999, governments were advised to carry on
financial reforms for increasing transparency and surveillance. Amendments to the
1999 Banking Law augmented the institutional powers of the Banking Regulation
and Supervision Authority (BRSA) and Savings Deposit and Insurance Fund (SDIF)
while bringing Turkey’s financial regulations closer to the EU standards. CBRT has
been granted formal independence in 2001. The National Programs from 2001
onwards comprised targets which were determined for increasing the
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competitiveness of the economy and convergence with the EU practices. With the
motto of adopting international best practices and compliance with EU directives, the
Banking Law No. 5411 of November 2005 has been promulgated. The Progress
Reports in the accession process have underlined the importance of reforms
enacted by the AKP governments. AKP has also accelerated the efforts to help
integrate Turkish finance into the world market, through state-authored
memorandums of understanding with other countries’ financial regulators.
Moreover, the process of transition to Basel II standards, which started in 2005,
made the regulation of financial markets one of the fields in which the alignment
with EU acquis has been achieved.
BRSA remains the sole supervising authority in the banking sector while there is a
division of labour in the supervision of growing non-bank financial sector, with
financial intermediaries supervised by BRSA, funds and trusts by Capital Markets
Board (CMB) and insurance companies by the Treasury. Despite this multiplicity of
supervision authorities, policymakers attempt to consolidate a systemic approach to
financial supervision. Financial Stability Committee (FSC) found in June 2011 is
designed for this purpose and serves as a hub for developing policy proposals and
taking measures in order to manage systemic financial risks. FSC is composed of
Treasury, CBRT, BRSA, SDIF, and CMB and it is chaired by the Deputy Prime Minister
in charge of Economic and Financial Affairs.
Macroeconomic Policy, Real Sector and Households
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The report notes that liberalization, deregulation and the ensuing macroeconomic
policies have trapped the Turkish economy in a policy of overvalued TL and very high
real interest rates in the aftermath of capital account liberalisation. 2008-9 blip has
not changed the course. In the Turkish context, financial and non-financial sectors
cannot be easily isolated with distinct interests. Business groups have been able to
diversify their activities and invested in the banking sector. Bank rush in the 1980s
and the high returns on securities in the aftermath of financial liberalisation
consolidated the tendency to derive income from financial investments.
There has occurred significant restructuring in Turkish economy because of the
mergers and acquisitions in the last decade. Although, merger activity level
remained low, number of acquisitions in critical sectors increased rapidly due to the
re-focusing strategy of major groups, increasing number of privatisations and
boosting investor confidence. The deals with the largest pecuniary magnitudes took
place in the sectors of telecommunications, financial services, petroleum, petroleum
refining and petrochemical products, infrastructure, iron and steel production,
energy, and alcoholic beverages. These acquisitions granted a high degree of
monopoly power to the purchasers.
The restructuring of the financial sector in the post-2001 period decreased the
number of business groups that own a bank, thus enhancing the concentration and
centralisation process. At the same time, borrowing from international financial
markets have become a critical source of funds for large corporations. Since the
equity market is in its developmental stage, bank loans are still important for large
corporations. Small and Medium Scale Enterprises (SMEs) had very limited access
to bank loans in the neoliberal era. SMEs have also limited access to capital
markets. They are not able meet the criteria to register for the CMB and issue
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securities in the stock exchange. Under such circumstances, as the competitiveness
of the SMEs would help decline unemployment ratios, governments have
continuously promised to improve the productivity of SMEs, their international
competitiveness and access to loans. Nevertheless, the bank loans extended to
SMEs remain well below that of the loans extended to relatively big business.
With the advent of explicit inflation targets (implicit targeting in 2002-2006 period
and explicit targeting from 2006 onwards), almost all contracts started to being
offered against the inflation target set by the CBRT. Decline of real wages in the
aftermath of 2000-1 crisis was replaced with wage stability from 2005 onwards. The
difficulty faced by working class households in providing the basic needs in the
aftermath of 2000-1 crisis was accompanied by banks’ increasing focus on consumer
loans and developments in payment technologies. Households, especially starting
from 2002 onwards, increasingly relied on bank credits as a means to finance
consumption and this has resulted in the rising share of personal loans, within total
loans provided by commercial banks. Housing loans have also rapidly increased in
2004-2006 and the share of housing loans in total consumer loans revolved around
48% between 2006 and 2010. The growing problem of household indebtedness is
evident in the growing ratio of household obligations to household disposable
income, which increased from 7.5% in 2003 to 51.7% in 2011.
With the reversal of capital inflows, Turkish economy has been severely affected
from the 2008-9 crisis. The ratio of GDP growth plummeted to 0.7% in 2008 and
collapsed to -4.7% in 2009 whilst unemployment jumped to 14% in the same year.
The combination of government stimulus, temporary tax cuts, fiscal discipline, the
availability of cheap money from the United States (quantitative easing), and low
growth rates in many advanced countries renewed inflows of capital into Turkey.
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Banks remained profitable before and after the crisis. The report states that from
2010 onwards, the exit strategy of policymakers was shaped as a response to the
monetary policies in advanced countries and the volatility in international financial
markets. CBRT intervened in money markets, focused on exchange rate
developments and aimed to moderate interest rate volatility by widening and
narrowing interest rate corridor (overnight borrowing and lending rates). The policy
responses to the 2008-9 crisis indicate that the major target has been minimising
interest rate volatility as well as the exchange rate volatility.
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I. HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND TO PRE-1980
It is fair to state that the Turkish policymakers in the pre-1980 period aimed at the
establishment and strengthening of financial institutions in order to develop the
economy in general, the industrial sector in particular. Thereby they attempted to
use the financial instruments in accordance with the needs of the productive sector.
By the same token, it is fair to say that while the nature of the Turkish economy's
integration with the world economy has been a bone of contention among the
policymakers, the integration with the world economy has rarely been either
perceived or presented as an end in itself.
7KH&RQJUHVVRI(FRQRPLFVZKLFKKDGEHHQFRQYHQHGLQì]PLURQWKHHYHRIWKH
foundation of the new Republic had adopted the creation of a national economy as
WKHEDVLFVWUDWHJ\RIWKHQHZVWDWHVHH.XUX©[[[Yí7KLVLVKDUGO\VXUSULVLQJ
since the establishment of a ‘national economy’ had been on the policymakers’
agenda even before the establishment of the Republic since the first decade of the
century. After a brief spell in tinkering with a liberal trade policy, the adjustment
strategy brought to the agenda in the wake of the 1929 Great Depression would
entail the characteristic features of a neo-mercantilist development strategy, even
though the impact of the global economic crisis on Turkey’s foreign trade was
UHODWLYHO\ OHVV VHYHUH FRPSDUHG WR RWKHU SHULSKHUDO HFRQRPLHV 7HNHOL DQG ìONLQ
1977: 31). The determination to initiate the industrialisation of the country in the
context of worsening economic conditions, however, could not be solely attributed to
the vagaries of the world capitalist system. The strategy adopted in the wake of the
Great Depression, étatisme, was thus understood as the duty of the state to
participate in the economic life of the nation in order to guide it to prosperity.
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To the extent the possibilities were perceived that the world economic crisis had
created for overcoming the vicious circles of underdevelopment by weakening the
links between the peripheries and the metropolises, though there were also
attempts to lure foreign capital investments into the country, étatisme was





etatism had a restrictive effect on private investments. On the contrary, there is a
convergence of opinion that the relations between the public and private sectors
were complementary rather than antagonistic during the implementation of etatist
policies, as promised by the key policymakers of the time (Kuruç 1993: 225; Boratav
  %XßUD  ,QGHHG PDQ\ DGYRFDWHV RI D OLEHUDO HFRQRP\ ZRXOG
acknowledge that “etatism has not been a policy restricting private investments, but
on the contrary has been a policy facilitating capital accumulation within the private
VHFWRUǥ<DđD
Yet, Turkish policymakers of the time were categorically refuting ‘competition’ on
the grounds that it would have a deleterious impact on the formation of national
wealth (Kuruç 1988: xl fn16). However, this by no means implied a particularly anti-
capitalist stance, as the anti-competition attitude of the Turkish etatists was showing
striking parallels with the views of British Conservatives like Harold Macmillan who
were, from the mid-1920s onwards, increasingly becoming critical of the doctrinaire
laissez-faire attitude of their party (Yalman 2009: 164). While there seemed to be an
ex-post entrenched opinion that the etatist experience has caused “insecurity in the
business world and led to a tendency to avoid investments, to keep capital liquid, and
WRVKRZLQWHUHVWLQRQO\VKRUWWHUPXQGHUWDNLQJVǥ6DU©VHHDOVR%XßUD
the preference for a strategy which would assign to the state a ‘leadership’ role in
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the coordination of investments had clearly been conditioned by a determination to
enhance the prospects for private accumulation.
Moreover, even the contemporary advocates of the market-based reforms
acknowledge that the étatiste regime’s policy orientation was characterised by a
commitment to macroeconomic stability, both internally and externally (Gültekin
2012). Indeed, balanced budget and hard currency would be the main objectives of
monetary and fiscal policies to be pursued. The brunt of taxation was, however,
carried by the wage and salary earners, as the level of taxation on merchants and
LQGXVWULDOLVWV ZHUH UHODWLYHO\ PXFK ORZHU .XUX©  [OY[OYíí 7ZR LPSRUWDQW
institutional developments that were critical for the pursuit of the macroeconomic
objectives were initiated in the same year, 1930: the Law for Protecting the Value of
Turkish Currency and the Law for Establishing the Central Bank of Turkey.
Law for Protecting the Value of Turkish Currency, enacted in February 1930, was
construed as a key mechanism authorising the government intervention into
currency and capital markets so as to maintain the external value of Turkish lira
%RUDWDY   7HNHOL DQG ìONLQ   7HNHOL DQG ìONLQ  1 In
fact, the Law was no more than a piece of legislation which authorised the
government to take all the necessary measures in order to achieve the objectives in
question. While the Law was originally intended to remain in effect for three years, it
tended to become a permanent feature of Turkish legislation, as it allowed the
16HH7HNHOLDQG ìONLQ  IRU WKHZD\V LQZKLFK WKHYDOXHRI WKHFXUUHQF\ZDVGHWHUPLQHG
until the 1930 Law; ibid. p.53 for the dependency of the monetary policy until 1930 on international
financial circles; Kuruç (2011: 284-285) for the decision not to leave the determination the value of the
currency to the financial markets.
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governments to extend the mandate by issuing decrees. Thus it remained in effect
for the next six decades with the purported objectives paid lip service by successive
governments which issued the relevant decrees.
Ironically, the 1930 Law for Protecting the Value of Turkish Currency was still in
effect during the first decade of financial liberalisation during the 1980s when the
real effective depreciation of the national currency was instrumental in gaining the
competitive edge for the export orientation of the manufacturing industry. Decrees
28 and 30 issued in the early 1980s under the same Law were important steps in the
initiation of the process of financial liberalisation. By the same token, the decision to
complete sequences of liberalisation with the capital account liberalisation in the
summer of 1989 was also put into effect with Decree 32 issued on the basis of the
extension of the mandate, prescribed by the same Law. In fact, it put an end to the
practice of implementing policy measures purportedly in compliance with the
original objectives as it paved the way for the convertibility of the Turkish lira.
Paradoxically, it also meant a reversal in policy as the real effective appreciation of
the national currency became an instrument so as to attract the so-called hot money
flows.
Etatism was to be grounded in a financial system which would entail the
establishment of a series of national banks starting with the Central Bank of Turkey,
thus laying the ground for the emergence of a bank-based financial system
.RFDEDđRßOXHWDO.XUX©[Oíí0DURLV,QIDFWWKH
establishment of the Central Bank was perceived as an integral part of the decision
to achieve and maintain the macroeconomic stability, to be anchored on the stability
of the exchange rate. For without the institution to issue the currency, it was
reckoned that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to accomplish the latter
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objective.2 However, it took more than a year after its establishment, for the Central
Bank to take over from the consortium which continued to operate during this
transition period.3
Establishment of the Central Bank would be followed by several “special purpose
banks” in order to provide the necessary finance for the establishment and
subsequent operational requirements of the enterprises identified in the Industrial
Development Plans that were prepared during the 1930s. Among these banks
Sümerbank, Etibank and Denizbank were to continue to function not only as publicly
owned banks but also as publicly owned holding companies containing several state
economic enterprises within their domain long after the state-led strategy of
industrial development has been superseded. 4 Indeed, they would remain as
important institutions of the Turkish financial system until their dismantling as
publicly owned holding companies and subsequent privatisation of their banking
arms from the late 1980s onwards.
Specific mention should also be made of the private sector banks which came into
existence during the 1920s and 1930s as they were to emerge as important loci of
capital accumulation. In fact, the first decade of the new Republic had witnessed the
2 According to the Law No. 1715 which remained in effect until 1971 with many amendments, the
Central Bank is an emission bank (bank of circulation) assigned with minting money, protecting the
value of the currency, adjusting the general liquidity of the economy, and lending to banks. In due
course, it started to extend more loans to the Treasury and state economic enterprises so as to close
the financing deficits of the public sector (BAT 2009).
36HH 7HNHOL DQG ìONLQ  IRU WKH HVWDEOLVKPHQW RI D FRQVRUWLXP EHWZHHQ WKH VWDWH
national and foreign owned banks prior to the establishment of the Central Bank with the aim of
maintaining the stability of the currency.
4 See Kuruç (2011: 400-411) for the contention that the establishment of Sümerbank in 1932 signified
the initiation a “new statist model of capital accumulation”, while at the same time being a
compromise between the representatives of the private sector and the advocates of this new model.
6HHDOVR.RFDEDđRßOX
35
This project is funded by the European Union under
the 7th Research Framework programme (theme SSH)
Grant Agreement nr 266800
proliferation of several single branch provincial banks most of which would not
VXUYLYHWKH*UHDW'HSUHVVLRQ$KDQGIXORIWKHVHEDQNVVXFKDV7¾UN7LFDUHW%DQNDVí
would be transformed, however, into private sector banks which would operate as
national banks until the financial liberalisation episode of the post-1980 era.
However, there was also another private sector bank established in 1924, less than a
year after the establishment of the republic with the initiation of the founders of the
republic that would emerge as a leading institution of the Turkish financial system
IRU GHFDGHV WR FRPH 7KLV ZDV ìđ%DQN 7¾UNL\H ìđ %DQNDVí ZKLFK KDG EHHQ
instrumental in inspiring a particular model of capital accumulation by initiating a
series of participations in several sectors of the economy since its establishment.
,QGHHGìđ%DQNKDGEHHQLGHQWLILHGDVDǤQDWLRQDOLQVWLWXWLRQǥWKDWZRXOGFRQWULEXWHWR
the realisation of the objectives of the First Industrial Development Plan of the early
1930s. In particular, its participations would concentrate in the production of raw
materials and intermediate goods, along with its increasing involvement in
LQVXUDQFHEXVLQHVV.XUX©.RFDEDđRßOXHWDO
It is necessary to point out in this regard the enactment of the first Banking Law of
the Republican era in 1936 which prescribed the scope and the ways in which the
banks could participate in the industrial enterprises. It is possible to say that this law
KDG SURYLGHG D OHJDO EDVLV IRU WKH NLQG RI DFWLYLWLHV WKDW ìđ%DQN KDG DOUHDG\ EHHQ
engaged for some time. Its rationale was to encourage the participation of the
private sector banks in the establishment of industrial enterprises, given the lack of
DFDSLWDOPDUNHWDVDVRXUFHRIIXQGVQHFHVVDU\IRUQHZLQYHVWPHQWV.RFDEDđRßOX
et al. 2001: 274).
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In the wake of the Second World War, as the basic outlines of the post-war
international economic order were emerging, the question of Turkey's integration
into the world economy was coming onto the agenda once again. For the Turkish
policymakers who had experienced the repercussions of being highly dependent on a
single partner in its foreign trade relations for more than a decade,5 the idea of
being incorporated into a world economy which would open the possibility of
multilateral trade relations was naturally quite appealing. The policymakers seemed
to be confronted with a basic dilemma though: how to re-integrate the Turkish
economy into the world economy in accordance with the liberalisation of
international trade relations as advocated by the designers of the new world
economic order, whilst maintaining the objective of industrialisation which was
deemed essential for national development (Yalman 2009: 177).
In short, adjustment and industrialisation were both conceived as desirable aims,
notwithstanding the difficulties in reconciling them. The policymakers were to find
themselves confronted with the difficult choice of opting for one or the other, almost
periodically over the next four decades, as the Turkish economy increasingly became
dependent on external sources for the financing of its development projects. This, in
turn, indicated one of the key policy dilemmas that have confronted the Turkish
policymakers. For the official policy line seemed to aim, more often than not, to
diminish the dependence of the economy upon foreign sources of finance for
developmental purposes. In fact, it is possible to differentiate periods of the
economic history of the Turkish republican state in terms of the relative weights
assigned to alternative sources of finance in order to realise the policy priorities.
5 In the second part of the 1930s, Germany's share in Turkey's foreign trade was no less than 45% on
average.
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With the transition to multi-party system in the immediate aftermath of the Second
World War, the parties vying for political power had both campaigned for the
liberalisation of the economy. While the Republican Peoples Party (CHP) could take
pride in initiating the economic apertura having already watered down the etatist
policies it had earlier implemented, its principal opponent Democrat Party (DP)
championed the virtues of a liberal, market economy.
By adopting a series of economic policy measures starting with the September 1946
devaluation, the Turkish policymakers were initiating a strategic shift by giving
priority to adjustment rather than to industrialisation in the face of the rapidly
deteriorating international relations. 1947 Development Plan of Turkey, which was
prepared with the aim of receiving financial assistance from the US, and never
officially implemented, reordered the priorities of development, acknowledged the
importance of the development of private sector and underlined the need for steps to
EHWDNHQLQDJULFXOWXUHWUDQVSRUWDWLRQDQGHQHUJ\7HNHOLDQGìONLQ
This change in policy priorities had its reflections in the growth of financial sector.
While the fortunes made during the Second World War provided the funds for
financing of new investments in the late 1940s, the growth and strengthening of
national banks can be seen as one of the characteristics of the 1945-60 period.6 In
addition to the establishment of a number of national private banks which would
initiate a new competitive environment with an emphasis on branch banking and
deposit accumulation, quite a few new public sector banks were also established
6 The number of banks rose to 60 in 1959 from 43 in 1944. During the same period, the number of
EDQNEUDQFKHVLQFUHDVHGIURPWRĐDKLQND\D
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%$7ĐDKLQND\D7 More saliently, there was also the establishment of
a yet another “special purpose bank”. In contrast to the 1930s, however, Industrial
Development Bank of Turkey (TSKB) was established in 1950 as “the first private
investment and development bank” of the country with the financial backing of the
World Bank (WB). Along with the newly established commercial banks which would
in due course be turned into “holding banks” that would constitute a characteristic
institutional form of the financial system from the 1960s onwards, TSKB, with the
loans provided on a project basis, would contribute to the development of the closely
knit structure of the relations between financial and non-financial sectors.
In their pursuit of a liberal economic policy agenda as part of their efforts to put a
GLVWDQFHEHWZHHQWKHPVHOYHVDQGWKHHWDWLVWKHULWDJH.RFDEDđRßOXHWDO
the Democrat Party government which came to power in 1950 would soon be
confronted with a predicament that would be the fate of many peripheral countries in
the post-war international economic order. As they tried to cope with the problems
of adjustment in accordance with the liberalisation of international trade relations as
advocated by the designers of the new world economic order, they would all
experience severe balance of payments crises which would, in turn, lead to the
adoption of import-substitution industrialisation (ISI) policies, albeit in an ad hoc
fashion, rather than planned. In the Turkish case, this would come in the wake of the
Korean War which would lead to the adoption of policies that would re-emphasize
the central role played the state in the conduct of economic policy whilst at the same
time contribute to the deterioration of the relations between the DP government and
72IWKHWKUHHSXEOLFVHFWRUEDQNVHVWDEOLVKHGRQO\RQHRIWKHP9DNíIODU%DQNDVíVHH,,,'EHORZLV
VWLOO LQ RSHUDWLRQ WRGD\ ZKHUHDV IRXU RI WKH SULYDWH VHFWRU EDQNV <DSí YH .UHGL %DQNDVí *DUDQWL
%DQNDVí$NEDQNĐHNHUEDQNDUHDOWKRXJKVRPHRI WKHPFKDQJHGKDQGV LQGXHFRXUVH ĐDKLQND\D
1999:95; Sönmez 1998: 69)
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the Bretton Woods institutions. The DP rule would thus denote the abandonment of
two macroeconomic principles that characterised the etatist period, namely,
balanced budget and hard currency. It was the peculiarity of that government to pay
lip service to the need for macroeconomic stability while refusing to implement a
stabilisation programme that would entail a realignment of the national currency
with those of Turkey’s trading partners, on the grounds that it would curtail its
implementation of growth oriented economic policies. By using deficit financing as a
means of forced savings, the DP government was, in fact, initiating a process of
capital accumulation that had been accompanied by soaring short-term credits
provided by the commercial banks to the non-financial sectors so as to finance both
the new investments and capitalisation requirements of the latter.8
Having been emboldened by its incorporation into NATO in 1951, as a result of its
decision to take part in the Korean War, the Turkish government tried to make use of
the so-called geo-strategic importance of the country for the security of the US-led
Western bloc so as to obtain as much US economic aid as possible, whilst the IMF
and the WB were against in principle to the use of foreign funds whatever their form
might be, as a means of avoiding or delaying the necessary adjustment for the
realisation of internal and external stability of the economy in question. As the
economy was plagued by a prolonged crisis of balance of payments which, in turn,
were fuelling discontent as a result of the disappearance of imported goods from the
market and rising inflationary pressures, there was nonetheless strong resistance
8 Whatever the source of their primary accumulation, according to one survey, 40% of the private
sector firms which were in operation at the end of the 1960s had been established during the 1950s.
Moreover, nearly 90% of these firms were in manufacturing industry (Soral, 1974, p.30).
40
This project is funded by the European Union under
the 7th Research Framework programme (theme SSH)
Grant Agreement nr 266800
on the part of the DP government to a stabilisation programme on the grounds that it
would curtail economic growth.
Yet, having exhausted all possible means of maintaining the import requirements of
the economy, the DP government would finally succumb to pressures and adopt an
IMF stabilisation programme in 1958, primarily so as to satisfy the international
creditors. Consolidation of the external debt and a new import regime were two key
features of the programme that would outlast its short term effects. Thus, despite
the fact that it was accompanied by a high devaluation, the 1958 stabilisation was
intended to pave the ground for achieving the necessary adjustment by enhancing
rather than constraining the import capacity of the economy. The objective of the
new import regime was not trade liberalisation per se, but to put an end to the
restrictive practices of the crisis years. As such, it would be instrumental for the
implementation of the ISI strategy for the next two decades by preventing the de
facto compression of imports for the nascent industry (Yalman 2009: 221-222).
The adoption of the stabilisation programme was to be accompanied by a new
Banking Law which would also establish Bank Association of Turkey (BAT) as the
official representative body of all banks operating in Turkey (Marois 2012: 54). Its
board of directors included the representatives of both public and private sector
banks. Its founding principles as stated in its statute were:
to defend the rights and interests of banks within the framework of market
economy and full competition principles in line with the principles and rules of
banking laws and regulations; and to work for the purpose of the growth and
healthy functioning of the banking system, and development of the banking
profession, and increasing the system’s competition power as a whole; and to
take or ensure that banks take, implement or demand the implementation of,
41
This project is funded by the European Union under
the 7th Research Framework programme (theme SSH)
Grant Agreement nr 266800
decisions as required for prevention of unfair competition in the market. (BAT
2009)
It is to be noted that while 30 new banks had been established during the 1945-1960
period, 14 banks had to terminate their activities in the aftermath of the adoption of
the stabilisation programme. The total number of banks would come down to 52, five
of which were foreign owned, at the end of 1962 after reaching a peak of 62 in 1958
.RFDEDđRßOX HW DO   ĐDKLQND\D   9 In order to facilitate a
mechanism to deal with the banks closed down, Banks Liquidation Fund had been
established as an amendment made to 1958 Banking Law following the military coup
of May 27, 1960. This Fund, in practice, would also function a saving deposit
insurance for the account holders as a precursor to SDIF that would be forthcoming
in the aftermath of reorientation of economic policies in the early 1980s.
Another significant feature of the 1958 Banking Law - which remained in force with
some significant amendments until 1985 - was that it had paved the way for the
emergence of capital groups that would increasingly characterise the Turkish
financial system from the 1960s onwards. On the grounds of stabilising and boosting
the lending capabilities of the banking sector, it had allowed the so-called “holding
banks” to extend unlimited credits to the firms within the group, thus making bank
RZQHUVKLS D SRZHUIXO OHYHU RI FDSLWDO DFFXPXODWLRQ .RFDEDđRßOX HW DO  
Marois 2012: 54).
9 Most of those banks closed had been established during 1945-1960 period, while the origins of the
rest could be traced back to early 20. century. This rather hectic period of bank closures also
witnessed the first examples of forced mergers among some of these banks with the aim of
VWUHQJWKHQLQJWKHLUILQDQFLDOVWUXFWXUHV&RđNXQHWDO2QHVXFKPHUJHU$QDGROX%DQNDVí
would turn out to be a casualty of yet another round of bank closures and mergers in the 1980s.
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1961 Constitution which came into effect following the military coup had, in fact,
paved the way for the emergence of a democratic form of the state in which the
different sections of the society would be given the opportunity to defend their socio-
economic interests. But it was also significant for stipulating the establishment of a
state planning organisation (SPO) without executive powers so as to initiate the
economic development of the country on a planned basis. The idea of planning was
perceived as providing an effective instrument to utilise the scarce resources in a
rational manner for the common good rather than to realise macroeconomic
stability – the elusive objective of the previous decade - per se (Kepenek 1984: 152;
Yalman 2009: 214). While the first two five-year development plans were reluctant in
encouraging interference with the market mechanism, there was an
acknowledgement of the fact that the functioning of the price mechanism in the
context of a mixed economy could be limited by a variety of public controls so as to
accomplish the desired objectives. Although there would emerge in due course
significant discrepancies between the plans’ targets and investments undertaken
especially by the private sector, the period 1962-1976 could be characterised as the
heyday of import substitution industrialisation (ISI) in the country. Yet, the
Development Plans would fail in accomplishing one major goal they would prescribe,
namely, gradually diminishing the dependency of the economy on foreign resources
(Kepenek 1984: 203). In their search to increase the resources necessary for
financing the investments, the planners would be obliged to acknowledge the need
to find new sources of foreign finance that would enhance rather than curtail the
capacity of the economy to achieve the planned targets.10
10 Boratav (1988: 102) calculated that the ratio of capital accumulation to GNP were near 17% for the
1962-1976 period, and roughly one fifth of which had been financed by foreign savings.
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In particular, the inadequacy of the efforts to increase domestic savings would be
accompanied by the establishment of yet another batch of “special purpose banks”
from the early 1960s onwards as a mechanism of enhancing the use of public
resources and/or special investment mechanisms for the realisation of plans’
REMHFWLYHV .RFDEDđRßOX HW DO  11 Moreover, the 1958 Banking Law
would be instrumental in encouraging the participation of the private sector banks
VXFKDVìđEDQNLQQHZO\HVWDEOLVKHGLQGXVWULDOILUPVDVDPHFKDQLVPRIUHDOLVLQJWKH
objectives of the plans. “Holding banking”, by the same token, was to be
“encouraged by the state in order to accelerate private sector investments” (BAT
1999:16). Consequently, the number of capital groups with bank ownership reached
11 by the end of 1970s (Artun 1985: 48), The neoclassical observers of the Turkish
economy would thus conclude with the benefit of hindsight:
With the limited scope for equity and bond financing, private firms relied on
deposit banks and their own resources for capital formation. This situation led
to the evolution of sellers’ markets for bank credits, large spreads interest
rates, and strong preference for a restrictive trade regime to sustain high-
cost industries established for home markets (Celasun & Rodrik 1989)
For others, these developments would underline the bank-based character of the
7XUNLVK ILQDQFLDO V\VWHP .RFDEDđRßOX HW DO  2Q WKH RWKHU KDQG WKH
liquidation of several banks in the wake of the Banking Law had made the
policymakers cautious about the new bank entries. Only one commercial bank which
11 There were 3 such banks established as public sector banks. These were Tourism Bank (1962),
State Investment Bank (1964), State Industry and Workers’ Investment Bank (1975). In addition, there
was also a private bank, Industrial Investment and Credit Bank (1964) established so as to facilitate
WKH FKDQQHOOLQJ RI SULYDWH VHFWRU LQYHVWPHQWV LQWR WKH PDQXIDFWXULQJ LQGXVWU\ ìđ%DQN KHOG WKH
majority of its shares.
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was a foreign capital bank would be licensed during the period in question 1962-
1976.12
Another important development was the enactment of a new Central Bank Law
(No.1211) in January 1970 which was going to shape the macroeconomic policy
environment for the rest of the decade. This was to gain saliency as it vested CBRT
with a new structure and brought significant changes to the legal status,
organisational structure, duties and powers of the Bank.13 The need for a new law
was deemed necessary as the functioning of CBRT since the end of the Second World
War had reflected a fundamental shift from its founding principles which were the
maintenance of the macroeconomic stability anchored on the stability of the
exchange rate. For the main function of the CBRT had been deficit financing for the
public sector during the 1950s and financing of investment projects in accordance
with the priorities of the Development Plans during the 1960s. In fact, the Law 1211
were designed so as to give “the Central Bank the authority to make medium term
rediscount and advance payment operations” 14 thus enabling it to implement
monetary policy in line with the plans (Marois 2011: 56).
The strategic objective to reduce the dependence on foreign resources by no means
stemmed from a desire to weaken the links with the world economy. The first
decade of development planning coincided with the beginning of a long haul at the
end of which the Turkish policymakers hoped to finalise their bid to become
127KLV ZDV $PHULFDQ7XUNLVK )RUHLJQ 7UDGH %DQN IRXQGHG LQ  .RFDEDđRßOX HW DO  
This bank remained in operation well into the 1990s before it changed hands and names a couple of
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integrated with the economies of Western Europe. The Association Agreement with
the European Common Market in 1963 had, in fact, been contemplated as the first
step towards that eventuality. This would be followed by the 1970 Annex Protocol
that would set Turkey on the path of an eventual customs union with the EEC 25
years later. The signing of the Annex Protocol - the terms of which had subsequently
been a bone of contention among different interest groups in the country – had come
in the wake of yet another stabilisation programme in August 1970 which aimed to
resolve the balance of payments crisis as both the trade deficit and the debt burden
had more than doubled during the second half of the 1960s. In fact, this would signify
the dilemma faced by the Turkish policymakers since the decision to devalue had
always been seen as a necessary, though regrettable, means of adjustment that
would pave the ground for the realisation of the objectives of the industrialisation
strategy. In order to overcome this dilemma the Third Five Year Development Plan’s
strategy had been revised so as to facilitate the prospective economic integration
with the EEC without forsaking the objectives of the industrialisation strategy. Thus,
the Third Plan was reiterating the determination to reduce the dependence on
foreign resources not by weakening the ties of the economy with the outside world,
but rather by enhancing the vertical integration and competitiveness of the industrial
structure. Eventually, the Turkish-EEC relations would be put on hold in 1978 with
the support of, at least significant sections of, the Turkish industrialists, while the
Turkish government was striving to negotiate a rescheduling agreement with
Turkey’s creditors in the wake of a severe debt crisis (Yalman 2009: 225-227, 246-
247).
Initially, the 1970 devaluation seemed to have accomplished the immediate objective
of resolving the balance of payments crisis by encouraging the transfer of
remittances by the migrant workers abroad as well as giving a jump-start to exports,
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mainly of textiles. After this brief interlude which coincided with fundamental
changes in the world economic order in the early 1970s, the Turkish economy would
find itself heading towards a foreign exchange crisis of unprecedented magnitude.
While there were obviously exogenous factors involved such as the quadrupling of
the oil prices and the American embargo in the aftermath of the 1974 Turkish
intervention in Cyprus, the major cause of the deterioration in the foreign balance
was the phenomenal rise of non-oil, particularly, capital goods imports which would,
in turn, lead to a desperate search for new sources of external finance. It was
observed that net use of foreign savings rose from -2.2% of GNP in 1973 to 6.9% in
1977 (Celasun & Rodrik 1989). Thereby, Turkish policymakers would be chided for
attempting to avoid adjustment by borrowing so as to sustain the development
VWUDWHJ\FI'HUYLđ	5RELQVRQ'HUYLđ	3HWUL.
However, while foreign borrowing by the public sector remained well below 1% of
GNP, the CBRT provided more than half of the funds needed over the period 1974-
1977 (Celasun & Rodrik 1989). Foreign borrowing did indeed finance the public
sector, but it did so indirectly via the intermediation of the banking sector, and of the
CBRT in particular. As indicated by (BAT 1999), Law No.1211 gave the authority to the
CBRT to make medium-term rediscount and advance payment operations. From
1973 onwards it required less, generally zero percent reserve requirement for the
loans to be given by private banks to the investment projects of planned priority, as
the banks were obliged to give medium-term loans and were encouraged to give
loans to their participations which were investing in priority areas. Even if the public
sector had absorbed an increasing proportion of the Central Bank resources, the
representatives of the Turkish industry had noted that this should not lead one to
gloss over the fact that “the private sector had access to funds outside Central Bank
UHVRXUFHVǥ 76ì$'   )DU IURP EHLQJ ǡFURZGHGRXWǢ DV WZR SURPLQHQW
observers of the Turkish economy pointed out, the private sector was the main
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beneficiary of the policies which were conventionally held responsible for the
destabilisation of the economy:
To prevent private sector crowding-out and to ensure foregin exchange
availability for its own needs, the government subsidised private sector
foreign borrowing by providing blanket protection against foreign exchange
risk. 15 … [T]his type of external financing contained germs of its own
destruction. The implicit subsidy on foreign borrowing was larger the greater
the likelihood of a crisis; in turn, the crisis became more likely as borrowing
skyrocketed. Hence, while the underlying cause of the deteriorating eternal
balance has to be located in the public sector investment drive, what
precipitated the debt crisis [of the late 1970s] per se was private sector
borrowing behaviour, itself in turn conditioned by government policy (Celasun
& Rodrik 1989).
The crisis of the late 1970's was primarily a crisis of balance of payments, yet, it was
at the same time a political crisis, i.e. a crisis of the state, the resolution of which
necessitated not only a fundamental reorientation of economic policies but also a
change in the form of the state. With the adoption of a new IMF stand-by agreement
in January 1980, a process of market-oriented reforms would be introduced and
Turkey would be a pioneer of structural adjustment process that would be widely
15 Convertible Turkish Lira Deposits (CTLDs) were short-term foreign currency accounts held by
foreign commercial banks with Turkish commercial banks, with a transfer guarantee from the
Central Bank. They were originally designed to lure the Turkish workers’ remittances, but, in
practice, widely used by the Turkish firms as a cheaper source of credit, thereby providing lucrative
SURILWVLQWKHIRUPRIDUELWUDJHDVZHOODVSURYLGLQJDQDYHQXHIRUWKHIOLJKWFDSLWDOWRUHWXUQ76ì$'
1976:.62). CTLDS were subsequently restructured in 1979 as foreign commercial bank deposits were
given an exchange rate guarantee from the Central Bank.
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experienced by the debtor economies of the countries of the South during the 1980s.
However, the Turkish experience of transition to neoliberalism and subsequently to
financialisation would entail restructuring of the relations between the state and the
society in a rather authoritarian political framework.
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II. FINANCIAL SYSTEM IN TURKEY SINCE 1980
II. A. AN OVERVIEW OF FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 1980
II.A.1. Macroeconomic Background of Financial Integration and Crises
In the pre-1980 period, the system revealed all elements of an underdeveloped
financial economy with negative real interest rates, high tax burden on financial
earnings, and high liquidity and reserve requirement ratios. Overall, the financial
markets suffered from an inefficient banking system, with consequent low quality
portfolio management. Given the underdeveloped and fragmented nature of the
capital and stock exchange markets, corporations had to excessively rely on bank
loans rather than issuing stocks in order to finance their working capital balances.
As highlighted in the previous section, the fiscal deficits were mostly financed by
direct monetization through the CBRT.
The launching of the 24 January 1980 stabilisation programme was hailed in the
international financial community as well as in political and business circles within
the country, as a turning point. The specificity of the programme, it was argued, laid
in its alleged aim to go beyond standard stabilization and to achieve structural
adjustment by changing the development strategy that the country followed for
several decades. The twin long-term objectives would thus be an export-oriented
trade and development strategy based on the neoclassical principle of comparative
advantages, and a more market-directed system of resource allocation.
One of the striking changes of the 1980s was the conception of the integration with
the world economy as an end in itself, at least at the level of discourse. The
attempted adjustment was thus portrayed as entailing the integration of the Turkish
economy with the world economy, whereas what has actually been in question was
but a change in the mode of integration. Put differently, the 24 January 1980
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programme signified a radical change both in the mode of articulation of the Turkish
economy with the world economy and in the nature of state-economy relationship
prevalent within the social formation, at least since the end of the Second World
War. Structural adjustment understood as such, did not signify simply a change in
the mode of integration that would put an end to intermittent crises of foreign
exchange. More fundamentally, it signified a new ‘mode of living’ more than anything
else by the availability of imported consumption goods that were instrumental in
gaining the consent of the people, whilst the real wages of the wage and salary
earners declined throughout the decade (Yalman 2009: 250). Perhaps the most
peculiar feature of the ‘structural adjustment’ episode in Turkey is the fact that it
was attempted during a period in which a complete reorganisation of the country’s
political structure was pursued. The military coup of 12 September 1980 signified not
only a change in the political regime but also a change in the form of the state which
was institutionalised within the confines of 1982 authoritarian constitution, thus
remains in effect after the return to civilian rule until today (Yalman 2009: 298).
Since the 1980s, under the neoliberal regime, Turkey has been exposed to the
instabilities, the accompanying problems, and the risks of financial liberalisation and
deregulation. In retrospect, it can be stated that the mode and the pace of financial
reforms have progressed in leaps and bounds, mostly following pragmatic, on-site
solutions to the emerging problems. In the beginning, the major aim of the reforms
had been the deregulation of the financial system with a naïve approach that such
deregulation would be sufficient in creating a competitive financial structure
functioning efficiently (Ersel 1996). The first action undertaken was the removal of
legal ceilings on deposit interest rates, which led to a fierce struggle among banks
and the broker institutions to attract funds from the public. This bonanza was short
lived, coming to a halt with the 1982 financial crisis as it will be explained below in
section II.B.1.
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The foreign exchange regime was liberalized at the beginning of 1984. The banks
were allowed to accept foreign currency deposits from citizens and to engage in
foreign transactions. Deregulation of restrictions on foreign exchange led to
enormous pressures towards currency substitution. Such pressures led to very high
real rates of interest throughout the reform period, as the monetary authorities tried
to defend the Turkish Lira (TL) by increasing the real interest rate to improve the
capital account. However, with full liberalisation of the capital account and the
recognition of full convertibility of the TL in 1989, there has been a massive inflow of
short term capital into the domestic economy.
The decision to complete the capital account liberalisation in the summer of 1989 by
issuing Decree 32 thus declaring to make the Turkish lira as fully convertible in
foreign exchange markets, in fact, signified the increasing dependence of the
economy on private financial sources. This decision which was, in fact, in line with
the classical sequencing strategy of liberalisation, effectively, put an end to the
policy of enhancing the export capacity of the economy by the real effective
depreciation of the currency. For the dependence on the speculative short-term
capital flows necessitated a higher return on domestic assets as compared to the
rate of nominal depreciation of the Turkish lira (Balkan and Yeldan 2002: 47).
While this policy stance led to a considerable growth of the country’s international
reserves, it would also raise eyebrows about the sustainability of the policy, since it
would be at the expense of ‘fast-growing short-term foreign indebtedness’ as well
as ‘slow-growing foreign exchange earnings’. Even though there was no officially
stated exchange rate management policy during this period, the government seemed
to use the exchange rate as the nominal anchor in trying to control the inflationary
expectations. However, as also witnessed under the Southern Cone experience, such
use of the exchange rate to attain the inflationary targets led to significant
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fluctuations in the real economy and was severely deflationary (see, Dornbusch
1982; Diaz-Alejandro 1985; Fanelli and Frenkel 1993). What is worse from a
neoclassical perspective, the overvalued currency, albeit by default, would return to
haunt the policymakers. Like as in many experiences, a major consequence has
been the exposure of Turkish economy to speculative short-term capital movements
and this process resulted in serious financial crises in 1994 and 2000-1.

Box 1: Major Developments Through 1980s
 1980 January 24, IMF Stabilisation Programme
 1981 Capital Markets Law No. 2499
 1983 Decree 91 for Stock Exchange Market
 thereby replacing Law for Stock Market enacted in 1929
 1983 Decrees 30 and 70
 important steps for financial liberalisation via 1930 Law Protecting
the Value of Turkish Currency
 important changes to Banking Law 7129 dated 1958
 1983 Establishment of Saving Deposit Insurance Fund (SDIF)
 a state institution designed to guarantee Turkish bank deposits
 1984 Establishment of the Housing and Public Partnership Directorate
 1985 Shift of the financing of public sector deficit from the Central Bank
to Government Debt Instruments (GDI) by the Treasury
 including foreign currency denominated bonds, thus giving rise to
substantial increases of interest burden on public finance
 1985 Banking Law No. 3182
 to bring Turkey in line with BIS requirements, capital adequacy,
non-performing loan provisions, accounting / reporting standards,
deposit insurance
 1986 Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE) started trading
 1986 Establishment of Interbank Money Market
 1987 Establishment of the Capital Market Board
 1989 Decree 32
Convertibility of Turkish Lira, capital account liberalisation via 1930 Law
Protecting the Value of Turkish Currency
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The combination of cheap foreign currency, i.e. the overvaluation of the TL and high
interest rates attracted short term capital inflows. The expansion that accompanied
this situation led, in 1993, to a hitherto unseen high level of the trade deficit and the
current account deficit. The burden of high interest rates payments also worsened
fiscal balance. In the end, this fragile nature of Turkish economy contributed the rise
of crisis in 1994. This situation continued with the exchange rate - based disinflation
and stabilization programs that were applied under IMF supervision during 1999-
2000. With non-sterilization capital inflows led to decline in interest rate and
increase in domestic loans and resulting in a 6.3% growth rate in that year. The
appreciation of the TL was accompanied by an “explosion” of net capital inflows by
non-residents during the first ten months of 2000. The appreciation of the TL and the
impact of CU with EU caused the rapid expansion of the current account deficit by
the end of 2000. The economy became vulnerable to speculative attacks and, finally
the program collapsed at the end of two attacks on the domestic currency in 2000
and 2001.
If the evidence of economic health is assessed by the ability to sustain the current
account deficit through foreign investment, without increasing the debt stock, then
clearly, the Turkish experience of the post-1989 opening of the economy to global
financial competition was hardly encouraging. In particular, the reliance upon
portfolio investments as the main source of money creation made the economy
susceptible to the vagaries of the international financial markets, as increasing
credit-worthiness through higher ‘country risk assessment’ by the rating institutions
of the international financial world became critical. More fundamentally, what the
Turkish experience highlights is that the process of financial liberalisation would not
necessarily put an end to the functioning of the state as an ‘asymmetric risk holder’,
whilst the mechanisms that have tended to ‘socialise’ the risk for the entrepreneurs
might be changing. The increase in public debt has, in fact, been indicative of a
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transfer of resources to the private sector in a variety of forms ranging from several
subsidy and bailing-out schemes to a series of tax policy changes which have
GHOLEHUDWHO\IDYRXUHGWKHFRUSRUDWHVHFWRU%HGLUKDQRßOX	<DOPDQ
In early December 2000, the government requested access to the Supplemental
Reserve Facility of the IMF. Only then could continued implementation of the
programme be secured, as the markets seemed to have calmed down. However, on
February 19, 2001, shortly after this arrangement with the IMF, Turkey suffered from
a full-fledged financial crisis and the CBRT declared the surrender of the pegged
Box 2: Major Developments Through 1990s
 1990 Decrees 412 and 414
 Separate the Housing and Public Partnership Directorate, as the
Public Participation Administration and the Housing Development
Administration (TOKI).
 1990 Establishment of KOSGEB (Small and Medium Industry Development
Organisation)
 a major instrument for the execution of SME-specific policies
 1991 Establishment of Credit Guarantee Fund
 to act as an intermediary organisation for the SMEs with the
inadequate collaterals to apply for bank credits
 1994 Privatisation Law No. 4046
The establishment of the "PHC (Privatisation High Council); the "PA
(Privatisation Administration; the "Privatisation Fund"
 1994 Competition Law No. 4054
 1995 Establishment of Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs)
 1997 Establishment of Turkish Competition Authority
 1999 Banking Law No. 4389
 1999 Establishment of Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (BRSA)
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exchange rate system on February 22, 2001, thereby letting the exchange rates free
float.
The Turkish crisis, which came in the aftermath of an exchange rate-based
disinflation attempt, followed all the well-documented empirical regularities of such
programmes: a demand-based expansion accompanied by rising and usually
unsustainable trade and current deficits followed by a contractionary phase – in the
form of a liquidity squeeze, sky-rocketing interest rates, and negative growth (see,
inter alia, Amadeo, 1996; Calvo and Vegh, 1999). The main weakness of the 2000
disinflation programme was its exclusive reliance on speculative short-term capital
inflows as the source of the liquidity generation mechanism. Overlooking the existing
structural indicators of financial fragility and resting the liquidity generation
mechanism on speculative in- and out-flows of short term foreign capital, the
programme has left the economy defenseless against speculative runs and a
“sudden stop.”16
In a controversial paper, Stanley Fischer, the then Deputy Director of the IMF.
Fischer (2001) had argued, based on the experiences of the Turkish November 2000
and the Argentinean 2001 crises that the currency regimes based on soft-pegs (as
had been the case for Turkey under the IMF programme) were not sustainable. Thus,
he called for either full flexibility or full dollarization. This critique to the theoretical
basis of the IMF-led austerity programme, coming from the inner-circles itself,
could be read as an acknowledgement of the flaws of the use of exchange rate as an
16 The underlying elements of the disinflation programme and the succeeding crises are discussed in
GHWDLO LQ $N\¾] DQG %RUDWDY  <HOGDQ  %RUDWDY DQG <HOGDQ  (UWXßUXO DQG 6HO©XN
(2001), Eichengreen (2002) and Alper (2001).
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anchor of an anti-inflation programme as depicted by the December 1999 IMF stand-
by agreement.
The post-2001 IMF programme in Turkey relied mainly on three pillars: (1) fiscal
austerity that targets achieving a 6.5% surplus for the public sector as a ratio to the
gross domestic product; (2) contractionary monetary policy (through an independent
central bank) that exclusively aims at price stability (via eventually inflation
targeting); and (3) structural reforms consisting of many of the customary IMF
demands: privatization, large scale layoffs in public enterprises, and abolition of any
form of subsidies. Thus, in a nutshell the Turkish government is charged to maintain
dual targets: a primary surplus target in fiscal balances (at 6.5% to the GDP); and an
inflation-targeting central bank whose sole mandate is to maintain price stability
and is divorced from all other concerns of macroeconomic stability.
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Box 3: Major Developments Through 2000s
 April 2001 Transition to Strong Economy Programme
 April 2001 Amendment to the Central Bank Law
 «Independence of the Central Bank», maintaining price stability
becomes the main objective via inflation targeting in due course
 2003 Public Procurement Law No.4734
 2003 Public Financial Management and Control Law No. 5018
 2005 “Road Map for Transition to Basel-II”
 its formal institutionalisation has been postponed in the wake of US
sub-prime crisis
 2005 Banking Law No. 5411
 aimed at a national banking system fully integrated to international
financial system
 the regulation and supervision of non-bank financial institutions
was transferred from Treasury to BRSA
 2005 Establishment of Turkish Derivatives Exchange
 2006 Emlak GYO (REIT) Co. Inc. becomes Emlak Konut GYO (REIT) Co. Inc.
by an act of parliament.
 72.ìUHWDLQVRZQHUVKLSRIRIWKHFRPSDQ\ǢVVKDUH
 2007 Housing Finance Law No.5582
 to enable banks to pool mortgages and securitise the housing loans
 2007 Insurance Law No. 5684
 2011 Establishment of Financial Stability Committee
 to better detect, manage, and mitigate aggregate and systemic
financial risks
The Turkish economy from 1989 onwards can be said to be operating under
conditions of a truly “open economy” –a macroeconomic environment where its
commodity trade and capital accounts are completely liberalized, and the process of
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financial deregulation is completed. In this setting, many of the instruments of
macro and fiscal control have been transformed, and the constraints of macro
equilibrium had undergone major structural change.17
The financial crisis that emerged in 2007 in USA and spread to the rest of the world
in 2008-9 is followed by a new wave of crises in Europe. It is argued that the
resultant “great recession” is being transformed to a great depression recently. In
this environment, with the huge current account deficit and foreign debt stock,
Turkey is still exposed to instabilities and faces the threat of a new crisis (see also
IV.A below).
II.A.2. Structure of the Financial Sector
The Turkish labour market experienced a significant structural transformation since
early 1980s, with declining share of agricultural employment, falling labor force
participation rates (especially for women), increasing informalization, decreasing
bargaining power of labour, falling real wages, increasing labour market flexibility,
and the weakening of the link between economic growth and employment (Boratav,
ĐHQVHV0¾WHYHOOLRßOXDQG,đíN
The burden of adjustment during the two severe financial crises in 1994 and 2000-1
fell severely on the labour market, as the rate of unemployment rose steadily to
10.0% and the real wages were reduced abruptly by 20.0% in 2001 and have not
recovered through 2000s.Unemployment rate fluctuated between 6.5%-8.5% during
1988-2000/1 before jumping to 10.0% and growing even higher after 2002. It reached
17 Yeldan (1995), and Boratav et al. (1996) offer a thorough analysis of the adjustment patterns and
shifts in the modes of surplus creation under structural adjustment reforms of the 1980s.
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to a peak of 14.0% in 2009. The civilian labour force (ages 15+) is observed to reach
53.6 million people as of 2012. If underemployed people is included, broader
unermployment rate indicating excess supply of labour reaches 12.3% of the labour
force as of 2012.
The most striking change in the sectoral distribution of employment in Turkey has
been the sharp decline in the agricultural employment. Nevertheless, this decline
was not matched by a proportional increase in industrial employment. For example,
while total agricultural employment fell from 7.5 million in 2002 to less than 6.0
million in 2009, industrial employment increased from 3.9 million to 4.0 million
during the same period. The real expansion, however, was realized in the services
sector where employment rose from 8.9 million in 2002 to 10.6 million in 2009
(Figure II.A.4). It is clear that this shift out of agriculture has not been channelled
into an expansion of the industrial labour force, but has been translated mostly as
“marginalized/informal labour” into service sector (Yeldan 2011: 27).
Figure II.A.1: Employed Persons by Economic Activity (%), 1980-2011 (15+ age)
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Source: Turkstat, share of total employment.
* Data for 2010 and 2011 include financial and insurance activities, real estate activities and
administrative and support activities from NACE Rev.2 (New Series).
Figure II.A.2 shows the shares of persons employed in the finance, insurance, real
estate and business services in total employment. After 2001, despite the rising
overall unemployment rate in the economy, this ratio increased substantially and
reached 6.3% in 2009. Then, there was a fall in the following two years, probably due
to definitional problems concerning the new series of Turkstat. In the 2000s,
employment in the banking sector represented about 65.0-75.0% of the total
employment figures in the finance and insurance sectors. The banking sector still
makes up a large segment of the financial sector, the majority of employed persons
work in this area.
Figure II.A.2: Employed Persons in Financial Sector (Finance, Insuranec, Real Estate
and Business Services),% of total employment, 1980-2011







1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010* 2011*
Finance, insurance,real estate and business services Agriculture, forestry, hunting and fishing Mining and quarrying
Manufacturing Electricity, gas and water Construction
Wholesale and retail trade, resturants and hotels Transportain communucation and storage Community, social and personal services
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Source: Turkstat, share of total employment.
* Data for 2010 and 2011 include financial and insurance activities, real estate activities and
administrative and support activities from NACE Rev.2 (New Series).
Following the crisis (of 2000-1), Turkey implemented an orthodox strategy of raising
interest rates and maintaining an “overvalued” exchange rate” (Yeldan 2011:15).
With the regulations on the financial sector after 2001, high arbitrage incomes and a
global liquidity glut brought about large scale capital inflows –especially short-term
speculative inflows- to Turkey and these capital inflows gave rise to a high growth
rate in 2002-6 (Boratav 2011; Yeldan 2011). Attracting short-term, speculative,
foreign capital from the international markets resulted in high interest rates. Hence
“in the aftermath of the 2000-1 crisis, fixed investments destined for the
manufacturing industries did not exceed their real 1998 levels, until 2005.
Furthermore, as the domestic industry intensified its import dependence, it was
forced to adapt increasingly capital-intensive, foreign technologies with adverse
consequences on domestic employment” (Yeldan 2011: 24).
Recovering from the crisis in 2008-9, Turkey attained higher growth and lower
unemployment rates in 2010-1. Recently, Turkey has been among the fastest
growing countries of the OECD region (see IV.A.). However, the data for the period
Finance, insurance, real estate and business services (%)
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1998-2011 concerning the sectoral composition of GDP at constant (1998) prices help
to a better understanding of the transformation in the economy (Figure II.A.3).
During this period, the share of agriculture in GDP declined from 12.5% to 9.0%, the
share of manufacturing was still around 23.0-24.0%, and the share of wholesale and
retail trade sector rose approximately from 27.0% in 1998 to 30.0% in the first 9
months of 2011.
Figure II.A.3: Sectoral Shares in GDP at Constant (1998) Prices, 1998-2011
Source: Turkstat.
Sectoral Share of GDP in Constant Prices (1998)
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As can be seen from Figures II.A.4-5, not surprisingly, the share of financial
intermediation sector in GDP (at constant prices) increased from 7.6% to about
12.0% during the same period. Especially after 2003, the share of financial
intermediation in GDP increased sharply in parallel with the new regulations on
financial sector, aiming to attract a massive inflow of finance capital. However, the
share measured at current prices does not exhibit a similar trend, mainly because of
the tendency of nominal interest rates to fall due to disinflation in the 2000s.





















1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
2011 -
9 Months
Sectorel share of gross domestic product in constant prices - By kind of economic activity at basic prices at 1998
Sectorel share of gross domestic product at current prices - By kind of economic activity in basic prices
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* Since 1998 Turkstat calculates sectoral values added in terms of ‘basic prices’ defined as
prices net of indirect taxes minus subsidies as distinct from those in earlier estimates,
which were based on producer prices.
Banks have the most important share (around 74.0%-84.0%) of both value of
production and value added in financial and insurance activities between 2002 and
2010 (Figure II.A.5). The shares of other financial and insurance activities within total
value added at factor cost of financial intermediation sector are presented in Figure
II.A.6.
Figure II.A.5: Banks: Value Added at Factor Cost and Production Value as a Proportion
of Financial and Insurance Activities,% (2002-10)*
Source: Turkstat, Financial Intermediary Institution Statistics.
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Figure II.A.6: Value Added at Factor Cost in Financial and Insurance Activities (%),
2002-10
Source: Turkstat, Financial Intermediary Institutions Statistics.
Value added at factor cost in financial and insurance activities (%)
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Insurance companies usually make up the largest segment of the value added
among the non-bank financial institutions in these years. In the last two years for
which data are available (i.e. 2009 and 2010), consumer financing companies18,
lenders and agriculture credit cooperatives increased their share in sector’s value
added. The same also holds true for participation banks and factoring companies
(Figure II.A.6.); see also II.A.3.
II.A.2. Assets of the Financial Sector
Turkey’s financial sector has expanded in the post-2001 period. It is generally
argued that high growth levels accompanied by declining interest and inflation rates
in these years have stimulated this expansion. According to the Turkish Banking
Regulation and Supervision Agency (BRSA), the Turkish financial sector increased at
a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of approximately 20.0% between 2002 and
2010. Despite this secultar trend, the sector is small and shallow when compared to
the financial sectors of developed countries.
The financial services sector in Turkey includes banks and insurance companies and
non-bank financial institutions such as factoring companies, leasing companies,
consumer financing companies, pension companies, intermediary institutions,
investment funds, investment partnerships and real estate investment trusts.19 The
banking system has a major share in the financial sector. Specifically, as 77.2% of
financial assets belonged to the banks as of March 2011, the financial sector is
dominated by the banks. The insurance sector has also developed rapidly at a CAGR
18 Consumer financing companies provide loans for customers at the point of purchase. Compared to
banks, these companies require less liabilities from their prospective customers to be eligible for
loans and arrange lower monthy payments for their customers’ debts. However, risks taken by these
companies are compensated by higher interest rates.
19 Further analysis of this expansion is provided in detail in in II.B and II.H.
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of 25.0% during 2002-10, and has gained new momentum after the social security
“reform” that has restructured health insurance system. In recent years, non-bank
financial institutions (NBFIs) have grown in number and size.
Table II.A.1 displays the asset distribution of the financial sector amongst
institutions. As of March 2011, the asset size of financial sector has reached up to
approximately 1.4 trillion TL and the banking sector has 77.2% of the overall assets.
Whilst CBRT has 9.9% share in overall financial assets, NBFIs including financial
leasing companies, factoring companies, consumer financing companies, asset
management companies, insurance companies, funds, investment trusts, and
portfolio management companies jointly have the remaining 13.0% share in assets.
The percentage distribution of assets among financial institutions from 2002 to
September 2011 is presented in Table II.A.2. The share of banking sector assets
passed from a minimum of 65.2% in 2003. Since 2008, this share has significantly
risen (to 75.3%, 76.2%, 76%, and 77.8% in 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2011, respectively).
While the weight of the banking sector assets did not change considerably in the
2000s, growth in the other components of the financial sector has continued over
time. The share of CBRT assets has declined from 23.5% in 2002, and 20% in 2003 to
noticeably lower shares of 9.7% in 2010 and 9.6% in September 2011. Amongst the
NBFIs, insurance companies, securities investment funds, and portfolio
management companies have relatively bigger shares of 2 to 5% in overall assets of
the financial sector compared to other NBFIs (BRSA 2011).
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Table II.A.1: Assets of the Financial Sector, 2002-11 (billion TL)




CBRT 74.1 76.5 74.7 90.1 104.4 106.6 113.5 110 128.4 139.7 9.9
Banks 212.7 249.7 306.4 406.9 499.7 581.6 732.5 834 1,007.0 1,046.0 77.2
Financial Leasing C. 3.8 5 6.7 6.1 10 13.7 17.1 14.6 15.8 15.8 1.2
Factoring Companies 2.1 2.9 4.1 5.3 6.3 7.4 7.8 10.4 14.5 14.4 1.1
Consumer Finance C. 0.5 0.8 1.5 2.5 3.4 3.9 4.7 4.5 6.1 6.4 0.5
Asset Management
Companies
Na Na Na Na Na 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.7 0.73 0.1
Insurance Comp. (1) 5.4 7.5 9.8 14.4 17.4 22.1 26.5 33.3 31.0 35.1 2.4
Pension Companies 0.0 3.3 4.2 5.7 7.2 9.5 12.2 15.7 17.8 17.8 1.4
Pension Investment
Fund (2)
0.0 0.0 0.3 1.2 2.8 4.6 6.0 9.1 11.7 11.7 0.0
Securities Investment
Trusts (2)
1.1 1.5 1.3 3.1 3.2 4.5 4.8 5.9 8.7 8.2 1.0
Securities Investment
Fund (2)
9.3 19.9 24.4 29.4 22 26.4 24 29.6 29.7 33.2 2.3
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Real Estate
Investment Trusts (2)
1.1 1.2 1.4 2.2 2.5 4.1 4.3 4.7 5.1 13.9 0.4
Venture Capital
Trust (2) 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.0
Portfolio Management
Companies(3) (4)
5.8 17.8 24.5 30.2 26 31.2 30.7 40.0 44.9 48.1 3.4
TOTAL 315.9 382.8 455.2 591.5 697.8 806.5 972.4 1,096.7 1,303.8 1,373.8 100.0
Source: BRSA, CBRT, TT, CMB, ACMII (1) January 2011 data is used. (2) December 2010 data is used (3) January 2011 data is used. (4) Portfolio
size managed by portfolio management companies.
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Table II.A.2: Percentage Distribution of Assets in Financial Sector
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Sep.10 Sep.11
CBRT 23.5 20.0 16.4 15.2 15.0 13.2 11.7 10.0 9.7 9.8 9.6
Banks 67.3 65. 2 67. 3 68.8 71.6 72.1 75.3 76.2 76.0 75.8 77.8
Financial Leasing Comp. 1. 2 1. 3 1.5 1.0 1.4 1.7 1.8 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.2
Factoring Companies 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.9 1.1 1.1 1.0
ConsumerFin. Comp. 0. 2 0.2 0. 3 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.5
Asset Manage. Comp. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1
Insurance Compa. (1) 1. 7 2. 0 2.2 2.4 2.5 2.7 2.7 2.9 2.7 2.6 2.5
Private Pension Funds n.d. 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9
Securities Int. Ins. (1) 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.6
Securities Inv. Part. (1) 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 01 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0
Securities Inv. Fund (1) 2.9 5.2 5.4 5.0 3.2 3.3 2.5 2.7 2.5 2.4 2.1
71
This project is funded by the European Union under
the 7th Research Framework programme (theme SSH)
Grant Agreement nr 266800
Real Estate Inv. Part. (1) 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.4 1.3 1.4 1.2
Vent. Capital Inv. F. (1) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0,0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Portf. Man. Com.(1) (2) 1.8 4.6 5.4 5.1 3.7 3.9 3.2 3.7 3.5 3.6 2.6
Source: BRSA, CBRT, UoT, CMB, ACMIIT
72
This project is funded by the European Union under
the 7th Research Framework programme (theme SSH)
Grant Agreement nr 266800
II.A.3. The Number of Financial Institutions and their Scale of Operations
As of March 2011, the total number of institutions operating in financial sector is 425,
particulars of which are given in Table II.A.3. Historically, the Turkish financial sector
has been characterized by the dominance of the banks. The Banks Association of
Turkey (BAT), classify banks as (i) state-owned deposit banks, (ii) privately-owned
deposit banks, (iii) foreign banks, (iv) banks under the SDIF, (v) development and
investment banks.20 Four participation banks (which operate according to profit/loss
sharing principle of Islamic banking) are placed either in (ii) or (iii), whichever
appropriate.21
As observed on the Table, out of 48 banks, 31 are the deposit banks, 13 of them are
development and investment banks, and only 4 of them are participation banks. The
number of depository banks has declined from 34 in 2005 to 31 in 2011. When
classified in terms of the capital structure, there are 16 privately-owned domestic
banks, 9 publicly-owned domestic banks, and 23 global capital banks.22 Amongst the
NBFIs, the number of insurance companies increased from 46 in 2005 to 58 in 2011.
While the number of asset management companies and consumer financing
companies has remained roughly stable over the period 2005-11, the number of
financial leasing and factoring companies has decreased considerably. Another
20 BAT has developed this classification as a translation of the categorization of the Turkish banking
system. With the exception of the development and investment banks, all these categories fall under
the definition of commercial banks. Hence, in different sections of this report both terminologies are
used interchangeably.
21 Participation banks were authorised to enter into Turkish financial system by the Decree of
December 1983 on Special Finance Houses.
22 In addition to these establishments, three financial holding companies are operating in Turkish
financial sector and total asset size of these companies accounts for 10.5% of the banking sector’s
assets. Financial holding companies are defined as companies whose all or majority affiliates are
credit institutions or financial institutions on condition that at least one of them is a credit institution
(BRSA 2010).
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considerable increase has been observed in the number of portfolio management
companies; that is, from 19 in 2005 to 28 in 2011.
Table II.A.3: Number of Institutions in Financial Sector, 2005-11
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 March
2011


















































Financial Leasing C. 84 81 68 50 47 35 35
Factoring Companies 88 86 86 81 78 76 74
Consumer Fin. C. 9 9 9 10 10 11 11
Asset Management C. 4 5 5 5 6 6 6
Financial Holding C. 0 0 0 3 3 3 3
Insurance Companies 46 47 51 62 55 57 58
Securities Intermediary
Institutions
101 100 104 104 103 103 103
Securities Invest. Trusts 26 30 33 34 33 31 31
Real Estate Invest. Trusts 10 11 13 14 14 18 24
Venture Capital Trust 2 2 2 2 2 2 4
Portfolio Management
Companies
19 19 19 23 23 28 28
Total Number of
Institutions
440 440 440 437 423 419 425
Source: BRSA, TT, CMB,AIRC, ACMII.
The introduction and still-ongoing growth of REITs represent one of the visible and
important changes in the Turkish economy over the past decade. Turkey established
KHU 5HDO (VWDWH ,QYHVWPHQW 7UXVWV 5(,7 VWUXFWXUH QDPHG Ǥ*D\ULPHQNXO <DWíUíP
2UWDNOíNODUíǥ*<2 LQ ZLWK WKHSXUSRUWHGDLPRIHVWDEOLVKLQJ LQVWLWXWLRQDO UHDO
estate sector, several years ahead of many developed countries. Further, it is a major
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step forward to bringing international and institutional standards and
professionalism to the broader real estate industry and to also fostering foreign
LQYHVWPHQWV(URODQG7íUWíURßOX$VL]HDEOHLQFUHDVHLVREVHUYHGLQ5(,7VWKHLU
number increased from 10 in 2005 to 24 in 2011.
II.A.4. Structure of the Financial Sector by Outstanding Securities
The distribution of outstanding financial securities over the period 2000 to 2011 is
presented in Table II.A.4. Evidently, public sector securities are dominant over the
private sector securities. Whilst government bonds are the leading public sector
securities, in the private sector equities (common shares) have the principal part.
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Table II.A.4: Outstanding Securities at Current Prices. 2000-11 (million TL)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Total Private Securities 6,868 10,517 13,177 18,008 25,186 31,929 41,046 52,055 63,860 70,577 83,707 103,898
Common Shares 6,867 10,516 13,177 18,008 25,186 31,916 40,929 51,685 63,300 70,061 80,806 89,274
Corporate Bonds 1 1 - - - - 120 140 240 360 1,281 4,221
Commercial Papers - - - - - 13 - 230 320 100 105 100
Asset Backed Securities - - - - - - - - - - - 573
Bank Bills - - - - - - - - - 56 1,495 9672
Warrants - - - - - - - - - - 20 58
Memo Item: Total Private
Securities
Outstanding/GDP,%
4.12 4.38 3.46 3.96 4.51 4.92 5.41 6.17 6.72 7.41 7.62 8.00
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Table II.A.4 (cont’d) : Outstanding Securities at Current Prices, 2000-11 (Million TL)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Total Public Securities 36,802 122,930 150,939 196,004 226,013 246,082 252,370 255,310 274,827 330,005 352,841 368,778
Gov. Bond 34,363 102,170 112,850 168,974 194,211 226,964 241,876 249,176 260,849 315,969 343,317 368,778
Treasury Bill 2,058 20,029 37,020 25,413 30,272 17,818 9,594 6,134 13,978 14,036 9,525 -
Revenue Sharing Cert. - - - - - - - - - - - -
FX Indexed Bonds - - - - - - - - - - - -
Privatisation Bonds 382 731 1,069 1,617 1,530 1,300 900 - - - - -
Memo Item: Total Public
Securities
Outstanding/GDP,%
22.08 51.17 39.67 43.10 40.43 37.92 33.28 30.28 28.91 34.64 32.11 28.41
Source: CMB.
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Specifically, as of end of 2011, 78.0% of the securities are public sector securities and
the remaining 22.0% are private sector securities. In 2011, public sector securities
include only the government bonds. Amongst the private sector securities, common
shares have the highest portion (86.0%). Common shares are followed by Bank-bills
and Bank-guaranteed bills (BB-BGB) with approximately 9.0% share. Finally, the
corporate bonds have a 4.0% share in private sector securities. The following sub-
sections provide a discussion on the i) Government Bond Market, ii) The Development
of Corporate Bond Market, and iii) Equities Market.
Government Bond Market
The central government gross debt stock was 520.8 billion TL as of end of May 2012.
Whilst 375.9 billion TL was denominated in local currency, the remaining 144.9 billion
was denominated in foreign currencies. At that time, central government debt stock
denominated in local currency consists of the following types of securities, respective
shares of which within the total stock being given in parentheses:
- Zero coupon TL-denominated securities (19.9%)
- Fixed rate TL-denominated couponed securities (33.3%)
- CPI-indexed securities (17.8%)
- Floating rate TL-denominated couponed securities (28.6%)
- Revenue-indexed securities (0.4%)
Central government external debt stock includes loans (multilateral agencies,
bilateral lenders, others) and the bond issues. As of end of May 2012, total external
debt stock was 79.1 billion USD. The share of loans and bond issues in total debt
stock were 38.4% and 61.6%, respectively.
Figure II.A.7. demonstrates the Turkish government’s annual debt stock excluding
loans by types of instrument between 1986 and 2011. Here the ‘loans’ are excluded
from the debt stock in an attempt to evaluate the bond market structure and size.
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Clearly, government domestic debt stock in bonds has been significantly greater in
comparison to the Treasury bills and international bonds over the specified time
period. Government’s domestic and external bond issuance have a rising trend,
especially after 1999. In contrast, Treasury bill issuance has a declining tendency
after 2002.
Figure II.A.7: Central Government Debt Stock by Types of Instruments, 1986 - 2011
Source: Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry, Undersecretariat of Treasury,
www.treasury.gov.tr
Figure II.A.8 presents the time-series pattern of the percentage distribution of
Treasury bills and government bonds between 1999 and 2011. In 2003, there is a
significant growth (from 60.2% to 72.9%) in the issuance of government domestic
bonds. In the same year, both the issuance of Treasury bills (from 19.7% to 11%) and
international bond (from 20.1% to 16.1%) have declined considerably. Between 2005
and 2011, government domestic bond issuance has been roughly stable around 80%
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declined from 6.2% in 2005 to 0% in 2011. In contrast, the issuance of international
bonds has increased from 14.7% in 2005 to 19.2% in 2011.
Figure II.A.7: Percentage Distribution of Treasury Bills and Government Bonds, 1996-
2011
Source: Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry, Undersecretariat of Treasury,
www.treasury.gov.tr
Finally, the maturity structure of the government debt stock between 2005 and May
2012 is presented in Table II.A.5. The average time to maturity for the domestic debt
stock has been 2 years between 2005 and 2009. In 2010 and 2011, the average time to
maturity has increased to 2.6 years and reached up to 2.9 years as of May 2012. For
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that is, 6-to-8 years between 2005 and 2009. In 2010, 2011 and May 2012 it has
reached to 8.8 years, 9 years, and 9.1 years, respectively.








2005 2.0 5.7 2.9
2006 2.0 7.0 3.4
2007 2.1 7.7 3.4
2008 2.0 7.9 3.6
2009 2.0 7.9 3.5
2010 2.6 8.8 4.2
2011 2.6 9.0 4.5
2012/May 2.9 9.1 4.6
Source: Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry, Undersecretariat of Treasury,
www.treasury.gov.tr
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Development of Corporate Bond Market
Turkish banks largely fund themselves through deposits as opposed to bonds;
therefore, they have a dangerous asset/liability mismatch: they borrow short-term
from their depositors (usually with maturities of less than 180 days) and lend long-
term to their corporate clients and the government. BRSA states that extending the
maturity of their funding was a key strategic aim and, to that end, using the bond
markets could provide a key source of stability. Accordingly, the development of the
private bond market would play a significant role in allowing banks to better manage
the asset/liability mismatch.
The size of the Turkish corporate bond market is significantly small relative to the
size of both the government bonds and common shares (see Table II.A.4). Until
October 2010, only development and investment banks, which cannot accept
deposits, could issue TL-denominated bond and bills. According to the new
amendments, BRSA gave permission to commercial banks to issue TL-denominated
bonds and bills.
Corporate bonds are classified as: 1) Floating rate, fixed rate, zero-coupon corporate
bonds, 2) commercial papers, 3) bank bills, 4) convertible bonds, 5) exchangeable
bonds, 6) indexed bonds (gold, silver, platinum), 7) asset backed securities, 8)
mortgage backed securities, and 9) islamic bonds.23 While the floating rate, fixed
rate, zero-coupon corporate bonds, bank bills and commercial papers are currently
traded in the market, indexed bonds, asset backed securities, islamic bonds, and
mortgage backed securities are only defined in the legislation. These papers haven
23 The principles and rules concerning the issue of corporate bonds (i.e. offering and placements,
listing requirements, the issue size and ratings, etc.) can be found in Communiqué Serial II, No 22,
which are not given in detail here for the sake of brevity.
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not been issued in the market, yet. On the other hand, there is an international
issuance of islamic securities. Kuveyt Turk Participation Bank issued a three-year
‘sukuk murabaha’ in the London Stock Exchange. It is the first issuance of islamic
securities by a Turkish corporation.
Table II.A.6. presents the annual statistics for the corporate bond market between
2006 and 2010. In 2010, corporate bonds market has grown substantially as a result
of historically low levels of benchmark interest rates and reductions in the issuance
costs. At the end of 2010, 35 corporate bonds, amounting to 3.7 billion USD were
issued. Trading volume of corporate bonds is very low. In 2010, while OTC trading
volume has been 155 USD million, trading volume of the listed corporate bonds in
WKHìVWDQEXO6WRFN([FKDQJHKDVEHHQPLOOLRQ86'6HH,QWHUQDWLRQDO&RXQFLORI
Securities Associations (ICSA), ‘Corporate Bond Markets in Emerging Countries’,
June 2011 for details). Most of the bonds are small and structured as floating rate
notes. It should also be noted that a probable rise in inflation rates in Turkey
threatens the nascent corporate bond market.
Table II.A. 6: Statistics for the Corporate Bond Market, 2006-10
Number of Corporate Bonds Issued
Corporate Bonds Commercial Papers Banks Bills Total
2006 2 0 0 2
2007 2 4 0 6
2008 2 1 0 3
2009 5 1 2 8
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2010 23 2 10 35
Size of Corporate Bonds Issued (Million USD)
2006 101 0 0 101
2007 119 226 0 345
2008 158 32 0 190
2009 189 33 67 289
2010 2,128 69 1,510 3,707
Source: CMB.
Equities Market: ISE Common Shares
ì6(LVWKHRQO\LQVWLWXWLRQLQ7XUNH\IRUVHFXULWLHVH[FKDQJHDQGZDVHVWDEOLVKHGDVDQ
autonomous organisation in 1986.24 As of the end of 2011, the total number of
corporations with stocks listed on the ISE increased to 363 from 338 in 2010, and 315
in 2009. Total market capitalisation of the companies listed on the ISE was 381.3
trillion TL as of the end of 2011, reflecting the decline in equity prices since the
beginning of the year (Table II.A.7).25 Even excluding the exceptional years 2001 and
2002, the price-to-earnings ratio has varied considerably with a low value of 4.97 (in
24 Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE) has been renamed as Borsa Istanbul (BIST) from April 3, 2103
onwards as a result of a new Capital Market Law (Law no. 6362) which came into force on December
30, 2012.
25 However, this situation was reversed in the second half of 2012 and the stock market became
buoyant again.
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1988) to a high value of 37.5 (in 1999). Market turnover ratio measures the trading
activities on a stock market relative to the size of the stock market. For the 12
PRQWKV HQGLQJ LQ'HFHPEHU  WKHPDUNHW WXUQRYHU UDWLR RQ WKH ìVWDQEXO VWRFN
market was 182.4%. This means that ISE stocks have significantly higher volume of
trading in 2011. Over the past ten years, ISE turnover ratio varies from a low value of










1986 348 709 5.07 1.23
1987 414 3,182 15.86 3.31
1988 556 2,048 4.97 7.28
1989 730 15,553 15.74 11.17
1990 916 55,238 23.90 27.72
1991 1,092 78,907 15.88 44.90
1992 1,238 84,809 11.39 66.50
1993 1,284 546,316 25.80 46.79
1994 1,204 836,118 24.83 77.80
1995 922 1,264,998 9.23 187.73
1996 789 3,275,038 12.15 92.81
1997 743 12,654,308 24.39 73.27
1998 686 10,611,820 8.84 170.53
1999 319 61,137,073 37.52 60.36
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2000 315 46,692,373 16.82 238.46
2001 310 68,603,041 108.33 135.73
2002 288 56,370,247 195.92 188.58
2003 285 96,072,774 14.54 152.64
2004 297 132,555,528 17.18 211.89
2005 304 218,317,837 17.19 123.64
2006 316 230,037,678 22.02 140.90
2007 319 335,948,412 12.16 115.43
2008 317 182,024,740 5.55 182.72
2009 315 350,761,077 17.89 135.31
2010 338 472,552,583 13.42 134.52
2011 363 381,262,499 11.88 182.38
6RXUFHì6(
Figure II.A.9 presents the ISE capitalisation as a percentage of GDP between 1997
and 2010. The effect of the recent global financial crisis can be easily observed in
2008. In 2008, ISE capitalisation-to-GDP ratio declines to 16.4% from a considerably
high ratio of 44.5% in 2007. In 2010, the market capitalisation of ISE reached up to
42% of the GDP.
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Figure II.A. 8: Stock Market Capitalisation as a Percentage of GDP, 1997-2010
Source: CMB.
II.B. THE STRUCTURE OF THE FINANCIAL SECTOR BY FORMS OF
ORGANISATION
II.B.1. Banking Sector
Restructuring of the Banking Sector in Turkey since 198026
The policy reforms and structural measures adopted from mid-1980 onwards were
closely monitored by the IMF and the WB and supported by various structural
adjustment loans (Akyüz, 1990). The financial liberalisation process of the 1980s
abolished interest rate ceilings, removed quantitative controls on lending, and lifted
26 The process of restructuring banks described here is intimately related with the changing
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entry barriers and controls on capital accounts. One of the central elements of the
1980 stabilization/liberalisation program adopted in Turkey was the internal
liberalisation. In July 1980, interest rates on borrowing and lending were
deregulated. This led to Ponzi-type financing27 that caused an intense pressure on
interest rates, which in turn provided a field day for a variety of formal and informal,
large and small players involved in fund-raising activities exploiting the lack of a
proper regulatory framework for the financial sector.28 By early 1982, the field day
was over as the majority of these players crushed with devastating social and
economic effects on the savers who had been lured into this “bonanza” by channeling
their savings to these money lenders, known as “the bankers”. The volatility of the
situation, dubbed as the
bankers’ crisis, in the context of a military regime also had a political fall out as
Turgut Özal, known as the architect of the structural adjustment process, had to
resign from the government where he was serving as deputy prime minister in
charge of the economy. In fact, it would take more than a year to develop institutional
mechanisms of a new regulatory framework by the military regime just before the
transition to civilian rule in late 1983.
27 The term Ponzi-type financing here refers to a Ponzi-scheme where new investors are invited by
offering relatively higher returns, in the form of short-term returns that are either abnormally high or
unusually consistent. Perpetuation of the high returns requires an ever-increasing flow of money from
new investors to keep the scheme going.
28 This highly speculative environment also led to a rush on the part of many capital groups to acquire
banks and/or establish brokerage firms quite a significant number of which collapsed during this
particular crisis (cf.Marois 2012: 105). Artun (1985) notes that there had been a significant rise in the
number of such groups from 11 to 18 during 1980-82 period, though by 1984 the respective figure had
come down to 14.
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In this regard, specific mention should be made of Decree 70 issued during the
summer of 1983 which effectively functioned as a new legal framework for the
banking sector without formally replacing the 1958 Banking Law. In its preamble, the
Decree 70 stated that the inadequacy of the latter had become obvious in the wake of
recent economic and social developments. Among the perceived problems
confronting the banking sector that the Decree aimed to overcome, the deterioration
of financial structures of the banks, the management disorders resulting from
concentration of ownership of the banks in few hands, (i.e. the capital groups), the
loss of confidence in the banks and financial institutions on the part of the public had
EHHQXQGHUOLQHG7Dđ©íRßOX
Following the election victory of Motherland Party led by Turgut Özal in November
1983, it was felt necessary to further prop up the financial sector by introducing new
legislation. The Banking Law (No. 3182) which came into effect on May 2, 1985 aimed
to provide a legal basis for prudential regulation and supervision of the banking
system in line with BIS requirements by instituting stronger capital adequacy
UHTXLUHPHQWV DQG 13/ SURYLVLRQV *DQLRßOX   0DURLV  29 In this
regard, it was continuing with the strategy entailed in Decree 70 by hardening the
conditions for new entries into banking sector. But this in turn created new tensions
between the banking community and the government which would eventually lead to
the relaxation of barriers restricting the entry into the banking system, even though
the Law no.3182 would remain in effect with several amendments made in due
29 While the Treasury was responsible for regulating and supervising both on-site and off-site. In 1986,
to increase market discipline, the CBRT mainly undertook the supervision of banks and one year later,
external auditing became mandatory for banks.
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course until 1999. Subsequently, there would be a significant increase in the number
of banks operating in the market, which occurred partly through the establishment of
QHZEDQNVDQGSDUWO\WKURXJKWKHDUULYDORIIRUHLJQEDQNVLQWRWKHPDUNHW*DQLRßOX
2008: 367). The number of capital groups with bank ownership did also rise more
than twofold from 14 in 1984 to 34 in 1989. One of the underlying reasons for this
tendency would be put forward by prominent industrialists as an attempt to tackle
their financial difficulties stemming from the high cost of borrowing in the wake of
the policy reforms (Yalman 2009: 277).30
Following the issue of Decree 32 which initiated the convertibility of TL in August
1989, there would be another round of enhancing the CAR in line with the BIS
guidelines so as to ensure that banks hold enough capital for their risky assets.
Banks were forced to report NPLs separately and they were required to cover
GHIDXOWHGORDQVWKURXJKSURYLVLRQV*DQLRßOX:LWKWKHFRPSOHWLRQRIWKH
final sequence of financial liberalisation with capital account liberalisation, the
combination of an overvalued TL and high real interest rates became instrumental in
attracting short-term capital. Thus the current account deficit increased rapidly and
the burden of high interest payments also worsened the fiscal balance. This
development contributed to the rise in interest rates. Paradoxically, it was the
orthodox recipes for financial liberalisation that caused unsustainable fiscal
imbalances, through rising interest payments. Later on, they were blamed by
orthodox analysis as the main cause of crisis.
30 However, Sönmez (2001: 270-272) contended that the groups benefitted from the phenomenal rise in
real interest rates and high spreads, thus making banking sector a very profitable line of activity
despite the high costs.This was due to the fact that the banks were able to determine the interest
rates among themselves given the lack of competition. See also Marois 2011: 58.
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The financial liberalization process changed the behaviour of economic agents. The
rise of interest rates in turn seriously increased the costs of firms relying heavily on
borrowing. Thus it became increasingly difficult for the banks to find reliable
customers. Consequently, NPLs rose substantially. The process of financial
liberalisation seemed to have the dual effect of driving the funds away from
productive investments and strengthening the position of the commercial banks, and
ipso facto of the groups, by making them the key agents of the money markets in
general and the foreign exchange market in particular. This would in turn, indicate
the presence of social forces that had a direct interest in the appreciation of the real
exchange rate, as it entailed cost reductions for those industries dependent upon
imports of raw materials and intermediate goods. (Yalman 2004)
External financial liberalisation made it possible for banks to borrow from abroad so
as to invest these funds domestically in various financial instruments. As a result,
some banks were unable to meet their liabilities on time, thus increasing their “open
positions” and eventually raising liquidity risks. There was also a serious increase in
speculative activities, which led the banks inevitably to act as institutional rentiers
(Boratav 2003; Yeldan 2001, Boratav and Yeldan 2006). Ultimately, this fragile
structure in the Turkish economy paved the way for a major financial crisis in 1994,
coinciding with the well known Tequila crisis in Mexico.
The crisis severely hit the banking system due to accumulated risks such as currency
risk, interest rate risk, liquidity risk and credit risk inherent in the banking system. It
soon became apparent that in addition to open market operations, interbank money
PDUNHWRSHUDWLRQVDOVREHFDPHDVRXUFHRIODUJHSURILWVDQGORVVHV*DQLRßOX
367). The coalition government in power had to adopt an IMF-led stabilization
programme on April 5, 1994, for the first time since the expiry of the last stand-by
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agreement in 1985. New measures were introduced on May 5, 1994 to restore
confidence in the banking system. Thereby, savings deposits started to be insured
100% by Savings Deposits Insurance Fund (SDIF). The government also revoked the
banking licences of three small-sized banks.
Because of severe financial crises in “emerging market economies” in the 1990s, the
stabilization programmes and structural measures necessitated the implementation
of prudential regulation and supervision of the banking while financial liberalisation
continued; so the original “Washington Consensus” was augmented with institutional
elements. The policy constituents of this renewed approach, i.e. “Augmented
Washington Consensus” were reflected in the conditionalities of the IMF
programmes for many countries (Rodrik 2001:15).31 Therefore, the IMF programmes
played a major role in establishing banking regulatory reform in Turkey. The Banking
Law of 1999 (No. 4389) formed a landmark in this context in which the IMF (and the
WB) were directly involved, especially in the establishment of BRSA (Türel 2011). The
possibility of Turkey’s EU membership also contributed to the reform process. The
law aimed to strengthen the banking sector and to improve the supervision
standards in line with Basel and EU standards.
The December 1999 IMF stand-by agreement which entailed the use of exchange rate
as an anchor of an anti-inflation programme led to appreciation of the TL which, in
turn, caused the rapid deterioration of the current account deficit by the end of 2000.
The appreciation of the TL was accompanied by an “explosion” of net capital inflows
by non-residents during the first ten months of 2000 attracted by arbitrage
31 Rodrik (2001:15) adds the following conditions to the original consensus’ list: Legal/political reform,
regulatory institutions, anti-corruption, labour market flexibility, WTO agreements, financial codes
and standards, ‘prudent’ capital-account opening, non-intermediate exchange rate regimes, social
safety nets and poverty reduction.
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opportunities. While they were instrumental in financing growing external deficits,
they made the economy more and more vulnerable to speculative attacks. Finally the
program collapsed with two attacks on the domestic currency in 2000 and 2001.32
Throughout 2000, the number of banks that were acquired by the SDIF kept
increasing. Additionally, a peculiar provision imposed by the IMF during the
negotiations for the additional stand-by agreement in December 2000 extended the
guarantee to ruined banks’ external debts. Hence, international banks’ bad loans to
Turkish banks were henceforth guaranteed and covered by the Turkish Treasury.
To sum up, after 1980, when both internal and external financial liberalisations were
implemented, and financial deepening took place, private sector’s explosion to
vulnerability increased and the public sector could borrow only at very high level of
interest rates. Thus, while only three banks and several intermediary institutions
went bankrupt in 1994, and two other banks were taken over by SDIF in 1997 and
1998, respectively, the bankruptcies in the 2000-1 crisis were much more widespread
(the number of ruined banks in that period was 18).33 These banks were either closed
down or nationalised in line with BRSA decisions (BRSA 2001). Two more banks
followed suit in 2002 and 2003, respectively. The banks’ structures were consolidated
through improvements in their open positions and the banks’ branch numbers were
diminished as the branches were put on sale (BRSA 2001). The 2000-1 crisis was a
classical “twin” crisis, caused by growing macroeconomic imbalances due to volatile
32 See III.A.2 below; also Akyüz & Boratav 2003 for a detailed analysis of 2001 crisis and its underlying
causes.
33 `The golden years of banking lasted until 1994 crisis, as profits in the sector dropped drastically and
heavy losses occurred: 10 of those 18 banks ceased to function between 1994 and 2002 by economic
and non-economic reasons. That means, most of the banks that were formed between 1983 and 1994
were either weak in capital structure or were abused by their owners for illegal gains” (Tacer 2004:74-
5).
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capital movements. It had severe consequences for the financial sector, and hence
after the crisis, the government adopted a comprehensive reform program supported
by the WB and IMF.
In the end, the banking system went through yet another round of significant
restructuring process. Private banks strengthened their equity, which they had lost
substantially due to the 2000-1 crisis. Banks failing to do so were either merged with
other banks, or transferred to SDIF. State-owned banks were restructured, and
some of them were brought under a joint management. “Uncompensated lending
subsidies and payments generated the ‘duty losses’ of the largest two state banks,
Ziraat Bank and Halk Bank which increased from nearly 3% of GNP in 1993 to about
 RI *13 LQ ǥ %DNíU DQGQLđ   'XW\ ORVVHV RI VWDWHRZQHG EDQNV
were a channel for cheap loans to corporate and individual donors. The “Banking
Sector Restructuring Programme” (BSRP) was put into implementation in May 2001,
with a view to realize the transition to an internationally competitive banking sector
which would be resilient to internal and external shocks. According to BRSA (2010a:
38), the aims of the BSRP were (i) restructuring public banks financially and
operationally, (ii) prompt resolution of banks under the SDIF, (iii) the rehabilitation of
the private banking system, (iv) the strengthening of surveillance and supervision,
and increasing competition and efficiency in the sector. Within the scope of program,
capital structure of public banks has been strengthened. Duty loss receivables are
paid and assignments which will lead to new duty losses are revoked, and short-term
liabilities are liquidated. These banks have been restructured on an operational
scale, professional staff are employed in their management, and the number of
branches and personnel are reduced to reasonable levels (BRSA 2010a).
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From 1997 to 2004, 22 private banks were taken over by the SDIF, mainly for three
reasons (Tacer 2004: 74-5): i) if the damage was beyond recoverable limits as in case
of a sudden weakening of a bank’s capital structure, SDIF would take the bank over
to secure its positions, ii) in case of the mismanagement of a bank by its owners,
after formal warnings, the bank would be expropriated by SDIF, iii) systematic abuse
of bank resources and irregular operations in command or full awareness of the
bank’s management was the last reason for SDIF’s expropriation of a bank.34 BRSA
reported that the total cost rehabilitating Turkish banking sector amounted to 46
billion USD, a substantial part of which being diverted from productive uses in the
real economy (BRSA 2004). The money-capital owners made high revenues in the
short-run via financial deals, i.e. playing in capital markets, stock-market
transactions and so forth. In this way, the capital that accumulated through financial
intermediation was not injected into the real sector as loans, but returned to financial
intermediation to benefit from further interest income.
$ ILQDQFLDO UHVWUXFWXULQJ SURJUDP ǤìVWDQEXO $SSURDFKǥ ZDV DGRSWHG LQ  DQG
public supervision and audit function was made more autonomous. Laws and
regulations regarding banks’ activities were renewed by the Banking Law No. 5411 of
October 2005, in line with the internationally recognized principles and standards
(BAT 2009: 22). The provisions of that law envisaged a national banking system to be
entirely integrated into the international finance. The law also transferred the
regulation and supervision of the banking system from the Treasury to the BRSA
(Türel, O. 2011: 146-8). Following such measures, the size of assets of the Turkish
financial sector including the CBRT, deposit and investment banks, financial leasing
34 According to Tacer (2004), 10 banks out of 22 were taken over on grounds of the first reason.
Decisions for the remaining 12 was based on the latter two.
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companies, factoring companies, consumer financing companies, insurance
companies, securities exchange companies and real estate partnerships increased.
“An important part of this program was the redesign of BRSA that became more
effective with prudential supervision and regulation and the appropriate enforcement
power, credibility, and autonomous structure in the post-crisis period. Private banks
were forced to strengthen their equity capital, either independently or through
mergers and acquisitions, and about 20 fragile banks that failed to comply were
transferred to the SDIF. The sector now has much stronger fundamentals and
remains largely unfazed despite the recent global financial downturn” (De Jonghe et
al. 2012: 51-2).
Number of Banks and Branches
As of November 2011, there were 48 banks in the sector including 3 state-owned
deposit banks, 13 privately owned deposit banks, 20 foreign deposit banks, 2 banks
under the SDIF and 13 development and investment banks. These 48 banks had
about 9500 branches and employed about 180,000 people as of 2011. Overall, the
distribution of capital ownership among state-owned, private and foreign (called
“global” in BAT reports) banks are 27.5%, 31.5% and 41.0%, respectively in 2011
(Table II.B.1). State-owned banks still make up a large segment of the Turkish
banking, comprising 33% of the total deposits and 29.0% of the total loans as of
September 2011.
Table II.B.1: Capital Structure of the Banking Sector, March 2011
Public, Private and Global Distribution of Shareholders (%)
Global Share
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1 Adabank 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
2 AkBank 10.9 0.0 64.2 10.3 25.6 35.9
3 $NWLI<DWíUíP
%DQNDVí
0.2 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
4 Albakara Turk
.DWíOíP%DQNDVí
0.8 0.0 21.6 61.9 16.6 78.5
5 Alternatif Bank 0.5 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
6 Anadolu Bank 0.5 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
7 $UDS7¾UN%DQNDVí 0.2 15.4 20.6 64.0 0.0 64.0
8 $V\D.DWíOíP
%DQNDVí
1.4 0.0 65.7 0.0 34.3 34.3
9 Bank Mellat 0.3 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0
10 Bank Pozitif Kredi
YH.DONíQPD
%DQNDVí
0.2 0.0 30.2 69.8 0.0 69.8
11 %LUOHđLN)RQ
%DQNDVí
0.1 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
12 Credit Agricole
<DWíUíP%DQNDVí
0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0
13 Citibank 0.6 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0
14 Denizbank 2.8 0.0 0.1 75.0 24.9 99.9
15 Deutsche Bank 0.2 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0
16 'LOHU<DWíUíP
%DQNDVí
0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
17 Eurobank Tekfen 0.4 0.0 30.0 70.0 0.0 70.0
18 Finansbank 3.8 0.0 0.2 58.2 41.6 99.8
19 *6'<DWíUíP
%DQNDVí
0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
20 Habib Bank Limited 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0
21 HSBC Bank 2.1 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0
22 ING Bank 2.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0
23 ,OOHU%DQNDVí 1.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
24 IMKB Takas ve
6DNODPD%DQNDVí
0.2 6.8 90.5 2.7 0.0 2.7
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25 JP Morgan Chase
Bank National
Assoc.
0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0
26 .XYH\W7XUN.DWíOíP
Bankas
1.0 0.0 19.8 80.2 0.0 80.2
27 Merrill Lynch
<DWíUíP%DQN
0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0
28 Fibabanka 0.1 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0
29 1XURO<DWíUíP
%DQNDVí
0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
30 Societe Generale 0.1 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0
31 Sekerbank 1.3 0.0 57.5 0.0 42.5 42.5
32 7&=LUDDW%DQNDVí 14.5 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
33 7DLE<DWíUíP
%DQNDVí
0.0 0.0 0.7 99.3 0.0 99.3
34 7HNVWLO%DQNDVí 0.3 0.0 88.9 0.0 11.1 11.1
35 Turkish Bank 0.1 0.0 60.0 40.0 0.0 40.0
36 Turkland Bank 0.2 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0
37 Turk Ekonomi
%DQNDVí
3.0 0.0 33.1 46.0 20.9 66.9
38 7)LQDQV.DWíOíP
%DQNDVí
1.1 0.0 35.3 64.7 0.0 64.7
39 Turkiye Garanti
%DQNDVí
11.9 0.0 32.7 26.1 41.2 67.3
40 Turkiye Halk
%DQNDVí
7.5 75.0 3.0 0.0 22.0 22.0
41 T. Ihracat Kredi
%DQNDVí
0.6 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
42 7XUNL\H,V%DQNDVí 13.3 0.0 78.6 00 21.4 21.4
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43 7XUNL\H.DONíQPD
%DQNDVí
0.2 99.1 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0
44 The Royal Bank of
Scotland
0.1 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0
45 76íQDL.DONíQPD
%DQNDVí
0.8 0.0 71.1 0.0 28.9 28.9
46 7XUNL\H9DNíIODU
%DQNDVí
7.3 74.8 4.6 0.0 20.6 20.6
47 Westlb A.G. 0.1 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0
48 <DSí.UHGL%DQNDVí 8.6 0.0 44.8 38.1 17.1 55.2
TOTAL (%) 100.0 27.5 31.5 21.5 19.5 40.9
Source: BAT.
Following financial liberalisation of 1989, the number of banks has increased rapidly
until the crisis of 2000-1. Due to the modest qualifications required from persons and
groups who wanted to become bank owners, and the weaknesses in procedures for
granting licenses, entrance into the sector was easy; and the revocation of a license
was difficult. This caused the number of banks to increase to 81 in 1999 (BAT 2010).
High profit opportunities from the rising public borrowing requirement, and a full
blanket deposit guarantee also contributed to this increase. Subsequent to the
financial crisis of 2000-1, small and inefficient banks have left the system; and the
banking sector experienced a period of decline with respect to the number of banks,
branches and personnel in 2001-2 (Table II.B.2). The number of banks dropped from
81 to 54 from 1999 to 2002, thereby concentrating assets in fewer banks which
increased their ability to maintain adequate capital reserves. Despite the fact that the
number of banks dropped heavily, the average number of branches per bank and
staff per bank rose in the 2008-10 period.
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Table II.B. 2: Number of Banks, Branches and Employees, 1980-2011
Number of Banks Number of Branches (including foreign branches) Number of Employees
Years (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Total (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Total (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Total
1980 12 24 4 - 3 43 2,469 3,374 105 - 6 5,954 62,480 60,596 1,842 - 394 125,312
1985 12 20 15 - 3 50 2,817 3,325 120 - 6 6,268 72,214 62,490 2,652 - 449 137,805
1990 8 25 23 - 10 66 2,975 3,455 113 - 17 6,560 80,825 68,145 3,012 - 2,107 154,089
1992 6 31 20 - 12 69 3,001 3,077 109 - 19 6.206 78,223 63,337 3,010 - 2,253 146,823
,1994 6 29 20 - 12 67 2,917 3,063 105 - 19 6,104 74,462 59,161 3,256 - 2,167 139,046
1996 5 33 18 - 13 69 2,886 3,429 104 - 23 6,442 70,284 68,592 3,170 - 6,107 148,153
1998 4 38 18 - 15 75 2,832 4,393 115 - 30 7,370 71,072 86,066 4,051 - 5,303 166,492
1999 4 31 19 8 19 81 2,865 3,960 121 714 31 7,691 72,007 76,386 4,185 15.980 5,430 173,988
2000 4 28 18 11 18 79 2,834 3,783 117 1.073 30 7,837 70,191 70,954 3,805 19.895 5,556 170,401
2001 3 22 15 6 15 61 2,725 3,523 233 408 19 6,908 56,108 64,380 5,395 6.391 5,221 137,495
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2002 3 20 15 2 14 54 2,019 3,659 206 203 19 6,106 40,158 66,869 5,416 5.886 4,942 123,271
2003 3 18 13 2 14 50 1,971 3,594 209 175 17 5,966 37,994 70,614 5,481 4.518 4,642 123,249
2004 3 18 13 1 13 48 2,149 3,729 209 1 18 6,106 39,467 76,880 5,880 403 4,533 127,163
2005 3 17 13 1 13 47 2,035 3,799 393 1 19 6,247 38,046 78,806 10,610 395 4,401 132,258
2006 3 14 15 1 13 46 2,149 3,582 1.072 1 45 6,849 39,223 73,220 25,794 333 4,573 143,143
2007 3 11 18 1 13 46 2,203 3,625 1.741 1 48 7,618 41,056 75,124 36,707 325 5,322 158,534
2008 3 11 17 1 13 45 2,416 4,290 2.034 1 49 8,790 43,333 82,158 40,567 267 5,273 171,598
2009 3 11 17 1 13 45 2,530 4,390 2.062 1 44 9,027 44,856 82,270 39,676 261 5,339 172,402
2010 3 11 17 1 13 45 2,744 4,582 2.096 1 42 9,465 47,235 83,633 42,013 252 5,370 178,503
2011 3 10 20 2 13 48
Source: BAT.
(1): State-owned Deposit Banks, (2): Privately-owned Deposit Banks, (3): Foreign Deposit Banks, (4): Banks Under the Deposit Ins. Fund, (5):
Dev't and Inv. Banks.
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The Turkish banking landscape changed considerably after the 2000-1 crisis because
of mergers and acquisitions, new entries, and privatizations (Table II.B.3). Beginning
by 2001, the BRSA, Undersecretariat of Treasury (UT), CBRT and Ministry of Finance
collaborated so as to encourage long-term savings, to support mergers and
acquisitions of banks and to provide incentives for increasing equity within the sector.
Within this perspective, steps were taken to facilitate the merger and turnover of
banks and their subsidiaries with legal provisions and tax incentives. On the other
hand, there were frequent changes in the status of commercial banks which are
relegated to the Appendix A of this report.
Table II.B. 3: Mergers in Banking Sector, 2001-11




















T. Emlak Bankası A.Ş. 
and T.C. Ziraat Bankası 
A.Ş.  
T.C. Ziraat Bankası 
A.Ş.  
12.49 15.14 38,762 32,926
31.08.2001
Birleşik Türk Körfez 
Bankası A.Ş. and Osmanlı 
Bankası A.Ş.  
Osmanlı Bankası 
A.Ş.  
2.20 3.38 1,708 1,288
26.10.2001
Tekfen Yatırım ve 
Finansman Bankası A.Ş. 
ve Bank Ekspres A.Ş.  
Tekfen Bank A.Ş.  0.15  0.18  649  630  
14.12.2001
Osmanlı Bankası A.Ş. and 
T. Garanti Bankası A.Ş.  
T. Garanti Bankası 
A.Ş.  
6.21 9.08 6,538 5,949
14.12.2001
Demirbank T.A.Ş. and 
HSBC Bank A.Ş.  
HSBC Bank A.Ş.  0.,90  1. 50  3,674  3,163  
14.12.2001
Morgan Guaranty Trust




0.18 0.20 62 50
11.01.2002
Sümerbank A.Ş. and Oyak 
Bank A.Ş.  
Oyak Bank A.Ş.  0.28  1.77  2,540  3,487  
29.03.2002
Sınai Yatırım Bankası 
A.Ş. and T. Sınai 
T. Sınai Kalkınma 
Bankası A.Ş.  
0.37 0.60 421 308
102
This project is funded by the European Union under
the 7th Research Framework programme (theme SSH)
Grant Agreement nr 266800
Kalkınma Bankası A.Ş.  
27.12.2002
Milli Aydın Bankası A.Ş. 
and Denizbank A.Ş.  
Denizbank A.Ş.  1.40  1.46  2,856  3,024  
09.04.2003
Fibabank A.Ş. and 
Finansbank A.Ş.  




 Merkez Şubesi and Credit 
Agricole
Indosuez Türk Bank 0.125 0.126 50 40
03.03.2004  Indosuez Türk Bank A.Ş.  A.Ş.      
12.11.2004
Pamukbank T.A.Ş. and T. 
Halk Bankası A.Ş.  
T. Halk Bankası A.Ş. 7.15 9.19 11,236 10,864
19.09.2005
Ak Uluslararası Bankası 
A.Ş. and Akbank T.A.Ş.  
Akbank T.A.Ş.  12,42  12.48  10,978  11,177  
30.12.2005
Family Finans Kurumu
A.Ş. and Anadolu Finans 
Kurumu A.Ş.  
Türkiye Finans
Katılım Bankası A.Ş. 
0.37 0.76 1,752 1,918
02.10.2006
Koçbank A.Ş. ve Yapı and 
Kredi Bankası A.Ş.  
Yapı ve Kredi 
Bankası A.Ş.  
5.94 10.16 13,468 13,355
12.02.2011
Fortis Bank A.Ş. and Türk 
Ekonomi Bankası A.Ş.  
Türk Ekonomi
Bankası A.Ş.  
1.88 3.05 10,096 9,632
* Shows total number of domestic personnel of the parties of merger or acquisition transactions as of the date of merger.
**Shows the number of domestic personnel of the institution occurred after the mergers and acquisitions on the date of 6
months after than the date of transaction.
Source: BRSA.
Penetration by foreign banks increased especially after the 2000-1 crisis. The
Turkish banking sector, especially after 2005, became very attractive for foreign
banks. Especially, in post-financial crises period, Turkey experienced cross-border
mergers and acquisitions in banking sector (Table II.B.4-5). In order to assess the
structural improvements which motivated foreign banks to acquire domestic banks,
some performance indicators of the banking sector during the period of liberalisation
and especially after the 2000-1 crisis will be reviewed below.
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Table II.B. 4: Cross-border Mergers and Acquisitions in Banking Sector, 2006-11*
Value (billion




National Bank of Greece
AS Greece




National Bank of Greece
AS Greece
1.0
7¾UNL\H )LQDQV <DWíUíP %DQNDVí
$Đ 1RWH[SODLQHG 6DXGL$UDELD
Source: WIR (2007, 2008, 2009)
*Deals with values over USD 1 billion
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BNP Paribas T. Ekonomi
%DQNDVí$Đ
28.12.04 The share of indirect shares of BNP Paribas

















General Electric T. Garanti
%DQNDVí$Đ
22.12.05 25.5% of the Bank’s shares were









to National Bank of Greece S.A. is realized.







17.08.06 Tarshish-Hapoalim Hold. and Invest. Ltd.,
affiliate of Hapoalim Group has taken over
57.6% of the Bank’s shares.
Arap Türk Libyan Arap Türk 22.06.06 Libyan Foreign Bank, having 47.7% of Arap
7¾UN %DQNDVí $Đ KDV WDNHQ RYHU WKH
Bank’s shares by 10.9% from Tekfenbank
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'HQL]EDQN$Đ 28.09.06  RI 'HQL]EDQN $Đ VKDUHV ZHUH









30.11.06  RI 7DW <DWíUíP %DQNDVí $Đ ZDV






06.12.06  RI $NEDQN 7$Đ ZDV WDNHQ RYHU E\








21.12.06 33.98% of the Bank’s shares were taken
over by Turan Alem Securities JSC, owned





28.12.06  RI01*%DQN $Đ ZDV WUDQVIHUUHG WR
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Review and Assessment of the Balance Sheet Items
Total Assets and Liabilities
Tables II.B.6-7 give an impression about the size of the total assets and total
liabilities in the banking sector respectively in recent years and their distribution
according to the types of banks. It must be kept in mind that as of 2011, about 77.0%
of the total financial assets belong to banks, indicating the dominance of banks over
the financial sector.
As noted earlier, following the 2000-1 crisis, the Turkish banking industry has
undergone a considerable amount of consolidation; there have already been
acquisitions by foreign banks and several mergers among private domestic banks. As
of the end of 2010, the distribution of the sectors’ assets among deposit, participation
and development and investment banks were realized respectively as 92.6%, 4.3%
and 3.1% (BRSA 2010a:20). As far as the banking sector’s asset concentration is
concerned, it must be noted that between 2000 and 2005, the shares of first 5 banks
and first 10 banks within total assets have increased considerably and these shares
are preserved in the following years. In the deposit banks group the distribution of
market shares remained almost the same in terms of total assets. The first group,
consisting of banks with assets in the 5-10 billion USD range, is what can be
considered as the "dominant" group of banks with market power. As of the end of
2010, the largest five banks included 1 state-owned bank and 4 private banks, and
the largest 10 banks included 3 state-owned banks, 5 private and 2 foreign banks.
There were 7 banks with an asset size above 40 billion USD, and 6 banks with an
asset size between 10 billion USD and 40 billion USD. However, more than half of the
banks in the banking sector had an asset size below 2 billion USD (BAT 2011).
Table II.B. 6: Total Assets in the Banking Sector, 2008-11 (TL Billion)
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2008 2009 2010 2011
Deposit Banks 683.8 773.4 932.4 1,119.9
Liquid Assets 83.9 84.7 70.3 85.6
Securities 191.6 258.6 282.1 278.0
Loans 338.1 355.3 479.0 621.4
Permanent Assets (net) 8.9 9.0 9.0 9.0
Other 61.3 65.9 92.0 125.9
State-owned Deposit
Banks (a)
209.0 251.5 299.4 342.4
Liquid Assets 23.4 25.5 22.1 18.3
Securities 84.8 106.6 110.1 110.6
Loans 84.8 101.2 144.1 181.2
Permanent Assets (net) 2.5 2.5 2.3 2.4
Other 13.4 15.7 20.9 29.9
Privately-owned Deposit
Banks
369.9 413.9 497.1 619.2
Liquid Assets 47.6 47.1 37.6 52.4
Securities 90.6 132.3 148.1 143.5
Loans 192.2 191.5 256.1 349.8
Permanent Assets (net) 5.1 5.1 5.3 5.4
Other 34.3 37.9 50.0 68.1
Foreign Banks 104.9 107.9 135.8 158.3
Liquid Assets 12.8 12.1 10.6 14.9
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Securities 16.2 19.6 23.9 23.9
Loans 61.1 62.6 78.9 90.4
Permanent Assets 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.2
Other 13.6 12.3 21.2 27.9
Participation Banks 25.8 33.6 43.3 56.1
Liquid Assets 3.9 5.1 6.5 7.4
Securities .. 1.0 1.4 2.0
Loans 17.6 23.6 30.8 38.5
Permanent Assets (net) 0.5 0.8 0.6 0.8
Other 3.8 3.1 4.0 7.4
Development and
Investment Banks
22.9 27.0 31.0 41.6
Liquid Assets 6.9 8.1 8.7 11.2
Securities 2.3 3.3 4.4 5.0
Loans 11.7 13.7 16.0 23.0
Permanent Assets (net) 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Other 1.9 1.7 1.7 2.3
Total Banking Sector 732.5 834.0 1,006.7 1,217.7
Liquid Assets 94.7 97.9 85.5 104.2
Securities 194.0 262.9 287.9 285.0
Loans 367.4 392.6 525.9 682.9
Permanent Assets (net) 9.6 9.9 9.8 10.0
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Other 66.8 70.7 97.7 135.6
Memo Items
Total TL Assets 510.2 611.1 748.9 848.7
Total FX Assets 222.3 223.0 257.8 369.0
Source: BRSA.
N.B. Liquid Assets = Cash + Claims from CBRT + Claims from Money Markets + Claims from
Other Banks
Items may not sum up to the totals because of rounding.
(a) Includes banks under SDIF.
Table II.B. 7: Total Liabilities in the Banking Sector, 2008-11 (in TL Billion)
2008 2009 2010 2011
Deposit Banks 683.8 773.4 932.4 1,119.9
Deposits 435.6 487.9 583.9 656.3
Debts to Banks &
Money Markets
84.4 78.2 111.5 151.1
Other External
Resources
91.8 113.4 122.0 189.5
Equity 72.1 93.8 115.0 123.0
State-owned Deposit
Banks (a)
209.0 251.5 299.4 342.4
Deposits 156.0 181.6 219.6 225.4
Debts to Banks &
Money Markets
11.3 10.9 17.8 29.6
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Other External
Resources
23.7 34.9 32.0 55.7
Equity 18.0 24.2 30.1 31.8
Privately-owned
Deposit Banks
369.9 413.9 497.1 619.2
Deposits 222.5 244.9 292.0 347.5
Debts to Banks &
Money Markets
51.3 47.8 63.3 88.6
Other External
Resources
55.3 67.3 75.3 110.7
Equity 40.9 53.9 66.5 72.4
Foreign Banks 104.9 107.9 135.8 158.3
Deposits 57.1 61.4 72.4 83.4
Debts to Banks &
Money Markets
21.9 19.5 30.4 32.9
Other External
Resources
12.8 11.2 14.7 23.1
Equity 13.2 15.8 18.4 18.8
Participation Banks 25.8 33.6 43.3 56.1
Deposits 19.0 26.7 33.1 39.2
Debts to Banks &
Money Markets
1.5 0.6 2.4 6.4
Other External
Resources
1.5 1.9 2.4 4.3
Equity 3.7 4.4 5.5 6.2
Development &
Investment Banks
22.9 27.0 31.0 41.6
Deposits 0.0 .. .. ..
111
This project is funded by the European Union under
the 7th Research Framework programme (theme SSH)
Grant Agreement nr 266800
Debts to Banks &
Money Markets
7.2 8.1 9.4 15.8
Other External
Resources
5.1 6.3 7.5 10.4
Equity 10.6 12.6 14.1 15.4
Total Banking Sector 732.5 834.0 1,006.7 1,217.7
Deposits 454.6 514.6 617.0 695.5
Debts to Banks &
Money Markets
93.1 86.9 123.2 173.3
Other External
Resources
98.4 121.6 131.9 204.2
Equity 86.4 110.9 134.5 144.6
Memo Items
Total TL Liabilities 476.8 570.2 699.0 777.2
Total FX Liabilities 255.7 263.9 307.7 440.5
Source: BRSA.
N.B. Items may not sum up to the totals because of rounding.
(a) Includes banks under SDIF.
Total Assets / GDP Ratio
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Figure II.B.1. displays the course of Total Assets / GDP ratio in the banking sector
between 1998 and 2010.35 Following the trough in 2002-4 which reflects the impact of
2000-1 crisis, this ratio reached its highest levels in 2009-10 (in the 80.0-90.0%
range). Even these levels are well below the EU average (more than 300.0%),
indicating the strong growth potential of the Turkish banking sector in the present
decade and after.
Figure II.B.1: Total Assets/GDP (1998-2010),%
Source: Turkstat and BAT.
Figure II.B.2. shows that on the basis of asset shares deposit banks play the greatest
role in financial intermediation. Among the deposit banks, private capital deposit
banks and state deposit banks have the major shares in assets (52.9% and 30.2%,
respectively as of March 2012). However, the asset share of “global” capital banks
has been on the rise in the 2000s, reaching 16.9% in March 2012 (BRSA 2012: 27).
35 Although the figures for the period 1980-98 are available, these are not comparable with the figures
pertaining to the period 1998-2010, due to the statistical break in GDP series in 1998. In terms of the
former GDP series based on a system of national accounts established in 1987, there is also a secular
rise in Total Assets / GDP ratio from about 30.0% in 1980 to about 65.0% in 1998.
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Total Assets/GDP in The Banking Sector
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Figure II.B.2: Total Assets/GDP Ratio in Different Types of Banks, (1998-2010)
Source: Turkstat and BAT.
Distribution of Bank Assets
Figure II.B.3. demonstrates that liquid assets and loans and receivables hold the
largest share of total assets between 1980 and 2010. As a result of the policies
relating to banking sector applied in 2002-2005 period, liquid assets and loans and
receivables of total assets increased. Until the crisis of 2000-1, the sector moved
away from funding real private sector activities and largely financed the public
sector.36 But this pattern started to change after 2001, and the share of loans in total
assets increased during the period of 2002-8. The shares of deposit banks,
participation banks and development and investments banks in total loans were
92.0%, 6.0% and 2.0%, respectively in 2010 (BAT 2011). The share of liquid assets
reached a high level in 2002-3 due to the 2000-1 crisis; but it later fell due to a better
business climate. The share of corporate loans in total loans was 68%, and the share
of loans borrowed by households was 32%, as of the end of 2010 (BAT 2011).
36 “Not surprisingly, both public and private banks channeled most of their funds to the government
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Figure II.B.3: Distribution of Bank Assets (1980-2010),%
Source: BAT.
Distribution of Liabilities
The major part of the banking system’s liability is made up of deposits which, as a
proportion, was fairly stable during 1980-2010 (Figure II.B.4). According to the
reports of BRSA and BAT, the high share of short-term deposits in total is still an
important problem for the Turkish banking sector. According to data presented in
Figure II.B.5, non-deposit funds have been the largest share in total liabilities
excluding deposits since 1988. The sector was operating with low levels of capital in
general, but between 2001-7 shareholders’ equity increased by measures to
restructure the sector.
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Figure II.B.4: The Share of Deposits in Total Liabilities (1980-2010),%
Source: BAT.
Figure II.B.5: Distribution of Non-Deposit Liabilities in the Banking System (1980-
2010),%
Source: BAT.
The Share of Foreign Currency Assets and Liabilities
The Figures III.B.6-7 demonstrate the share of foreign currency assets and liabilities,
respectively in total assets and liabilities between 1988 and 2010. Dollarization has
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affected the resource structure negatively. By the mid 1990s, the share of foreign
currency deposits within total deposits has increased above 55%. This situation has
caused both foreign currency savers and foreign currency credit customers to stay
out of the banking system. As seen from the Figure II.B.7, the share of foreign
currency in total liabilities was very high in the 1990s and in the beginning of 2000s.
During the pre-crises years liquid liabilities denominated in foreign currency
increased rapidly, leading to excessive indebtedness because of the tendency of the
banking system to open positions. “High real interest rates and financial arbitrage
encouraged banks to focus on government deficit funding via large, open foreign
H[FKDQJHSRVLWLRQVLHIRUHLJQEDQNORDQVZKLFKJHQHUDWHGOXFUDWLYHSURILWVǥ%DNíU
DQGQLđ37 Sensitivity of the banking system towards the speculative capital
outflows has increased in both crises of 1994 and 2000-138. Although converting the
short term foreign liabilities into the long term loans in domestic currency (maturity
and currency mismatch) could finance the growth in the economy via the banking
system, the financial fragility increased the risk of crisis.
37 The annual real interest rate for government securities averaged 32.0% between 1992 and 1999
%DNíUDQGQLđFLWHGIURP7UHDVXU\
38 Net capital inflows by non-residents minus net capital outflows by non-residents between the years
1993 (before financial crises) and 1994 (at the height of the crisis), and between 2000 and 2001 has
reached approximately the level of 19 billion USD (Erdem 2007: 139).
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Figure II.B.6: The Share of Foreign Currency Assets (1988-2010),%
Source: BAT.
Figure II.B.7: The Share of Foreign Currency Liabilities (1988-2010),%
Source: BAT.
Leverage Ratios
The following ratios are examined below as leverage ratios: Liabilities/own funds,
own funds/total assets, liabilities/total assets, and deposits/assets. Because of
strengthening capital structure of the banks, the ratio of liabilities/own funds
decreased after the 2000-1 crisis, as seen in Figure II.B.8. Other leverage ratios are
displayed in Figure II.B.9.
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Figure II.B.8: Liabilities/Own Funds in Banking System (1980-2010),%
Source: BAT.
Liabilities=total deposit (TC+FC)+total non-deposit funds+ other liabilities; own funs = total
shareholders’ equity.
As far as total assets/equity ratio is concerned, this ratio for the depository banks
have been under 10% since 2002 and this is lower than US financial institutions’
OHYHUDJHV DOíđNDQ   $IWHU WKH  FULVLV WLJKW UHJXODWRU\ DQG
supervisory reforms were put in place; hence the year 2002 was crucial for the value
of financial ratios in banking system. Liabilities/total assets ratio has recovered after
2003 and was fairly stable later. The rise of self-financing ratio of the sector refers to
the fact that the sector has become more resistant to possible fluctuations (BRSA
2011: 36).
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Figure II.B.9: Other Leverage Ratios in Banking System (1980-2010),%
Source: BAT.
Liabilities= total deposit (TC+FC)+ total non-deposit funds+ other liabilities; own funs = total
shareholders’ equity.
NPLs39
As a result of economic slowdown, the non-performing loan (NPL) ratio has
increased considerably between 1998 and 2002, not only for state banks which also
suffered from duty losses, but for private banks as well (Figure II.B.10).40 When the
39 "Non-performing Loans" name was changed to "Loans Under Follow-up" and evaluated under the
"Loans" section, starting from 2002.
40 “More significantly, at the other end of the spectrum, corrupt private banks were directing public
deposits and profits derived from arbitrage into group financing (i.e. connected lending) and ‘bad loans
to good friends’… The SDIF held the biggest portfolio of NPLs in Turkey. The amount of funds injected
into the SDIF banks reached USD 27.8 billion in 2004. By the end of 2007, the financial cost of SDIF
bail-outs had reached over USD 60 billion, while the SDIF collected only USD 16 billion (Sabah, 14
'HFHPEHUǥ%DNíUDQGQLđ7KHEXUGHQRQWKHWUHDVXU\GXHWROLDELOLWLHVRIWKHVHEDQNVDV
of 2001 was estimated 9.3% of the GNP (Boratav and Yeldan 2006: 427).
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initial shock subsided, NPL/gross loans ratio gradually went down to 3.5% in 2007. It
rose again to 3.7% in 2008 and 5.3% in 2009, mainly because of the repercussions of
the global financial crisis setting forth the 2008-9 crisis in Turkey (BRSA, 2011; see
also IV.A). The respective ratios for 2010 (3.7%) and 2011 (2.7%) are indicative of a
manageable situation (BRSA, 2011: 33-4). The decreases seen in NPL provision/own-
funds and NPL/gross loans in comparison to the crisis years may be taken as an
indication of a positive change in asset quality. However, the rising proportion of
credit card loans in total loan portfolio and increasing rates of NPL within this
category may pause a significant credit risk for the banks in the future (ISPA 2010:
11).41
Figure II.B.10: Loans Under Follow-up/Loans and Receivables by Banks Types (1986-
2002)*
Source: BAT.
41 According to the data of the Interbank Card Center, there were 46 million credit cards and 67.4
million debit cards as of July 2010. Turkey has become the third largest credit card market in Europe,
following the UK and Spain.
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By the amendments on the regulations concerning capital adequacy and credit risk in
May and June 2011, BRSA tried to ensure that the credit risk is monitored closely and
that necessary measures are taken on time; but also to manipulate the banks to act
prudently against the considerable increase in consumer loans and especially in
vehicle and housing loans.
Liquidity and Capital Ratios
With the new Basel Capital Accord (Basel II) in 2002, a ceiling of 20% was set for the
net general foreign currency position to equity of the banks. Minimum capital
adequacy requirements of 8% were similarly enforced. As a result of these
regulations, as can be seen in Figure II.B.11, liquidity was higher after 2002 than
previous years as expected. The ratio of shareholders’ equity/total assets increased
distinctly after 2002; then this ratio decreased until 2008 (Figure II.B.12).











































(Deposits + Non-Deposit Funds)
122
This project is funded by the European Union under
the 7th Research Framework programme (theme SSH)
Grant Agreement nr 266800
Figure II.B.12: Capital Ratios, 1980-2010*
Source: BAT.
*The previous values of the ratio "Shareholders’ Equity / (Amount subject to credit risk +
Amount Subject to Market Risk + Amount subject to operational risk)" is not available in the
data base system of BAT, before 2002.
Net Working Capital = Shareholders' Equity - Permanent Assets.
Household Debt
Table II.B.8 shows that the strong growth tendency in household debt has continued
in the “regulated” financial environment between 2003 and 2011. The housing loans
and the liabilities arising from credit cards were the important parts of the increase
of household borrowing. Household financial liabilities/GDP ratio increased rapidly
after 2005, and reached 15.9% in 2011. It is clear that banks (and NBFIs after 2005)
play a significant role in sponsoring consumption bubbles and financing property
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Table II.B.8: Development of Household Financial Assets and Liabilities, 2003-11 (billion
TLs)
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Financial Assets 156.0 190.7 216.3 256.0 281.8 353.8 402.0 450.3 509.2
Ind. Pension Fund 0 0.3 1.2 2.8 4.6 6.0 9.1 12.0 14.1
Shares 9.2 12.4 15.8 15.7 17.5 10.8 24.5 32.6 30.0
Gov. Debt Sec. (GDS+Eurobond) 36.1 41.0 33.3 27.7 19.2 19.7 13.0 8.4 10.3
Real Pers. Sav. Dep,
Part. Fund, Prec. Met. Sh. 100.9 124.6 150.2 188.8 221.1 278.4 307.7 352.1 405.4
Money in Circulation 9.8 12.4 18.2 24.4 25.0 29.3 34.3 45.2 49.4
Financial Liabilities
8.0 18.1 39.0 60.6 84.1 102.5 118.9 159.4 206.3
Consumer Loans 5.9 12.8 29.7 48.0 68.9 85.2 97.4 32.7 71.6
Credit Card Debt Balance 1.7 4.4 7.5 10.7 12.6 14.7 19.1 23.2 29.6
Con. Fin. Comp. Loans 0.4 0.9 1.8 1.4 1.7 1.6 1.7 2.9 4.4
Ind. Fin. Leasing Debts - - - 0.5 0.9 1.0 0.7 0.6 0.6
Liabilities/Assets (%) 5.1 9.5 18.0 23.7 29.8 29.0 29.6 35.4 40.5
Liabilities/GDP (%) 1.8 3.2 6.0 8.0 10.0 10.8 12.5 14.5 15.9
Source: BRSA December 2011:17
Data after 2005 include consumer loans allocated by banks, participation banks and
consumer financing companies as well as non-performing loans, installment credit
cards debts balances and non-performing credit card receivables concerning these
loans. Loan amounts are gross figures including non-performing loans. Credit card
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debt balance is composed of installment credit card debt balance and non-
performing credit card receivables.
State of the Banking Sector following Re-structuring
In brief, following the 2000-1 crisis, prudential regulations have significantly
contributed to improve the soundness of the banking sector, although some risks of
global financialisation are ever present. Table II.B.9 summarizes the indicators
related to the banking activities between 2006 and 2011. “Soundness” indicators of
the banking system are also presented in Table II.B.9.
Table II.B. 9: Development of Ratios Concerning Banking Activites (2006-11),%
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Loans/Total Assets 43.8 49.1 50.1 47.1 52.2 56.1
Credit Growth Rate 40.0 30.4 28.6 6.8 33.9 29.9
Securities/Total Asset 31.8 28.3 26.5 31.5 28.6 23.4
Fixed Assets/Total Assets 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 3.0 3.0
Own Funds/Total Liability 11.9 13.0 11.8 13.3 13.4 11.9
Deposits/ Total Liability 61.6 61.4 62.1 61.7 61.3 57.1
Loans/Deposits 71.2 80 80.8 76.3 85.2 98.2
Liabilities/Total Asset 88.1 87.0 88.2 86.7 86.6 88.1
Liabilities/Own Funds 739 667 748 652 648 742
Liquid and Semi-Liquid Asset/Liability 104.4 198.9 194.8 203.5 198.3 182.3
Liquid and Semi-Liquid
Asset(FC)/Liability(FC)
87.6 126.4 124.7 141.2 128.1 117.9
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FC Loans/Total Loans 25.5 24.0 28.7 26.6 27.0 29.0
FC Deposit/Total Deposit 39.4 35.4 35.3 33.7 29.7 33.9
FC Assets/Total Assets 33.1 28.3 30.3 26.7 25.6 30.3
Off-Balance Sheet Transactions/Total Assets 55.5 66.3 65.0 69.5 103.1 134.9
Derivative Transactions/Off-Balance Sheet
Transactions 38.6 41.6 41.2 43.3 37.6 35.0
Source: BRSA 2011, December, p.26.
Table II.B. 10: Banking Sector Soundness Indicators,% (2005-11)
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 March
2011
Legal Equities /Risk Weighted Assets 23.7 21.9 18.9 18 20.6 19 18
Tier-I / Risk Weighted Assets 24.3 21.3 18.3 17.2 18.6 17 16.4
Provisions for NPLs /Equities 1.6 1.5 1.8 3.3 3.2 2.4 2.2
NPLs /Gross Loans 4.7 3.7 3.5 3.7 5.3 3.7 3.2
ROA 2.7 3.2 3.3 2.5 3.3 3 2.8
ROE 20.4 27.1 26.6 20 26.4 22.3 20.7
Net Int. Income (Interest Margin)/Gross
Income
60.5 60.4 61 64.7 67.1 61.5 55.6
Non-interest Expenditures / Gross
Income
49.2 46.2 44.9 47.6 38.1 43.4 43.2
Liquid Assets /Total Assets - - 54.1 45.3 48.3 47.1 44
Liquid Assets /Short-term Debts - - 93.7 75.2 80.1 77.3 74.8
FX Open Position/Equities 4.6 4.4 2.4 1.7 -0.3 0.1 0.3
Source: BRSA March, 2011.
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Total loans and receivables/total assets ratio of banking sector decreased in the
crisis years; then this ratio has increased until 2011. This rise may be interpreted as
an improvement in asset quality. In contrast, the share of permanent assets in total
assets decreased in recent years.
While the share of loans within total assets has shown a tendency to increase
between 2006 and 2011, the securities portfolio has been reduced relatively in line
with the interest rate expectations. When the sector’s asset composition is analyzed,
it is seen that fixed assets are composing only 3.0% of total assets and that the asset
structure having high liquidity reduces the sector’s risk level. The increase in non-
deposit finance in 2011 has caused the share of deposits within total liabilities to
decrease, but also has led the loan/deposit ratio to rise. The fact that liquid and
semi-liquid assets to liabilities ratio is 100% and above, is considered as a positive
fact for liquidity risk. But this ratio has decreased from 203.5% in 2009 to 182.3% in
2011. Therefore, liquidity risk can be important in near future. Liquid and semi-liquid
foreign currency assets to foreign currency debts ratio is also above 100.0% and
117.9%, indicating that the sector is also strong in repaying foreign currency
liabilities. The high increase seen in off-balance sheet to balance sheet ratio in 2011
is considered as a risk-augmenting element.
After the crisis 2000-1, the financial restructuring resulted in significant
improvements in capital structure and NPL of the banking sector. The structure of
Turkish banking sector is stronger now than it was prior to 2001 crisis. However “the
IMF-supervised ‘prudent’ fiscal and monetary policies coupled with regulatory
reform not only helped to sustain the privileged position of bank capital but also led
WRLQFUHDVHGILQDQFLDOL]DWLRQRIWKHHFRQRP\ǥ%DNíUDQGQLđ
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II.B.2. NBFIs
Restructuring of the NBFIs
The division of labour among governmental agencies as regards the regulation of
financial sector is summarized in Table II.B.11. NBFIs supervised by the CMB will be
examined below first; later NBFIs under BRSA will be dealt with.
Table II.B. 11: Institutions and Regulatory Authorities in the Financial Sector




Public Deposit Money Banks*
Private Deposit Money Banks
Foreign Deposit Money Banks
Participation Banks
Investment and Development Banks
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Real Estate Investment Trusts
Venture Capital Investment Trusts
Portfolio Management Companies
Independent Auditing Firms
Real Estate Appraisal Companies
Rating Agencies
Capital Markets Board
*The term Deposit Money Banks in this Table refers to Deposit Banks.
NBFIs under the Supervision of CMB
The definitions for and the rules of establishment and/or operation of major NBFI
categories falling under the supervision of CMB are shown in Table II.B.12. Some
important steps taken by CMB for the development of these institutions can be
enumerated as follows: (i) the first communiqué regulating mutual funds and the
establishment of the first mutual fund in Turkey (1986); (ii) issuance of regulations on
types of mutual funds and tax incentives (1992); (iii) coming into force of a new and
comprehensive communiqué that brought many innovations to the business (1996);
(iv) various amendments to the said communiqué according to the changing needs of
the sector.
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Table II.B. 12: Definitions and Rules Concerning NBFIs under the Supervision of CMB
(as of 2011)





Collection of assets which
have been established
with the money to be
collected from the public




precious metals on the
basis of risk distribution
and fiduciary ownership.
They are established in the
form of open-end
investment companies and
do not have a legal entity.












These are mutual funds
established abroad.
_





the pension fund. The fund
is managed by portfolio
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No.4632 (April 2001) management companies
authorized by CMB.
Guaranteed Funds
Funds that guarantee to
repay a significant portion
or all of the initial
investment, or a specified
return to the investors at a
specified date
These are formed as sub-
funds of an umbrella fund.
A guarantee agreement is
signed between the fund
founder and guarantor in
which the beneficiary is
the fund investor. If the
founder is the guarantor,
then the conditions of
guarantee are specified in
the internal statute of the
fund.
Protected Funds
Funds that aim to protect
a significant portion or all
of the initial investment as
well as to maximize the
fund performance through
exposure to certain
investment markets for a
specified date. Capital
protection is not a definite
commitment, but is based
on “best-effort”.
Their characteristics are
similar to the guaranteed
funds, with a significant
difference that the funds
should be invested in GDI,










They are established in
form of joint-stock
corporations and have a
legal personality. They are
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real assets, real estate-
based projects and capital
market instruments based
on real estates.
They are established in
form of joint stock
corporations and have a
legal personality. Their
establishment requires
the approval by CMB and
Ministry of Industry. They
are authorised to manage







which direct the issued
capital towards venture
capital investments
They are established in
form of joint-stock
corporations and have a
legal personality. They








and (iv) invest in other
venture capital investment
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that manage portfolios of
institutional and individual
investors
They are established in the
form of joint-stock
corporations with the
permission of (and also









They are established in the
form of joint-stock
corporations and are
responsible for the losses
borne by their customers
or third parties due to the
deficiencies of their
appraisal.
As of December 2011, there are 787 mutual funds (securities mutual funds, foreign
mutual funds, pension mutual funds, guaranteed funds, and protected funds), 53
investment trusts (securities investment trusts, real estate investment trusts, and
venture capital investment trusts) and 32 portfolio management companies (see
Table II.B.13). Since 2007 there has been a significant increase in the number of real
estate appraisal companies (from 26 in 2007 to 113 in 2011).
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Table II.B. 13: Number of NBFIs under the Supervision of CMB, 1997-2011
Source: CMB, www.cmb.gov.tr
* Number of funds as of 31October 2011.
** Data for the number of securities investment trusts are available from 2003. So, there is a
significant increase in the number of funds in 2003.
Table II.B.14 and Figure II.B.13 provide the information on the portfolio value of

















1997 - - 4 2 75 - 6
1998 143 13 22 3 72 - 6
1999 136 13 29 5 72 - 7
2000 133 20 30 9 73 - 7
2001 123 21 31 14 77 - 4
2002 119 40 32 16 77 - 4
2003 117 292** 32 21 80 6 4
2004 109 381 34 21 83 6 5
2005 101 424 38 19 91 9 6
2006 100 451 43 19 94 13 7
2007 104 461 48 19 96 26 8
2008 104 541 50 23 97 50 8
2009 103 523 49 23 95 63 9
2010 103 695 54 28 92 82 9
2011 100 787 53 32 92 113 9
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period 1997 to December 2011. Noticeably, investment trusts portfolio value is
considerably smaller when compared to the mutual funds and portfolio management
companies. As of December 2011, portfolio value of investment trusts is
approximately 7.6 billion USD. Portfolio management companies have portfolio value
of 27.9 billion USD, and mutual funds have portfolio value of 26.6 billion USD.
Over the period 1997-2011, the portfolio values of mutual funds and portfolio
management companies have moved in parallel to each other with significant
increases in 2003 and 2004. Investment trusts have experienced an escalation in the
portfolio value in 2010 with a subsequent decline in 2011.
Table II.B.14: Portfolio Value of Mutual Funds, Investment Trusts and Portfolio
Management Companies (Million USD), 1997 - 2011

























1997 932 43 62
1998 1,112 66 434 150
1999 2,257 4 160 796 472
2000 2,888 4 117 792 5 995
2001 3,318 20 89 621 3 1,912
2002 5,718 18 85 661 2 3,531
2003 14,226 20 160 845 3 12,759
2004 18,213 20 219 234 1,030 78 18,105
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2005 21,872 25 902 364 1,645 69 22,395
2006 15,577 52 1,984 382 1,756 90 18,259
2007 22,508 77 3,890 587 3,315 148 26,613
2008 15,768 35 3,973 364 2,808 90 20,213
2009 19,921 39 6,126 479 3,172 103 26,694
2010 21,620 35 7,822 488 11,189 121 30,304
2011* 18,459 30 8,057 378 6,853** 352** 27,902
Source: CMB.
* as of 31October 2011
** as of September 2011
Figure II.B. 13: Portfolio Value Distribution (Million USD), 1997- 2011
Source: CMB.
The ratio of overall portfolio value of mutual funds, investment trusts and portfolio
management companies to GDP is displayed in Figure II.B.14. The overall portfolio
value–to–GDP ratio has ascended to 9.2% in 2003 from substantially lower ratios of
3.0% and 4.3% in 2001 and 2002, respectively. Except for the year 2008, when the
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overall portfolio value-to-GDP has stayed roughly stable around 8.0% to 9.0%
between 2003 and 2011.
Figure II.B.14: Portfolio Value of Mutual Funds, Investment Trusts and Portfolio
Management Companies as a Percentage of GDP, 1997-2011
Source: CMB.
Figure II.B.15 displays the structure of mutual funds between 1997 and 2011.
Specifically, this figure presents the percentage distribution of the overall portfolio
value of mutual funds among the ‘securities funds’, ‘foreign funds’ and ‘pension
funds’. Apparently, foreign funds have a negligibly small share in the overall portfolio
value. Between 1997 and 2004, securities funds have 99%-100% shares in the overall
portfolio. However, after 2005 the share of securities funds decline from 88.4% in
2006 to 69.5% in 2011. In contrast, the share of pension funds increase systematically

























This project is funded by the European Union under
the 7th Research Framework programme (theme SSH)
Grant Agreement nr 266800
Figure II.B. 15: The Percentage Distribution of Mutual Funds, 1997-2011
Source: CMB.
Figure II.B.16 displays the structure of investment trusts between 1997 and 2011.
Specifically, the figure presents the percentage distribution of the overall portfolio
value of investment trusts among the ‘securities investment trusts’, ‘real estate
investment trusts’, and ‘venture capital investment trusts’. Over the specified period
real estate investment trusts have the largest share in the overall portfolio value of
the investment trusts.
100 100 99.84 99.90 99.41 99.69 99.86 98.70 95.91
88.38 85.02
79.73 76.37 73.34 69.53

















This project is funded by the European Union under
the 7th Research Framework programme (theme SSH)
Grant Agreement nr 266800
Figure II.B. 16: The Percentage Distribution of Investment Trusts, 1997-2011
Source: CMB.
NBFIs under the Supervision of BRSA
This sub-section provides information on the NBFIs operating under the BRSA and
uses ‘Financial Markets Report’ of the BRSA published in March 2011 (Tables II.B.15-
II.B.25). As noted earlier, the following NBFIs are regulated by the BRSA:
- Financial Leasing Companies
- Factoring Companies
- Consumer Financing Companies
- Asset Management Companies
In the period 2002-7, the total assets of this category of NBFIs grew faster (at around
31% CAGR) than that of the banking sector (at around 22% CAGR). Consequently their
total assets in proportion to bank assets rose from 3.0% in 2002 to around 4.0% in
2006-8. Later, a slowdown in the asset growth of this category set in, such that the
proportion mentioned above fell to 3.6% in 2010. It is likely that the prospective
0.0
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growth of NBFIs in these fields will be geared to the overall growth of financial
activity in general, and the growth of banking sector in particular. The asset shares of
four different types of companies within this category of NBFIs exhibit substantial
variation over time, but financial leasing and factoring companies definitely have
larger shares (about 43.0% and 39.0%, respectively, as of 2010) relative to those of
consumer finance and asset management companies (about 16.0% and 2.0%
respectively, in the same year). The preponderance of the first two types is not
expected to change considerably in the medium term. Below are the tables
displaying fundamental balance sheet magnitudes, operational indicators and
soundness indicators of these four categories (Tables II.B.15-25).
Table II.B. 15: Financial Leasing Sector Fundamental Balance Sheet Sizes (Billion TL),
2007-11
Share within Balance Sheet
(%)
2007 2008 2009 2010 March
2011
March 2010 March 2011
Receivables 11.7 13.9 10.8 10.2 10.9 70.6 69.0
NPLs 0.5 1.0 1.5 1.5 1.5 10.7 9.20.3
Reserves 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.7 4.5 4.6
Banks 0.8 1.4 1.6 3.1 2.3 13.9 14.7
Total Assets 13.7 17.1 14.7 15.8 15.8 100.0 100.0
Loans Granted 10.3 13.7 10.7 11.2 11.0 71.9 69.9
Equities 2.5 3.0 3.5 3.9 4.0 24.6 25.5
Total Off-Bal. Sheet
Accounts
8.1 15.6 16.8 18.6 20.0 117.9 126.2
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Guarantees Taken - 13.4 14.1 13.7 14.2 97.5 89.5
Guarantees Given - 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 4.6 4.7
Derivatives Financial Inst. - 0.9 1.1 1.9 2.3 6.3 14.4
Custody Accounts - 0.4 0.8 2.2 2.6 8.4 16.2
Source: BRSA (March 2011).
Table II.B. 16: Financial Leasing Sector Operational Indicators, 2007-11
2007 2008 2009 2010 March
2011
Change (same period of
previous year)
Number of Branches 10 18 18 16 16 -1 (number)
Number of Offices 65 80 76 69 68 -7 (number)
Number of Personnel 1,557 1,427 1,280 1,286 1,280 9 (number)
Number of Customers - 73,577 60,010 50,428 46,950 -17.3 (%)
Number of Contracts - 121,627 98,596 82,615 82,127 -11.1 (%)
Source: BRSA (March 2011).
Table II.B. 17: Financial Leasing Sector Soundness Indicators (%), 2007-11
2007 2008 2009 2010 March 2011
Share within Non-Banking Sector* 54.5 57.9 49 42.7 42.4
Receivables/Equities Ratio 4.7 4.7 3.1 2.6 2.7
Profit After Tax /Equities 14.1 19.8 16.5 12.0 3.4
Profit After Tax /Assets 2.5 3.4 3.9 2.9 0.9
141
This project is funded by the European Union under
the 7th Research Framework programme (theme SSH)
Grant Agreement nr 266800
NPL Ratio 4.2 6.6 12.3 12.6 11.8
Reserve Ratio 52.7 37.7 40.7 47.6 49.6
FX Assets /Assets 70.9 79.2 73.2 67.5 73.0
FX Liabilities /Liabilities 72.6 76.7 68.0 61.0 64.8
On-Balance Sheet FX Net Position/Equities -9.4 14.1 21.8 27.0 32.4
Off-Balance Sheet FX Net Position/Equities 167.8 339.9 315.3 313.7 319.8
Transaction Limit Ratio (<30) 5.9 5 3.8 3.0 3.0
Nr. of Companies Bearing Loss (number) 20 4 5 9 4
Source: BRSA (March 2011)
*”Non-banking sector” in this context implies NBFIs under the supervision of BRSA.
Table II.B. 18: Factoring Sector Fundamental Balance Sheet Sizes (Billion TL), 2007-11
Share within Balance Sheet
(%)
2007 2008 2009 2010 March
2011
March 2010 March 2011
Receivables 6.2 5.6 8.4 12.4 12.4 82.1 86.5
NPLs 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 4.5 3.7
Reserves 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 3.9 3.2
Banks 0.4 1.1 1.1 1.2 0.9 10.0 6.0
Total Assets 7.6 7.8 10.5 14.5 14.4 100.0 100.0
Loans Granted 4.9 4.9 7.6 11.1 10.8 74.3 75.2
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Equities 2.0 2.4 2.5 3.0 3.0 23.0 21.0
Total Memorandum
Accounts
23.4 30.6 28.3 37.9 34.0 272.1 236.7
Fac. Trans. Risk of which is
not
- 3.9 2.4 3.1 3.2 24.3 22.0
Guarantees Taken - 15.6 10.5 17.4 15.5 99.7 107.7
Derivatives Financial Inst. - 1.4 1.0 1.9 2.2 9.8 15.6
Custody Accounts - 7.9 12.8 12.7 10.5 123.4 73.1
Source: BRSA (March, 2011).
Table II.B. 19: Factoring Sector Operational Indicators, 2007-11
2007 2008 2009 2010 March
2011




16 20 26 28 29 2 (unit)
Number of Offices 119 128 116 175 184 45 (unit)
Number of
Personnel
2,912 3,009 2.959 3,557 3,678 627 (unit)
Number of
Customers
- 50,228 40,997 57,094 61,602 31.8 (%)
Number of
Contracts
- 146,558 65,952 89,516 88,259 22.4 (%)
Source: BRSA (March, 2011).
Table II.B. 20: Factoring Sector Soundness Indicators (%), 2007-11
2007 2008 2009 2010 March 2011
Share within Non-Banking Sector* 30.0 26.3 34.9 39.2 38.5
Receivables/Equities Ratio 3.1 2.4 3.4 4.2 4.1
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Profit After Tax /Equities 21.3 18.5 13.1 13.1 3.4
Profit After Tax /Assets 5.6 5.6 3.1 2.7 0.7
NPL Ratio 4.0 8.2 5.9 4.0 4.1
Reserve Ratio 87.0 77.0 83.7 85.3 85.2
FX Assets /Assets 11.6 15.4 8.2 9.1 13.1
FX Liabilities /Liabilities 24.0 35.1 16.9 17.5 19.7
On-Balance Sheet FX Net Position/Equities -46.9 -64.6 -36.6 -41.2 -31.2
Off-Balance Sheet FX Net Position/Equities 40.3 175.3 189.7 188.6 266.4
Transaction Limit Ratio (<30) 3.3 2.3 3.5 4.4 4.2
Nr. of Companies Bearing Loss (number) 13 13 15 14 10
Source: BRSA (March, 2011).
*”Non-banking sector” in this context implies NBFIs under the supervision of BRSA.
Table II.B. 21: Consumer Finance Sector Fundamental Balance Sheet Sizes (Billion TL),
2007-11
Share within Balance Sheet
(%)
2007 2008 2009 2010 March
2011
March 2010 March 2011
Receivables 3.7 4.0 3.9 5.4 5.8 84.1 90.7
NPLs 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 7.5 4.0
Reserves 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 3.4 2.7
Banks 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 10.0 6.4
Total Assets 3.9 4.7 4.5 6.1 6.4 100.0 100.0
Loans Granted 3.2 3.7 3.6 4.5 4.9 76.8 76.0
Equities 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 9.2 7.8
Total Off-Bal. Sheet
Accounts
3.3 0.9 2.5 4.4 4.4 41.1 67.9
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Guarantees Taken - 0.2 1.2 2.9 3.2 28.3 50.4
Derivatives Financial Inst. - 0.7 0.9 1.2 1.1 12.0 17.3
Source: BRSA (March, 2011).
Table II.B. 22: Consumer Finance Sector Operational Indicators, 2007-11
2007 2008 2009 2010 March
2011




3 3 1 1 1 0 (number)
Number of Offices 0 0 0 0 0 0 (number)
Number of
Personnel
474 544 512 551 567 58 (number)
Number of
Customers
- 357,475 229,676 261,905 272,861 23.9 (%)
Number of
Contracts
- 371,965 242,441 276,208 287,576 23.8 (%)
Source: BRSA (March, 2011).
Table II.B. 23: Consumer Finance Sector Soundness Indicators (%), 2007-11
2007 2008 2009 2010 March 2011
Share within Non-Banking Sector* 15.5 15.8 15.1 16.3 17.2
Receivables/Equities Ratio 12.4 10.6 9.5 11.4 11.6
Profit After Tax /Equities 15.4 2.5 3.2 9.1 5.6
Profit After Tax /Assets 1.2 0.2 0.3 0.7 0.4
NPL Ratio 3.9 7.4 9.6 5.0 4.4
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Reserve Ratio 45.5 21.5 35.6 60.2 68.6
FX Assets /Assets 17.7 9.3 8.1 3.9 3.7
FX Liabilities /Liabilities 30.0 43.9 42.7 28.9 27.2
On-Balance Sheet FX Net Position/Equities -163.1 -432 -380.7 -322.0 -301.5
Off-Balance Sheet FX Net Position/Equities 184.3 82.3 180.5 233.2 218.4
Transaction Limit Ratio (<30) 12.2 10.8 10.0 11.7 12.3
Nr. of Companies Bearing Loss (number) 1 4 4 4 4
Source: BRSA (March, 2011).
*”Non-banking sector” in this context implies NBFIs under the supervision of BRSA.










Banks and Other Financial
Institutions
28.5 40.9 39.6 103.5 125.0 8.6 17.1
Loans Taken Over 34.7 17.9 190.2 344.3 0.0 53.0 0.0
NPL Taken Over 90.6 311 198.7 277.9 683.8 54.5 93.4
Provisions 33.2 7.8 96.2 108.9 114.4 20.8 15.6
Total Assets 241.3 369.8 355.5 657.7 732.3 100.0 100.0
Loans Taken 157.1 287.1 218 466.7 525.2 61.9 71.7
Equities 72.9 74.8 126.6 178.6 191.7 30.7 26.2
Total Off Balance Sheet
Accounts
123.9 188.5 118.9 214.0 209.9 37.7 28.7
Letter of Guarantees 2.4 16.3 10.1 22.1 13.1 3.9 1.8
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Commitments 5.8 5.6 0.0 2.3 0.8 0.6 0.1
Derivative Financial
Instruments
41.4 28.2 7.8 7.6 7.6 1.6 1.0
Custody Accounts 72.9 137 101 181.9 184.0 31.6 25.1
Source: BRSA (March, 2011).
Table II.B. 25: Asset Management Companies Soundness Indicators (%), 2007-11
2007 2008 2009 2010 March 2011
Share within Non-Banking Sector* 0.9 1.2 1.2 2.0 2.0
Equities/Receivables Ratio 58.2 22.8 32.5 28.7 28.0
Profit After Tax /Equities -28.7 -73.1 19.0 30.3 8.2
Profit After Tax /Assets -8.7 -14.8 6.8 8.2 2.2
Provisioning Ratio 36.6 2.5 48.4 39.2 16.7
FX Assets /Assets 55.1 19.1 17.7 13.2 11.9
FX Liabilities /Liabilities 67.2 78.4 16.0 29.4 30.5
On-Balance Sheet FX Net
Position/Equities
-40.1 -292.9 4.9 -59.9 -70.9
Number of Firms Made Loss (Number) 2 4 3 0 0
Total Number of Firms (Number) 5 5 6 6 6
Source: BRSA (March, 2011).
*”Non-banking sector” in this context implies NBFIs under the supervision of BRSA.
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II.C. INTEGRATION OF TURKISH ECONOMY WITH THE WORLD COMMODITY
FINANCIAL MARKETS
II.C.1. Trade Integration
This section briefly investigates the main trends in the integration of the Turkish
economy with the rest of the world. For this aim, first, the focus will shortly be on
trade integration. Then, we will shift our focus on the main subject of financial
integration. The last part of this section will be on the implications of financial
integration.
As briefly mentioned in Section I of this report, openness of the Turkish economy has
significantly increased after the 1980s. Trade liberalization has gone hand in hand
with financial liberalization. In line with these developments the importance of trade
and financial flows relative to Turkish GDP has shown a steady increase.










1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 19901992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Exports of Goods and Services Imports of Goods and Services
148
This project is funded by the European Union under
the 7th Research Framework programme (theme SSH)
Grant Agreement nr 266800
In the beginning of the 1980s relative weight of the total trade of the Turkish economy
in the economy was only about 10%. This ratio reached to about 65% at the end of
2012 (see Figure II.C.1). Since 1980s, both imports and exports have shared the same
trend. Goods trade has been the driving force behind the spectacular increase in the
share of trade in the economy. Overall, while it is apparent that the importance of
services related activities in exports has contributed to the rise of the ratio of the
exports of goods and services to the GDP due to mainly tourism related services, the
importance of services in imports remained relatively stable (see Figure II.C.2 and
II.C.3).
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Figure II.C. 3: Imports of Goods and Services (% of GDP)
Source: CBRT, WB.
The increasing trade integration with the rest of the world caused relatively high
current account deficits during the high growth periods. The current account deficit
was giving some bad signals before the two major crises of 1994 and 2001 (exceeding
3% as a ratio to GDP), although it floated around much lower values during 1980s
and 1990s (see Figure II.C.4). Yet, there seems to be a structural break in the
behaviour of the current account deficit after 2001. The average deficit to GDP ratio
became about 5.0% after 2001 whereas this was 1.2% in the period from 1980 to 1989
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The main contributor of the current account deficit has been the balance on goods
(see Figure II.C.5). Customs Union with the EU from 1995 onwards were among the
causes of the rapid expansion of the current account deficit. Income balance has
been another factor worsening the Turkish current account balance whereas service
balance and current transfers have improved the deficit. The balance on services
has been positive due to tourism revenues. Although the relevance of workers’
remittances has disappeared gradually, they have also improved the current account
balance particularly in the 1980s and 1990s.
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Figure II.C. 5: Current Account Balance and its Components (% of GDP)
Source: CBRT, WB.
II.C.2. Financial Integration
Along with financial liberalization of the 1980s, the amounts of financial inflows have
gradually increased as well. Financial liberalization policies also enabled the Turkish
citizens to purchase foreign financial assets. Nevertheless, the magnitude of
financial outflows has never reached significant levels in Turkey (see Figure II.C.6).
As a result, the Turkish economy has generally enjoyed positive absolute and relative
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Figure II.C. 6: Financial Inflows and Outflows (% of GDP)
Source: CBRT, WB.
Although as expected, this trend has gained momentum after the convertibility of the
Turkish lira in 1989, it took a relatively long time for financial flows to gain
importance in Turkey. The amount of net financial flows reached to 70 billion USD
whereas it was less than 5 billion USD before the mid-1980s.
Three structurally different periods seem to have existed in the movements of the
financial flows. When one investigates financial inflows and outflows separately,
these periods are much more apparent. Financial inflows and outflows were
negligible during 1980s. Financial outflows were restricting the role of relatively
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increased in the 1990s while financial outflows remained unimportant in the same
period. Post-2001 seems to be structurally a different period than the earlier periods.
There was a sudden stop in net financial flows during the 2008-9 global crisis.
However, financial flows reached their pre-crisis levels in a very short time.
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Figure II.C. 8: Financial Flows, net (% GDP)
Source: CBRT, WB.
Although foreign direct investment (FDI) gained importance after 2001 as well,
financial flows to the Turkish economy have mostly been in the form of other flows or
portfolio flows (see Figure II.C.9). The surge of net foreign direct investment into the
Turkish financial markets after 2001 was mostly related with the privatization of
major public companies in this period. Furthermore, increasing global liquidity and
decreasing interest rates in major developed countries have been external driving
forces behind the surge of other and portfolio flows to Turkey in the same period.
Overall, among financial flows, other flows have been the dominant form of flows
(see Figure II.C.9). Other flows consist of the international financial transactions of
central banks, general government, banks and other sectors. In general, the
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Turkish financial account (see Figure II.C.10). The borrowing of the Turkish banks
has been another significant component of other flows. In other words, financial
liberalization process has provided Turkish banks and other firms with ample
opportunities to borrow at a lower cost from the international financial markets.
Figure II.C. 9: Composition of Capitlal Flows to the Turkish Economy, net (%GDP)
Source: CBRT,WB.
One of the key characteristics of financial flows to the Turkish economy is high
volatility of the flows. When one investigates the components of financial flows in
terms of volatility, as expected new other flows including trade credits, borrowing of
the banks and other companies from the rest of the world are most volatile
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Figure II.C. 10: Net Other Flows , (% of GDP)
Source: CBRT,WB.
II.C.3. The General Macroeconomic Implications of Financial Flows
Elements of Speculation-Led Growth
The age of globalisation, if one is to go by the promises made until the ongoing global
crisis, was supposed to bring economic growth, prosperity and stability for the
participants of the post-Cold War international economic order. But ironically, it has
been so far plagued with a series of financial crises which posed a threat to the
stability of the financial system. More significantly, it wreaked havoc with the
contention that the policies of financial liberalization in general, of capital account
liberalization in particular, would constitute the lynchpin of political and economic
stability. Turkish case provides an exemplary illustration of the fallacy of this
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stabilisation’. While this would, in turn, lead many to conclude that the 1990s had
been a ‘lost decade for Turkey’, since in per capita terms Turkish real GDP was just
DERXWLWVOHYHOE\WKHHQGRIWKHGHFDGH%HGLUKDQRßOXDQG<DOPDQ
As in the case of many developing countries, financial flows have had many crucial
implications for the Turkish economy. First, high volatility of financial flows has come
with a big burden on the economy in the form of high growth volatility. Turkish
economy has been exposed to boom-bust cycles of financial flows. During the boom
period, the economy has experienced a relatively high growth while the growth rate
has either become negative or has decreased considerably during the bust periods.
Figure II.C.11-II.C.12 demonstrate this phenomenon. Figure II.C.11 provides a long-
term picture of the relationship between net financial flows from the balance of
payments data over 1980 until 2012. Figure II.C.12, on the other hand portrays the
post -1989 financial liberalisation era. The simple correlation between net financial
flows and growth was 0.45, 0.66, and 0.75 in the period of 1980-9, 1990-9, and 2000-
12 respectively. Yet, one can argue that the increased dependence of the Turkish
economy on speculative short-term capital flows over the post-1989 financial
liberalisation era is also evident from the figures. In fact, capital account
liberalisation in August 1989 increasingly forged the Turkish economy to become
dependent on the newly emerging financial cycles, and the arbitrage-seeking in - and
outflows led to deepening external and domestic instability.
This phenomena is directly related to the fact that one the one hand, financial flows
proliferate the capacity of domestically operated banks to give more loans to
consumers and firms, on the other hand, during the boom periods, big firms can
easily obtain relatively cheap loans from the international financial markets. When
financial flows halt or start moving out of the country, a credit crunch takes place
beside a sudden pressure on exchange rates which would deteriorate the balance
sheets of those firms of which earnings are denominated in TL and payments are
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denominated in foreign currencies. The figures underscore the observation that
under the deregulated financial environment, sources of growth originated not from
domestic capital accumulation, but from the ad hoc and often irrational decrees of
foreign (speculative) financial capital. In periods of high inflows of financial capital
growth rate of the gross domestic product tended to increase, yet periods of capital
flight meant direct recession –even outright collapse as in 1994, 1999, and 2001.
Under these conditions, whatever the growth performance of the economy during the
post-capital account liberalisation, it had to be based on speculation-led.
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Figure II.C. 12: Balance of Payments Finance Account + Net Errors and Omissions
(Million USD) + Real Growth Rate of GDP (%), 1992 Q1 – 2008 Q4
Source: Turkstat and CBRT.
Note that the adjustments of the economy in response to the 2008-9 global crisis has
also relied on reinvigoration of the foreign capital inflows. It was only the rise in
capital inflows that the GDP could have recovered. In Figure II.C.13 the same process
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Figure II.C. 13: Financial Capital Inflows and GDP Growth,% (2008 Q1- 2012Q4)
Source: Turkstat and CBRT.
All figures help to disclose the same phenomenon: Turkish economy had become
increasingly dependent on foreign finance capital. At times of inflows economic
activity accelerates, yet once the inflow slows down, GDP falters. This led to a highly
volatile pattern of growth trends.
The Exchange Rate
Figure II.C.14 displays the very apparent relationship between financial flows and the
nominal exchange rate over a long time horizon. Figure II.C.15, on the other hand,
portrays the path of the bilateral (vis-à-vis the USD) real exchange rate (in PPP
terms, with producer prices as the deflator). One can observe from the figures that,
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inflation rate, the appreciation of the effective exchange rate are mostly translated
into appreciation of the real effective exchange rate.
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Figure II.C. 15: Index of the Real Exchange Rate, Jan. 1982 – Apr. 2013
Source: CBRT and Turkstat.
The era of export promotion (the 1980s) is known with its devaluationist features
(Section I). To promote exports TL was significantly devalued. The 1989 gives a
turning point with Turkey being trapped into a high interest rate and cheap foreign
exchange rate (appreciating domestic currency - the TL). The currency crises of
November 2000 through February 2001 are clearly visible in the figures. The recent
blip in late 2008 under the great recession, on the other hand, has had a minimal
effect on the real value of the real exchange rate and did not suffice to change the
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It can be argued that one key aspect of this tendency towards appreciation of the TL
is due to the deregulated, excessively open regime of the Turkish capital account. In
this structure the the exchange rate and the interest rate actually became exogenous
variables, totally dependent on the decisions of international arbiters.
The volatility of financial flows and the high cost of sudden stops seems to have
forced CBRT to accumulate high reserves as many central banks in developing
countries. In this vein, even though officially the Turkish Central Bank implements a
flexible exchange rate regime, the Bank has also built up a huge foreign exchange
reserves for mostly insurance purposes especially since the crisis of 2001 (see
Figure II.C.16). Although high accumulated reserves would serve as insurance, given
the magnitude of financial flows to the Turkish economy, it is not very clear how the
accumulated reserves would immunize the Turkish economy from a big external
shock wave which can be intensified demand of domestic players for foreign
exchanges. Furthermore, taking into account that the financial shock which hit the
Turkish economy during the recent crisis could not be considered very high relative
to the shocks of the 1994 and 2001, the performance of the Turkish economy during
the 2008-9 global crisis cannot be considered as an indication of increasing
resilience of the economy. Net financial flows reached -2.5% and -7.5% of GDP in
1994 and 2001 respectively, it was a 1.64% in 2009.
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Figure II.C. 16: Net International Reserves (% of GDP)
1
Source: CBRT, WB.
Foreign Balances and Dynamics of External Debt: Post-200142
The structural overvaluation of the TL, not surprisingly, manifests itself in ever-
expanding deficits on the commodity trade and current account balances. As
traditional Turkish exports lose their competitiveness, new export lines emerge. Yet,
these proved to be mostly import-dependent, assembly-line industries, such as
automotive parts and consumer durables. They use cheap import materials, are
assembled in Turkey with low value added, and are re-directed for export. Thus,
being mostly import-dependent, they have a low capacity to generate value added
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and employment. As traditional exports dwindle, the newly emerging export
industries had not been vigorous enough to close the trade gap.
Consequently, starting in 2003 Turkey has witnessed expanding current account
deficits, with the figure in 2007 reaching a record-breaking magnitude of 38.1 billion
USD, or 6.7% as a ratio to the aggregate GNP. As noted in Section II.C.1, Turkey
traditionally has never been a completely current account deficit-prone economy.
Over the last two decades (80’s and 90’s) the average of the current account balance
hovered around plus and minus 1.5 - 2.0%, with deficits exceeding 3.0%, leading to
open crises as in 1994 and 2001, during when significant currency depreciations had
taken place. Thus, the mechanics behind the culminating current account deficit of
the post-2001 period can only be understood in the context of the speculative
transactions embedded in the finance account of the balance of payments.
Table II.C.1 summarizes the relevant data, which indicate that the finance account
has depicted a net surplus of 16.4 billion over the period, 2003 through 2007. About a
third of this sum (51.2 billion USD) was due to credit financing of the banking sector
and the non-bank enterprises, while a sum of 42.1 billion USD originated from non-
residents’ portfolio investments in Turkey. Residents have exported financial capital
at the magnitude of 10.1 billion USD, and if one interprets the net errors and
omissions term of the BOP accounts as an indicator of domestic hot money flows
(see e.g. Boratav and Akyüz 2003; Boratav and Yeldan 2005), the total sum of net
speculative finance capital inflows is calculated to reach 41.2 billion USD over the
post-2003 to 2008 crisis adjustments under the AKP administration.
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Table II.C. 1: Selected Indicators on Balance of Payments and Foreign Debt (Million
USD), 2001-7
Source: CBRT (www.tcmb.gov.tr).
The FDI is taken as an important source of financing the current account deficit
especially after 2005. The BOP data reveal a sudden increase in the flow of FDI
monies totaling 40.7 billion USD in 2006 and 2007. However, looking at the
components of FDI more closely, it would be revealed that the bulk of the
aforementioned flow had been due to privatization receipts plus real estate and land
purchases by foreigners. Neither of these items are sustainable sources of foreign
exchange, and they were driven by speculative arbitrage opportunities rather than
enhancing the real physical capital stock of the domestic economy.
Over its period of administration, 2003-2007, the first AKP government succeeded in
attracting a total of 94 billion USD of speculative foreign capital. This stock was fed
upon two sources: (i) foreigners’ holdings of government debt instruments and (ii)
IRUHLJQHUVǢ KROGLQJV RI VHFXULWLHV DW WKH ì6(  7KLV DJJUHJDWH VWRFN RI KRW PRQH\
reaches to almost the total cumulative current account deficit over the post-2001
crisis period.
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Total over 2007-
2003
Exports (fob) 34,373 40,124 51,206 67,047 76,949 91,944 113,185 400,331
Imports (fob) -38,106 -47,407 -65,216 -90,925 -110,479 -133,268 -160,702 -560,590
Trade Balance -3,733 -7,283 -14,010 -23,878 -33,530 -41,324 -47,517 -160,259
Current Account Balance 3,392 -1,524 -8,037 -15,604 -22,603 -32,192 -38,031 -116,467
Finance Account Balance -14,643 1,161 7,098 17,679 43,623 42,966 50,029 161,395
Foreign Direct Investment by Residents Abroad -497 -175 -499 -859 -1,078 -934 -2,107 -5,477
Foreign Direct Investment by Non-Residents 3,352 1,137 1,752 2,847 10,029 19,918 21,864 56,410
Non-Residents' Portfolio Investments in Turkey -3,727 1,503 3,851 9,411 14,670 11,402 2,780 42,114
Residents' Portfolio Investments Abroad -788 -2,096 -1,386 -1,388 -1,233 -4,029 -2,063 -10,099
Other Investment, Net -12,983 792 3,380 7,668 21,235 16,609 29,555 78,447
Net Errors and Emissions -1,759 118 4,941 2,267 2,181 -149 17 9,257
Change in Reserves (-: Increase) 12,924 212 -4,097 -4,342 -23,200 -10,625 -12,015 -54,279
Foreign Debt Stock 113,592 129,532 144,098 160,927 169,050 205,727 247,418 117,886
Short Term Foreign Debt Stock 16,403 16,424 23,013 32,215 37,746 40,969 41,747 25,323
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Financing of the balance of payments – current account deficits had followed a wide
swing over the post-2008 global crisis era. The current account deficit soared in
2011, reaching to 75 billion USD. This was 10% to the ratio of the GDP. Table II.C.2
below portrays the sources of current account financing. The rise of the share of
portfolio investments within the finance account reveals the “hot money” component
of this finance.
Table II.C. 2: Balance of Payments Main Indicators
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Current Account Balance -40,438 -121,680 -45,447 -75,092 -47,521
Finance Account 34,730 10,123 59,061 66,698 69,228
Foreign Direct Inv., Net 17,211 7,110 7,572 13,698 8,481
Portfolio Balance, Net -5,014 227 16,093 21,986 40,780
Net Errors and Omissions 3,011 2,879 1,405 9,433 1,158
Reserve Changes* 1,057 -111 -12,809 1,813 -20,814
Source: CBRT
* “-“ indicates increase in reserves
Following on this set of information, in Figure II.C.17 the stock of “speculative short
term capital” since 2005 to November 2012 is given. The stock of securities and GDI’s
held by non-residents had reached its peak in December of 2007 with a total sum of
94 billion USD as indicated. With the widening of the global crisis in 2008, these
flows were reversed and in February 2009 it reached its lowest value of 65 billion
USD. The rebound of the flows was equally abrupt in 2010. The rapid expansion of
global liquidity following the fiscal stimulus measures is now being channeled into
the emerging market economies with Turkey capturing a significant share. The
widening of the current account deficit under this new speculative attack is
unavoidable under conditions of severe appreciation of the TL.
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Figure II.C. 17: Stock of Securities and GDIs Held by Non-Residents (Monthly,
MarketValues, Million USD), Jan. 2005-Nov.2012
Source: CBRT (www.tcmb.gov.tr).
As a “new emerging market”, Turkey is able to attract such capital inflows with the
aid of very high rates of financial arbitrage that it offers in the international capital
markets. This financial arbitrage can be calculated as the end result of an operation
that converts initially the foreign exchange into TL at the initial rate of exchange, and
after earning the rate of interest R offered in the domestic asset markets, is re-
converted back to the foreign currency at the then prevailing foreign exchange rate.
Algebraically, this net arbitrage gain is calculated as .
Thus, during the course of this operation, financial speculators would gain domestic
rate of RDQGORVHDWWKHUDWHRIGHSUHFLDWLRQRIWKH7/ť7KHQHWGLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQ
the two prices would give us the net financial arbitrage gain. The evolution of such
gains is presented in Figure II.C.18. Here, the main hypothesis is that the financial
arbitrageurs would financially invest their foreign monies at the domestic instrument
]1)1/()1[(  R
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that would bring the highest rate of return in the domestic asset markets (most of
the case the government debt instruments (GDIs)).
Figure II.C. 18: Speculative Financial Arbitrage in Turkish Financial Markets,
Source: Turkstat, www.tuik.gov.tr.
According to the calculations portrayed in Figure II.C.18, Turkey has offered real
rates of 80% during the February crisis of 2001; 60% in December 2002; 75% in the
summer of 2003; and became one of the leading emerging markets in the world of
financial speculation. While the US and the OECD interest rates were at 2.5 – 4%
levels, Turkey continued to offer arbitrage gains over dollar-denominated assets
reaching 30%. Such returns enabled Turkey to attract huge sums of speculative
finance capital with a significant “hot” component during especially the post crisis
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A significant detrimental nature of speculation-led balance of payments financing
was foreign debt intensity. The stock of external debt has increased by a total of
150.2 billion USD over the end of 2002 to the end of the third quarter of 2008 (just
before the global crisis had hit Turkey). This indicates a cumulative increase at a
rate of 82.3% in US dollar terms over a period of 5.5 years. This persistent external
fragility is actually one of the main reasons why Turkey had been hit the hardest
among the emerging market economies in the post 2008 global crisis. By the end of
2012 external debt continued its trend and reached to 330 billion USD.
Another facet of the external fragility of the Turkish balance of payments regards the
composition of debt. As far as the post-2001 era is concerned, a very critical feature
of external debt driven current account financing was that it was mostly driven by the
non-financial private sector, rather than the public sector. Within the private sector,
non-financial enterprises explain 60% of the aggregate increase of private external
debt over the post-2001 period and accounts for 70.9% of the total stock of private
debt by 2008. The relevant data are displayed in Figure II.C.19.
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Figure II.C. 19: Composition of External Debt Stock (billion USD), 2000Q4-2008Q3
Source: CBRT, www.tcmb.gov.tr .
The sources of the current account deficit varied, with the deficit on merchandise
trade generating the largest contribution. As for the internal component of the
current account deficit, it is observed that the main source had been the widening of
the private saving-investment gap in contrast to the relative equilibrium of the public
saving-investment balance. As the public sector balances were maintained, private
sectors savings deficit deepened. In short, Turkish adjustments after 2001 into the
2008 global recession entailed substitution of the private against the public deficit.
Figure II.C.20 below narrates this observation, while Figure II.C.21 traces this
adjustment to the overall deceleration of the savings effort as a ratio to the GNP.
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Figure II.C. 20: Components of the Current Account Deficit,% (1998-2012)
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Figure II.C. 21: The Decline of Savings Effort, 1990-2013
Source: Ministry of Development.
The behaviour of savings seems to be directly influenced by foreign exchange
movements. The TL appreciated in real terms almost by 60% since 2002 (see Figure
II.C.15 above). This appreciation led a consumption boom based on cheaper imports
and widening foreign deficits. Thus, Turkey was following the downward path of
savings as was observed for the case of the main OECD economies over to the road
to the global recession, with a high private consumption boom, speculative financing
of the external deficits, and heavy external debt burden.
Here an important issue is the decline in domestic savings effort against high
domestic real interest rates. One would expect rising savings if interest rates were
high. Part of the explanation lies with the observation that even though the Turkish
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rates of interest was high from the point of view of the foreign financial investors,
they were on a declining trend for the domestic households. The decline of the real
rate of interest of the public bonds, for instance, from 30% on average to less than
15%, was a strong reduction. Coupled with an obsessive hunger for credit fuelled via
depreciated cost of foreign currencies, Turkey fell into a trap of high consumption
with high import content.
In the context of the Turkish disinflation episode, Figure II.C.22 portrays one of the
important elements of the culminating process of external fragility: the path of the
ratio of short term foreign debt to CBRT’s international reserves. This ratio is
regarded as one of the crucial leading indicators of external fragility and has been
called as the “most robust predictor of a currency crisis” by Rodrik and Velasco
(1999). The lure of the uncontrolled flows of speculative gains clearly unleashed all
its might throughout post-2001 adjustments, during when the Turkish economy has
been converted into a bastion of speculative bonanza, and the whole liquidity
generation mechanism was based on the short term, hot money inflows.
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Box 4: Turkey and IMF, 1980-2008
 1980s: Two three-year Stand-by Programmes (1980-85) and World
Bank Structural Adjustment Loans (SALs)
 1986 World Bank Financial Sector Adjustment Credit Agreement
 1988 World Bank Second Financial Sector Adjustment Credit
Agreement
 Credit releases conditional on the radical restructuring
proposed in financial institutions, instruments and policies
 1989 World Bank ceases new adjustment loans, concerned about
«Turkey’s failure to undertake structural reforms»
 1990s: With no adjustment lending and poor performance on the
investment portfolio, «World Bank-Turkey relationship was at a low
ebb».
 1994 IMF-Stabilisation Programme
 Turkey as «an example of highly effective Bank-Fund
coordination» during the first half of 2000s.
 1998 Staff Monitoring Agreement with IMF
 1999 December IMF Three-year Stand-by Programme
 2002 World Bank Programmatic Financial and Public Sector
Adjustment Loans
 Improve public financial management and to help Turkey
establish ‘good governance’
 2002-2005 IMF Three-year Stand-by Programme
 2005-2008 IMF Three-year Stand-by Programme
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II.D. IMPACT OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION ON THE NATIONAL FINANCIAL
SYSTEMS43
II.D.1. Pre-Helsinki Period
After the rejection of Turkey’s application for full membership in 1989, Turkey had
been offered a special relationship in the form of a Customs Union with the EU from
1995 onwards. This was in fact a renewal of an old relationship dating back to the
1970s which had been frozen for a long time. In response to Turkey’s application for
membership in 1987, then what was European Community (EC) had stated that
Turkey was not ready to initiate the accession process due to the substantial political
and economic problems.
Following the liberalisation of 1980s, Turkish financial sector has experienced a
significant transformation in terms of financing techniques and instruments
%X©XNRßOX$FFRUGLQJWRWKH3UH$FFHVVLRQ(FRQRPLF3URJUDPPHV.2(3
2001: 29), the Turkish banking sector gained dynamism as a result of the actions
such as removing limits on interest rates for borrowing and lending and liberal
foreign exchange regulations. Additionally, the establishment of ISE in 1986 made a
substantial contribution to the development of capital markets. In the Pre-Helsinki
period, Bank of International Settlements (BIS) principles and EU Directives were
taken into account in the rule-making processes. Nevertheless, in the 1990s, the
macroeconomic instability, high government deficits and financial problems of the
state-owned banks jointly led to the deterioration in the intermediation function of
the financial sector (KOEP 2001: 29).
43 In this section, the focus will be on the specific effects of the process of Turkey’s accession
negotiations with EU upon the Turkish financial system. Since the assessment of Turkish financial
sector itself and changes in its regulatory structure are dealt with in II.B and II.E, it has to be short to
avoid duplication.
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In 1998, the Commission’s Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress towards Accession
(Progress Report) defined Turkey’s financial sector as ‘weak’ and as one of the
critical flaws of the economy. Furthermore, the Report underlined the significant
amount of government bonds in the banks’ balance sheets as the main threat to the
functioning of the banks as financial intermediaries.
Banking reforms have been the most important vehicles for the approximation of the
Turkish financial system to the EU system. Specifically, the Banking Law No 4389 of
June 1999 was an important reform prepared with the aim of ensuring confidence
and stability in the Turkish financial markets and took into account the EU directives
DQGRWKHULQWHUQDWLRQDOO\DFFHSWHGEHVWSUDFWLFHV*¾QGRßGX
II.D.2. Helsinki Summit and Accession Negotiations
In the the Helsinki European Council of December 1999, Turkey was declared as a
candidate country for EU membership. Subsequently, Turkey was asked to prepare a
national programme for the adoption of the acquis, as a response to the Accession
Partnership Document. According to the Council’s decision on the principles,
priorities, intermediate objectives and conditions contained in the Accession
Partnership with the Republic of Turkey (8 March 2001), the main short term
priorities and objectives related to the Turkish financial system were stated as the
following: (i) Ensuring the implementation of the anti-inflationary structural reform
programme supported by the IMF and (ii) Proceeding the implementation of the
financial sector reform to guarantee the transparency and surveillance.
For the adoption of the EU acquis, Turkish government announced the first national
programme in March 2001, which emphasised the importance of financial sector
reform. Accordingly, the actions were taken to ensure macroeconomic stability (i.e.
the anti-inflationary programme and the programme to control of the public
expenditure) and significantly contributed to satisfying the aims of the financial
sector reform. Indeed, BRSA (established in August 2000) played a crucial role in
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financial sector reform and a number of duties assigned to various agencies were
consolidated in the BRSA. In 2001, in an attempt to resolve the structural problems,
the BSRP was put into effect. The BRSP was based on restructuring the state-owned
banks, liquidating the banks that are under the control of the SDIF and increasing the
effectiveness of regulation and supervision in the banking sector (see II.B.1). The
Restructuring of Debts to the Financial Sector Programme were also initiated by
BRSA. In 2001, BRSA focused on enhancing the regulatory structure and the agency
has enacted several regulations including the capital adequacy, risk management,
credit limits and provisioning in line with the EU regulations. The first national
program has highlighted the main issues of privatisation and restructuring of state-
owned banks. In order to remove the restrictions on capital movements – on the
condition of reciprocity – several rules and regulations were revised within the
Turkish Commercial Code. Furthermore, the program indicated that the restrictions
regarding the transfer of funds exceeding 5 million USD would be reconsidered.
Regarding the Economic and Monetary Union, it was stated in the first national
program that the mission of the CBRT and provisions regarding its independence
would be re-evaluated in order to harmonise it with the EU Central Bank system. In
May 2001, with the Law Amending CBRT Law No. 4651, price stability was
determined as the primary target of the CBRT and the independence of the bank was
strengthened.
The second national programme, which had the main target of enhancing the market
economy and increasing its competitiveness was announced in 2003. The programme
highlighted the importance of reducing state intervention in the market by
privatisation, transferring the market regulation function to the independent
regulatory agencies and removing the macroeconomic uncertainty. Consequently, a
number of regulatory agencies were established in sectors like energy and
telecommunication. Moreover, the supervision and regulation of NBFIs were
proposed to be transferred to the BRSA. The second national programme also gave
180
This project is funded by the European Union under
the 7th Research Framework programme (theme SSH)
Grant Agreement nr 266800
importance to the convergence to the EU system of taxing financial instruments. In
addition, the removal of the blanket deposit guarantee regime was one of the targets
of the programme. Regarding the capital markets, meeting the EU standards in the
financial reporting has been accepted as one of the main objectives that would
enhance transparency in capital markets. A special emphasis was also given to
public disclosure, protection of investors and the exchange systems. Lastly,
concerning the insurance sector, the programme pointed out the work on Insurance
Activities Regulation and Supervision Law, which was compliant with the EU
directives.
II.D.3. Accession Negotiations Today
In October, 2005 the EU started accession negotiations with Turkey. Taking into
consideration the effects of 2000-1 crisis, the related international best practices,
and the EU directives, the new Banking Law No. 5411 of November 2005 was put into
effect. 44 This law included provisions about the consolidated regulation and
supervision, corporate governance, consumer rights, etc. All related sub-regulations
that would enhance compliance with the EU regulations were completed as of
November 2006.
In 2004, Basel-II was finalised by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and
the EU enacted the Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC based on this framework.
Accordingly, the Turkish authorities prepared their road maps for the amendment of
national regulations along the lines of Basel II and the related EU directives.
However, taking into account the views of related parties, implementation of the
regulations that are fully compliant with 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC has been
postponed several times. In 2011 a process leading to the compliance to directives
44 Law Amending the Banking Law Numbered 5411 was published in the Official Gazette on November
1, 2005. The Banking Law No.5411 was amended by the laws no. 5472, 5667 5754, 5766, 6111.
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has been initiated and these are expected to be fully implemented in July 2012.
Moreover, Turkey became a member of Basel Committee on Banking Supervision in
2009. As a result, Turkey is expected to implement Basel II.5 and Basel III
frameworks along the lines of the Committee’s road map. This would enhance the
convergence of Turkish regulations to the international best practises.
Regarding the capital markets and the insurance sector, the Turkish Derivatives
Exchange became operational in February 2005. CMB initiated initiated a project with
the EU for the fully convergence of Turkish capital markets regulation with the EU
acquis in 2006. Mortgage Finance System Law and Insurance Law came into effect in
March 2007. However, in 2006 the EU included the “Financial Services” negotiation
chapter among the eight chapters in which accession negotiations were suspended
since Turkey has not implemented the additional protocol that would open her ports
and airports to the Republic of Cyprus which it does not recognize as the legitimate
representative of the whole island.
Before and during the 2008-9 global financial crisis, Turkish authorities applied
prudential rules. For instance, before the global financial crisis target CAR of 12 was
introduced, operational risk was included into the capital requirements and a
liquidity regulation was enacted. These measures, which were not related to
compliance with the EU rules, have significantly contributed to the robustness of the
sector during the crisis period.
Turkish financial sector has shown notable development in the last ten years which
can easily be observed in the successive the Progress Reports of the European
Commission. In this period regulatory structure has been enhanced. Moreover, the
banking sector’s intermediation problem (investing huge portion of the portfolio to
the government debt) was tackled and the loans to deposit ratio reached around
100% by 2011.
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According to 2011 Progress Report, the Turkish banking sector was characterized by:
resilience to the global financial crisis, robust financial ratios, improved efficiency in
financial intermediation and moderate banking sector concentration. It was also
indicated that the alignment with the acquis on banks and financial conglomerates
and financial market infrastructure was at high level. On the other hand, insurance
sector and the capital markets were designated as the areas where more progress
was needed.
Following the 2000-1 crisis, prudential regulations were followed by the regulatory
agencies and these measures have contributed strongly to the breakout of the
financial sector from the 2008-9 global financial crisis. Also, it can be observed that
some of the recommendations given by the EU have not been accepted and
implemented (e.g. privatisation of state banks: instead of privatization, restructuring
is preferred for these institutions, see Section III.D.4-5). Although convergence to the
EU standards have always been indicated as the goal of the regulatory reform,
considering that the negotiations in the financial services chapter was suspended in
2006, it is not easy to link all these developments directly to the progress of
negotiations between EU and Turkey.
II.E. KEY CHANGES IN FINANCIAL REGULATION SINCE 1980 AND THE
PRESENT REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
II.E.1. Historical Evolution of Financial Regulation in Turkey: From 1980 to
Present
The Early Years
From January 1980 Programme to the mid-1980s
Following the full implementation of the 24 January 1980 stabilization programme by
the military regime after September 1980 there was a phase of rapid financial
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liberalisation and the removal of interest rate controls which ultimately led to the
1982 Bankers’ Crisis as explained in Section II.B.1 above. The basic argument used
by the IMF and the WB to justify such policies of financial deregulation was that
financial system in Turkey had been under severe repression that led to inefficiency
in the utilisation of resources, lower economic growth in relation to low national
saving and investment levels (Türel, O. 2009: 135). As an application of the 24 January
1980 stabilisation programme, the foreign exchange regime was liberalised and a
regime of managing real foreign exchange rates by frequent exchange rate
adjustments was put into practice. In July 1980, (i) legal restrictions on deposit and
loan interest rates were removed, and (ii) banks were allowed to issue negotiable
certificates of deposit (CDs). In parallel with the liberalisation of the foreign exchange
regime, the Interbank Foreign Exchange Market was activated within the CBRT in
order to help determine foreign exchange rates under free market conditions. To
further institutionalize Turkey’s new market-oriented development strategy, the
military regime passed the Capital Markets Law 2499 of July 1981. This was followed
by Decree 91 for Stock Exchange Market in 1983 which replaced the old law for Stock
Market dating back to 1929. But ISE did not start trading until 1986.
The Capital Markets Law of July 1981 further promoted the development of financial
markets along market-oriented principles. The Law enabled foreign capital to buy TL
securities and repatriate profits freely; it also began to develop state financial
institutional capacity by enabling the CMB to deal with securities and derivatives
markets in Turkey. However, as ISE did not start trading until 1986, not until 1987 did
the government establish the CMB to begin regulating financial market operations. It
is also significant that in response to the initial post-1980s rapid liberalisation
processes and the Bankers’ Crisis, the government had to establish the SDIF in 1983
– a state institution designed to guarantee Turkish bank deposits.
Banking Law No.3182 of May 1985
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The Banking Law of 1985 was designed to bring Turkey in line with the BIS
requirements in especially capital adequacy, non-performing loan provisions,
accounting and reporting standards, and a system of deposit insurance in
accordance with SDIF (Marois, 2012: 106). The law also sought to remove some of the
regulatory barriers to new entry into the banking system. In consequence, the
number of banks increased in Turkey alongside the entry of some foreign banks.
Türel, O. (2009: 135-6) argues that the ‘financial adjustment’ expected by the
international financial institutions (IFIs) in the mid-1980s was much comprehensive
than the Banking Law of 1985 envisaged. Hence, the Financial Sector Adjustment
Credit Agreement signed by the WB in June 1986 made the related loan releases
conditional on the radical restructurings proposed in financial institutions,
instruments, and policies. However, out of the committed 300 million USD, only 80
million USD could be used due to the Turkish authorities unwillingness to fulfill the
credit conditionalities. The Second Financial Sector Adjustment Credit Agreement
signed in June 1988 had the same fate.
Further financial developments from the mid-1980s to the late-1990s
While the passing of the Banking Law of 1999 –discussed below- was a significant
point in Turkish financial regulation, the law was facilitated by several institutional
developments in the years leading up to it. For example, the government established
the Interbank Money Market in April 1986. Then in 1987 the CBRT started open
market operations. In 1988 the government established the foreign exchange
market. Financial liberalisation took a significant step forward with the elimination of
interest rate controls in the same year. This was matched by the significant move
towards capital account liberalisation by Decree No. 32 on the Law of Protection of
the Value of Turkish Currency such that foreign exchange trading and capital
movements were fully liberalised. Turkish residents were allowed to invest in foreign
securities and to hold foreign currency accounts abroad while non-residents were
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permitted to invest freely in Turkish financial markets and government securities. In
1990, The Convertibility of TL was formely announced. To politically support open
financial markets, the CBRT then introduced a new monetary programme in 1990,
intended to increase predictability and reduce uncertainties in financial markets. The
new openness necessitated new institutions to manage greater flows of money. In
1992, an electronic fund transfer system and Turkish Interbank Clearing system
became operational. To bolster confidence in the Turkish Lira, the government
introduced a crawling peg exchange rate regime in 1995 while the 1995 EU Customs
Agreement more explicitly linked Turkish financial regulation to EU standards.
Towards the late 1990s, a system of regulation of financial sector which was based
on three governmental bodies (i.e. UT, CBRT and CMB) has been in effect. Under this
system, the UT was responsible for the implementation of regulations and on-site
supervision in general, UT and CBRT jointly undertook the supervisory duties
concerning the banking sector, and CMB became the regulatory and supervisory
authority in charge of the securities and derivatives markets. The Treasury was
responsible for regulation and on-site supervision. The move towards an
independent CBRT through the 1980s and 1990s and the establishment of BRSA in
June 1999, which became operational during 2000 ultimately led to a change in this
regulatory structure (see below).
Managing Financial Opening and Crisis, 1999 to Present
The Banking Law No.4389 of June 1999
The long-awaited new banking law was put into effect in June 1999. Notably,
supervision and regulation duties concerning the banking sector which were
previously shared jointly by the UT and the CBRT, were passed to the newly
established BRSA. The BRSA began operations in late August 2000. According to
Turkey’s December 1999 IMF Letter of Intent, ‘The BRSA will be made fully
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autonomous by removing the involvement of the Council of Ministers from all
decisions in the area of supervision, other than the appointment of the members of
the Board.’ The new Law aimed to strengthen the banking sector and to improve the
supervision standards in line with international norms (Basel principles for bank
supervision and BIS capital adeqaucy ratios) and EU guidelines. Banks were to meet
new requirements within five years. For its part, the BRSA acquired the right to audit
banks, recommend the issuance or cancellation of bank licenses, transfer failing
banks to the SDIF, or force the merger of two or more banks in trouble. With
approval from the Turkish cabinet, the BRSA could close down a bank. According to
Marois, while the BRSA is independent in law, in practical terms the power of the
BRSA remains dependent on the Turkish state (Marois 2012: 121). Türel, O. (2009:
137) argues that this law, based on the experience of the 1994 economic crisis, was
relying on the principle of “economic punishment to economic crime.” Somehow,
following the Letter of Intent given to the IMF on 9 December 1999, the government
substantially revised the Law No.4389 by the Law No.4491. The latter amended many
standards envisaged by the former.
The December 1999 Disinflation Programme
In tandem with the 1999 Bank Law the Democratic Left Party (DSP) coalition started
to implement the new IMF-influenced December 1999 disinflation programme
GHVSLWH QRW EHLQJ LQ WKH PLGVW RI D ILQDQFLDO FULVLV QLđ   7KH ,0) DQG
Turkish authorities formulated the 1999 programme, adhering to tight fiscal and
monetary policies, aiming to undertake ambitious market-oriented structural
reforms, and to the use of a pre-announced exchange rate to reduce inflation. The
market-oriented intent was to reduce the inflation and real interest rates, to
stimulate economic growth, and to more effectively allocate economic resources.
Politically, officials wanted to send financial capital an unambiguous message about
Turkey’s dedication to inflation management and debt service capacity. To this end,
the government adopted a new currency board-type arrangement which shaped
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monetary policy and tied liquidity expansion to foreign currency inflows (BRSA 2002).
A crawling peg exchange rate restricted TL devaluation to 15% per year such within
18 months (that is, by July 2001) they could begin to widen the bands around central
parity (Marois 2012: 122).
The December 1999 programme was meant to last three years (2000 to 2002); but by
the late 2000, the programme was in trouble. Crisis struck again in February 2001
and the coalition government abandoned the currency peg, replacing it with a free
floating exchange rate regime, based again on the advice of the IMF. This was
accompanied by the “Transition to a Strong Economy Programme” (TSEP) and rapid
financial regulatory change.
The Transition to a Strong Economy Programme of 2001
The 2000-1 crisis led to abandonment of currency peg in favour of floating the
exchange rate in February 2001. At the same time the coalition government
LQWURGXFHGWKH76(3,QWKHZRUGVRI.HPDO'HUYLđD:%WHFKQRFUDWDSSRLQWHGDVD
minister and entrusted with the task managing recovery from the crisis, the goal of
TSEP was to institutionally ‘separate the economic from the political’ (quoted in BAT
ǞKRZHYHULPSUREDEOHLQUHDOZRUOGSUDFWLFH'HUYLđǢV76(3UHVSRQGHGWRFULVLV
by restructuring the state in ways subordinate to financial profit imperatives (Marois
2012: 169). Notably, the government made the CBRT formally independent (see
below). The TSEP was revised in the beginning of 2002 so as to cover the period 2002
to 2004. Officially, the programme was intended to eliminate structural problems in
the economy, increase resilience against external shocks, reduce inflation, reduce
the public sector’s debts, and to strengthen the financial system, financial discipline,
and the banking system (BAT 2009b: 21). At the heart of the TSEP was the BSRP of
May 2001 (see II.B.1).
The 2001 Banking Sector Restructuring Programme (BSRP)
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Two important targets envisaged by BSRP are (i) strenghtening regulatory and
supervisory framework in banking sector, and (ii) restructuring state-owned banks.
The first target involved restructuring aspects of the state financial apparatus to
enhance its capacity to manage financial risks within Turkey’s borders. For example,
amendments to the 1999 Banking Law augmented the institutional powers of the
BRSA and SDIF while bringing Turkey’s financial regulations closer to EU standards.
The list of specific reforms is extensive but included such things as higher capital
requirements for Turkish banks, stiffer capital requirements for bank mergers and
acquisitions, a fine-tuned determination of loan limits, new NPL provisions,
harmonized accounts for the participation of banks in other companies, enhanced
balance sheet reporting, and so on. Notably, the coalition government altered
corporate and tax legislation so as to transform Turkish capital groups into separate
financial and corporate conglomerates. Whereas before 2001 the private banks had
been at the core of holding group operations and profitability strategies, the banking
affiliates would now have to become profit-seeking enterprises in their own right
(Marois, 2011: 170). 45 The initial BSRP changes also paved the way for compliance
with the new Basel II Capital Accord requirements in 2002 (BAT 2009b: 6). Then in
July 2001 the government allowed the CMB of Turkey to establish a derivatives
market under the ISE to expand domestic financial markets. Policymakers framed
these changes as vital to enhancing efficiency and guarding against sectoral
instability.
Duty Losses, the State-owned Banks, and the BSRP
45 The aim of dividing the financial and non-financial sectors and regulating the relationship between
these two is not new. This has historically been an aim of the policy makers as it had been attempted a
number of times since the 1980s. However, despite these attempts, the holding groups preserve their
structure and importance up to present.
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The duty loss mechanism is a way authorities can channel investment resources and
preferential loan terms into priority economic sectors. Historically, the duty losses
assigned to state-owned banks enabled state managers and government elites to
facilitate capitalist development. This internalized significant control over domestic
money resources within the state. While this developmental practice of state-
assigned preferential loans was sustainable for decades in the postwar period, in the
mid to late-1990s the ruling governments used duty losses to hide budgetary deficits
(BRSA 2003: 10). This was not done to promote development but to smooth the
otherwise volatile transition to market-oriented development strategies that left the
government short of resources and rural populations without past sources of state
support (Marois 2012: 58). The government benefited by refusing to pay the assigned
duty loss differences back to the state banks, as had been done in the past. The
assigned duty loss claims, which began to include everything from major agricultural
supports to being used by the government to pay public employee wages, appeared
as illiquid fixed assets in the state banks’ balance sheet belonging to the Treasury.
However, these claims did not show as liabilities in the state Treasury’s budget
accounts. As such, the government used the state bank duty losses as off-budget
spending left unrecorded in government expenditures (OECD 1999, 57) (Marois 2012:
117). State bank duty losses grew from 2.2% of 1995 GNP to 13% of 1999 GNP (that
is, from 2.77 billion USD to about 19.2 billion USD) (World Bank 2000, 96). The build
up of unpaid duty losses in the state banks alongside the increasingly speculative
practices of the private banks led to a period of financial crisis in 2000-1. The
contribution of the state-owned banks to the crisis was not, therefore, because they
were public banks and therefore inherently corruptible as argued by neoclassical
analysts. Rather, decades of well-run public banking operations was corrupted by
neoliberal transition. The solution is not privatization, which has led to greater
instability globally, but clearer institutional mechanisms of democratic governance
that systematically link the decisions of state bank managers to their developmental
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community more directly (farmers, SMEs, communities, and households) rather than
governing parties.
Turkey’s December 1999 Letter of Intent to the IMF expressed the coalition
government’s commitment to state bank privatization and outlined a process of
market-oriented restructuring. The 1999 Letter states:
The long standing problems of the state-owned banks will be addressed by
strengthening their oversight and developing strategic corporate plans,
operational restructuring, and financial and capital restructuring plans with
phased-in timetables, which will be initiated in year 2000. Pursuing actions
will be taken to begin the commercialization of Ziraat Bank and Halk Bank
with an eventual privatization goal. In the interim, in order to impose financial
discipline on the operations of these banks, while improving their cash
management, cash transfers to cover losses on subsidized lending have been
specified in the 2000 budget… these services will be more properly priced in
the future. Management of the state-owned banks is expected to maintain the
profitability of the state-owned banks under this tighter budget constraint.
From mid to late June 2000, the coalition government pushed the legalisation of
state bank privatisation but failed due to Constitutional Court challenge only to re-
assert legislation in November 2000 providing for the commercialization and
privatization of Ziraat, Halk, and Emlak banks. By this time, however, volatility had
fully gripped the Turkish economy thereby foreclosing any immediate state bank
sell-off (Marois 2012: 123-24). However, in February 2000 and nine months prior to
the November 2000 crisis, the government set a new interest rate mechanism for
Ziraat Bank and Halk Bank that eliminated any future duty losses accruing from loan
subsidies. This began the marketization of the state banks’ developmental missions,
which was completed following the 2001 crisis under the guidance of IFIs and the
DSP government via the BSRP, which was carried out largely outside of normal
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democratic processes (Marois 2012: 173). Subsequent restructuring was done
according to the EU harmonization of banking regulations. To this end, the BRSA took
charge of coordinating and implementing a two-phase project, involving, first, the
immediate financial restructuring of the state banks (mostly completed by the end of
2001) and, second, their ongoing operational restructuring (see BRSA 2002; Marois
2012: 172-7; and also III.E.3-5).
The Independence of the CBRT
The nature of postwar financial relations involved the subordination of domestic
policy to national developmental goals (see Section I). In Turkey, for example, the
January 1970 Central Bank Act specifically allowed domestic monetary policy to be
set according to five-year development plans. Globally, advocates of financial
liberalisation since the 1980s have sought reforms aimed at ‘de-politicising’ central
banks, that is, establishing institutional independence from political and democratic
processes arguably as a means of reducing corruption.
The rise in debt-led and market-oriented development in Turkey since the 1980s put
increasing pressure on state finances creating mounting financial imbalances. An
attempt to counter this trend emerged in 1990 when the Treasury and the CBRT
signed a protocol to “limit public sector borrowing requirement and the monetization
of the fiscal deficit” (Balkan and Yeldan 1998: 132). However, official debt continued
to rise, officially and via the duty losses of the state-owned banks. The problem
worsened with the crisis of 1994 and jump in interest rates that exacerbated Turkey’s
debt servicing problems. In response, a 1997 protocol committed the Treasury to
ending cash advances, which suggests a move towards independence. This was the
sentiment expressed in the June 1998 Letter of Intent to the IMF, “The autonomy of
the central bank is fully respected. The Treasury has ceased to borrow from the
central bank.” Still, the Treasury and CBRT continued issue mounting debts during
the 1990s and duty losses continued to accumulate in the state-owned banks despite
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making clear moves toward independence (in light of assistance from the EU and IMF
%DNíU0DURLV
The severity of the 2000-1 crisis opened an opportunity for the government to push
IRUZDUGZLWKIRUPDOFHQWUDOEDQNLQGHSHQGHQFH$V%HGLUKDQRßOXQRWHV
addressing corruption was a key element of TSEP. To this end, the government
changed the Central Bank Law granting the institution formal independence from the
Turkish government and the Treasury. The same law granted the now formally
independent CBRT responsibility for maintaining price stability. The government also
gave newly established Monetary Policy Committee responsibility for implementing
an inflation-targeting regime. In this reconstitution of the state financial apparatus,
the CBRT can still pursue other economic activities but only so long as its activities
do not conflict with the price stability imperative. The CBRT could no longer extend
loans or grant credit to the Treasury or any other state institution and neither could it
purchase any state debt in the primary market. To bolster institutional independence
and help mitigate political interventions, the government extended the rights and
tenures of senior CBRT executives (see Marois, 2012: 168). Each of these measures
had been signaled in the early stages of the 2000-1 crisis. Turkey’s December 2000
Letter of Intent to the IMF made clear Turkey’s commitment to a new central bank
law and inflation targeting to be enacted by the end of April 2001. By early 2002, the
CBRT announced its move to implicit inflation targeting (but explicit inflation
targeting had to wait until 2006).
Further Regulatory Developments since 2001 and under the Justice and
Development Party (AKP)
Broadening out the neoliberal ideal of separating politics and economics as a
measure of anti-corruption efforts, the AKP also made several reforms linked to
state regulatory practices and the financial sector (see Güven 2012: 438). These
include the Public Financial Management and Control Law No. 5018 of December
2003 and in line with international best practices on state spending practices. This
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was followed up by the amendments in public procurement regulations, the
enactment of new laws for the regulation of civil servants’ ethics and public
information, and the approval of several international agreements on corruption.
While applied unevenly, each piece of legislation restructured government, state, and
financial sector relations ostensibly in line with EU and market-oriented principles.
In the post-2002 era, AKP government’s initial commitment to EU accession
facilitated the implementation of reforms in Turkey’s capital markets in accordance
with EU harmonisation criteria. The National Development Plan 2007-13 prepared by
AKP government (NDP 2007: 34) reports the Investor Protection Fund and transition
to the registry system in stocks and bonds were taken to bolster investor confidence
in Turkey. With the establishment of the Turkish Derivatives Exchange (TurkDEX)
under the Capital Market Law No. 2499 of July 1981 by Cabinet resolution in October
2001, the NDP also reports improvements in and new capacity for risk management
of listed companies and for improved corporate governance (despite low saving
levels, less developed capital market culture, inadequate individual and institutional
investor base, and the limited variety of instruments in the market) (NDP 2007:13,
34).
The Housing Finance Law of March 2007 enabled banks to pool mortgages and
securitize these housing loans. While the legal framework exists, few if any
mortgage-backed security transactions have been made (see III.F.3). By 2007, the
BAT could report that Turkish financial authorities had harmonized most banking
activities according to both EU directives and international best practices.
The AKP government after 2002 also accelerated efforts to help integrate Turkish
financial sector into the world financial markets and, by extension, to enhance the
state apparatus’ international regulatory capacity (see Marois, 2012: 179). This was
institutionalized via state-authored memorandums of understanding (MoUs) with
other countries’ financial regulators. To increase Turkey’s cross-border cooperation,
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evaluation, auditing, and information exchange on banking operations and their
associated domestic and foreign parent companies, the BRSA reports accelerated
efforts to establish new international MoUs, which grew from 12 in 2005 to 18 by late
2009 (BRSA 2009a: 33).
When state authorities sign MoUs, however, this cannot be viewed as a neutral and
institutionally value-free action. Rather, MoUs institutionalize specific relationships
of power that inherently privilege certain social groups over others. When the
Turkish BRSA and other foreign bank supervisory agencies sign financial regulatory
MoUs they reflect prevailing political commitments to the internationalization of
financial capital and the state authorities’ responsibility for helping to manage and
stabilize this process (Marois 2012: 179).
What financial institutions refer to as prudential regulations intended to “smooth out
the effects of capital inflows on the economy” have been taken on board by the AKP
JRYHUQPHQWVVHH<¸U¾NRßOXDQGXIDGDU7KLVKDVLQYROYHGEXLOGLQJXS
foreign exchange reserves, setting new liquidity management policies, and
HVWDEOLVKLQJ UHJXODWLRQV DLPHG DW ILQDQFLDO VWDELOLW\ <¸U¾NRßOXDQGXIDGDU VSHFLI\
these to include: “(i) tight rules for the FX open positions, liquidity and CAR of the
banking system; (ii) transparency; (iii) risk management; and (iv) coordination with
the CBRT and the BRSA, rather than focusing on impediments to capital flows.” The
CAR requirement tool has once again been at the forefront of banking regulations, as
it had been a contentious issue between the baking sector and the authorities.
Domestically, authorities have set the CAR requirement at 8% with the target for
increasing to 12% (in 2010-1 actual CAR ratios rose above the recommended levels
and were in the range of 16.5% to 19%). Regulations also state that the absolute
value of the foreign exchange net open position/own funds standard ratio may not
exceed 20%. In addition to enhancing the domestic BRSA capacity and
implementation of on- and off-sight supervision, internationally Turkey joined the
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Financial Sector Assessment Programme (FSAP) in 2006 to send creditworthiness
signals globally.
In June 2005 authorities introduced a new rules for the prevention of money
laundering, followed by a stand-alone terrorist financing offence in July 2006. Law
No. 5549 (October 2006) then allowed for a more comprehensive mechanism for
disclosures of cross-border transactions of cash and monetary instruments.
The Banking Law No. 5411 of November 2005
After coming to power in 2002, the AKP proceeded to change the Banking Law of
1999 through partial amendments up to 2005. These were prepared according to EU
legislation and aimed at crafting a new banking law by 2005 (NDP 2007: 13, 34). The
Law of 2005 was legislated to ensure confidence on international financial investors
under conditions of ever increased dependency of the government to persistent and
uninterruptted inflow of capital. Hence, it aimed to establish a national banking
system fully integrated to international financial system (Türel, O. 2009: 139). It also
transferred the regulation and supervision of some non-bank financial institutions
from the UT to the BRSA (see II.B.2).
The Banking Law of 2005, in part, entailed reversing certain liberalisation measures,
insofar as the Law gave state financial authorities greater power to manage the
banking sector by, for example, limiting the number of banks and new bank
licensing. It also made provisions for outsourcing of banking activities. The
subsequent Outsourcing Regulation of 2006 set out the necessary regulations and
standards for outsourcing in Turkish banking. In line with market advocates, the
BRSA sees outsourcing as a natural consequence of competition and new
technologies which will help to increase productivity and efficiency insofar as it offers
bankers more flexible and cost-effective solutions in the workplace (BRSA 2009a:
26).
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II.E.2. The Present Regulatory Set-up
In June 2011, authorities established the new Financial Stability Committee (FSC).
The FSC aims at offering a systemic approach to financial supervision in Turkey in
order to better detect, manage, and mitigate aggregate and systemic financial risks.
The FSC is made of the Treasury, CBRT, BRSA, SDIF, and CMB and it is chaired by
the Deputy Prime Minister in charge of Economic and Financial Affairs. The idea is
that the FSC can bridge the individual mandates of separate financial authorities in
Turkey and align their policy tools.
The developments described above has led to the establishment of a new system of
regulation, the main agents for its execution being UT, BRSA, and CMB. This division
of labour which was noted earlier (see Table II.B.11) are further elaborated below.
CBRT
The primary aim of the CBRT is “to achieve and maintain price stability”.46 This
objective, which is the very first information highlighted in the Bank’s website,
reflects the turn towards an independent central bank in the aftermath of the 2001
crisis. The CBRT has been mainly using short term interest rates as a means to
achieve this aim.
On the basis of the lessons drawn from the 2008 global capitalist crisis, the TCMB
has started targetting financial stability besides price stability in late 2010, a
development which has required new policy tools such as interest corridor, required
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The Central Bank Risk Center
According to the repealed Article 44 of the Central Bank Law No.1211, the Risk
Center (established in 1951) is to ensure that the customers or loan applicants of
banks and financial institutions can access the updated total amount of credits over
the financial system as a whole and assist them in their credit decisions (CBRT 2011:
63). While initially dealing with banks, in June 2000 the Risk Center began dealing
with factoring and financial leasing companies and beginning in February 2005 with
consumer financing companies, and then most recently in October 2007 with asset
management companies (CBRT 2011: 63). At present there are 177 participants
included within the Risk Center, which include 48 banks, 11 consumer-financing
companies, 6 asset management companies, 36 financial leasing companies, 75
factoring companies and Credit Guarantee Fund, Inc. in addition to the the SDIF and
CMB (which provide information resources) (CBRT 2011: 64).
In line with the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Turkish authorities have
decided that the banks in Turkey develop their own internal risk control mechanisms.
To this end, authorities decided to transfer Risk Center activities to the BAT (since a
substantial part of the Turkish financial system consists of banks) (CBRT 2011: 64).
This was institutionalized in Law No. 6111 of February 2011 (which annulled earlier
provisions under Article No. 1211 of the CBRT Law).
Capital Markets Board
The CMB regulates and organizes capital markets and the development of market
instruments and institutions in Turkey. The main legal framework of Turkish capital
markets consists of three core legislations. These include the Capital Markets Law
No. 2499 of July 1981, the Decree By-Law No. 91 of October 1983 concerning
securities exchanges, and the Turkish Commercial Code. Other regulations related
to the capital markets include Decree No. 32 of August 1989 on “protecting the value
of the Turkish currency”, the Regulation concerning the establishment and operation
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SULQFLSOHV RI VHFXULWLHV H[FKDQJHV WKH 5HJXODWLRQ RQ WKH ì6( WKH 5HJXODWLRQ
concerning the establishment and operation principles of futures and options
exchanges, and the Law amending the laws related to housing finance system47.
Hence, the CMB is the regulatory and supervisory authority in charge of the
securities and derivatives markets in Turkey.
Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency
As the historical overview above indicates, the BRSA has become the central
regulatory authority within the financial markets in Turkey following its start of
operations in August 2000. The 2005 Banking Law, discussed above, extended the
regulative responsibility of the BRSA by putting financial leasing, factoring, consumer
finance, and asset management companies under its authority besides the banks.
II.E.3. Adjustments to International Standards
Basel-I and Basel-II Accords
As the 2000-1 crisis abated and reforms envisaged by BRSP progressed, Turkish
officials and banking sector representatives began efforts in 2002 to incorporate
elements of emerging Basel-II framework for risk management, corporate
governance, accounting, information systems, and so on. In March 2003, the BAT
established the Basel-II Working Committee that evolved into the Basel-II
Coordination Committee, comprised of BRSA, UT, CBRT, CMB, and BAT officials
along with some individual bank managers. The Committee formed a discussion
platform in preparation for Basel-II implementation. This led to the writing of the
“Road Map for Transition to Basel-II”, which was released by the BRSA in May 2005
(BAT, 2009b: 51). With the unfolding of the US subprime crisis into a global financial
47 http://www.cmb.gov.tr/indexcont.aspx?action=showpage&menuid=0&pid=5&submenuheader=-1).
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crisis in 2008-09, the BRSA announced that Basel II transition would be postponed
(Türel, O. 2009: 154). Still the BRSA asked the banking sector to implement Basel II
standards for reporting for a transition period from 1 July 2011 to 30 June 2012,
though without any sanctions proposed in case on non-compliance.48
As mentioned in Section II.D.2, the regulation of financial markets is a field in which
Turkey has already ensured a successful alignment with the acquis (European
Commission 2011: 64). As Basel II Accords have also been accepted by the EU as the
main regulatory framework since 2006, Turkey’s implementation of Basel II
principles help harmonize her financial regulations with those of the EU.
In the insurance sector, harmonization of rules between te EU and Turkey has been
made on the basis of Solvency II principles, which were identified in 2009. According
to the European Commission (2011: 64), there is some progress made in this field
under the authority of the Treasury though the EU expectations for the establishment
of an independent regulatory and supervisory authority for the insurance sector has
not been yet met.
II.F. NATURE AND DEGREE OF COMPETITION BETWEEN FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS
As discussed earlier in detail, banking system has a major share in the Turkish
financial sector; therefore, this section provides a discussion of the degree of
concentration and competition within the Turkish banking sector.
Figure II.F.1 displays the number of banks (deposit banks and development &
investment banks) between 1988 and June 2012. Clearly, the deposit banks have
been dominant in the Turkish banking sector throughout this period of time. The total
48 http://www.bddk.org.tr/WebSitesi/turkce/Basel/Basel_II_Gecis.aspx
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number of banks (deposit banks + development and investment banks) has reached
81 (62 +19) in 1999. After the November 2000 and February 2001 crises, the number
of banks has declined significantly. Specifically, there were 40 deposit banks and 14
development and investment banks at the end of 2002. As of June 2012 there were
31 deposit banks with a 70% share in the overall banking sector and 13 development
and investment banks with a share of 30% (see Figure II.F.2).49 As seen from Figure
II.F.2, the share of deposit banks has declined from approximately 87% in 1988 to
70% in June 2012.
Figure II.F.1: The Number of Deposit Banks and Development & Investment Banks
between 1988 and June 2012
Source: BAT, www.tbb.org.tr.
49 By the end of 2012 the total number of banks has reached 45, with the granting of licence to another
foreign (deposit) bank.
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Figure II.F.2: The Percentage Share of Number of Deposit Banks and Development &
Investment Banks within the Turkish Banking Sector: 1988 and June 2012
Source: BAT, www.tbb.org.tr.
The number of state-owned banks, privately-owned banks and foreign banks within
the deposit banking is presented in Figure II.F.3. While privately-owned banks were
the largest group between 1988 (25 banks) and 2005 (17 banks), their numbers
declined to 11 in June 2012. Thus making foreign banks the largest group from 2006
onwards, the number of these banks reached 16 in June 2012. Meanwhile, the
number of state-owned deposit banks has declined from 8 in 1988 to 3 in June 2012.
Figure II.F.4 shows the percentage share of the number of banks within the deposit
banking. The share of state-owned banks within deposit banking has declined from
15% in 1988 to 10% in June 2012. Whilst the share of privately-owned banks has
considerably declined from 48% in 1988 to 35% in June 2012, the share of foreign
banks has increased significantly from 37% in 1988 to 52% in June 2012.
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Figure II.F.3: The Number of State-owned Banks, Privately-owned Banks and Foreign
Banks within Deposit Banking
Source: BAT, www.tbb.org.tr.
Figure II.F.4: The Percentage Share of Number of State-owned Banks, Privately-owned
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Examining the percentage share of deposit banks and development and investment
banks within the total assets of the Turkish banking sector, we see that deposit
banks have been dominant throughout the sample period. The share of deposit banks
in the total assets has increased from 91% in 1988 to 96% in June 2012 (see Figure
II.F.5).
Figure II.F.5: The Percentage Share of Deposit Banks and Development& Investment
Banks in Total Assets of the Turkish Banking Sector: 1988 and June 2012
Source: BAT, www.tbb.org.tr.
Figure II.F.6 displays the distribution of banks within the deposit banks; namely, the
percentage share of state-owned, privately-owned and foreign banks in deposit
banking sector. The share of state-owned banks in total assets of deposit banking
has declined and the share of foreign banks has increased over a period of 25 years
from 1988 through June 2012. Specifically, the share of state-owned banks has
declined from 47.7% in 1988 to 30.2% in June 2012 and the foreign banks’ share in
total assets has risen up to 14% in June 2012 from a low share of 4% in 1988. The
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share of privately-owned banks in total assets of deposit banking has varied between
47% and 56% throughout the sample period.
Figure II.F.6: The Percentage Share of State-owned Banks, Privately-owned Banks and Foreign
Banks within Total Assets of the Deposit Banking
Source: BAT, www.tbb.org.tr.
In addition to the distribution of banks within total assets, we examine the
concentration in total deposits and total loans in the Turkish banking sector,
respectively.
Figure II.F.7 displays that privately-owned banks have the highest shares in total
deposits. Since 1990, privately-owned deposit banks have had 50% to 59% of overall
deposits in the Turkish banking sector. Whilst the share of state-owned banks in
total deposits has declined, share of foreign banks has increased over a period of 25
years from 1988 through June 2012. In particular, the share of state-owned banks
has declined from 48.5% in 1990 to 34.3% in June 2012. On the other hand, foreign
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2.4% in 1988. As of June 2012 the share of privately-owned banks in total deposit was
52.6%.
Figure II.F.7: The Percentage Share of State-owned Banks, Privately-owned Banks and
Foreign Banks in Total Deposits within the Banking Sector
Source: BAT, www.tbb.org.tr.
Figure II.F.8 displays that between 1988 and June 2012 deposit banks have been
dominant in total loans. Deposit banks’ share in total loans has increased from 86%
in 1988 to 95% in June 2012. Within the total loans of the Turkish banking sector
privately-owned banks have had the highest shares, especially after 1992, followed
by state-owned banks and the foreign banks (see Figure II.F.9).
During the period from 1992 to 2003, while the share of privately-owned banks has
increased considerably from 49% to 74%, the share of state-owned banks has
declined from 48% to 20%. After 2003, the share of privately-owned banks in total
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was due to the increasing share of both state-owned banks (from 22% in 2004 to 28%
in June 2012) and foreign banks (from 5% in 2004 to 15% in June 2012) in total loans.
Comparing the share of privately-owned banks in total lending and total borrowing of
deposit banking sector, it can be concluded that private banks are relatively
dominant or more concentrated in credit market.
Figure II.F.8: The Percentage Share of Deposit Banks and Development& Investment
Banks in Total Loans of the Banking Sector
Source: BAT, www.tbb.org.tr.
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Figure II.F.9: The Percentage Share of State-owned Banks, Privately-owned Banks and
Foreign Banks within Total Loans of the Deposit Banking
Source: BAT, www.tbb.org.tr.
$EEDVRßOX HW DO  H[DPLQHG WKH GHJUHH RI FRQFHQWUDWLRQ DQG GHJUHH RI
competition of the Turkish banks for the period from 2001 to 2005. In this period,
especially after 2001 crisis, the Turkish banking sector has experienced a rapid
process of concentration through the merger and acquisition activities and
liquidation of some insolvent banks. Investigating the relationship between the
FRQFHQWUDWLRQ DQG FRPSHWLWLRQ LQ EDQNLQJ VHFWRU $EEDVRßOX HW DO  XVHG WKH
Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) approach, which states that the higher the
concentration in a market, the lower the competition and the higher profits that the
firms receive. After the November 2000 and February 2001 crises, the new
macroeconomic environment in Turkey led to important changes in the banking
sector.
Within the programme of the ‘Banking Sector Reconstruction’, firstly, the number of
banks, branches, and employees were restructured. Then, the equity structures of
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SURPRWHG ZLWK WD[ LQFHQWLYHV ,Q   EDQNV 8OXVDO %DQN 6LWHEDQN ìNWLVDW
%DQNDVí.HQWEDQN7DULđEDQN%D\íQGíUEDQN(*6%DQN7RSUDNEDQNZHUHDFTXLUHG
E\ 6',) VHYHQ EDQNV (JHEDQN <XUWEDQN <DđDUEDQN %DQN .DSLWDO 8OXVDO %DQN
XQGHU 6¾PHUEDQN ìQWHUEDQN DQG (VEDQN XQGHU (WLEDQN ZHUH PHUJHG DQG WKH
OLFHQVHVRI WKUHHEDQNV (WLEDQN ìNWLVDW%DQNDVí.HQWEDQNZHUH LQYDOLGDWHG$V LW
will be explained below in Section III.C., the Turkish financial system has undergone
a period of mergers and acquisitions. As part of this M&A process, several Turkish
private sector banks were involved in mergers and acquisition activities.50 In 2002,
3DPXNEDQNZDVDFTXLUHGE\6',),QìPDU%DQNDVíHQWHUHGLQWRWKHOLTXLGDWLRQ
process upon withdrawal of its license to perform banking activities and accept
deposits. Fiba Bank was transferred to Finans Bank, ING Bank and Credit Suisse
FHDVHGWKHLUDFWLYLWLHVLQWKH7XUNLVKEDQNLQJVHFWRU$EEDVRßOXHWDO
After all these restructuring activities, the number of deposit banks has declined
significantly from 61 in 2000 to 46 in 2001, and further declined to 40 in 2002. In 2003,
there were 36 deposit banks in the Turkish banking sector. Over the same period of
time (2000 to 2003), the number of development and investment banks also declined
from 18 to 14.
In an attempt to measure the degree of concentration in the Turkish banking sector,
$EEDVRßOXHWDOXVHG&DQG&UDWLRVZKLFKSURYLGHWKHFRQFHQWUDWLRQUDWLRV
of the biggest 3 and 5 banks, respectively, according to the share of their assets in
the total assets of the banking sector.51 To measure the degree of competition, the
50.¸UIH]%DQNZDVWUDQVIHUUHGWR2VPDQOí%DQNDVíWKHQ2VPDQOí%DQNDVíZDVWUDQVIHUUHGWR*DUDQWL
%DQNDVí %DQN(NVSUHVPHUJHGZLWK 7HNIHQ <DWíUíP YH )LQDQVPDQ DQG IRUPHG 7HNIHQ%DQN+6%&
DFTXLUHG 'HPLUEDQN 6¾PHUEDQN ZDV WUDQVIHUUHG WR 2\DNEDQN DQG 6íQDL <DWíUíP %DQNDVí ZDV
WUDQVIHUUHGWR7¾UNL\H6íQDL.DONíQPD%DQNDVí
51,QIRUPDWLRQRQWKHUHPDLQLQJEDQNVZDVQRWXVHGLQWKH&QDG&UDWLRVWKHUHIRUH$EEDVRßOXHW
al., 2007) also calculated Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), calculated by adding up the squares of
the market shares of all banks.
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authors used the Panzar and Rosse’s (PR) approach and constructed H-statistic as a
measure of competition.52 Empirical results of the study showed that C3 and C5
ratios increased except for the year 2004 and that Herfindahl-Hirschman Index has
increased over the whole period. That is to say, there has been an increase in the
concentration overall. Moreover, their findings did not show a clear relationship
between concentration and competition. The H-statistics calculated by the PR
method were always between zero and one. Hence, the study concluded that there is
an evidence for the existence of monopolistic competition in the Turkish banking
sector over the sample period. ,Q VXP DFFRUGLQJ WR $EEDVRßOX HW DO  WKH
degree of concentration has increased and the level of competition has decreased
between the years 2001 and 2005.
The second recent study by Macit (2012) investigated the degree of concentration and
degree of competition in the Turkish banking sector for the period 2005-2010. This
study can be accepted as an extension of Abbasoglu et al (2007). In order to measure
concentration in the banking sector, Macit (2012) investigated three main balance
sheet items; namely, total assets, total loans and total deposits and found that the
largest concentration was in the total deposits, whereas the smallest concentration
was in total loans. The author revealed that since 2005 the degree of concentration
has not shown a major change. Furthermore, using the PR methodology Macit (2012)
examined the degree of competition and concluded that the Turkish banking sector is
characterized by monopolistic competition and the degree of competition has
decreased between 2005 and 2010.
52 The H-statistic is defined as the sum of the factor price elasticities of interest revenue with respect
WRFDSLWDO ODERXUDQGSK\VLFDOFDSLWDO7KH35PRGHOVXJJHVWVWKDW+ȈXQGHUPRQRSRO\+
under monopolistic competition, and H = 1 under perfect competition. The magnitude of H can be
interpreted as an inverse measure of the degree of monopolistic power, hence a measure of the
GHJUHHRIFRPSHWLWLRQ$EEDVRßOXHWDO
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II.G. PROFITABILITY IN FINANCIAL AND NON-FINANCIAL SECTORS
II.G.1. Profitability in Financial Sector
Profitability in Banking Sector
Because of the dominance of banking over the financial system in Turkey, the
profitability in banking sector is crucial for the overall profitability in finance. The rate
of profit in banking sector may be conceived as rate of return on assets, i.e. net
profits as a proportion to total assets (Figure II.G.1). Alternatively rate of profit may
be conceived either as the rate of return on equity (i.e. net profits/total shareholder’s
equity), or the rate of return to capital (i.e. net profits/paid-in capital). The latter
conception is adopted in constructing Figure II.G.2.
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Figure II.G.2: Profitability as a Proportion to Equity or Capital (1980-2010),%
Source: BAT.
Apart from the years corresponding to “bankers’ crisis” (1982-3) and the crisis year
of 1994, rate of return on assets were fairly satisfactory in the 1980s and the 1990s
till 1999. High nominal interest rates were the key factor behind this picture. The
situation abruptly changed in 1999, as the final juncture of developments described
in II.B.1; and the ratio of net profit/total assets had been negative in 1999-2002. It
later recovered gradually until 2006 and remained fairly stable thereafter around 3%
(see Figure II.G.1). Figure II.G.2 tells a similar story.
The improvement in profitability after 2002 is closely related to the rising volume of
loans and net interest incomes obtained from loans, which brought down the
operating incomes/total incomes ratio from the peak it reached in 2002 (see Figure
II.G.3). Interest income/expenditure profiles which are related to profitability are also
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Figure II.G.3: Operating Incomes / Total Incomes in Banking Sector (1998-2010),%
Source: BAT.
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Profitability in NBFIs
The data in this regard is not easily obtainable, continuous and comparable to those
in banking sector. For the NBFIs under the supervision of BRSA, the reader is
referred to Tables II.B.13-16.
II.G.2. The Profitability in Non-Financial Sector
During the import-substitution phase as referred to in Section I, private industrial
profits were fed from three sources (Boratav and Yeldan 2006: 418): protectionist
trade regime, mixed economy and repressed financial system. “Import substitution
reached its limits in 1976 when keeping up the investment drive and financing the
consequent current deficits became increasingly difficult. The foreign exchange
crisis of 1977-80, accompanied by civil unrest and political instability, ended with an
orthodox stabilization package (1980) and a right-wing military regime (1980-83)”
(Boratav and Yeldan 2006: 412). In 1980, Turkey began to apply liberal economic
policies and an export-led growth strategy which was dependent on wage
suppression, the depreciation of domestic currency, and export subsidies.
Meanwhile, the foreign trade policy was designed with strong export incentives and
low labour costs, to encourage industrial products to enter world markets, and at the
beginning a moderate liberalization took place in imports. However, in the mid
1980’s, quotas were mostly removed, customs tariffs reduced, and generous
incentives were offered to exports. This policy approach reached its economic and
political limits by 1988. Therefore, liberalisation of the capital account was
implemented in 1989, after liberalisation of trade account in 1984. Within the context
of the theory of “financial repression,” the McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis suggested the
liberalization of financial markets, on grounds that particularly in developing
countries, where the most valid saving method is bank deposits, a high return of
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interest on deposits would increase the incentive to save, thus reducing shortages of
capital, and providing a positive impact on investment hence development.
Structuralists and Marxist analysis (Akyüz 1990; Boratav 1993; Burkett 1987; Burkett
and Dutt 1991; Grabel 1996) underlined the fact that financial liberalisation led to the
choice of non-productive investments, and led to a kind of development – “a
speculation-led development” in the words of Grabel – they drew attention to its
growth-distorting quality (Grabel 1995). During this process, because of the high
revenues speculation may provide to financial and non-financial operations, such
operations turn their resources away from their primary purposes, and direct them
to the financial arena. An increase in the stock market and in real estate prices
accompanies the superior returns associated with speculative activities, and ‘Ponzi
financing’ (Grabel 1996). Stock markets and Anglo-Saxon type markets have led to
developing countries having to cope with heavy loads, because of the high degree of
instability associated with share prices and its short-term nature, encouraging
speculation rather than long term investments. Contrary to the theory of “financial
repression”, in Turkey, domestic savings moved away from fixed capital investment
toward speculative financial investment. Rittenberg (1991), Akyüz (1990) and Balkan
and Yeldan (2002) indicated that in Turkey after the liberalisation, the high interest
rates resulted in a downward slide of the investment function and there was no
improvement in fixed capital formation.
Furthermore, the development of stock markets has had a negative impact on the
relationship between industry and finance, instrumental for the real economy. As a
consequence of these developments, the “symbiotic” relationship between industry
and finance deteriorates, and the financial sector becomes one of the sources of
macro-economic instability (Amadeo and Banuri 1991:45). Recently, many
economists emphasize the fact that financial crises, for the market oriented credit
and financial systems, have their own inner dynamics, and they state that the
instability creating quality of high capital inflows cannot be corrected, no matter how
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successful a country may be in exports (Singh 1992; Amadeo and Banuri 1991; Das
2000). In Turkey, when capital inflows were not sustained, they turned into capital
outflows, thus reversing the process, as witnessed during the financial crises of
1994, 2000 and 2001.
Briefly, it can be said under global financialisation, a “financierist” approach
becomes predominant rather than a “productivist” approach. It is argued that
“Growth with equity requires improving the rewards enhancement rather than
financial rent-seeking searching for capital gains” (Ffrench-Davis 2006:23). Table
II.G.1 shows, the incomes of the biggest 500 industrial enterprises from non-
operation activities have been significantly higher than the following period.
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Table II.G. 1: Income from Non-Industrial Activities in Major Private Firms and Its Share in Net Balance Sheet Profit (Pre-Tax, TL)
Other Income (1) Change(%) Net Balance Sheet Profit (2) Change(%) 1/2 (%)
1982 18.439 120.558 15,3
1983 37.783 104,9 192.819 59,9 19,6
1984 65.888 74,4 316.573 64,2 20,8
1985 104.501 58,6 433.462 36,9 24,1
1986 204.558 95,7 663.879 53,2 30,8
1987 285.321 39,5 1.593.763 140,1 17,9
1988 632.251 121,6 2.494.087 56,5 25,3
1989 1.299.144 105,5 4.189.118 68,0 31,0
1990 2.224.648 71,2 6.679.368 59,4 33,3
1991 3.721.504 67,3 7.282.288 9,0 51,1
1992 7.794.368 109,4 20.052.423 175,4 38,9
1993 17.548.778 125,1 43.093.652 114,9 40,7
1994 57.694.649 228,8 105.587.224 145,0 54,6
1995 96.191.958 66,7 206.857.875 95,9 46,5
1996 195.948.193 103,7 370.418.929 79,1 52,9
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1997 407.054.079 107,7 771.761.381 108,3 52,7
1998 699.577.134 71,9 797.402.394 3,3 87,7
1999 1.577.329.277 125,5 720.405.946 -9,7 219,0
2000 1.760.163.086 11,6 1.538.333.855 113,5 114,4
2001 4.645.687.973 163,9 718.029.004 -53,3 647,0
2002 4.833.432.876 4,0 4.269.008.132 494,5 113,2
2003 5.016.304.190 3,8 6.985.609.668 63,6 71,8
2004 3.557.069.000 -29,1 9.087.928.518 30,1 39,1
2005 3.048.142.484 -14,3 8.236.526.584 -9,4 37,0
2006 3.380.665.053 10,9 12.855.752.414 56,1 26,3
2007 6.124.524.780 81,2 17.223.034.088 34,0 35,6
2008 3.793.360.109 -38,1 10.317.558.781 -40,1 36,8
2009 5.686.581.323 49,9 12.852.111.028 24,6 44,2
2010 5.980.685.439 5,2 17.453.114.853 35,8 34,3
Source:ICI
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When financial liberalisation were combined with other steps taken to opening the
economy to the world economy, the behaviour of economic actors changed,
contributing to the conditions that laid the groundwork for a financial crisis. For
example, after the liberalization of interest rates, the interest rate spread grew, and
loan interest rates rose to excessively high levels.53 The high loan interest rates, in
turn, seriously increased the costs of firms operating on equity, and relying heavily
on loan. After liberalization, the share of interest in the value added of private
institutions doubled, exceeding the share of wages among total costs. During the
period of 1986-88 and the crisis year of 2001, interest payments as a share of the
value added of large private firms was substantially above the share of wages. While
the interest payment ratio of major 500 private industrial enterprises was 33.4% in
2000, this ratio declined to 8.8% in 2005, then because of the global crisis, it
increased 16% in 2008 (ICI, 2011). Therefore, in order to reduce production costs, the
real sector has gravitated towards borrowing externally instead of borrowing
domestically. Borrowing from abroad has consistently exceeded domestic borrowing
for the productive sector throughout 2000’s.
The Share of Non-operating Income in Profits
In Turkey, it is not possible to measure the percentage of financial profits within the
total profits from the avaliable data. Therefore, for financialisation, non-operating
income over net profit/loss of non-financial establishments is a critical indicator. In
this regard, two sets of data can be used in order to assess the dominance of
financial activities over the real sector: (i) Statistics of the major 500 firms
obtainable from the journal of the Istanbul Chamber of Industry (ICI) which refers to
53 In a case where the interest rate on a deposit was 58%, the cost of borrowing to a client could
reach 105%; and where the interest rate on a deposit was 80%, the interest rate for borrowing
reached 151% (Sönmez 1992: 33).
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manufacturing sector only, and (ii) corporate sector accounts of a large sample of
firms kept by CBRT comprising manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors.54
To assess the extent of financial activities in the industrial sector, non-operating
LQFRPHVRIWKHǤ7KH)LUVW%LJJHVW)LYH+XQGUHG&RPSDQLHVǥRIWKHìVWDQEXO&KDPEHU
of Industry (ICI) as a proportion to their net balance sheet profit may be examined
(Figure II.G.5). According to the data, industrial firms were attracted by non-
industrial activities and these activities became the norm during the 1990s and
2000s. Income and profit from other operations include dividend income from
affiliates, dividend income from subsidiaries, interest income, commission income,
provisions no longer required, profit on sale of marketable securities, exchange
gains, rediscount income, other income and profit (Table II.G.2).
54 The Central Bank of Turkey has been compiling the annual financial accounts of the companies
since 1990, and producing the aggregated financial accounts data by the economic sectors, classified
according to NACE (Nomenclature Générale des Activités Economique dans les Communautes
Européennes), Rev.1.1. The aggregated financial accounts of the sectors over three-year periods have
EHHQLVVXHGLQWKHDQQXDOSXEOLFDWLRQVRIWKH%DQNǤ6HNW¸U%LODQ©RODUíǥDQGDFFHVVLEOHLQ(QJOLVKRQ
the web site of the Bank under the title “Company Accounts”. The Company Accounts consist of two
data sets classified as manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors and are based on the financial
statements of Turkish private companies. For example, for the period of 2008-2010, balance sheets of
8576 firms have been compiled as of 16 main and 30 sub-sectors and for the period of 2006-2008, data
included 13 main and 26 sub-sectors of 7352 companies.
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Figure II.G.5: The Ratio of Income from Non-Industrial Actities to Net Balance Sheet
Profit (500 Major Firms, 1983-2010)
6RXUFH6DQD\L2GDVí'HUJLVL-RXUQDORIWKH,VWDQEXO&KDPEHURI,QGXVWU\ìVWDQEXO
Figure II.G.5 indicates the non-operating income figures for the major 500 firms and
their ratio to balance sheet profit within that term, which indicates that “industrial
production lost some of its importance that in the 1990s and the interest of the
industrialists shifted to more profitable activities other than industrial production”
(ICI, 1993:59).55 It should be noted that “Other incomes” include incomes from non-
55 When the value added created by company is calculated, the pre-tax balance sheet profit is not
directly included as factor income. If income generated through non-industrial activities is included in
total profit, it is subtracted from balance-sheet profit, which gives us profit as share of national
income. And this figure is then included in the added value as factor income” (ICI, 1993:59).
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industrial activities but excludes state subsidies. Dramatic increases in the crisis
years left aside, these show that the ratio was around 50.0% in the first half of the
1990s and rapidly increased from 1997 to 2001 then decreased considerably in post-
crisis period. However, the ratio concerned has been considerably high even after
2003 (39.0% in 2004, 34.0% in 2010 and 23.0% in 2011). The fact that industrial firms
generated their profits from predominantly financial activities and lending to the
government at high real interest rates had clearly negative impact on investment
performance.
Table II.G. 2: Distribution of Net Value Added of the Major 500 Firms
Years Wage Profit Interest
1982 52,6 19,4 27,6
1983 55,5 15,2 28,9
1984 46,4 31,0 22,2
1985 40,4 43,5 24,6
1986 37,9 23,7 37,9
1987 34,4 27,0 38,2
1988 33,5 22,3 43,9
1989 46,6 18,0 35,0
1990 59,9 9,2 30,5
1991 82,3 -27,1 44,0
1992 75,0 -15,3 39,7
1993 68,8 -6,2 36,8
1994 60,7 0,9 37,7
1995 49,8 19,6 29,9
1996 47,9 17,3 34,1
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1997 48,5 16,0 34,6
1998 61,5 -0,4 37,8
1999 83,5 -30,8 45,9
2000 82,5 -13,6 28,4
2001 123,3 -123,1 97,3
2002 68,4 4,6 25,5
2003 66,1 18,4 14,0
2004 53,6 35,9 10,5
2005 62,7 29,2 8,2
2006 54,4 36,2 9,3
2007 54,1 36,9 9,0
2008 61,8 22,5 15,7
2009 56,8 32,1 11,0
2010 49,9 42,5 7,6
Source:C ìVWDQEXO 6DQD\L 2GDVí 'HUJLVL (Journal of the Istanbul Chamber of 2011
By using company accounts from CBRT, the shift in the center of gravity of the
economy from production to finance is clearly revealed. During the period of 1998-
2010, the ratio of operating incomes/non-operating incomes for the 5 main sectors
(namely, manufacturing, services, construction, energy and agriculture) displayed in
Figure II.G.6, shows the operating incomes/total incomes and non-operating
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income/total incomes of firms in the non-financial sectors56. The findings point out
the high level non-operating incomes of firms in the sectors of services, construction
and energy during the period. For manufacturing sector, the ratio of non-operating
income approach to the ratio of operating income. As an important indicator of
financialisation, non-operating income/total income of institutions in these sectors
has strikingly high values. Non-financial corporations substantially increased their
foreign debt due to the high domestic interest rates. In the post-crisis financialization
areas, Turkish economic growth became dependent on consumption expenditure
rather than investment expenditure.
The empirical findings above in these sectors reveal that real sector firms take into
account alternative investment opportunities in financial markets when making their
decisions on physical investment. Accordingly, rather than making long term fixed
investment, firms may choose to “invest” in short term financial instruments. For
Turkey (and also Argentina and Mexico), by using micro panel data method, Demir
(2009) stated that increasing uncertainty and risk in the macroeconomic
environment, and a growing rates of return gap between financial and fixed
investment assets have an economically and statistically significant fixed
investment-retarding effect; and increasing country risk and uncertainty in key
macro prices, higher real interest rates as well as existence of loan market
imperfections and availability of rising rates of return on financial assets over and
above those on fixed assets encourage financial investments over fixed investments.
56 The set of data found here has limitations from the point of view of the provision of complete
information because it was obtained by questionnaires filled out by firms. In some years, these firms
were among the top five hundred firms but it’s not possible to know where they’re placed in other
years. For example, the number of firms in the manufacturing industry between 2008–2010 is 3404 ;
and firms in retail and wholesale trade include 2188. Despite the fact that these figures represent
large numbers, the comparisons and evaluations based on those figures might contain distortions due
to the lack of details on sectoral shares.
224
This project is funded by the European Union under
the 7th Research Framework programme (theme SSH)
Grant Agreement nr 266800










1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010







1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010








1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Operating incomes/total incomes (%) Non-operating incomes/total incomes (%)
225
This project is funded by the European Union under
the 7th Research Framework programme (theme SSH)
Grant Agreement nr 266800
Source: CBRT.
*Data adjusted for inflation in 2004.
Profitability in the Major 500 Companies Affiliated to ICI
Profitability in industry has three widely used definitions: Sales profitability = balance
sheet profit/sales proceeds; return on equity capital = balance sheet profit/equity
capital; return on assets = balance sheet profit /total assets. Profitability ratios in the
major 500 firms during 1982-2010 are given in Figure II.H.7 which indicate that the
profit rates based on different definitions of profitability move in a fairly similar
manner over the medium term. On account of pervasive privatisations, the number
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this fact, the aggregate profitability ratios of the total 500 firms converged to those of
the private sector firms within the sample57 (see also Table II.H.1).
Figure II.G.7: Aggregate Profitability in Major 500 Firms Affiliated to ICI,% (1982-2011)
6RXUFHìVWDQEXO6DQD\L2GDVí'HUJLVL-RXUQDORIWKH,VWDQEXO&KDPEHURI,QGXVWU\
Note: Sales profitability = balance sheet profit/Sales proceeds*100; return on equity capital =
balance sheet profit/equity capital*100; return on net assets = balance sheet profit/total
assets*100.
57 The spectacular fall in profit rates in 1992-3 is intimately related with the major losses of state
economic enterprises within the sample in these years. Otherwise, profit rates generally tend to be
lower during the crisis periods (i.e. 1994 and 2000-1).
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Table II.G. 3: Profit Rates of the 500 Biggest Industrial Enterprises,% (2001-11)
2001 2002 2004 2006 2008 2009 2010 2011
Profits/ Sales
Total 500 -0.4 5.7 6.7 5.9 3.9 5.8 7.6 5.6
Of which, Private 1.3 5.5 6.1 5.9 3.6 5.2 5.9 4.8
Profits/ Assets
Total 500 -0.5 6.4 7.8 7.3 4.7 6.0 8.3 6.8
Of which, Private 1.7 6.3 8.0 8.4 5.0 6.1 7.1 6.5
Profits/ Equity
Total 500 -1.7 16.6 14.3 13.8 9.9 11.8 16.9 14.8
Of which, Private 5.3 17.3 15.2 16.6 10.9 12.4 15.5 15.6
6RXUFH ìVWDQEXO 6DQD\L 2GDVí 'HUJLVL -RXUQDO RI WKH ,VWDQEXO &KDPEHU RI ,QGXVWU\ 2012:
48,197).
When the profit rates of the biggest 500 are compared to those which can be inferred
from the CBRT data set, they are not in full accord. Moreover, because of the
problems of definitional discrepancies and reliability concerning various sources of
data, it cannot be definitely argued that profit rates in financial sector proper is
systematically over and above those in non-financial sectors, a hypothesis which is
often associated with arguments on financialisation.
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II.H. THE INSURANCE SECTOR
As indicated in several sections of this report, December 1999 Standby agreement
with the IMF was a watershed fro initiating a series of “structural reforms” entailing
among others, the restructuring of the social security system and privatization of the
pension system. The Social Security Reform Law of 2000 and the Individual
Retirement, Saving and Investment Sytem Law of 2001 have been instrumental in
starting this restructuring process, even though there have been some setbacks as a
result of challenges by different parties to the Constitutional Court for these
legislations.
The insurance sector also developed rapidly at a CAGR of 25% during 2002-10, and
has gained new momentum after the social security “reform” that has restructured
health insurance system. The Turkish insurance sector is mainly driven by non-life
insurance companies and foreign companies. Insurance Supervisiory Board,
established in 1963 in order to supervise all insurance activities in Turkey, has
recently published the 48th Annual Report on Turkish insurance sector including
private pensions. With the introduction of private pension system, the reports started
to cover data for both insurance and private pension activities together.
Consequently, the 48th Annual Report covers the results of both insurance and
private pension activities for the year 2010 in Turkey.58
As of the end of 2010, the number of companies carrying out insurance and pension
activities were 58. Out of these companies, 34 of them were licensed in non-life
insurance, 7 in only life insurance and 16 in pension and life business. There is only
one licensed reinsurance company in the domestic market. With the inactive
58 (www.treasury.gov.tr).
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companies, total licensed insurance, reinsurance and pension companies were 63 as
of December 31, 2010.
In terms of their capital structure, there are 21 local and 36 foreign companies
operating in the sector. As of the end of 2010, 57.1% of the total capital and 51.7% of
the total premium production belong to foreign companies. In 2010, there was one
new foreign entry in the non-life sector. Furthermore, one local life and pension
company and one local non-life company acquired a license on 31.12.2009 and
started to operate in 2010.
Total investments including the investment portfolio of reinsurance companies have
decreased by 14.2% compared to the previous year and reached to 9.3 billion TL. The
breakdown of investments demonstrate that the share of private sector bonds,
government bonds, treasury bills, equities and fixed assets increased compared to
the previous year while the share of government debt securities has decreased.
Government bonds, treasury bills and other government debt securities constituted
85% of the total investments while fixed assets have a total share of 7%.59
Insurance sector has had a substantially concentrated structure. 50.7% of total non-
life premiums are produced by the top five non-life companies, while 73.2% of the
premiums are produced by the top ten non-life companies. For the life premium
production, 68.8% of total premiums are produced by the top five life companies, and
98.7% of the premiums are produced by the top 10 life insurance companies.
Table II.H.1 presents the consolidated balance sheet of insurance sector as of the
end of 2010. Total assets of the insurance sector has increased from 31.8 billion TL in
59 2010 Insurance Sector Market Analysis Report, Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry, UT.
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2009 to 35.1 billion TL in 2010 with a 10.4% annual increase. Current assets had 78%
and 77% share in total assets in 2009 and 2010, respectively. The remaining 22% and
23% comprised non-current assets. While the share of cash and similar assets
increased from 15% in 2009 to 19% in 2010, the share of financial assets and
investments (with risk on policy holders) declined from 34% in 2009 to 25% in 2010.








TOTAL CURRENT ASSETS 24,821 78 27,014 77
A- Cash and Similar Assets 4.617 15 6.801 19
B- Financial Assets and Investments with
Risk on Policyholders
10,956 34 8,889 25
C- Receivables from Main Operations 8.079 25 9.995 28
D- Due from Related Parties 63 0 11 0
E- Other Receivables 46 0 49 0
F- Deferred Expenses and Income Accruals 938 3 1.111 3
G- Other Current Assets 122 0 158 0
NON-CURRENT ASSETS 6,986 22 8,106 23
A- Receivables from Main Operations 4,562 14 5,785 16
B- Due from Related Parties 1 0 0 0
C- Other Receivables 1 0 1 0
D- Financial Assets 1.266 4 844 2
E- Tangible Assets 684 2 689 2
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F- Intangible Assets 380 1 403 1
G- Deferred Expenses and Income Accruals 18 0 252 1
H. Other Non-Current Assets 74 0 132 0





SHORT TERM LIABILITIES 15,651 49 18,897 54
A- Financial Payables 7 0 18 0
B- Payables from Main Operations 5.616 18 7.501 21
C- Due to Related Parties 34 0 88 0
D- Other Payables 176 1 180 1
E- Technical Provisions 9,182 29 10,393 30
F- Taxes and Other Liabilities to be Paid and
Provisions Thereof
195 1 238 1
G- Provisions Related to Other Risks 64 0 101 0
H- Income Relating to Future Months and
Expense Accruals
327 1 332 1
J- Other Short Term Liabilities 51 0 47 0
II. LONG TERM LIABILITIES 7,306 23 9,032 26
A- Financial Payables 0 0 0 0
B- Payables from Main Operations 4,432 14 5,638 16
C- Due to Related Parties 0 0 6 0
D- Other Payables 3 0 3 0
E- Technical Provisions 2,783 9 3,287 9
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F- Other Liabilities and Provisions Thereof 5 0 5 0
G- Provisions for Other Risks 52 0 67 0
H- Income Relating to Future Years and
Expense Accruals
3 0 2 0
I- Other Long Term Liabilities 28 0 24 0
III. EQUITY CAPITAL 8,851 28 7,190 20
A- Paid-in Capital 4,516 14 5,179 15
B- Capital Reserves 680 2 611 2
C- Profit Reserves 3,785 12 2,032 6
D- Profits/Losses From Previous Periods -586 -2 -746 -2
E- Net Profit for The Period 455 1 115 0
Source: UT (2010).
On the liabilities side of the balance sheet, both the short-term and long-term
liabilities of the insurance sector has increased from 2009 to 2010. Specifically, the
share of short-term liabilities increased from 49.0% in 2009 to 54.0% in 2010, and the
share of long-term liabilities increased from 23.0% to 26.0%. In contrast, the share of
equity capital declined from 28.0% (8.8 billion TL) in 2009 to 20.0% (7.2 billion TL) in
2010. As of June 2011, total assets of the insurance sector has reached up to 38.3
billion. While 59.8% of total assets are owned by life and pension companies, the
remaining 40.2% share of the assets are owned by non-life insurance companies.
Table II.H.2 displays the general indicators of the insurance sector between 2006 and
2010. Non-life and life insurance premium volume in Turkey increased from 6.9
billion USD in 2006 to USD 9.2 billion in 2010. As seen from Table II.H.2, non-life
insurance companies have significantly higher premium volume of 7.8 billion USD,
whilst life-insurance companies have only 1.4 billion USD premium. Turkey’s share
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in global premium volume has been roughly stable at 0.2% between 2006 and 2010.
Over the same time period, total insurance premium volume to GDP ratio has been
1.3%. Between 2008 and 2010, real premium growth in Turkey (especially for the life
insurance sector) has been considerably higher when compared to the real premium
growth in the world.
Table II.H. 2: General Indicators of the Insurance Sector, 2006-10
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
PREMIUM
Global Premium (Billion USD) 3,674.9 4,127.6 4,269.7 4,067.0 4,339
Non-Life 1,549.1 1,685.8 1,779.3 1,735.0 1,819
Life 2,125.8 2,441.8 2,490.4 2,332.0 2,520
Premium Volume in Turkey (Billion USD) 6.9 9.4 7.7 8.4 9.2
Non-Life 5.9 8.3 6.7 7.1 7.8
Life 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.2 1.4
Turkey's Share in Global Premium Volume (%) 0.19 0.23 0.18 0.21 0.21
Non-Life 0.38 0.49 0.38 0.41 0.43
Life 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.06
Premium Volume / GDP (%)
World 7.52 7.49 7.07 6.95 6.90
Turkey 1.28 1.30 1.24 1.31 1.28
Real Premium Growth (%)
Non-Life
Global (World) 1.50 0.70 -0.80 -0.10 2.09
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Turkey 12.22 6.86 -3.08 -2.60 5.79
Life
Global (World) 7.70 -2.00 -3.50 -2.00 3.21
Turkey 1.68 -11.34 6.81 9.32 10.83
Premium Per Capita (USD)
Global (World) 555 608 634 590 627
Turkey 96 131 106 113 125
COVERAGE
Total Coverage (Billion TL) 9,472.6 11,910.8 22,676.5 24,937.9 30,661.7
Non-Life Branches (*) 9,358.7 11,756.2 22,452.2 24,722.3 30,402.2
Life Branch 114 154.6 224.3 215.6 259.5
Total Cover age / GDP 12.49 14.13 23.87 26.14 27.75
FOREIGN SHARE IN CAPITAL (%) 23.00 37.79 51.37 54.98 58.78
Non-Life Companies 19.00 37.69 51.20 55.04 58.15
Life / Pension Ins. Companies 34.00 38.07 51.92 54.76 60.69
CAPACITY OF EMPLOYMENT
No.of Personnal in Ins.&Pension Co. 13,617 15,138 16,069 15,602 16,029
No.of Broker 56 64 73 72 81
No.of Insurance Agency 15,322 16,011 14,250 15,579 16,205
- No.of Pension Intermediary 12,135 12,422 13,735 15,666 16,716
No.of Loss Experts 963 963 901 908 1,095
Source: UT, www.treasury.gov.tr.
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The amount of total coverage, another important indicator of the insurance sector
size, has reached to 30.7 trillion TL. Total coverage to GDP ratio increased from
12.5% in 2006 to 27.8% in 2010.
Private pension system launched in 2003, has been rapidly growing since founded. As
of the end of 2010, the number of pension contracts rose up by 15.0% while the
accumulated funds by 32.0%. In the wake of the 2008-9 global financial crisis, this
rise can be seen as an indication of growth potential in the private pension business.
Correspondingly, the share of foreign capital in insurance and pension sector has
considerably increased. Specifically, foreign capital share in has increased from
23.0% in 2006 to approximately 59.0% in 2010.
With the Insurance Law No. 5684, coming into effect in 2007 the insurance sector is
said to have developed in harmony with the EU regulations. As the harmonization
process improved, the insurance industry would emerge as a financially stronger,
dynamic and reliable sector (UT, 2011).
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II.J. THE CHANGING PATTERN OF AVAILABILITY AND SOURCES OF
FUNDS
This section will focus on (i) Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) and (ii) High Net Worth
Individuals (HNWIs) and Private Banking as the alternative funding systems in
Turkey. It should be noted that pension and insurance funds were examined under
II.B.2 and II.H. and will not be reconsidered here.
II.J.1. SWFs
Turkey and SWFs
SWFs are generally defined as state-controlled investment instruments funded by
foreign-exchange assets. Traditionally, SWFs were used by the major commodity
exporters, particularly oil-rich countries like Kuwait, Norway or Saudi Arabia. Today,
more than 30 countries have SWFs although some of them have relatively small
funds compared to the funds of the countries such as Saudi Arabia and Norway. The
distinguishing feature of SWFs from other categories of investment instruments,
such as pension funds, investment funds and trusts, hedge or private equity funds, is
that they are state-owned. In general, SWFs are funded from accumulated foreign-
exchange reserves in origin countries, but are governed autonomously from the
official reserves.
The growth of SWFs motivated mainly by the high oil prices, financial globalization,
and ongoing imbalances in the global financial system that has resulted in the rapid
accumulation of foreign assets in some countries.60
In recent years, Turkey faces huge trade and current account deficits and needs to
attract both direct and portfolio investments to finance these deficits. SWFs from the
other countries has important role as an alternative source of funds required to
6076ì$'
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finance deficits. Three basic factors leading to the rise of SWFs in Turkey as
additional source of funds to pension and insurance funds can be summarized as the
following; (i) Rising attractiveness of Turkey in the post-September 2001 era, (ii)
JOREDOFULVLVDQGLLL$.3JRYHUQPHQWǢVSURMHFWRIWUDQVIRUPLQJìVWDQEXODVD
regional hub for financial services.
Rising Attractiveness of Turkey in the Post September 2001 Era
It is believed that after the attacks to World Trade Center in New York on September
11, 2001, the US environment for investments by Arab companies and SWFs became
unfriendly, if not hostile. Consequently, Arab direct and portfolio investors have
begun to shift their attention to other countries, including Turkey (Erdilek, 2008).
Hence, this search of Arab capital for alternative destinations to the US and the EU,
coupled with the acceleration of the privatization process in Turkey, has brought
substantial investments by the Arab Gulf states, including several SWFs.
The AKP government has invigorated the relationship with Arab capital and Islamic
finance by aggressively promoting investments from such sources. Private business
organizations such as the Independent Industrialists and Businessmen's Association
06ì$' DQG WKH 7XUNLVK$UDE %XVLQHVVPHQ
V $VVRFLDWLRQ 75$% KDYH DOVR
supported these efforts, which have in turn, generated controversies among the
Turkish opinion (Erdilek, 2008).
Two of the well-known Arab SWFs in Turkey are the Kuwait Investment Authority
.,$ DQG'XEDL+ROGLQJ '+ .,$ RZQV WKH&HYDKLU VKRSSLQJPDOO LQ ìVWDQEXO IRU
which it paid 750 million USD in 2006 through its London-based subsidiary St.
Martin's Property. In 2005 DH's international property development subsidiary, Sama
'XEDLEHFDPHLQYROYHGLQDMRLQWELOOLRQ86'LQYHVWPHQWYHQWXUHZLWKWKHìVWDQEXO
Metropolitan Municipality. The first project of this investment venture was the multi-
XVH WRZHU FRPSOH[ FDOOHG 'XEDL 7RZHUV ìVWDQEXO  +RZHYHU LQ  DIWHU 6DPD
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Dubai won the USD 1.1 billion bid for the municipal land on which the towers are to
be built, legal obstacles have prevented this real estate development project (Erdilek,
2008).
The Global Economic Crisis
In August 2011, global real estate specialists Jones Lang LaSalle reported that
SWFs, investment funds and private equity funds from the Gulf region are among
those redirecting their growth plans towards Turkey in the wake of worsening
economic instability in Western Europe. As the economies of the developed world
crumbled, Turkey, with long-term average economic growth rate of 5%, has become
an attractive asset class on both equity and bond side of the market (Rintoul 2011). 61
In May 2012, a new law was promulgated changing the rules of reciprocity, which
eased foreign investment restrictions in real estate.62 As noted in III.F., European and
especially Gulf-based property investors have turned their attention to Turkish real
estate markets. Retail development in Turkey is seen as a priority market for Gulf
investors. Turkey saw 13 new shopping centers open in the first half of 2012.
Commercial office market demand also remained strong as multinationals accept
ìVWDQEXODVDUHJLRQDOEXVLQHVVKXE63
ìVWDQEXODVD5HJLRQDO+XEIRU)LQDQFLDO6HUYLFHV
61 Nearly two-thirds of the Istanbul stock market is held by foreign investors.
62 Article 35 and 36 of the ‘Land Registry Law Numbered 2644’ are the two main articles which
regulate the foreigners’ right to acquisition of property in Turkey. Article 35 stipulates that: “With
reservation of reciprocity and compliance with legal restrictions, foreign natural persons can acquire
real property in Turkey for the purpose of using is as residence or as business place, provided that
such real properties are allocated and registered in the implemented development plans or localised
development plans for these purposes”.
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For some two millennia Istanbul has been one of the world’s greatest cities, and is
today classified as an “Alpha-“ world city in the Globalization and World Cities
(GaWC) group’s 2010 rankings. In line with Sassen’s (1991) theorization of the global
city, the rapid growth of the finance sector and highly specialised producer services
in Istanbul are at the root of its global city-formation. Sassen (2010) argues that like
London and Istanbul, many of today’s global cities are “old-world cities” that
reinvested in themselves. Given that “complexity” and “diversity” are the two
requirements for becoming a global city, Istanbul already had enormous complexity
and diversity, and is going to be immensely significant in the future (Sassen, 2010).64
According to a previous ranking within the GaWC Inventory of World Cities
(Beaverstock et al  ìVWDQEXOZDV FODVVLILHG DV D Ǥ*DPPDǥZRUOG FLW\ PLQRU
world city) as opposed to “Alpha” or “Beta” world cities, which have more office
connections. Although classified as only a ‘Gamma’ world city, Istanbul was
considered noteworthy as being the only world city identified within the region
consisting of the Balkans, the Eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East, and Central
Asia (Walker and Taylor, 2000).65 More recently, Istanbul was upgraded to the ranks
of the “Alpha”-world cities by the GaWC in 2010, a designation shared by world cities
that have “extensive globalisation,” which has been created largely by accountancy
DQGDGYHUWLVLQJILUPV(URODQG]EDNíU
The current government attempted to create an Istanbul International Financial
Center (IFC) and developed a strategic and action plan for entitled as “Strategic and
Action Plan for Istanbul International Financial Center”. This plan was broadly
64 The top investors in Istanbul are from both the West and the East, including Kazakhstan, China,
Russia, and Bulgaria (Sassen, 2010).
65 In 1999 the Globalization and World Cities Study Group and Network (GaWC), based primarily at
Loughborough University in the United Kingdom, defined and categorized world cities based upon a
comprehensive empiricalanalysis (263 cities and 74 producer service firms).
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welcomed by the Turkish investment fund industry. According to the leading Turkish
fund management groups, creating an IFC will provide an opportunity to turn
Istanbul into a regional hub to rival Moscow and attract foreign investors such as
Middle Eastern SWFs and boost the Turkish capital markets.
Since late 2000s European interest in the Turkish investment fund industry has been
VWURQJ:LWKWKHH[FHSWLRQRIìđ$VVHW0DQDJHPHQWPRVWRIWKHOHDGLQJ7XUNLVKIXQG
management groups are already controlled by European or US parent companies.
For instance, Citibank, Unicredit, BBVA, ING, HSBC and BNP Paribas IP are all
present in the top 10 and other companies are moving into the Turkish investment
fund industry. Franklin Templeton Investments has formed an alliance with Akbank
to offer a mirror of the Franklin Templeton Bric equity fund in Turkish Lira.
Moreover, there is a talk of similar agreement between Garanti Bank and Fidelity
Asset and Spend Management (Rintoul 2011).
SWFs in the Gulf Region
As of October 2012 there are 14 SWFs in the Gulf region. The Gulf countries having
the SWFs are namely; Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia and United Arab
Emirates (UAE). As seen from Table II.K.1, one of the earliest SWFs was established
in the UAE (Abu Dhabi Investment Authority) in 1976 and has the highest market
value of 627 billion USD. The total market value of the Gulf SWFs was approximately
1.8 trillion USD as of the end of October 2012. Note that, the market value of the
global SWF was nearly 5 trillion USD in October 2012.
241
This project is funded by the European Union under
the 7th Research Framework programme (theme SSH)
Grant Agreement nr 266800
Table II.J.1: SWFs in the Gulf Region as of October 2012










Oman State General Reserve
Fund
8.2 1980
Oman Oman Investment Fund n/a 2006
Qatar Qatar Investment Authority 115 2005
Saudi Arabia SAMA Foreign Holdings 532.8 n/a
Saudi Arabia Public Investment Fund 5.3 2008
UAE – Abu Dhabi Abu Dhabi Investment
Authority
627 1976
UAE – Abu Dhabi International Petroleum
Investment Company
65.3 1984
UAE – Abu Dhabi Mubadala Development
Company
48.2 2002
UAE – Abu Dhabi Abu Dhabi Investment
Council
n/a 2007




Initially, the Gulf countries established their SWFs in order to invest their
petrodollars into the developed countries like UK and USA, and invested mainly in the
UK and US banks, and the US government bonds. After the global financial crisis of
2008, the Gulf countries have experienced a loss of approximately 700 billion USD.
Accordingly, the Gulf region has changed its investment plans towards new
investment instruments like industrial companies, real estate development and also
towards the new geographical locations like China. It is believed that Turkey can be a
destination country for the Gulf region SWFs if the current government can achieve
LWV JRDO RI WUDQVIRUPLQJ ìVWDQEXO LQWR D UHJLRQDO KXE IRU ILQDQFLDO VHUYLFHV DQG
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initiating new projects, especially in the real estate sector.66 There is already a wide
web of agreements between Turkey and Gulf country investors.67
II.J.2. HNWIs and Private Banking in Turkey
Private banking can be defined as a combination of traditional banking and
investment-related advisory services, such as accounting and tax services and legal
and property planning, offered to HNWIs through specialized advisors. Today, in
addition to the basic services such as growing existing wealth and providing tailored
financial solutions, the range of products and services offered by banks is moving
towards planning for a favorable retirement and transferring wealth to the next
generation.68
Private banking sector is growing in Turkey as the bank and wealth managers
compete for the deposits of the HNWIs. Managers try to convince Turkish HNWIs and
institutional investors that previously entrusted their funds to European and US
banks to shift their business to domestic institutions. In Turkey, a HNWI is described
as a person having investable and liquid assets above 1 million TL – or 613,000 USD –
whereas this threshold is accepted as 1 USD million globally.
66 A.Çiftçi, 2012, see http://emlakkulisi/istanbulun-finans-sehri-olmasinin-nedeni-nedir/142855
67 Some of the agreements can be noted as follows: (i) A private equity fund managed by NBK Capital,
a unit of National Bank of Kuwait, bought 30% of the Dünyagöz eye hospital group in June 2010. It is
known that some other Gulf-based funds are inspecting Turkey’s health sector. (ii) Akbank, one of the
Turkey’s biggest deposit banks, opened an office in Dubai in the early 2010 in order to profit from
strengthening corporate ties. It is introducing Turkish companies to the Abu Dhabi Investment
Authority, which is the region’s largest SWF. Akbank’s chairman declared that the office is working on
deals for Gulf investors who have shown particular interest in the Turkish food, health, logistics and
real estate sectors. (iii) In November 2005 Oger Telecom, a Gulf-based group controlled by Lebanon’s
Hariri family, has owned 55% share in Turk Telekom. (iv) The biggest lender in the emirate, National
Bank Kuwait (NBK) has bought 40% stake in an unlisted Istanbul-based Turkish bank in 2007.
68 A.Biçer 2011, see www.tkbb.org.tr/download/Ahmet_Bicer_IFN_July.pdf.
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According to the BRSA (December 2011), the number and wealth of HNWIs in Turkey
have increased considerably. As of December 2011, total deposit belonging to 115
million depositors has reached up to 695 billion TL. 47.4% of deposit is above 1
million TL and belongs to 46 thousand depositors. 82.1% of the deposit belonging to
government, commercial and other institutions take place in this group. Deposit
lower than 10,000 TL composing 4.7% of total deposit belongs to 111 million
depositors composing 96.1% of total number of depositors. It is seen that the deposit
belonging to natural persons is concentrated mostly on 51,000 TL – 250,000 TL (see
Table II.J.2).
As of June 2012, the total deposit belonging to 119 million depositors reached up to
approximately 719 billion TL. It is reported that 47.4% of the total domestic deposits
have been composed of accounts exceeding 1 million TL and belongs to 50 thousand
depositors.
Higher income individuals in the country have seen their wealth grow by more than
11% on average over the period between 2006 and 2010. Moreover, a separate
analysis by State Street Global Advisors concluded that Turkey, among many other
emerging economies including Chile, Colombia, Egypt and the Czech Republic, had
outperformed the BRIC nations69 by 39.0% between 1997 and 2011.70
Table II.J.2: Distribution of Deposit by Size and by Number of Customers as of
December 2011
69 BRIC countries include Brazil, Russia, India and China.
70 High Net Worth, June 2011, Ledbury Research:
http://www.managersofwealth.com/uploads/whitepapers/HIGHNETWORTH_June2011.pdf
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Deposit Total Deposit Number of Depositors
Billion TL % Thousand
Persons
%
1 Million Natural persons 103.4 24.6 27.8 0.0
Gov. Com. Other Inst. 226.5 82.1 17.8 0.2
250,000 – 1 Million Natural persons 85.5 20.4 164.0 0.2
Gov. Com. Other Inst. 21.8 7.9 37.8 0.5
51,000 – 250,000 Natural persons 127.4 30.4 1,061.8 1.0
Gov. Com. Other Inst. 16.4 6.0 126.4 1.5
11,000 – 50,000 Natural persons 74.3 17.7 2,771.4 2.6
Gov. Com. Other Inst. 7.7 2.8 288.6 3.5
0 – 10,000 Natural persons 29.0 6.9 103,571.0 96.3
Gov. Com. Other Inst. 3.4 1.2 7,685.7 94.2
TOTAL Natural persons 419.7 100.0 107,596.1 100.0
Gov. Com. Other Inst. 275.8 100.0 8,156.3 100.0
Source: www.bddk.org.tr, BRSA (December, 2011).
There are 8 deposit banks in Turkey (5 privately-owned and 3 foreign) that provide
highly personalised Turkish and international private banking services to HNWIs.
Seven of them are among the top 10 banks ranked according to their asset size.
Some of these innovative and personalised services can be enumerated as follows:
(i) All kinds of standard banking, safety deposit box and counter services that
provide solutions for the customer needs and turn their savings into
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investments; banking products like deposits, loans, insurance, and private
pension plans;
(ii) Services that enable customers to find the investment plan that suits them
the best;
(iii) Investment services such as repo transactions, fixed income securities and
domestic/international equities trading;
(iv) Sophisticated investment products including foreign currency securities
and various derivative products;
(v) Personalised and mile-accumulating credit cards;
(vi) A spectrum of products including various types of mutual funds;
vii) Structured Deposit Products and Option Strategies that offer guaranteed
principal for TL and foreign currency savings and the opportunity to obtain
returns from the changes in the financial markets;
(viii) Derivative products including forwards, futures, swaps, and options;
(ix) Asset Management including portfolio advice and discretionary portfolio
management;
(x) Advisory services, including inheritance advisory, real estate advisory, art
advisory and tax advisory services.
In November 2012, the private banking head of Akbank (one of the biggest deposit
banks in Turkey) reported that 770 million USD flowed into Turkey’s private banking
sector in 2011 alone. The money came largely from Middle Eastern (particularly
Dubai and Qatar) and developing Far Eastern countries to invest especially in real
properties in Turkey. Akbank opened a private banking office at the beginning of 2012
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in Dubai and Akbank Private Banking aims to reach an asset size of 1 billion TL in the
region.71
According to an expert in the field72, participation banking has a brand familiarity in
the minds of the newly-emerged wealthy people. However, designing a Shariah-
compliant private banking system that can exclusively match the products and yields
of conventional banking may have its challenges.73 Yet, it has been asserted that
there is also growing demand for Islamic private banking in Turkey. Hence, the
market can be analyzed in two segments; namely, the local depositors and the
foreign depositors. Furthermore, besides traditional private banking products and
services, some new innovative services like inheritance and donation planning are
expected to be attractive for these individuals who are already inclined to make
donations and to join in various social responsibility organizations.
As a result, the local private banking potential for participation banks is expanding in
parallel with the growing wealthy and conservative population in Turkey. It is believed
that this expansion will be steady and relatively slow depending on the rate of
generation of new products and services. On the other hand, foreign investors,
particularly, GCC investors and HNWIs, who already have private banking services in
their own countries, hold significant potential for Turkish participation banks, if they
are able to provide high quality and satisfactory services.74
71http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/rich-from-mideast-revive-turkish-
banks.aspx?pageID=238&nID=34520&NewsCatID=345, November 13, 2012.
72 Ahmet Biçer, the head of international organizations and investor relations at Kuwait Turkish
Participation Bank.
73 Shariah Trust is an Islamic approach to wealth planning.
74 A.Biçer 2011, see www.tkbb.org.tr/download/Ahmet_Bicer_IFN_July.pdf.
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III. REAL SECTORS, HOUSEHOLDS IN RELATION TO FINANCIAL
SYSTEM
III.A. MACROECONOMIC POLICY CONTEXT: PREMATURE FINANCIAL
LIBERALISATION, VOLATILE GROWTH AND DEEPENING SOCIAL
EXCLUSION
III.A.1. Macroeconomic Policy in Retrospect, 1980-99
Turkish macroeconomics towards the 21st century can be characterized as
premature and unprepared deregulation of the financial markets; increased
indebtedness both externally and domestically by the public sector, together with its
virtual collapse to provide any social services to the citizens; a lopsided and volatile
growth trajectory amidst rising unemployment, declining real wages, and deepened
social exclusion.
A characteristic shift of the macroeconomic balances was that the domestic economy
has been trapped into mini-cycles of “growth-crisis-adjustment-growth” during the
post-reform era. Furthermore the public sector has experienced increased
deterioration of its fiscal balances with consequent rise of indebtedness. The
economy also witnessed growing trade deficits despite falling investment ratios. As
the rate of investment demand fell and public expenditures cut, unemployment
levels rose. Finally the key macro economic prices have undergone through a
structural shift with real rates of interest rising sharply and foreign exchange getting
cheaper. All these meant a generally deflationary macroeconomic environment.
On the macro-economic policy side, a significant shift towards “austerity” have been
witnessed, where “macroeconomics” has largely (notably in the decade or so before
the financial crisis) become almost synonymous with “monetary policy” (at the
expense of fiscal policy). Furthermore, monetary policy has often taken the exclusive
form of inflation targeting whereby an ‘independent’ CBRT has the objective of
attaining a low inflation target by using the policy interest rate. All these changes
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can be placed within the concept of financialization, i.e. an overall ascendance of
finance over the real economy, industry in particular.
Given the Turkish experience, one can easily trace out the drastic impacts of the
reform measures on the domestic financial markets and the ongoing trend towards
financial deepening. However, contrary to expectations, public sector's share in the
financial markets remained high. The financing behaviour of corporations did not
show significant change, and loan financing from the banking sector and inter-firm
borrowing continued. Furthermore the share of private sector securities in total
financial assets fell. Thus, the observed upward trend of the proportion of direct
securities to GNP originated from the direct new issues of public sector securities
and Treasury bills. Since the commercial banking system has been the major
customer of such securities, however, the share of aggregate security instruments
fell in private portfolios. In fact, with the implementation of positive interest rates,
and the new possibility of foreign exchaunts, the advance of financial deepening for
the private households has meant increased foreign exchange deposits with vigorous
currency substitution. Thus, it can be stated that the "pioneers of financial
deepening" in Turkey in the 1980's have been the public sector securities and the
forex deposits. Through the 1990s, Turkish experience did not conform to the
McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis of financial deepening with a shift of portfolio selection
from "unproductive" assets to those favoring fixed capital formation (cf. Akyüz 1990).
III.A.2. A Prelude to the Millennium: The Crisis of 2000-1
According to the logic of the programme, successful achievement of the fiscal and
monetary targets would enhance “credibility” of the Turkish government ensuring
reduction in the country risk perception. This would enable reductions in the rate of
interest that would then stimulate private consumption and fixed investments, paving
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the way to sustained growth. Thus, it is alleged that what is being implemented is
actually an expansionary program of fiscal contraction.
The growth path of the Turkish economy over the post-2001 period had been erratic
and volatile, mostly subject to the flows of hot money. Growth, while rapid, was not
free from problems. In fact, the two key characteristics of the recent upswing in
economic activity were that (i) it was mostly fueled by inflows of hot money, hence
was speculation-led; (ii) it was accompanied by high rates of unemployment; hence
was of the jobless growth type. The two fundamental characteristics of the current
growth trajectory of the Turkish economy (viz., speculation driven, jobless growth)
are not incidental, and they are the direct outcomes of the main mode of
accumulation observed under the post-financial reform episode.
III.A.3. Post-Crisis Characteristics of Growth After 200275
Annual rate of growth of real GNP averaged 7.8% over 2002-2006. Growth, while
rapid, had very unique characteristics. Firstly, it was mainly driven by a massive
inflow of foreign finance capital which in turn was lured by significantly high rates of
return offered domestically; hence, it was speculation-led in nature (a la Grabel,
1995). The main mechanism has been that the high rates of interest prevailing in the
Turkish asset markets attracted short term finance capital, and in return, the
relative abundance of foreign exchange led to overvaluation of the TL. Cheapened
foreign exchange costs led to an import boom both in consumption and investment
goods. Clearly, achievement of the fiscal contraction under severe entrenchment of
public non-interest expenditures was a welcome event boosting the expectations of
the financial arbitrageurs.
75 This section draws from Yeldan (2008) and Boratav and Yeldan (2006).
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The second characteristic of the post crisis era was its jobless growth patterns.
Rapid rates of growth were accompanied by high rates of unemployment and low
participation rates. The rate of unemployment rose to above 10% after the 2001
crisis, and despite rapid growth, has not come down to its pre-crisis levels (of 6.5% in
2000). Furthermore, together with persistent open unemployment, disguised
unemployment has also risen. According to Turkstat data, “persons not looking for a
job, but ready for employment if offered a job” has increased to 20.5% over the
eruption of the global recession beginning October 2008 .
Together with rapid growth, disinflation has been hailed as another area of
“success”. The CBRT has started to follow an open inflation targeting framework
since January 2006. The Bank’s current mandate is to set a “point” target of 5.0%
inflation of the consumer prices. Inflation rate, both in consumer and producer
prices, has, in fact, been brought under control by 2004. After the brief turbulence in
the asset markets in May-July 2006, inflation again accelerated to above 10% and
could only be brought under control gradually to 9.6% towards the end of 2006.
Under the great recession era, Turkish inflation hovered around 6.0-8.0% on y-o-y
basis.
What is peculiar for the Turkish financial markets is that despite the positive
achievements on the disinflation front, rates of interest remained slow to adjust. The
real rate of interest on the government debt instruments (GDIs) for instance
remained above 10.0% over most of the post-crisis period and generated heavy
pressures against the fiscal authority in meeting its debt obligations (See Figure
III.A.1). Inertia of the real rate of interest is enigmatic from the successful macro
economic performance achieved over the fiscal front. Even though one traces a
decline in the general plateau of the real interest rates, the Turkish interest charges
are observed to remain significantly higher than those prevailing in most emerging
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market economies. The loan interest rate, in particular, has been stagnant at the
rate 16% despite the deceleration of price inflation until the great recession
(Turkstat, 2006).
The persistence of the real interest rates, on the other hand, had also been
conducive in attracting heavy flows of short term speculative finance capital over the
2000s. This pattern continued under the post 2009 crisis adjustment at an even
stronger rate. Then, with the emergence of the cheap loan boom in the global
markets in response to the “quantitative easing” monetary policy measures, real
rates of interest turned into low and even negative values at the “recovery” period,
2010-211. Over the first half of the 2012, the real interest rates continue to hover
around “2 – 4”% range.
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III.B. SOURCES OF FUNDS FOR BUSINESS
III.B.1. Interrelationships between Financial Sector and Non-Financial
Enterprises
The reorientation of economic policy with the 24th January 1980 stabilisation package
has had radical implications on the restructuring of capital as well as the relations
between the capitalists and the state. This, in turn, brought forth the need for an
anatomy of the Turkish corporate sector in general, and that of the capital groups in
particular.
The structural features of the Turkish business class have comprised a wide range of
diversified interests (banking, manufacturing, foreign trade, tourism, construction,
etc.). This structure has provided the necessary flexibility to alter the relative weight
assigned to different domains of activity within the group, in accordance with the
changing priorities of macroeconomic policies. In that sense, the behaviour of the
groups was a confirmation of their capacity as a specific institutional form of capital
for flexibility and adaptation, as aptly described by Braudel (1985: 433), “to slip at a
moment’s notice from one form or sector to another, in times of crisis or of
pronounced decline in profit rates” (Yalman 2009:265).
What probably distinguishes the Turkish business class from most of their
counterparts in Latin America and/or East Asia, where the family-controlled groups
have similarly shown an inclination to diversify into ‘new growth industries’ unrelated
to their main line of activity, but promoted by the incentive policies of the states
concerned, is the relative lack of investment into industries that would enhance the
competitiveness of the economy as a whole (Yalman 2009:267). It was also noted that
the profit markups did not change significantly in the post-1980 period implying that
the deregulation of industrial prices had not produced by the mid-1980s a highly
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competitive market structure in the Turkish economy (Celasun & Rodrik 1989). In
fact, this has generally been the pattern until the 2000-1 crisis.
After the liberalisation of the capital account in 1989, these big capital groups
intensified their activities in the banking sector which further complicated the
analyses of relations between financial and non-financial sectors. In the Turkish
context, financial and non-financial sectors cannot therefore be easily isolated with
distinct and conflicting interests. Taking into account this rather specific
characteristic of the Turkish capitalist class, effective analyses of the structure of the
Turkish financial system and its impact on the real sector requires a particular focus
on the size of enterprise.
In what follows, the relations between the financial sector and non-financial sector
will be analysed by dividing the latter into the corporate (‘groups’ and large
enterprises) and non-corporate (small and medium size enterprises) sectors. The
most important constraint of this endeavour is the non-existence of systematic data
on SMEs partly due to definitional problems. Until 2005, SMEs had been classified
and defined differently by various organisations. In October 2005, a single definition
was ratified by a Council of Ministers’ Decree No. 2005/9617, based on number of
employees, the size of their annual balance sheet and turnover. Although the criteria
for the classification are aligned to the EU definition, the limits for the annual
balance sheet and turnover are reduced significantly in this SME definition of Turkey
(see Table III.B.1). The SMEs in the trade, crafts and industrial sectors are
represented by Confederation of Tradesmen and Craftsmen of Turkey (TESK in
Turkish acronyms) and Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges (TOBB).
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Table III.B. 1: Definition of SMEs in Turkey and EU
Definitional Criteria Micro Small Medium




Turkey Ȉ0LOOLRQ7/ Ȉ0LOOLRQ7/ Ȉ0LOOLRQ7/
EU Ȉ0LOOLRQ(XUR Ȉ0LOOLRQ(XUR Ȉ0LOOLRQ(XUR
Annual
Turnover
Turkey Ȉ0LOOLRQ7/ Ȉ0LOOLRQ7/ Ȉ0LOOLRQ7/
EU Ȉ0LOOLRQ(XUR Ȉ0LOOLRQ Euro Ȉ0LOOLRQ(XUR
Source: Council of Ministers’ Decree No. 2005/9617.
III.B.2. SMEs and Their Financing since the 1980s
In 1981, faced with tight domestic market and dried out financial loans, a score of
SMEs which lacked the capacity to produce for the export market chose to sell out
their assets. Meanwhile, the conglomerates, that are referred to as ‘groups’ in the
Turkish context, were putting adverts in the newspapers calling for SMEs to buy out
VHH)LJXUH ,,,% ,QDGGLWLRQ WR(F]DFíEDđí ,QYHVWPHQW+ROGLQJRWKHUELJ ǡJURXSVǢ
which had been active in the construction sector in the Middle East countries
QDPHO\ .R]DQRßOXDYXđRßOX+ROGLQJ (QND+ROGLQJ .XWOXWDđ+ROGLQJ VWDUWHG WR
buy the SMEs which were on the verge of bankruptcy (Sönmez 1982: 110-11).
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)LJXUH,,,%$1HZVSDSHU$GYHUWLVHPHQWE\(F]DFíEDđí,QYHVWPHQW+ROGLQJLQWR
Purchase SMEs
Source: Sönmez 1982: 114.
Although these ‘groups’ and large firms form the most important portion in the
industry, the SMEs continued to employ a large amount of the workforce which led
the Turkish governments to develop SME-specific policies since the end of the 1980s.
The Fifth Five Year Development Plan (1985-9) suggests that SMEs link themselves
with the large enterprises as their subcontractors. The plan also presents the
objective of enhanced financial supports for the SMEs through Halk Bank loans. The
Sixth Five Year Development Plan (1990-4) states the necessity for an umbrella
association for the SMEs and increased availability of loans for them. For these
purposes two steps were taken. First, two previously existing but non-effective two
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institutions 76 were united under the roof of Small and Medium Enterprises
Development Organisation (KOSGEB in Turkish acronyms) in 1990, as a major
instrument for the execution of SME-specific policies.77 Second, the Credit Guarantee
Fund, Inc. (KGF) was established in 1991 with the mission to support the SMEs which
have limited access to bank loans due to lack of satisfactory securities. The KGF was
established not simply to increase the number of firms enjoying the bank loans, but
to increase the number of medium and long-term loans as well as the limits of loans
available to the SMEs.
KGF granted its first guarantee on July 1, 1994, after Germany and Turkey signed a
Technical Cooperation Agreement and undertook a project entitled ‘Assistance in the
Establishment of a Credit Guarantee Fund for Small and Medium-Sized Industrial
Firms’ in 1993. The first shareholders of KGF were the TOBB with 50.99% share,
TESK with 0.43%, Free Entrepreneurs and Managers Foundation of Turkey (TOSYÖV)
with 0.01%, and Vocational Education and Supporting of The Small-Scale Industry
Foundation (MEKSA) with 0.01%. KOSGEB involved in the partnership in August 1995;
similarly Halk Bank entered the partnership in March 1996. Although Halk Bank
remained as the only fund bank that is a partner of KGF, since 2003, 18 other banks
have signed protocols with the KGF.78 The declared priorities of KGF are to support
76 Small Industry Development Organisation (KÜSGET) was created in 1983 by the support of United
Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) and Industrial Training and Development
Centre (SEGEM) in 1978.
77 The Law No. 3625 of 1983 which established KOSGEB defined the SMEs as enterprises in the
manufacturing industry with less than 150 employees.
78 According to the protocol between the banks and KGF, when a bank receives a credit application by
an SME, it examines the application according to its regular procedures. If the bank deems the
application appropriate but finds the securities of the firm unsatisfactory, sends the application file to
the KGF. Then, if the KGF decides to be the guarantor for the loan, the firm receives the credit from
Halkbank with the ‘repayment guarantee’ by the KGF. The guarantee of the KGF cannot exceed 80% of
the credit amount and the maximum term of credit is 8 years. In return for its repayment guarantee,
the KGF charges a commission fee that is equivalent to 2.0 to 4.0% of the guarantee amount per each
year http://www.kgf.com.tr/eng/3nasilbasvurulur.htm.
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young and woman entrepreneurs, to promote innovative investments, to promote
high-tech SME’s, to support export, to increase the rate of employment and to
contribute regional development. Nevertheless, the scale of KGF guarantees were
insufficient to meet to the loan needs of SMEs. A research conducted in 1995 reveals
that although 61% of the SMEs claimed that they would need additional funding, 71%
RIWKHPKDGQRWERUURZHGDQ\ORDQVIURPEDQNV6DUíDVODQ
Although the governments have continuously promised to improve productivity of
SMEs, their international competitiveness and access to loans, it is generally
accepted that the SMEs had to face the initial shock of the opening of the economy
and competition within the Customs Union in 1996 (OECD 2004: 9). Arguably due to
this, SMEs were given a distinctive place in the Seventh Five Year Development Plan
(1995-1999). After placing a significant emphasis on their potential to generate jobs,
the plan proposes alternative financial supports for the SMEs through the institution
of risk capital (venture capital) and credit guarantee fund in order to protect them
from the shocks they may have faced with following the start of the Custom Union. It
was also underlined that KOSGEB had not been successful in accomplishing its
PLVVLRQV 0¾IW¾RßOX   DQG WKH LQVWLWXWLRQDO FDSDFLW\ RI .26*(% KDG WR EH
strengthened.
In the second half of the 1990s, while high inflation and real interest rates have
stimulated domestic savings and have absorbed much of these private savings in the
banking system, the saving-investment gap has widened. The fact that the
government expenditures were financed via bond issuance lured private savings to
finance the public sector borrowing which had a direct impact on both the supply of
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loans for SMEs. As already stated in this report, the corporate sector in general, the
groups which have their own banks in particular were largely insulated from any
possible adverse effects of the domination of the financial markets by making use of
the financial instruments of the state. Under these rather risky conditions with high
inflation and real interest rates, the banks have protected themselves by purchasing
government bonds. Meanwhile, the corporate sector heavily invested in rentier
activities which would be more profitable than the prospective investments in the
productive activities (see II.G.2). While the banks made loans available only to their
own established customers that are mainly large business and the ones within their
own ‘group’, the SMEs had very little chance to obtain bank loans. By the end of
1990s, the data show that SMEs, despite their significance for the economy in terms
of employment and amount of enterprises, they have very limited access to bank
loans. In 2000, the SME sector, including services, accounted for 99.8% of the total
number of enterprises, 76.7% of total employment, 38% of capital investment, 26.5%
RIYDOXHDGGHGURXJKO\RIH[SRUWVDQGRIEDQNORDQ6DUíDVODQ79
The situation for the SMEs did not improve in the first couple of years of the 2000s,
while the bank loans to corporations more than doubled in the 2002-8 period. The
2000 and 2001 financial and banking crises and the banking regulations had direct
and indirect impact on SMEs. In the midst of the banking crisis, the government
assisted SMEs through Halk Bank offering unhedged subsidized loans. However, the
new banking regulations required to end the Treasury finance of the duty losses on
the subsidised loans to SMEs (see section II.E.1 above). In order to prepare
themselves for these new financial regulations, both Ziraat Bank and Halk Bank
unilaterally increased the interest rates which caused more repayment difficulties
and made it more difficult for the SMEs to use public bank loans due to higher costs.
79 cf. Table III.B.4. The apparent inconsistency in data for the share of SMEs in bank loans is likely to
be due to definitional problems.
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Moreover, Halk Bank is planned to be privatized. To improve its saleability, the Bank
is retrenching, so do its loans for SMEs. Consequently, since SMEs do not have a
credit rating tradition and do have a weak capital base, the new banking sector
UHJXODWLRQVKLWWKHPKDUGQLđDQG%DNíULQWKHGHIDXOWVRQORDQV
increased to 12% from 5% which necessitated new support programmes.
In the immediate aftermath of the 2000-1 crisis, in order to keep the unemployment
level at a sustainable level, the government launched new support programmes for
SMEs through ‘innovative’ financial instruments concerning the SMEs. In April 2002,
‘SME Strategy and Action Plan’ has been issued with the decision of the High
Planning Council in accordance with ‘the European Charter for Small Enterprises’
and ‘Multi-Annual Program for Enterprises and Entrepreneurship’. In the wake of the
2002 general elections in November, the government echoed both the OECD and EU
Charters with emphasizing its commitment to boost competitiveness and capabilities
of the SMEs. It was also emphasized by the government authorities that the SMEs
were expected to become significant contributors to the policy making. In order to
facilitate SMEs access to finance, the Eighth Five Year (2000-5) and the Ninth (2007-
13) 80 Development Plans strenthened the emphasis in the Seventh Five Year
Development Plan in calling for ‘innovative’ financial instruments. The Eight Plan
also names KGF and risk capital (venture capital) as possible funding alternatives for
SMEs. Furthermore, it suggests ‘equity participation’81 as another alternative and the
Ninth Plan adds ‘start-up capital’ to the content of which was included within the
YHQWXUHFDSLWDOLQWKH(LJKWK3ODQ0¾IW¾RßOX
In 2002, the government aimed at revitalizing already existing financial institutions
that would provide the SMEs with those ‘innovative’ instruments. Although there
80 After the completion of the Eighth Five Year Development Plan, the term of the plans are extended
to seven years.
81 The equity participation largely draws upon Small Business Investment Companies in the USA.
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were certain attempts in the late 1990s, in opening new financial channels for SMEs,
they remained inactive until 2002 when the Treasury allocated some funds to be
provided to the SMEs through equity participation funds. The first risk capital
FRPSDQ\ 9DNíIEDQN 5LVN &R ZDV HVWDEOLVKHG LQ  E\ 9DNíIEDQN WKH QDPH RI
ZKLFK ZDV FKDQJHG WR 9DNíIEDQN 9HQWXUH &DSLWDO &R LQ 82 The first equity
participation fund company, ‘Partnership to KOBI Investment Inc.’ was established in
1999 with the partnership of TOBB, Halk Bank, KOSGEB, TESK and 16 Chamber of
,QGXVWU\ DQG 7UDGH $FFRUGLQJ WR 6DUíDVODQ   72%% KDG QRWLILHG WKH
government about its intention to adopt this form of SME financing in 1993. Although
it was uttered in the Eight Plan, the government had not prepared the regulatory
base for such a practice. Between 1998 and 2003, the partnership did not undertake
any activities. In 2003, the name of the partnership was changed to ‘KOBI Venture
Capital Investment Trust’ (in short, KOBI Inc.) and the Trust became active from
2004.83 The development of non-traditional financial instruments, such as venture
capital or equity participation appears to be lagging behind the need for these
instruments.
In 2003, KOSGEB has gone through significant institutional restructuring. In 2002,
there were only 400 firms registered to KOSGEB, in 2012, this number rose to 700
000. Starting in 2003, some amount of KOSGEB budget has been allocated to Credit
Support system according to which KOSGEB pays certain amount of the interest of
the borrowed loan. Through this interest rate support on bank loans, SMEs are able
use loans with low or zero interest rates by the intermediary banks. The KOSGEB is
also providing grants for the SMEs that are not to be repaid.
82 In the interview with one of the KOSGEB directors, the preference of the venture capital over risk
capital in the related legislation was explained with regards to negative connotation of the concept of
‘risk’ as opposed to rather positive meanings of ‘venture’.
83 http://kobias.com.tr/kobiportal/en/history.html
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In 2002, the government also launched new subsidy programmes for SMEs through
purchases of capital equipment through a series of tax incentives and offsets. The
administrative arrangements for this tax relief have recently been simplified to
remove an explicit requirement for government approval (OECD 2004: 15).
The government provides trade loans for the corporate and non-corporate sector
with export capacities. The share of trade loans in total external finance of the real
VHFWRULVVLJQLILFDQWO\KLJKLQWKHVHFRQGKDOIRIWKHV]O¾DQG<DO©íQ7KH
same applies to the SMEs, trade loans constitute large portion of their external
finance. Trade loans are available for those SMEs with high export performance.
However, as the governments were forced to limit public expenditure according to
the neoliberal orthodoxy, the state subsidies for the SMEs diminished, since 2000 the
share of trade loans decreased steadily every year. The amount of the trade loans
DUH FODLPHG WR EHPXFK ODUJHU LQ 7XUNH\ WKDQ LQ RWKHU FRXQWULHV ]O¾ DQG <DO©íQ
2010).84 During the first 6 months of 2009, trade loans fell decreasing at a rate of
134% compared to first 6 months of year 2008 which negatively affected SMEs,
craftsmen and tradesment and their employees.85
Equity financing through stock exchange is not a viable option for the SMEs. SMEs
have limited access to capital markets. They are not able meet the criteria to register
for the CMB and issue securities in the ISE. On average only 14 SMEs gain access to
capital market every year.
84 During the first 6 months of 2009, trade credits fall,decreasing at a rate of 134% compared to first 6
months of year 2008 which negative affected SME’s, craftsmen and tradesmen and their employees.
(See “Turkish Industrial Strategy Document 2011-4 (Towards EU Membership)”
http://www.sanayi.gov.tr/Files/Documents/TurkiyeSanayiStratejisiIngilizce.pdf
85 “Turkish Industrial Strategy Document 2011-2014 (Towards EU Membership)”
http://www.sanayi.gov.tr/Files/Documents/TurkiyeSanayiStratejisiIngilizce.pdf
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Since 2009, regional development agencies initiated several support programs for
SMEs. These agencies periodically call for projects from SMEs. The successful ones
are granted 25 to 50% of the cost of the investment. In addition to these unrepayable
grants, development agencies initiated interest rate support programs in which they
can provide loans to the selected SMEs with zero and low rates of interest. There is
no data regarding the amount of these SMEs.




KGF, TESKOMB Credit Guarantee Fund
KOSGEB Credit Support System
Ministry of Industry and Trade Trade Loans
KOSGEB Non-repayable Grants
ISE Capital Market
Regional Development Agencies Non-Repayable Grants and Investment Loans
with low or zero interest rate
Although, Turkey accepted the Basel II criteria in 2009, it seems that the SMEs were
not yet ready to carry out obligations arising out of these criteria. Credit rating tends
to discriminate against the SMEs while favouring the corporate firms because the
credit ratings of SMEs will be lower due to their weaker structure. So SMEs will be
urged to pay more interest and most of the SMEs will have more limited access to
bank loans then before.
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In June 2009, European Investment Bank (EIB), Undersecretariat of Treasury and its
banking partners signed a loan agreement. An EIB loan for SMEs was concluded with
the Industrial Development Bank of Turkey (TSKB), Turkish Development Bank
(TKB)86DQG9DNíIEDQN IRUD WRWDODPRXQWRI(85P7KH(,%DOVRHQWHUHG LQWRD
loan agreement in support of SME lending with Halk Bank, signing a first EUR 150m
tranche of a total facility of EUR 300m.87
III.B.3. SMEs and Bank Loans, 2006-10
The Allocation of Bank Loans across User Categories
The place of SMEs in bank loans vis-à-vis households and the corporate sector may
be assessed by the data presented in Table III.B.3. The significant asymmetry
between loans available for the corporate sector and for the SMEs is apparent.
During the recession 2008-9 the share of SME loans fell relative to that of corporate
sector and later recovered. However, the data are indicative of the fact that bank
loans to corporations grew faster than those extended to SMEs for the entire period
of 2006-10. Similarly, the average growth of bank loans for small firms was negative
(-5.9%) during 2002-9 while it was positive for large and medium firms (1.8% and
9.5% respectively) (Özmen, et al. 2010: 15).
86 TKB is the state development bank that aims to provide financial support for development projects
in the less developed regions.
87 In addition to these two agreement a third agreement between EIB and the treasury was signed an
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Table III.B. 3: Allocation of Bank Loans, 2006-12
Loans extended to… 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Households, TL Billion 69.6 95.7 118.0 131.0 174.2
SMEs, TL Billion 59.6 76.5 84.6 83.3 125.7
Corporate Sector, TL Billion 89.8 113.4 164.8 178.4 225.9
Total Bank Loans, TL Billion 219.0 285.6 367.4 392.6 525.9
Source: BRSA.
Distribution of SMEs Using Bank Loans by Size
Table III.B.4 displays the numbers and percentage distribution of SMEs using bank
loans with respect to their size, whereas Table III.B.5 gives the amounts of loans and
their distribution according to size groups. Although micro-size enterprises comprise
the biggest number of the loan-using bank customers, the amounts of the loans they
are using are considerably low. Arguably, SMEs are forced to seek funds elsewhere
in the economy, and it is doubtful whether they often find enough to undertake new
investments. At present no information is available on the use of personal assets or
loans from families and friends and about recourse to such potential funding sources
as the mortgaging of assets.88 According to a World Bank report, SMEs in Turkey
have grown slower than in other middle-income countries (WB 2010).
88 We are informed that the banks have recently started to accept equipment and machinery as well as
gold as assets available for mortgage. Yet, there is no data about the amount of this resource in the
balance sheet of the SMEs.
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Table III.B. 4: Number and percentage distribution of customers using bank loans by
size, 2006-10.89
Size Group 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Micro, Numbers 1252 1088 1312 1356 1418
(% of SMEs) (77.0) (70.1) (80.7) (79.6) (76.6)
Small, Numbers 314 369 228 249 313
(% of SMEs) (19.3) (23.8) (14.0) (14.6) (17.0)
Medium, Numbers 61 94 86 99 119
(% of SMEs) (3.7) (6.1) (5.3) (5.8) (6.4)
Total SMEs (Numbers) 1627 1551 1626 1704 1850
Memo Items:
SMEs as a proportion of
Total Loan Customers,% 6.4 5.6 6.3 6.4 6.7
Total Loan Customers 25580 27658 25662 26499 27787
Source: BRSA.
Table III.B. 5: Amounts and Percentage Distribution of the Loans Used by SMEs, 2006-
10
Size Group 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Micro, in TL Billion 24.0 28.7 33.1 29.2 40.8
(% of loans) (40.2) (37.5) (39.1) (35.1) (32.5)
Small, in TL Billion 18.0 23.9 22.3 22.1 34.2
(% of loans) (30.2) (31.2) (26.4) (26.5) (27.2)
Medium, in TL Billion17.6 24.0 29.2 32.0 50.5
(% of loans) (29.5) (31.4) (34.5) (38.4) (40.3)
Total loans for SMEs,
89 The unit of measurement for the number of SMEs and the total credit customer is ‘one thousand’.
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in TL Billion 59.6 76.5 84.6 83.3 125.4
Source: BRSA.
Defaults
The adverse impact of the 2008-9 recession on SMEs was in terms of defaults on
loans (See Table III.B.6). According to a news clip published in September 2009,
owners of the SMEs that have limited access to bank loan due to previous defaults,
force their employees to borrow consumers’ loans threatening to fire them (cited in
Tuvay, 2009: 3). In October 2009, the Treasury granted a fund of USD 1 billion to the
KGF in order to mitigate this effect of the crisis on SMEs. The debt of those firms who
had been established before June 30, 2008 and had not have any repayment
difficulties until then, yet were not able to repay loans after June 2008, was
restructured. This debt restructuring was made possible by guarantee of the KGF of
up to 75% of the total debt (Tuvay 2009: 3). Although there is no publicly available
data regarding the details of this programme, and in an interview with one of the
directors of the KOSGEB, the respondent revealed –off the record- that out of 5600
such firms accepted onto the programme, 20 of them have continued to have
repayment difficulties after the restructuring. However, as the data on Table 5 show,
the KGF fund appears to have been insufficient in protect the SMEs and particularly
micro enterprises from the negative impacts of the crisis. The SMEs and particularly
micro enterprises have had repayment difficulties on their borrowing.
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Table III.B. 6: Defaults on SME Loans as a Percentage of Number of Loans Outstanding,
2006-10
Size 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Micro 5.7 5.6 6.1 10.4 7.0
Small 2.8 3.2 4.9 7.7 4.0
Medium 1.0 1.6 3.2 5.0 2.8
Total SMEs 3.5 3.6 4.8 7.6 4.6
Total Loans 3.8 3.5 3.7 5.3 3.7
Source: BRSA.
III.B.4. Financing Manufacturing Activities
The new banking regulations in 2001 did not improve the performance of the banking
sector in financing the manufacturing sector. The share of equity finance on the
balance sheet of manufacturing firms has not steadily decreased since 1996. Instead,
it increased particularly from 2002 (37.1) to 2004 (52.7). While the equity share
dropped 8.2% from 2004 to 2008, in 2009 it increased 3.7% reaching 48.2%. Since
2009, it is showing a slightly decreasing trend again. In accordance with the
fluctuations in the equity financing, due the impact of the financial crisis and banking
regulation, the share of bank financing both short and long term fell significantly
from 2000 to 2004, then started to increase incrementally each year until the 2008
crisis where it fell significantly. Since 2008, bank financing appears to be increasing
minimally (Table III.B.7). Despite these low figures, a research paper prepared by
three analysts of CBRT claims that “Turkey is a bank-based country; nearly half of
non-equity liabilities are bank loans, and market financing is negligible” (Özmen,
ĐDKLQ¸]DQG<DO©íQ
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Table III.B. 7: Sources of Net Funds in Liabilities of the Manufacturing Sector,% (1996-
2011)
1996 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2009 2010 2011
Current Liabilities 49.51 48.7 43.9 35.1 36.8 39.2 35.8 38.5 41.0
Short Term Loans 16.2 18.3 14.4 11.1 13.0 16.6 13.1 13.9 15.3
Short Term Bank Loans 13.7 15.5 12.4 9.9 11.3 14.0 10.4 11.3 12.5
Other90 2.5 2.8 1.9 1.3 1.7 2.4 2.7 2.5 2.8
Short Term Trade Loans 16.7 16.9 18.2 15.0 15.1 13.8 13.9 15.3 16.5
Other91 16.5 10.8 11.3 8.9 8.7 8.8 8.7 9.3 9.6
Long term Liabilities 12.8 15.6 19.0 12.2 13.4 16.3 16.0 16.0 17.0
Long Term Loans 8.9 10.0 12.1 7.9 9.8 12.6 11.9 12.3 13.3
Long Term Bank Loans 8.6 9.8 11.9 7.1 8.9 11.7 11.0 11.4 12.3
Other Long Term Loans92 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.9
Other93 3.7 5.5 7.0 4.4 3.7 3.8 4.1 3.8 3.7
Equity 37.7 35.8 37.1 52.7 49.8 44.5 48.2 45.2 42.0
Paid-up capital 15.1 15.1 18.7 51.8 38.8 33.2 34.0 30.9 28.5
Capital and Profit Reserves 19.3 22.1 20.8 21.3 12.2 12.4 14.7 13.1 12.0
Profits94 3.3 -1.4 -2.4 -13.0 -1.2 -1.1 -0.2 1.3 3.4
Type of loans 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
SME loans 59.614 76.521 84.605 83.271 125.734
Corporate Sector Loans 89.761 113.400 164.845 178.398 225.885
Source: BRSA.
90 Until 2004, this figure is calculated as the sum of current maturities of long term credits and
accrued interest and other short term loans..
91 Total sum of other short term loans, advance payments, contract progress costs, taxes and other
liabilities payable, provision for liabilities and expenses, short term deferred income and expense
accruals, and other short term liabilities.
92Since 2004, this figure includes leasing payables minus deferred lease interest payables. The rise in
this figure is due to the addition of the leasing payments.
93 Total sum of trade credits, other long term loans, advance payments, provision for other liabilities
and expenses, long term deferred income and expense accruals, and other long term liabilities.
94 Past net profits plus net current profits.
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CBRT sector balance sheet dataset also reveal that banking regulation in 2001 had
negative impact on the short term bank loans of both corporate firms and SMEs.
SMEs’ access to short term bank loans has been curtailed more than the big-sized
firms in manufacture. Short term bank loans of the small and medium size
manufacturing firm dropped 9.0% and 6.4% respectively. The same figure for the big
size firms is as low as 3.6%. Similar trend is observed between 2008 and 2009. Data
show that small and medium size manufacturing firms had less access to both short
and long term bank loans than the corporate sector in the same sector. Total share
of long and short term bank loans fall 8.4% in small firms, and 4.9% in medium firms
and 3.5% for big firms. In 2011, although total of short and long term bank financing
in the source of net funds are 27.2, 27.5 and 24.0 in small, medium and big size
manufacturing firms, the reasons for relying on the equity for each size may vary
(see Tables III.B. 8, 9 and 10). We suggest that while the small firms, participated in
this questionnaire do not have access to external financing, big-size manufacturing
firms were rather reluctant to use bank financing probably due to intermediation
FRVWVFI7¾UNHU.D\DDQG'RßDQ:KLOHWKHVPDOODQGPHGLXPVL]HILUPVZHUH
forced to increase their equity despite their high losses, the big size manufacturing
firms participated in the CBRT data, preferred to use their retained profits to finance
investments.
The data gathered by the Istanbul Chamber of Industry (ICI) on the 500 biggest
industrial enterprises differ from the big size manufacturing firms. Table 12 shows
that in the aftermath of the crisis, the biggest 500 industrial enterprises have had
access to bank loans and preferred to increase their financial leverage: the total
loan/equity ratio was 103.8% in 2009, 119.2% in 2010, and 140.7% in 2011. When the
profit rates of the biggest 500 are considered, they differ from significantly from the
CBRT dataset (see Table III.B.12).
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Table III.B. 8: Sources of Net Funds in Liabilities of Small-Size Manufacturing Sector,%
(1996-2011)
1996 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2009 2010 2011
Current Liabilities 59.7 61.6 44.4 35.0 46.9 41.6 36.9 37.8 41.2
Short Term Loans 18.8 20.5 14.2 11.0 16.5 17.9 13.4 14.4 15.8
Short Term Bank Loans 17.6 19.3 13.4 10.5 15.3 16.7 12.4 13.3 14.3
Other95 1.2 1.2 0.8 0.5 1.3 1.2 1.0 1.2 1.5
Short Term Trade Loans 21.6 19.7 17.8 13.4 17.0 12.6 12.1 12.1 13.0
Other96 19.4 21.7 12.3 10.6 13.4 11.0 11.4 11.3 12.9
Long term Liabilities 9.0 12.0 22.1 13.7 11.1 17.0 13.3 15.0 19.0
Long Term Loans 5.2 7.7 14.4 8.8 8.5 14.3 9.8 11.9 13.7
Long Term Bank Loans 5.0 7.5 14.1 8.3 7.4 13.1 9.0 11.2 12.9
Other Long Term Loans97 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.5 1.1 1.2 0.9 0.7 0.8
Other98 3.9 4.2 6.6 4.9 6.4 2.7 3.5 3.1 5.2
Equity 31.3 26.1 33.5 51.3 42.0 41.5 49.7 47.2 39.9
Paid-up capital 17.8 19.2 23.8 71.7 48.9 44.9 41.5 40.3 46.1
Capital and Profit Reserves 14.4 19.5 19.2 8.7 8.1 8.8 18.8 16.8 7.6
Profits99 -1.0 -2.6 -9.5 -27.9 -15.5 -12.3 -10.7 -10.0 -13.8
95 Until 2004, this figure is calculated as the sum of current maturities of long term credits and
accrued interest and other short term loans. Since 2004, balance sheets include a new item, that is
loans on leasing payables which flactuates between 0.2 and 0.3.
96 Total sum of other short term loans, advance payments, contract progress costs, taxes and other
liabilities payable, provision for liabilities and expenses, short term deferred income and expense
accruals, and other short term liabilities.
97Since 2004, this figure includes leasing payables minus deferred lease interest payables. The rise in
this figure is due to the addition of the leasing payments.
98 Total sum of trade credits, other long term loans, advance payments, provision for other liabilities
and expenses, long term deferred income and expense accruals, and other long term liabilities.
99 Past net profits plus net current profits.
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Table III.B. 9: Sources of Net Funds in Liabilities of Medium-Size Manufacturing
Sector,%, (1996-2011)
1996 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2009 2010 2011
Current Liabilities 51.5 50.4 45.9 37.4 44.1 44.9 39.8 42.6 44.8
Short Term Loans 21.0 21.3 17.0 13.7 17.0 19.4 15.1 16.4 17.4
Short Term Bank Loans 20.0 19.1 15.2 12.7 15.5 17.7 13.3 14.8 15.9
Other100 1.1 2.2 1.9 1.1 1.5 1.7 1.8 1.5 1.5
Short Term Trade Loans 16.9 18.0 18.4 15.1 17.2 15.2 15.1 16.4 16.8
Other101 13.1 11.2 10.4 8.7 10.0 10.2 9.6 9.8 10.6
Long term Liabilities 11.5 15.8 15.0 11.1 13.7 15.8 14.8 14.7 16.3
Long Term Loans 7.2 10.3 9.6 7.4 10.4 12.8 11.8 12.0 13.4
Long Term Bank Loans 7.0 10.2 9.5 6.7 8.8 11.1 10.2 10.5 11.6
Other Long Term Loans102 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.7 1.6 1.7 1.5 1.6 1.9
Other103 4.3 5.6 5.4 3.6 3.3 2.9 3.0 2.7 2.9
Equity 37.4 33.8 39.1 51.5 42.2 39.3 45.4 42.7 38.9
Paid-up capital 16.8 16.8 22.3 62.1 39.7 35.7 34.6 32.2 29.8
Capital and Profit Reserves 18.4 21.4 20.9 9.9 7.6 8.8 10.7 9.4 9.7
Profits104 2.2 -4.4 -4.1 -20.4 -5.0 -5.1 0.0 1.0 -0.7
100 Until 2004, this figure is calculated as the sum of current maturities of long term credits and
accrued interest and other short term loans. Since 2004, balance sheets include a new item, that is
loans on leasing payables.
101 Total sum of other short term loans, advance payments, contract progress costs, taxes and other
liabilities payable, provision for liabilities and expenses, short term deferred income and expense
accruals, and other short term liabilities.
102. Since 2004, this figure includes leasing payables minus deferred lease interest payables. The rise
in this figure is due to the addition of the leasing payments.
103 Total sum of trade credits, other long term loans, advance payments, provision for other liabilities
and expenses, long term deferred income and expense accruals, and other long term liabilities.
104 Past net profits plus net current profits.
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Table III.B. 10: Sources of Net Funds in Liabilities of Big-Size Manufacturing Sector,%
(1996-2011)
1996 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2009 2010 2011
Current Liabilities 47.8 44.3 43.1 34.2 33.8 37.4 34.8 37.7 40.2
Short Term Loans 14.1 15.5 13.4 10.2 11.5 15.7 12.7 13.3 14.8
Short Term Bank Loans 10.8 12.3 11.3 8.7 9.7 12.8 9.6 10.3 11.6
Other105 3.2 3.2 2.1 1.5 1.8 2.9 3.1 3.0 3.1
Short Term Trade Loans 16.1 16.8 18.2 15.1 14.4 13.6 13.9 15.4 16.7
Other106 17.6 12.1 11.5 8.9 7.8 8.0 8.2 9.0 8.7
Long term Liabilities 13.7 15.6 20.1 12.5 13.6 16.4 16.5 16.4 16.9
Long Term Loans 9.9 10.1 12.6 7.9 9.7 12.4 12.1 12.4 13.3
Long Term Bank Loans 9.7 9.9 12.5 7.1 9.1 11.7 11.4 11.6 12.4
Other Long Term Loans107 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.8 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.8 0.9
Other108 3.8 5.5 7.5 4.5 3.9 4.0 4.5 4.0 2.6
Equity 38.5 40.1 36.9 53.4 52.6 46.3 48.7 45.9 42.9
105 Until 2004, this figure is calculated as the sum of current maturities of long term credits and
accrued interest and other short term loans. Since 2004, balance sheets include a new item, that is
loans on leasing payables.
106 Total sum of other short term loans, advance payments, contract progress costs, taxes and other
liabilities payable, provision for liabilities and expenses, short term deferred income and expense
accruals, and other short term liabilities.
107. Since 2004, this figure includes leasing payables minus deferred lease interest payables. The rise
in this figure is due to the addition of the leasing payments.
108 Total sum of trade credits, other long term loans, advance payments, provision for other liabilities
and expenses, long term deferred income and expense accruals, and other long term liabilities.
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Paid-up capital 14.1 15.1 16.7 44.9 37.6 31.4 33.2 29.8 26.6
Capital and Profit Reserves 20.2 22.4 21.0 16.2 13.9 13.8 14.7 13.6 13.0
Profits109 4.2 2.7 -0.9 -7.6 1.2 1.1 0.8 2.4 3.
Table III.B. 11: Sources of Net Funds in Liabilities of the 500 biggest private firms (%),
2006-11
500 Biggest Industrial Enterprises 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Short Term Loans 32.5 31.9 36.5 33.5 35.2 36.2
Long Term Loans 14.5 13.3 16.2 15.6 15.8 17.2
Total Loans 46.5 45.2 52.6 49.1 51.1 53.7
Equity 53.1 54.8 47.4 50.9 49.0 46.3
Private Enterprises 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Short Term Loans 34.2 33.9 37.0 34.3 36.8 39.7
Long Term Loans 15.1 14.0 17.4 16.6 17.6 18.7
Total Loans 49.3 47.9 54.4 50.9 54.4 58.5
Equity 50.7 52.1 45.6 49.1 45.6 41.6
Public Enterprises 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Short Term Loans 24.1 23.5 33.7 29.6 26.9 14.4
109 Past net profits plus net current profits.
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Long Term Loans 11.5 10.1 10.1 10.7 6.1 6.9
Total Loans 35.6 33.6 43.8 40.3 32.9 21.4
Equity 64.4 66.4 56.2 59.7 67.1 78.6
6RXUFHìVWDQEXO6DQD\L2GDVí'HUJLVL-RXUQDORIWKH,VWDQEXO&KDPEHURI,QGXVWU\
(2012: 40).
Table III.B. 12: Profit Rates of the 500 biggest Industrial Enterprises,%, 2003-11
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
500 Biggest 6.2 7.8 5.4 7.3 8.7 4.7 6.0 8.3 6.8
Private 6.8 8.0 6.3 8.4 10.1 5.0 6.1 7.1 6.5
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III.C. MERGERS/ACQUISITIONS AND RESTRUCTURING IN THE SELECTED
SECTORS
III.C.1 Description of the Turkish Mergers/Acquisitions Market
A peculiar feature of the post-1980 economic liberalisation experience in Turkey was
that the establishment of an institutional framework for supervision and regulation of
the markets came much later than the decisions to liberalise the economy. For
instance, it was not until the adoption of the Law No. 4054 on the Protection of
Competition in 1994 that Turkey had a competition law; and, even then,
establishment of the Turkish Competition Authority (TCA) in 1997 had to be awaited
for its enforcement. For this basic reason, i.e., in the absence of an institution that
was responsible for keeping records, data on mergers/acquisitions (M&A) prior to
1998 is dispersed, and even a partial portrait of this period in question would be
impressionistic at this point.
The Law No. 4054 imposed that a formal application for authorisation to be made to
the TCA in order for M&A deals to be realised, if (i) pecuniary magnitude of the
transaction is above the specified thresholds determined in the TCA communiques
and (ii) it brings a permanent change in the control of the economic entity involved.
Thereby, it has become possible to follow the number of M&A deals on a yearly basis
from the applications that the TCA concludes. Table III.C.1 presents these data as
they appear in the annual reports of the TCA according to the type of the transaction.
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Table III.C. 1: Breakdown of the Type of M&A Applications Concluded by the TCA
Type of Application
Year Mergers Acquisitions Joint Ventures Privatisations Total
1998 59
1999 5 56 5 2 68
2000 13 70 11 6 100
2001 6 73 7 0 86
2002 14 83 6 0 103
2003 7 76 9 14 106
2004 7 88 8 19 122
2005 5 122 8 35 170
2006 4 138 23 21 186
2007 6 193 22 11 232
2008 3 209 20 23 255
2009 4 128 12 2 146
2010 3 202 5 66 276
2011 3 168 68 14 253
2012 1 190 91 21 303
Source: TCA Annual Reports.
Nevertheless, it should not be considered that the figures in Table III.C.1 represent
the exact number of M&A deals realised. First, there are intra-group transactions
that are “out of scope” of the Competition Law and others that are “below
thresholds”. If applications have nevertheless been made to the TCA for these, which
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may or may not be the case, these are included in the figures above. Second, there
are those applications rejected by the TCA; however, since this occurred only for 4
deals between 1998 and 2012, the due corrections to the Table III.C.1 were not made.
Third, there may be transactions that have not materialised despite the TCA’s
approval; Table III.C.1 does not reflect these cancelled deals.
Having made these reservations on the reliability of the data to reflect the M&A
reality for the period of 1998-2011, it can be readily observed that acquisitions have
become a more common practice in Turkey especially since the mid-2000s. Number
of acquisitions rose above 100 for the first time in 2005 and nearly doubled in 2008.
The global economic crisis and the slowdown in growth figures in recent years did
not cause the number of acquisitions to go back to its pre-2005 level. In explaining
this leap in the number of acquisitions, the effect of three concurring dynamics can
be pointed out: (i) Turkey’s slowly improving macro-economic and political risk
factors in the international markets, which boosted foreign investors’ confidence; (ii)
the re-focusing strategy pursued by major capital groups, which led them to search
for acquisition opportunities in activities that they wanted to focus and to put up for
sale their undertakings in others, and (iii) the partial or complete re-sale of assets
that were acquired by domestic capital groups through increasing number of
privatisations.
It can also be observed from Table III.C.1 that the level of merger activity, which was
already insignificant in comparison to acquisitions at the beginning of the 2000s, has
actually decreased over time. The reason for the low level of merger activity can be
found in the fact that the majority of the even the most institutionalised corporations
in Turkey are still controlled by holding companies, which are owned either by
certain families or individual capitalists. Among these, there is simply little incentive
to merge their existing businesses under a single economic entity. Therefore, in a
predominant number of merger cases, it is not surprising to observe that at least
one, if not both, of the parties to the deal is a foreign company.
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Turning to joint ventures, it can be stated that they have customarily been used by
domestic companies to form partnerships with foreign companies. It is also common
for foreign companies to start joint ventures for their operations in Turkey.
Therefore, the observable increase in the number of joint ventures is consistent with
the rise in the number of companies with foreign capital110 and the process of
internationalisation of domestic capital groups.
Apart from annual reports of the TCA, it is possible to find useful information on M&A
deals in Deloitte Turkey’s Annual Turkish M&A Review, which is published since
2007. It must be noted that the deal numbers provided in these reports do not match
with those provided by the TCA and that the joint ventures are left out. Table III.C.2
presents these figures as they appear in Deloitte’s Reviews.



















2007 160 19.3 12% 70% 13%
2008 169 16.2 32% 85% 30%
2009 101 5.2 23% 43% 13%
2010 190 17.3 17% 60% 5%
2011 237 15.0 7% 74% 8%
2012 259 28.0 43% 46% 6%
Source: Annual Turkish M&A Reviews, Deloitte Turkey.
110 The number of companies with foreign capital rose from 6,702 in 2005 to 26,765 in 2012 in Turkey,
which means a four-fold increase in eight years (Ministry of Economy, 2013: 7; Undersecretariat of
Treasury, 2008:10).
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It can be observed that (i) M&A deals, despite a setback in 2009, continue their
upward trajectory in terms of number and volume; ii) privatisations still make up a
significant part of the M&A market; (iii) foreign investors constitute more than half of
the market (in value terms) on the average, and (iv) the share of financial investors,
which was relatively insignificant prior to the global crisis, is low.
The total capitalisation of corporations that comprises the national market in the
ISEcan be taken as a reference point to establish the relative significance of the total
deal volumes that are reported in Table III.C.2. Accordingly, the average value of the
division of deal volumes to capitalisation values for the years from 2007 to 2012 gives
a result of 0.072, which means that the amount of equity that changed hands yearly in
this period, corresponded, on average, to 7.2% of the total value of vendible capital
WKDWFRPSULVHG WKH ì6(111. This ratio does not seem high when it is considered that
RQO\DVPDOOIUDFWLRQRIWKHFRUSRUDWHVHFWRULQ7XUNH\LVWUDGHGLQWKHì6(+RZHYHU
such conclusion should not obscure the importance of several individual M&A deals
in terms of their impact on the ownership structures in the economy.
III.C.2 Restructuring and Competition in the Selected Sectors
A systematic method to assess the impact of this restructuring on industries and
competition does not seem available due to lack of accessible data. The sources we
have consist of industry and service sectors concentration ratios, which were
categorised according to the four-digit classification of economic activity (NACE
Rev.2) and the annual breakdown of M&A applications concluded by the TCA that was
prepared according to a different economic sector categorisation (see Table III.C.4
below). These two are only very generally compatible. Furthermore, even if a way
was to be found to make them comparable for an assessment, what counts for
111 The ratio of total deal volume to average value of capitalisation for each individual year was as
follows: 8.4% for 2007, 8.5% for 2008, 3.1% for 2009, 6.4% for 2010, 5.9% for 2011, and 11.2% for 2012.
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restructuring may not be the number of M&A deals realised but their pecuniary
magnitudes. Therefore, in order to address the issue of competition, we prefer to
proceed below case-by-case by going over the largest deals and try to evaluate their
impact on concentration ratios in their respective industries. As a start, Table III.C.3
presents a compilation of M&A deals between 2003 and 2012 that are larger than
USD 2 billion. Table III.C.4, on the other hand, presents the breakdown of M&A
applications to economic sectors as they are classified in the TCA annual reports and
compares them with concentration ratios of the sectors for which a comparison
seems meaningful to us within the data limitations.
Table III.C. 3: M&A Deals Over USD 2 Billion, 2003-12
Target Stake Deal
Value
Buyer Type Sector Year
1.Türk Telekom 55% 6.550 Oger Telecom Privatisation Telecom. 2005
2.Garanti
%DQNDVí










4.Telsim 100% 4.550 Vodafone Privatisation Telecom. 2005
735$Đ   .R©+ROGLQJ 3ULYDWLVDWLRQ 3HWUROHXP
Refining
2005
6.Denizbank 100% 3.793 Sberbank Acquisition Financial
Services
2012
7.Turkcell 13% 3.330 Alfa Telecom Share Transfer Telecom. 2005
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50% 2.100 Vallares Merger Petroleum 2011
0H\ì©NL   'LDJHR $FTXLVLWLRQ $OFRKROLF
Beverages
2011
3(7.ì0   6RFDU	7XUFDV 3ULYDWLVDWLRQ 3HWURFKHPLFDO
Products
2007
Sources: Annual Turkish M&A Reviews, Deloitte Turkey, and Internet Sources
* Privatisation cancelled by the Directorate of Privatisation Administration for the reason of
insufficient auction price.
** Privatisation process not yet completed.
*** A re-sale after privatisation.
It is observable from Table III.C.3 that the deals which have the largest pecuniary
magnitudes are in the sectors of telecommunications, financial services, petroleum,
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petroleum refining and petrochemical products, infrastructure, iron and steel
production, energy, and alcoholic beverages. It needs emphasis that except iron and
steel production, and energy, all of the sectors that were counted above are
characterised by the TURKSTAT as having “very high” or “high” concentration
ratios112$VIRUH[FHSWLRQVLWPD\EHFRQVLGHUHGWKDW(5'(0ì5LURQDQGVWHHOLVWKH
largest flat-steel producer, which ranks top 10 among the 500 largest industrial
firms in Turkey and the price offered for Seyitömer TP (energy) is not only for the
plant itself but also includes the operating licence of lignite fields in the province and
several other assets. Therefore, as a common property of all the deals that are listed
in Table III.C.3 it can be underlined firmly that they grant their purchasers a large
degree of monopoly power, and the price paid for them may be a reflection of this
degree.
Table III.C. 4: Sectoral Breakdown of M&A Applications Concluded by the TCA (1998-
2011 Aggregate) 113 and CR4 Ratios for Selected Years








1. Iron and Steel 57 34.35% 263 39.21% 211
2. Non-Ferrous Metals 12
3. Energy (Electricity-Gas-Water) 195
112 According to TURKSTAT classification, 100>CR4>70, 70>CR4>50, and 50>CR4>30 are considered to
represent “very high”, “high”, and “medium” concentration ratios, respectively.
113 For years 1998 and 1999, the number of M&A applications made instead of the number applications
concluded were available. The year 2001 could not be included to the aggregation since the sectoral
breakdown was not reported. Since sectoral categories changed in 2012, figures for that year were
not incorporated into the aggregation.
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6. Plastic and Rubber Products 19
7. Baked Clay and Ceramics 8
8. Printing and Publishing, and
Reproduction of Audio-Visuals
84
9. Office Machines and Computers 68




12. Pulp, Paper, Paper Products 41








16. Home Appliances 24
17. Food Products and Beverages 229
18. Agriculture and Stockbreeding,
Forest Products, Fisheries
35
19. Textiles and Ready-Made
Clothing, Leather and Leather
62
20. Tobacco Products 7 60.94% 39 81.46% 24
21. Glass and Glass Products 5
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22. Transport 91
23. Tourism 31
24. Financial Services (banking,
insurance, and other financial
140
25. Land, Air, Sea, and Railway
Vehicles
99




Source: TCA Annual Reports and TURKSTAT (2001, 2012)
Unfortunately, Table III.C.4 is not very helpful apart from presenting the sectoral
breakdown of M&A deals between 1998 and 2011. Therefore, we now proceed with
restructuring in the selected sectors. Our purpose in the following sub-sections is to
report the largest and other important deals on the one hand, and to describe their
significance for competition on the other.
Telecommunications
Türk Telekom, the state-owned telecommunications company, had a legal monopoly
over the wired telephony services in Turkey until 2004. In early 2004, the government
allowed alternative operators to provide domestic long-distance and international
calls services. The 55% sale of Türk Telekom to Oger Telecom of Dubai for USD 6.55
billion in 2005, which was recorded as the largest deal in the history of the Turkish
M&A market, followed this liberalisation decision. At the time of the deal, Türk
Telekom still retained its monopoly over the short distance calls114.
114 Liberalisation of the local calls were authorised only in 2007 (Atiyas 2011: 183).
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Policy-makers’ efforts to liberalise the wired segment of the telecommunications
sector did not serve the purpose of creation of an effective competition just yet. Türk
Telekom continues to operate as an actual monopoly in the wired telephony services.
Concentration statistics provided by the TURKSTAT show that the CR4 ratio was
99.58% although 301 firms were operating in this segment in 2009 (TURKSTAT 2012).
The latest sectoral report of Information Technology and Communications Authority
(ITCA) gives a slowly improving picture. It reports that the share of fixed operators
other than Türk Telekom in telephone service revenues as of third quarter of 2012
rose to 13.0% from its 9.0% level in 2008 (ITCA 2012: 14; ITCA 2009: 18).
Several other deals also reshaped the ownership structure in the
telecommunications market. Most notable of them was the sale of state-owned GSM
operator Telsim to Vodafone of the UK for 4.55 billion USD in 2005, marking the
fourth largest deal in the history of the Turkish M&A market. Telsim had been
founded by C. Uzan in 1994 as one of the two GSM companies then operating in the
market. It was seized by the SDIF in 2004 in return for Uzan’s debts to the state and
then sold to Vodafone. Next, 13.2% of Turkcell shares, the leading GSM operator in
Turkey, were transferred to Alfa Telecom of Russia when Turkcell defaulted several
times in a credit arrangement that was struck for 3.3 billion in 2005115. A third GSM
company was founded in 2006 when Aycell of Türk Telekom and Aria of Telecom
Italia merged to form Avea. Türk Telekom now owns 90.0% of Avea. Presently,
Turkcell, Vodafone, and Avea jointly dominate the wireless telecommunication
services in Turkey. Among the three, only Turkcell reports a profit (ITCA 2012: 4).
According to the TCA Annual Report 2011, total fines that the firms operating in the
telecommunication sector had been sentenced to for infringement of the Competition
115 Privy Council of the UK decided as of January 31st, 2013 that if Turkcell paid its debts to Alfa
Telecom, it could get its shares back.
286
This project is funded by the European Union under
the 7th Research Framework programme (theme SSH)
Grant Agreement nr 266800
Law have reached 178 million TL for the period 1999-2010 (TCA 2011: 49). This
amount marks that telecommunications comes second in infringement fines
incurred after the land, air, sea and railway vehicles sector.
Financial Services
Mergers that took place in the banking sector between 2001 and 2011 and share
transfers between 2002 and 2007 are presented in Tables II.B.3, II.B.4 above. Detailed
information on the change of bank ownership structures is available in the Appendix
that is located at the end of this report. Several significant transactions can be added
to these in order to present the on-going vitality in the financial sector. Most notable
RI WKHP ZDV *HQHUDO (OHFWULFǢV VDOH RI *DUDQWL %DQNDVí VKDUHV WR %DQFR %LOEDR
Vizcaya-Argentaria (BBVA) of Spain. General Electric had acquired 25.5% of Garanti
%DQNDVíIRU86'ELOOLRQLQDQGPDQDJHGWRVHOOIRU86'ELOOLRQ
in 2010. This example alone, which was recorded as the second largest in deal in the
history of the Turkish M&A market, attests to the high rates of profitability in the
Turkish banking sector in comparison to its counterparts in the developed countries.
Next, in 2012, Sberbank of Russia acquired Denizbank from Dexia of Belgium for USD
3.793 billion; Burgan Bank of Kuwait bought Eurobank Tekfen from its Greek-Turkish
SDUWQHUVIRU86'PLOOLRQDQGRI+DON%DQNDVíWKHVHFRQGODUJHVWRIWKH
six state-owned banks, was put to public offering. Also in 2012, two new banks were
granted permission by the BRSA to operate in Turkey, i.e., Odeabank of Lebanon and
The Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ of Japan.
In order to observe the impact of restructuring on competition in the banking sector,
three ratios are used as proxies in the absence of TURKSTAT data. To calculate these
ratios, eight banks that have the largest amount of assets are chosen for five
representative years. Then, the cumulative assets, lending and borrowing of these
eight banks are divided into the total amount of assets, lending and borrowing in the
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banking sector, respectively. Table III.C.5 summarises the results: (i) almost one-
third of the banks did not survive the 2001 crisis in Turkey; (ii) consolidation trend in
the banking sector continued up to 2011; (iii) the level of concentration in each of the
three ratios observed showed a persistent increase since 2000, meaning that the top
eight banks now seem to control a much higher percentage of assets, lending and
borrowing in the banking sector than they did eighteen years ago.
Table III.C. 5: Levels of Concentration of Assets, Loans, and Deposits in the Turkish
Banking Sector, 1995-2011
Years Number of Banks* Ratio of Assets of
the Top 8 Banks
to Total Assets
Ratio of Loans of
the Top 8 Banks to
Total Loans
Ratio of Deposits of
the Top 8 Banks to
Total Deposits
1995 68 63.9% 63.9% 69.8%
2000 79 63.3% 63.8% 65.9%
2002 54 75.7% 67.6% 79.2%
2005 47 79.5% 71.8% 84.6%
2011 44 80.7% 79.6% 84.8%
Source: BAT, our calculations
* As of year end for each representative year.
A word of caution on the accuracy of Table III.C.5 to represent the change in levels of
concentration may be considered. Until recently, it was commonplace for domestic
capital groups to have a shareholding in more than one bank. Since some of these
subsidiary banks merged with their parents throughout the 2000s, it may be the case
that figures in Table III.C.5 somewhat exaggerate the increase in concentration levels
when viewed from the standpoint of ownership. However, this bias does not interfere
with the observation that levels of concentration in the Turkish banking sector still
seem significantly high.
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Transportation Infrastructure
Since the mid-2000s, transportation facilities with income-generating capacity have
entered into the scope of the privatisation process. These facilities mainly include
bridges and highways, airports, and seaports. In 2012, for instance, the operating
ULJKWVRI WZREULGJHV LQ ìVWDQEXO DQGRI HLJKWKLJKZD\V LQGLIIHUHQWSDUWVRI 7XUNH\
were transferred for 25 years to a consortium that consisted of Koç Holding and
Gözde Venture Capital of Turkey and UEM Group of Malaysia for USD 5.72 billion, and
this marked the third largest deal in the history of the Turkish M&A market.116
In 2012, Aéroports de Paris Group of France paid USD 874 million for a 38% majority
stake in TAV Airports – a joint-venture of Tepe and Akfen groups of Turkey, which
was founded in 1997. TAV Airports had won privatisation tenders for the operating
ULJKWVRIDLUSRUWVLQ$QNDUDìVWDQEXO$QWDO\D*D]LSDđDDQGì]PLU
(2011) for limited periods, and, among these, had most notably offered USD 3 billion
IRUWKHPDQDJHPHQWULJKWVRIìVWDQEXO$WDW¾UN$LUSRUWIRU\HDUVìVWDQEXOǢVVHFRQG
airport, i.e., Sabiha Gökçen, was similarly privatised in 2007 for USD 3.1 billion for 20
\HDUVWRDFRQVRUWLXPWKDWFRQVLVWHGRI/LPDN<DWíUíPRI7XUNH\*05,QIUDVWUXFWXUH
of India and Malaysia Airports Holding. Finally, ICF Airports, a joint venture of Fraport
AG of Germany and IC Holding of Turkey, won the operating rights of Antalya Airport
terminals for USD 3.197 billion in 2007 for 17 years. According to the TURKSTAT data,
32 firms operated in the sector of service activities incidental to air transportation in
2009 and the CR4 ratio was 73.52% (TURKSTAT, 2012).
According to the data provided by the Directorate of Privatisation Administration
(DPA), operating rights of 17 seaports were transferred to the private sector between
1997 and 2011 (DPA, n.d.). The most notable were the acquisition of the operating
1167KLVSULYDWLVDWLRQZDVFDQFHOOHGRQ)HEUXDU\DIWHU3ULPH0LQLVWHU(UGRßDQGHFODUHGWKDW
the auction price did not meet their expectations.
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rights of Mersin Seaport by a joint venture of PSA International of Singapore and
$NIHQRI 7XUNH\ LQ  IRU86'PLOOLRQDQGRI ìVNHQGHUXQ6HDSRUW LQ E\
Limak of Turkey for USD 372 million, both for 36 years. The TURKSTAT data show
that 242 firms were active in the sector of service activities incidental to sea
transportation in 2009 and CR4 ratio was 41.61% (TURKSTAT, 2012).
Petroleum, Petroleum Refining, Petrochemical Products
The merger of Genel Energy International (Genel Int) and Vallares in 2011 is an
example that suitably demonstrates the internationalised nature of the largest
conglomerates in Turkey. Genel Int was an oil exploration and production company,
which had gained “stakes in two world-scale producing oil fields” (Genel Energy,
2011: 1) in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and was controlled by M. E. Karamehmet
(Çukurova Holding) and M. Sepil. Among Vallares’ shareholders were the former BP
CEO T. Hayward and N. Rothschild. In the deal, Vallares issued new shares worth of
USD 2.1 billion that gave the current owners equal share in the newly formed
company, which was named Genel Energy PLC. What geopolitical impact Genel
Energy is going to make in Turkey’s relations with the Middle East is yet to be seen. It
can only be reported here that according Reuters, “Iraq Energy minister Abdul
Kareem Luaibi has said Baghdad intends to sue Genel Energy” - the first company to
export oil directly from Kurdistan [Region of Iraq]” (Reuters 2013).
Three state-owned companies that operated in the sector of oil-related products
were privatised in a manner similar to each other. At the beginning of the 1990s, less
WKDQRI735$Đ3(7.ì0DQG32$ĐVKDUHVZHUHLQLWLDOO\SXWLQWRSXEOLFRIIHULQJ
in order to open these companies to the stock exchange. This was followed either by
a block sale or by another round of public offering and then a block sale.
&RQVHTXHQWO\RI735$ĐVKDUHVZHUHVROGWR.R©+ROGLQJLQIRU86'
billion, which marked the fifth largest deal in the history of the Turkish M&A market.
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As a result of this deal, all four of the existing oil refineries in Turkey were brought
under the control of the biggest conglomerate in Turkey.
3(7.ì0 WKHPDMRUSHWURFKHPLFDO UDZPDWHULDO SURGXFHU LQ7XUNH\ZDVERXJKWE\
Socar of Azerbaijan and Turcas of Turkey for USD 2.04 billion in 2007, but in a few
\HDUVǢ WLPH 7XUFDV VROG LWV  3(7.ì0 VWDNH WR 6RFDU 7KH WZR FRPSDQLHV DUH
currently constructing a new refinery in partnership.
32$Đ RU 3HWURO 2ILVL LV WKHPDUNHW OHDGHU LQ WKH IXHO GLVWULEXWLRQ VHFWRU 'RßDQ
+ROGLQJDQGìđEDQNRI7XUNH\ILUVWDFTXLUHGRI32$ĐVKDUHVIRU86'ELOOLRQ
through a block sale in 2000, and later increased their share up to 90% in three
VXEVHTXHQWSXEOLFRIIHULQJVWKDWWRRNSODFHLQ,Q'RßDQ+ROGLQJDFTXLUHG
ìđEDQNǢVVWDNHLQ32$ĐDQGVROGRIWKHVKDUHVWR209$NWLHQJHVHOOVFKDIW
of Austria for USD 1.054 billion a year later. In 2010, OMV acquired the remaining
 VKDUHV IURP 'RßDQ +ROGLQJ IRU 86'  ELOOLRQ DQG WRRN FRQWURO RI WKH
company.
Once again, it is possible to doubt whether these privatisations and subsequent
acquisitions made a positive impact on competition in their subsectors. TURKSTAT
concentration data for the sector of refined petroleum products show that the CR4
ratio for the year 2009 was 95.51% (TURKSTAT, 2012). Although far from desirable,
the situation is better for fuel distribution companies as might be expected.
According to a report provided by the Energy Market Regulatory Authority (EMRA),
the market share of the four largest fuel distribution companies (among a total of 48
distributors) was 67.9% in 2011 (EMRA 2012: 34).
Energy
Liberalisation of the electricity sector in Turkey started in 1984 with the enactment of
the Law No. 3096, which proposed the removal of state monopoly over production,
transmission, distribution and sale of the electricity. The main purpose of the law
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was to draw private investment to the energy sector and, thereby, to alleviate the
financial burden that new investment requirements put on the state. However,
several legal problems that arose in relation to the BOT model adopted by the law
slowed down private investments and necessitated new legal arrangements to be
made. Finally, in 2001, Law No. 4628 was enacted to provide a legal framework for
the creation of an electricity market that was subject to the private law and one in
which competition would dominate. As a result of these efforts, both private
investment and privatisations gained a momentum since the mid-2000s.
Currently, private investors are active in production, distribution and sale of the
HOHFWULFLW\WUDQVPLVVLRQLVVWLOOXQGHUWKHHIIHFWLYHPRQRSRO\RIVWDWHRZQHG7(ì$Đ117.
According to the annual sectoral reports provided by the Ministry of Energy and
1DWXUDO 5HVRXUFHV 0(15 WKH PDUNHW VKDUH RI VWDWHRZQHG ($Đ118 in terms of
HOHFWULFLW\SURGXFHGGURSSHGWRLQIURPLQ7(7$Đ119, 2012: 15).
Partly responsible for the state’s decreasing weight in electricity production was the
privatisation of power plants. An example was Zorlu Holding’s acquisition of the
operating rights of eight state-owned plants for 30 years for USD 550 million in 2008.
Among private deals, a USD 359 million payment by ENKA to its partner InterGen (a
Shell-Bechtel venture) for its share in three thermal plants, the acquisition of five
hydro-plants by Energo-Pro of Czech Republic for USD 406 million from a Turkish
venture, and the sale of 49.6% of Koç Holding’s Entek Elektrik to AES of the USA for
USD 136.5 million can be mentioned.
For the M&A market, more important were the privatisations in electricity
distribution. Policy-makers, in order to prevent the creation of a giant nation-wide
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So far, the transfer of 10 of these distribution regions to private companies has been
concluded, and the aim is complete the whole process until the end of 2013. These
deals triggered the M&A market in the energy sector. Verbund of Austria paid
6DEDQFí+ROGLQJ RI 7XUNH\86'PLOOLRQ IRU DQ HTXDO VKDUH LQ(QHUMLVD LQ 
DQGLQ(QHUMLVDZRQWKHHOHFWULFLW\GLVWULEXWLRQOLFHQFHRI%DđNHQWUHJLRQIRU
years for USD 1.225 billion. Similarly, CEZ of Czech Republic and Akkök Holding of
Turkey won the tender for Sakarya region in 2008 for USD 600 million, and CEZ
bought later that year 37.4% of Akenerji of Akkök Holding for USD 302.6 million.
According to the TURKSTAT data, in 2009, the CR4 ratios for production and
distribution of electricity were 44.6% and 42.1% respectively (TURKSTAT, 2012).
These figures indicate relatively lower concentration ratios among the sectors that
have been encompassed so far. However, it should not be forgotten that for the
electricity distribution segment, (i) each of the 21 distribution regions represent a
regional monopoly; (ii) a single company can takeover more than one region via the
on-going privatisations, and (iii) the three largest regions (in terms of electricity sold)
have not been transferred to the private sector yet. Therefore, it is early to give a
verdict on the ownership structure of the electricity sector in Turkey.
Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco Products
The sale of the liquor section of state-owned TEKEL120 is the candidate for being the
most contentious transaction in the history of privatisations in Turkey. The reason
can be traced from the price paid each time the company changed hands following
the dismantling its tobacco and bewerages segments to make it more lucrative for
120 Tekel literally means monopoly in Turkish. Sale and/or manufacturing of various products such as
cigarette, liquor, salt, gunpowder and explosives, tea and coffee, beer, and matches were brought
under the state monopoly between 1932 and 1946, and these monopolies were gradually lifted in years
thereafter. The monopoly over liquor manufacturing was the last one to be removed in 2001.
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potential buyers. TEKEL’s liquor section was sold to a consortium that consisted of
three Turkish contracting firms and a liquor wholesalers association for USD 292
PLOOLRQ LQ  DQG ZDV UHQDPHG0H\ ì©NL ,PPHGLDWHO\ DIWHU LQVWDOPHQWV RI WKLV
WUDQVDFWLRQ ZHUH FRPSOHWHG  RI 0H\ ì©NLǢV VKDUHV ZHUH VROG WR 7H[DV 3DFLILF
Group of the USA in 2005, this time, for USD 826 million. Finally, Diageo of the UK
DFTXLUHG0H\ì©NLLQIRU86'ELOOLRQ7KHUHLVDGHFLVLRQJLYHQE\&RXQFLORI
State in 2008 that TEKEL’s real value prior to its privatisation has to be re-
investigated, but the legal process still continues in the lower court (Hürriyet, 2008).
The TURKSTAT data shows that only 7 firms were active in the sector of distilling,
rectifying and blending of spirits in 2009, and the CR4 ratio in this sector was 97.66%
(TURKSTAT 2012).
TEKEL’s tobacco products section was eventually sold to British American Tobacco
of the UK for 1.72 billion USD in 2008. Liberalisation in the tobacco products sector
had started with the beginning of cigarette importation by TEKEL in 1984. Two years
later, private firms were authorised to produce tobacco products in partnership with
TEKEL. This was followed in 1988 by the removal of restrictions over the importation
of tobacco. Finally, in 1991, the partnership condition with TEKEL was ruled out. In
1992, Phillip Morris International and R. J. Reynolds (acquired by JTI in 2000) started
production in Turkey. According to the TURKSTAT data, 24 firms were active in the
sector of manufacturing of tobacco products in 2009 and the CR4 ratio in this sector
was 81.46% (TURKSTAT 2012).
An important transaction, which took place in 2012 between Anadolu Efes of Turkey
and SABMiller of the UK, concerned the beer industry. According to the 1.9 billion
USD deal, SABMiller transferred its operations in Russia and Ukraine to Anadolu
Efes in return for a 24.0% stake in the company. According to SABMiller, the deal
signifies the formation of a “strategic alliance” between the companies “for Turkey,
Russia, the CIS, Central Asia, and the Middle East” (SABMiller 2012). Anadolu Efes
and Tuborg of Denmark are currently the only companies that dominate the Turkish
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beer market with their own brands. They also produce brands such as Miller, Beck’s,
Carlsberg, and Skol through licence agreements.
III.C.3. Private Equity Firms and Mergers/Acquisitions121
It is hard to assess the role played by private equity (PE) firms in the Turkish M&A
market. Systematically gathered records are limited to Deloitte Turkey’s annual
reviews, which only date back to 2007. Even in these, since individual deal values are
not mostly disclosed, total deal volumes are based on mere estimates. Table III.C.6
presents these estimations as they appear in Deloitte’s annual reviews. It is observed
that the share of PE deals in total volume of M&A is below 15% on average within the
period of 2007-12.
Table III.C. 6: Number of Deals and Total Amount of Deal Values in relation to PE
Activity
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Number of Deals 24 32 8 24 46 57
Total Deal Volume (USD
Million)
2,500 5,653 700 850 1,200 1,600
Share of PE in Total
Volume
13% 30% 13% 5% 8% 6%
Source: Annual Turkish M&A Review (2007-2012), Deloitte Turkey.
Table III.C.7 compiles the PE deals whose values are larger than USD 100 million for
the period of 2003-12. It is also possible to add few PE firms which rank among the
global fifty according to a list published by Private Equity International magazine in
121 Section II.J.1 includes information on the activities of sovereign wealth funds, especially in the real
estate sector.
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2012 but which do not appear in Table III.C.7 for data restrictions (PEI, 2012: 40-1).
These are The Carlyle Group (in healthcare, education, and shipbuilding), The
Blackstone Group (in real estate), and Bridgepoint (in services). Furthermore, it can
be noted that investments of Prysmian Cables and Ontex (hygienic disposables) in
Turkey were transferred to Goldman Sachs as it bought these companies globally.







98% 3,100 Migros Türk Retail 2008
KKR & Co. 98% 1,252 UN Ro-Ro Transportation 2007
7H[DV3DFLILF*URXS   0H\ì©NL $OFRKROLF%HYHUDJHV 
$EUDDM&DSLWDO   $FíEDGHP6DßOíN
Hizm.
Health Care 2008
J.P. Morgan Chase 6% 583 Turkcell Telecommunications 2006
Babcock & Brown,
Goldman Sachs
N/D 315 TAV Airports Infrastructure 2006
Babcock & Brown, 20% 298 TAV Airports Infrastructure 2006
Providence Equity
Partners
47% 256 Digitürk TV Broadcasting 2005
Goldman Sachs 13% 240 Aksa Enerji Energy 2012
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Sources: Annual Turkish M&A Review (2007-2012), Deloitte Turkey, and Internet Sources
*Includes shares worth of USD 1.6 billion that were acquired through a mandatory tender
call.
A measurement that we made among the 87 disclosed PE deals gave a median value
that was close to one-third of the arbitrarily chosen threshold of USD 100 million. In
light of these figures, it would not be realistic to assume that the PE firms carry
much of the burden of economic restructuring. Rather, it seems more appropriate to
assert that PE firms follow the major restructuring trends that are already taking
place in the economy. Whether their mere presence brings in an additional
dimension of qualitative change that is otherwise absent is a question that is open to
debate.
Among the sectors that appear in Table III.C.7, those that are not already covered by
section III.C.2 above are the health care, transportation, and retail sectors. For the
former, it must be considered that a large-scale structural transformation is
currently taking place in the health care sector of Turkey. The state increasingly
abandons its role as a direct service provider, and rolls back to a mere supervisory
and regulatory role. There is an on-going study as to minimise the financial backing
provided to the state-sponsored hospitals and bring CEOs to their management. In
such policy environment which opens wide the door to the neoliberal ethos, the
interest of PE firms to the sector is only plausible.
Acquisition of UN Ro-Ro by Kohlberg Kravis Roberts of the USA for USD 1.252 billion
was just another occasion in which a significant degree of monopoly power changed
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hands. UN Ro-Ro is the “market leader for trucked cargo between Turkey and
Europe”122. According to the company CEO, UN Ro-Ro presently has 77% market
VKDUH LQURXWHV WR(XURSH (UGRßDQ7KLV ILJXUHFDQEHYLHZHG LQ OLJKWRI WKH
statistic that 40% of Turkey’s export to Central and Western Europe utilised Ro-Ro
transportation in 2011 (Özdemir, 2011: 50). On the other hand, UN Ro-Ro’s
competition record does not seem bright. In a commutable decision declared by the
Competition Board in 2012, it was stated that UN Ro-Ro should pay a fine of TL 841
thousand for its actions restrictive of the activities of its main competitor by using its
dominant position in the market (TCA 2012). There is also a commutable decision,
which dates back to 2005, that punishes the company for being in a formal
agreement with a competitor (TCA 2005: 16).
Acquisition of Migros was the largest deal that was concluded by PE firms in the
history of Turkish M&A market. By this deal, BC Partners et. al., obtained the biggest
Fast-Moving Consumer Goods (FMCG) retailer, and the seller, Koç Holding, secured
WKH IXQGV WKDW ZDV QHFHVVDU\ IRU LQVWDOPHQWV RI WKH 735$Đ GHDO $FFRUGLQJ WR D
sectoral report published by the TCA, the CR4 ratio in the sector of organised FMCG
retailing was calculated to be 31% on average for the period of 2006-9, and even
lower in the sector of organised plus traditional FMCG retailing: i.e., 12% on average
within the same period (TCA, 2011: 17). The latter figure is significantly lower than
the CR4 ratios of the 14 European countries that are listed in the report, the closest
country to Turkey being Italy with CR4 ratio equal to 20%123(TCA, 2011: 50). This low
level of concentration can arguably be explained by the large share of traditional
retailers in the market. Although clearly in a fast downward trend, the market share
of traditional retailers in FMCG was reported to be still 57.0% in 2009 (TCA, 2011: 8).
122 http://www.kkr.com/partners/portfolio-partners
123 Date of study is not indicated.
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III.D. HOUSING FINANCE
III.D.1. Introduction: Real Estate Sector in Turkey
Since the adoption of ISI as development strategy from the 1960s onwards,
construction industry has been considered as one of the engines of economic growth.
With the reorientation of economic policies starting with the 1980 stabilization
programme, the industry has been assigned a new role as part of the export oriented
growth strategy as Turkish contractors have expanded their activities abroad,
especially in the Middle East and North Africa. Meanhile, within the domestic
economy, the construction industry has assumed a new saliency with the foundation
of the Housing and Public Partnership Directorate in 1984 and its subsequent
separation into the Public Participation Administration and the Housing Development
Administration (TOKI) in 1990. TOKI has been instrumental in undertaking numerious
projects of mass housing and landscaping from mid1990s onwards, which has gained
significant momentum since AKP came to power in 2002.
Since 2005, Turkey has been the region’s fastest developing real estate market as a
result of the economic growth and favorable demographics in the 2000s. The need
for replacing and/or renewing the high number of unlicensed and old housing stock
has also been instrumental in this expansion. In May 2012, a new law redefining rules
of reciprocity is substantially eased foreign investment restrictions in Turkey.
Accordingly, European and especially Gulf-based property investors have turned
their attention to Turkish real estate markets.124
124 Retail development in Turkey is seen as a priority market for Gulf investors. Turkey saw 13 new
shopping centers open in the first half of 2012. Commercial office market demand also remains
strong as multinationals accept Istanbul as a regional business hub (August 2012, Fast-Growing
Turkish Real Estate Market Lures Major Gulf Investors,
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Figure III.D.1 displays the share of real estate market; namely, the construction
sector and real estate, renting and business activities, in GDP between 2000-Q4 and
2011-Q4. Over the last decade, real estate market had 8.0% to 10.0% share in GDP.
As of the end of 2011 while the construction sector-to-GDP ratio was 6.0%, the real
estate, renting and business activities-to-GDP ratio was 4.0%.
Figure III.D. 1: The share of Real Estate Market in GDP: 2000-Q4 – 2011-Q4
Source: CBRT, www.tcmb.gov.tr.
Turkey has a population of 72.6 million, which has grown over the last five years at an
average rate of 1.3% and which represents the 17th largest population in the world.
The population increase and the high migration from rural to urban areas over the
last 30 years resulted in exponentially rising demand for urban land and housing in
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led to the affordability problem for these groups, which are unable to purchase or
rent a dwelling and also the increase in unauthorised housing neighbourhoods
(gecekondu), which do not satisfy either sustainability or liveability conditions.
Accordingly, social housing is a key issue in Turkey. Currently, TOKI is responsible
for dealing with this problem. However, its efforts to provide access to adequate
shelter for low-income groups are still far from achieving their objectives as the
population’s needs are extremely diverse and funding sources are limited. Yet, there
are also housing and business center and shopping center projects in and around
major urban centers, such as Istanbul and Ankara, targeting mostly upper-income
groups.
According to Turkstat data, construction nor occupancy permits from 2007 to 2010
did not point out to a major setback in housing demand in Turkey. This was in
contrast to what happened in the European and the US real estate markets, which
were severely affected by the 2008-9 global crisis.
It has also been observed that there has been an increased entry of global investors
into the Turkish real estate market. According to the report titled Emerging Trends
in Real Estate Europe, prepared jointly by PricewaterhouseCoopers and the Urban
/DQG,QVWLWXWHìVWDQEXOLVUDQNHGDVWKHPRVWDWWUDFWLYHLQYHVWPHQWPDUNHWLQ(XURSH
In this report, it is noted that in the ‘Existing Property Performance’, ‘New Property
Acquisitions’, and ‘Development Prospects’ categories, Istanbul is followed by
Munich, Warsaw, Berlin, and Stockholm. Moreover, according to a survey conducted
by the Association of Foreign Investors in Real Estate (AFIRE), Turkey ranks as the
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Lately, essential legislative reforms introduced in line with the EU harmonisation
process, made investing in the real estate market even easier and more profitable.
The amendments to the Land Registry Law, the Housing Finance Law126, and the
redrafting of Tax Laws are designed to improve the competitiveness of the Turkish
real estate sector.
In the following subsections the recent developments in Turkish real estate market
will be examined, with a focus on (i) housing production and housing policies, and (ii)
housing finance system in Turkey.
III.D.2. Housing Production and Housing Policies in Turkey
In terms of housing production, Turkey is one of the biggest countries in Europe.
Annual housing starts have been between 500,000-600,000 dwelling units in most
years during the last two decades in Turkey, and went up as high as 643,000 in 2011.
Culturally, home ownership is the most embraced means of investment and socially,
the Turkish households mostly prefer to be homeowners rather than being tenants.
The Housing Finance Law of March 2007 introduced a mortgage system and
envisaged the possibility of the eventual securitization of the mortgages. Hence long-
term fixed rate borrowing became for the first time ever, an available financing
option for potential homeowners in Turkey. The main target of the mortgage system
is thought to be the middle-income households. Moreover, due to the government’s
declined domestic debt requirement, investors have started to seek alternative
investment opportunities within a reasonable risk class, including mortgage-backed
securities. However, as stated by Türel, A. (2012) high housing production in recent
126 The Law Amending the Laws Related to Housing Finance No 5582 (March 2007).
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years cannot be attributed to the new Law of March 2007 and the rapid rises in the
usage of mortgage loans, as housing starts were also high at 500,000 – 550,000 level
during the 1993-1996 period when not many people were using mortgage loans in
their house purchases.
Figure III.D.2 demonstrates the construction permits or housing starts measured by
dwelling units between 1970 and 2010. Annual housing starts began to rise in 1990,
exceeded 500,000 dwelling units in 1993 and remained over that level during the
following two years. The fall that began in 1996 continued until 2002, when housing
starts were as low as 162,000 dwelling units. This fall can be related to the effects of
a much destructive earthquake that hit the north-western regions of the country in
1999, new building regulations that were introduced following the earthquake and a
series of economic crisis during the 1999-2002 period. Recovery began in 2003;
housing starts went over 500,000 again in 2005, reached up to 600,000 in 2006 and
remained over 500,000 during the global financial crisis of 2008-9.
Great rise of starts in 2010 to as high as 823,060 was due to enlarging geographical
coverage of building regulations from 19 to all 81 provinces. As new regulations
involve additional cost in the preparation of housing projects, many house-builders
aimed to avoid those costs by getting construction permits for the projects that they
plan to build in the following years before the regulations become applicable in their
provinces (Türel, A. 2012).
Figure III.D.3 demonstrates the occupancy permits measured by dwelling units
between 1970 and 2010. Occupancy permits began to increase considerably in 1983,
exceeded 250,000 dwelling units in 1989. Between 1990 and 2001, occupancy permits
were 200,000 to 250,000 dwellings. 2001 financial crisis in Turkey remarkably
affected the construction sector; therefore, the occupancy permits declined to
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161,491, 162,908, and 164,994 dwelling units in 2002, 2003, and 2004, respectively.
Recovery began in 2005 and occupancy permits increased from 250,000 dwellings in
2005 to 400,000 dwellings in 2009.












Construction Permits (Number of Dwellings)
304
This project is funded by the European Union under
the 7th Research Framework programme (theme SSH)
Grant Agreement nr 266800
Figure III.D. 3: Occupancy Permits (Number of Dwellings), 1970-2010
Source: Turkstat, www.turkstat.gov.tr.
When we examine the housing production in terms of producer groups, there are
three main actors. These are namely, the public sector, the private sector, and the
construction cooperatives.
As shown in Figure III.D.2, housing starts began to increase substantially in 2004.
This rise appears to be mainly due to the great increases in starts by the private
sector. Previous peak of the private sector construction was in 1995 with 391,000
dwellings. After the 2001 financial crisis that reached the bottom in 2002, and private
sector construction increased to 456,000 dwellings in 2005. Figure III.F.4 displays the
percentage shares of three housing producer groups in construction permits or
housing starts between 2007 and 2011. Clearly, private sector has the leading part in
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producers have 3% to 5% shares in total housing starts. The share of construction
cooperatives declined from 4.8% in 2007 to only 1.5% in 2011.
Figure III.D. 4: Percentage Shares of Three Housing Producer Groups in Construction
Permits (Number of Dwellings), 2007-11
Source: Turkstat, www.turkstat.gov.tr, Annual Construction Statistics.
Private sector in residential building has been dominated by small-capital builders
that produce mostly apartments on single parcels. In recent years moderate-to-
large capital domestic builders and even worldwide construction companies have
been increasing their share in housing supply as they produce housing on large
tracks of land with many on-site amenities, including parking, sport facilities and the
means to operate private guards. Many of these properties are in the form of gated
communities and supplied for upper income groups. Consequently, the share of the
private sector in total housing starts has increased steadily from about 70.0% in
2000s to about 95.0% in 2011. The rise in the share of the private sector has been at
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the expense of cooperatives, which are regarded as non-profit producers together
with the public sector.
Construction cooperatives have been producing housing for their members
(shareholders) since mid-1930 in Turkey. Cooperative members acquire dwellings in
freehold ownership status after construction is finished, and then the cooperative is
dissolved. Contrary to their counterparts in many European countries, cooperatives in
Turkey are not permitted to produce social rented housing. Cooperatives have been
supported by local and central governments in the forms of allocation of loans from
public funds at lower than market interest rates, the sale of land developed by local
or central government agencies usually at lower than market prices, and the supply
of infrastructure to cooperative housing projects without much concern for
recovering investment cos (Türel, A. 2010).
Cooperative housing starts have been decreasing since the year 1993, and have fallen
to about 14 thousand in the year 2011, which has been the lowest level since 1990.
Their share was about 26.0% in 1992 and has come down to about 1.5% in the year
2011. The declines in cooperative starts coincided with the decreased and finally
stopped loans from public funds. With the increasing dominance of the private sector
in housing supply, cooperatives have been facing great difficulties in finding land at
affordable prices, as they are in increasing competition in the land market with the
private sector.
Cooperatives are also in competition with the public sector, which is the other non-
profit housing producer in Turkey. HDA has increased its involvement in housing
production by the year 2003. Public sector has had higher share in housing starts
than cooperatives in 2008 and 2011 (see Figure III.D.4). HDA builds housing by
developing publicly owned land, for this reason cooperatives have become unable to
buy land from public institutions during this period.
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The housing starts or construction permits by three groups of housing producers in
terms of the market value are presented in Figure III.F.5. Once again, the private
sector has the leading part in the market value of housing starts with 83% to
approximately 90% shares in total value of housing starts. The public sector
producers have the highest share of 10.4% in 2008 and their share declined to 7.7%
both in 2010 and 2011. The share of construction cooperatives was 7.3% in 2007 and
declined significantly to 2.6% in 2011.
Figure III.D. 5: Percentage (%) Shares of Three Housing Producer Groups in
Construction Permits (Market Value of Dwellings) between 2007 and 2011
Source: Turkstat, www.turkstat.gov.tr, Annual Construction Statistics.
Indeed, high levels of housing production have occurred without noticeable policies
addressed to demand side or supply side of the housing market. This implies that
housing markets in Turkey operate under highly competitive conditions without much
regulation by central and local governments. However, one of the outcomes of the
less regulated housing markets is the great variation of housing starts among
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provinces of Turkey. Much less than needed number of dwelling units in accordance
to the newly formed households are produced in certain provinces, whereas
authorized housing production comfortably meets the need in many other provinces
(Türel, A., 2012).
Housing policies are classified as: (i) Demand-side housing market policies, (ii)
Supply-side housing market policies, and (iii) Intervention in housing markets,
especially when housing policy was in its infancy.
Demand-side Housing Market Policies
In the historical development of housing policies in Turkey, provision of mortgage
loans from public funds at below market interest rates has been the most important
demand side policy. Social Security Institution (SSI) began to finance cooperative
house buildings by 1950 at 4-5% fixed annual interest rate. As much as 233,000
dwelling units were built by using SSI loans between the years 1950 and 1984, but the
funds used for this purpose greatly lost value, as inflation was much higher than the
mortgage interest rates during most of the years. The SSI had to stop providing
finance in 1984, and a new organization attached to the Prime Ministry, called the
HDA was created by the Law on Mass Housing, No 2985, March 1984.
Implicit interest rate subsidy has been involved in loans provided by the HDA, the
most important of which was between the 1984-1989 periods, when the fixed
mortgage interest rates were set at 15%, 20% and 25%, according to the size of the
dwelling unit and inflation rate varied between 29% and 69%. Consequently, 548,000
dwelling units that were financed from that fund during that period enjoyed
substantial amounts of unintended interest subsidies. Implicit interest rate subsidy
decreased after the interest rate of loans from the Fund and repayments were
indexed to the rate of increase of wages in the public sector in 1989. However the
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value of assets of the HDA continued to decrease, since most of its incomes were
allocated to the National Budget by 1992, and the rate of wage increase in the public
sector remained under the inflation rate during the years of economic crises and did
not much recover later (Türel, A., 2012).
The governments that came into power after 2002 reduced and finally stopped in
2005 advancing new mortgage loans by the HDA. Cooperatives had been the main
beneficiaries of the HDA loans that were paid with the progress of construction.
Indeed, out of 1,051,000 dwelling units that were financed between the years 1984
and 2005 by the HDA, 944,000 of them were cooperative housing (Türel, A. 2010).
Selling HDA produced housing with as much as 85% loan-to-value ratio loans at
indexed interest rates to the public sector wage increase has become the primary
demand side housing policy addressed to moderate-to-lower income households.
In the early 2000s, mortgage market began to grow significantly largely as a result of
a change in the investment policies of commercial banks. As the supply of high-
income government bonds dried up, banks have moved into residential mortgages.
Mortgage market value jumped from 70.1 billion TL in 1997 to 248.4 billion TL in 2000
and reached up to 273.6 billion TL in March 2004.127 The market value of the
mortgage loans that are denominated in USD rose from 290.8 million USD in 1997 to
1.6 billion USD in March 2004 (Erol and Patel 2004).
Commercial banks have greatly increased their involvement in mortgage loans and
have become the primary source of mortgage loans by the year 2004 with the fall of
127 The figures are real market values calculated as nominal mortgage loan values denominated in
consumer price index (inflation) number of the corresponding month (December) of each year.
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inflation and mortgage interest rates. After the new Housing Finance Law of March
2007, banks have been able to operate in mortgage finance under safer conditions
and people have now greater options in making decisions for mortgage loans (See
next section for a detailed discussion).
Currently, annual mortgage interest rates of commercial banks are about twice as
high as the rates applied by the HDA. There is not any subsidy to the households for
the interest payment of the mortgage loans if they use the house for their own usage.
However, for the houses purchased to earn rental income, interest paid for the
mortgage loan can be deducted from that part of the rent that is subject to income
tax.
It is important to note that provision of subsidies for moderate-to-lower income
families living in rental accommodation, which is a well-known demand side policy
that is implemented in many countries, has not also come to the agenda of
governments until now. Rental subsidies were put into effect as a limited support for
civil servants only.
Supply-side Housing Market Policies
Among the supply oriented housing policies, housing production by the HDA on
publicly-owned land has been the most important one during the last decade. Since
2003 housing starts by the HDA have reached to 537,000 dwelling units, which is
about 11% of the national starts during the same period. Almost all the HDA
produced housing is in the form of multi-storey apartments, and their prices are
generally below the market prices. All dwelling units that are produced by the HDA
are sold to households who are the first home-buyers. Note that neither public
institutions nor civil society organizations provided social rented housing in Turkey.
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The private sector’s residential building is supported by the reduced value-added-tax
(VAT) to 1% (instead of 18%) when they sell housing that they produce having up to
150 m2 net floor area. The Government has recently sent a bill to the parliament to
change this incentive and apply different VAT rates according to the value of the
dwelling unit, rather than according to the floor area.
Supporting the cooperatives’ owner occupied housing had been the most important
supply-oriented policy by the middle of the 1930s. Public institutions and
municipalities supplied land for cooperatives usually at lower than market prices.
Cost recovery was not a consistently followed consideration in infrastructure
provision for cooperative housing projects. Cooperatives did not pay VAT for a long
time and currently they pay only 1% VAT in construction of their dwellings by
contractors. From 1966 to the end of 2011 the cooperative housing starts have
reached up to 2.7 million dwelling units, which make up about 18% of the total starts.
Since 2002 the government support for cooperative houses has significantly
decreased, and the share of cooperative housing starts has fallen under 10% by 2004
and went further down to about 2% in 2011 (Türel, A., 2012).
The Urban Development Law No. 3194 of 1985 has greatly affected housing
production. Municipalities are empowered with plan making and approval rights by
this Law. Decentralization in planning has led to great increases in planned areas,
land development and housing production in many cities. Municipalities have to
undertake land subdivisions as well in planned areas on their own decision. However,
some municipalities do not use this instrument to produce sufficient amount of land
with planning permission for the production of housing (Türel, A. and Koç, 2008).
An important supply oriented policy was introduced by enacting the Building Amnesty
Law in 1984 with the aim of managing transformation of unauthorized housing. The
Law defines the process and required conditions of regularization and
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transformation of unauthorized built dwelling units. In recent years the HDA, in
cooperation with municipalities, has been involved in the transformation of
settlements that could not be transformed through the market process in
accordance to that Law. In the realized projects, one or two storey structures are
replaced by multi-storey apartments.
Housing Market Interventions
Rent controls can be accepted as the primary direct housing market intervention in
Turkey. It has been implemented on the decisions of the Appeals Court on the
maximum annual rate of increase in rents, as this had not been regulated by any law
until recently. In 2000, the maximum rent increase was determined by Law as 25%
for only that year, as was recommended by IMF in connection to their economic
stabilisation programme. The recent Turkish Code of Obligations (February 2011)
specify that rents can be increased as much as the rate of increase in the “Producers
Price Index” during the preceding 12 months.
To conclude, housing markets in Turkey operate under highly competitive conditions,
without much regulation and incentives. With the exception of direct provision of
housing by the HDA mostly for moderate-to-lower income households, there is not
any effective policy in attempt to support low income households in housing
acquisition and consumption. Transformation of unauthorized housing where many
lower income households live as tenants further reduces the supply of affordable
housing for those households. A solution to the affordability problem in the absence
of demand side policies comes within the housing market, as housing is supplied at
highly differentiated prices in spatially differentiated submarkets of cities.
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III.D.3. Housing Finance System in Turkey: The Development of Mortgage
Markets
The sources of housing finance are both institutional and non-institutional in Turkey.
Project debt finance, housing loans or mortgages are the institutional financing,
while cooperative housing and equity sharing agreements are the non-institutional
alternatives.
Housing cooperatives are legal entities established to provide their members with
residential flats or houses. These entities are traditionally one of the most favoured
methods of acquiring a property among Turkish citizens, generally of middle income
levels. Equity sharing agreements are also widely used in Turkey. In this
arrangement, the land owner offers his land to the contractor in return for a portion
of the equity interest (for example, in return for half of the apartments that will be
built in the development). In project debt financing, the project developer applies to a
financial institution which agrees to provide a secured loan of appropriate maturity
and terms. The most rapidly growing source of housing finance in recent years is
housing loans or mortgages but from a very low base.128
Potential of the Turkish Mortgage Market
In spite of the historically high demand for real estate assets, a well-organized and
deep enough mortgage market did not exist in Turkey until the early 2000s. The
absence of an efficient mortgage market was mainly due to a long-running process
128 ISPA (2010).
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of persistently high inflation, the inability of the banks to fund mortgages from their
deposit base, and the lack of standardization within the title and appraisal systems.129
The measures, taken after the crisis of 2000-1, have been effective in suppressing
inflation, building investor confidence and attracting substantial and record amounts
of foreign investments, notwithstanding the drawbacks highlighted in Section III.A
above and III.D below. The recent improvements in the Turkish economy, especially
the drop in the inflation rate has led the government to work on a draft of regulatory
changes that would facilitate the legal environment for the establishment of the
mortgage system. The efforts for the development of the mortgage system have
attracted the construction sector and the related financial sectors. The result was
the increase in the construction of the new housing units, the development in the
mortgage products, and the significant decline in mortgage interest rates (Erol and
Çetinkaya, 2009). Eventually, the Turkish Parliament ratified the Housing Finance
Law in 2007.
Turkey experienced strong growth in mortgage debt over the last few years. The
share of housing loans, which had been less than 1.0% of GDP before 2004, has
increased to approximately 6% in 2010. Total housing loans are far lower than the
Central and Eastern European EU Member States and the average in the Euro Area.
Unlike some Central European countries, the level of housing loans in Turkey was
not large enough in 2008-9 to cause any instability or risk to the Turkish banking.
Figure III.D.6 exhibits the growth in housing loans between December 2002 and
September 2011. The share of housing loans in total banking assets have increased
129 See Erol and Patel (2005) for failed attempts to introduce mortgages during the high inflation era.
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substantially from around 0.5% in 2004 to 6% in 2011. However, the growth of
mortgage market has been moderate after a fast growth between 2004 and 2007.
Figure III.D. 6: Growth in Housing Loans in Turkey, 2002-11
Source: BRSA, www.bddk.org.tr.
Since 2005, BRSA started to classify consumer loans as (i) Car loans, (ii) Housing
loans, (iii) Personal loans and (iv) Other loans.
Figure III.D.7 exhibits the distribution of consumer loans in terms of the ‘outstanding
loan balances’ between 1997 and 2011. After 2004, housing loan and personal loan
balances have been considerably higher than car loans. More specifically, housing
loan balance has increased from 2.4 billion TL in 2004 to approximately 70 billion TL
in 2011. Personal loan balance has increased from 9.4 billion TL in 2005 to 62.3
billion TL in 2011. Lastly, car loan balance has reached to approximately 7 billion TL
as of the end of 2011.
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Figure III.D. 7: Outstanding Loan Balances in Million TL, 1997-2011
Source: BAT, www.tbb.org.tr.
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The percentage share of housing loan balance in total outstanding consumer loans is
displayed in Figure III.F.8. Housing loans or mortgages represented only 9.7% of the
overall consumer loan value in 2003, whereas as of the end of 2011 housing loans
have a share of 43.8% (Figure III.F.8). Between 2005 and 2011 outstanding housing
loan balance had 43.8% to 49% shares in overall consumer loan portfolio.
Analysing the Turkish mortgage market from the perspective of lenders, it is
observed that mortgage loans are almost entirely extended by the deposit banks. In
other words, development and investment banks do not have any role in mortgage
origination in Turkey. Since the mortgage market is mainly funded through saving
deposits the mortgage debt to GDP ratio is so low for Turkey.
As seen from Figure III.D.9, privately-owned deposit banks have the biggest share in
mortgage lending. Between 2005 and 2011, the share of privately-owned deposit
banks in overall mortgage lending has been between 48.0-53.0%.
In the years 2003, 2004, and 2005 the share of foreign deposit banks has been
considerably higher than the share of state-owned deposit banks in the overall
mortgage lending. In 2006 and 2007, the shares of state-owned banks and foreign
banks have been more or less the same; that is around 26.0% each. After 2007, the
share of state-owned banks has increased gradually from 25.3% in 2007 to 31.2% in
2011. On the contrary, the share of foreign banks has declined from 25.5% in 2007 to
18.5% in 2011 (Figure III.D.9).
Examination of the percentage shares of individual banks in mortgage lending
activity indicates that the first 10 deposit banks which are at the top of the list
according to total asset size are also the top 10 in mortgage lending, although not in
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the same order.130 No foreign banks takes place in the list of top 10 mortgage
lenders.
Deposit banks extend loans to borrowers who wish to purchase a single-family
detached/semi-detached/apartment style houses. While the lenders generally rely
on the appraisal company's determination of the eligibility of the property subject to
transaction, some lenders have their own staff to do the appraisal work. Currently,
Turkish banks offer a variety of mortgage products including TL-denominated fixed-
rate, adjustable rate, and graduated payment mortgages and USD and Euro
denominated mortgages. Currently, the most popular mortgage products are fixed
rate mortgages (FRMs) with 60 to 120-month contract maturity, and the prevailing
mortgage coupon rates range from 0.94% to 1.10% in October 2012.
In terms of insurance policies, hazard and earthquake insurance is required by all
lenders. This has been a requirement since 1999 and is provided by Turkish
Catastrophe Insurance Pool (TCIP). TCIP takes the first loss position and private
insurers take the second loss position. The annual premiums due to TCIP are
collected by private insurance companies from the home owners and then forwarded
to TCIR. Earthquake insurance rates are not fixed. They are determined according to
the type of dwelling and the earthquake zone it is in. Most of the lenders also require
a life insurance policy that would remain in effect over the term of the mortgage.
Such a policy would help to cover the full repayment of the loan in the event of
borrower's death. Borrowers are required to renew their policy annually (at least
during the term of the loan). Mortgage default insurance products are not prevalent
130 The mortgage industry leader and the runner-up appear as the third and the seventh banks in the
asset size ranking in 2011.
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in Turkey.131 The existing sectoral studies suggest that there is no urgent need for
mortgage insurance as this will increase the cost of funds for borrowers (Erol and
Çetinkaya 2009).
Figure III.D. 9: The Share of State-owned, Privately-owned and Foreign Deposit Banks
in Overall Mortgage Lending, 2003-11
Source: BAT, www.tbb.org.tr.
The New Housing Finance Law
1315HFHQWO\DQXPEHURIEDQNV)LQDQVEDQNìđ%DQNDQG9DNíIEDQNKDYHVWDUWHGWRDVNIRUPRUWJDJH
payment protection insurance from the borrowers in the case of being unemployed or injured. The
insurance policy generally pays up to six monthly payments to the bank. However, this product is
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The Housing Finance Law of March 2007 modified the the Foreclosure and
Bankruptcy Law, Capital Markets Law, Consumer Protection Law, Financial Leasing
Law, Mass Housing Law and some Tax Laws. Moreover two bye-laws (Serial III, No
33-4 by CMB) were put into effect for covered debt instruments (covered bonds) and
securitisation instruments (asset-backed and mortgage-backed securities).
The following issues are clearly defined within the context of the new Housing
Finance Law (see Teker, 2007):
(i) Housing Finance and Primary Mortgage Lenders: According to the new Housing
Finance Law, housing finance covers loans for home buying purposes (houses under
construction are also included), home equity loans, loans extended for refinance, and
home ownership through leasing. The primary lenders are banks that lend or lease
directly to the customer for the purposes of housing finance, as well as the leasing
companies and consumer finance companies specialized in mortgage lending as the
non-bank mortgage companies. Mortgage companies are subject to approval and
licensing by the BRSA.132
(ii) Less Time to Foreclose: Due to high inflation and rapidly increasing real estate
prices, the defaulted borrowers tended to use every legal right they had to delay the
legal foreclosure process as the penalties and objection fees remained below the
value earned over inflation. With the amendments in Foreclosure Law, the
foreclosure process is shortened.
132 It is important to note that although secondary mortgage market legislation came into force in 2007
with the new Housing Finance Law, no transactions in this market have taken so far.
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(iii) Real Estate Appraisal Services: The aim was to make sure that the properties
held by publicly owned companies and real estate investment trusts (REITs) are
valued properly.
(iv) Consumer Protection: In the past, consumer finance companies were unable to
extend home loans to consumers since homes were excluded from the definition of
consumer goods. This law has amended that definition as well, enabling the
consumer finance companies to act as mortgage lenders (subject to BRSA approval).
Lenders who were not able to extend variable and adjustable rate mortgages in the
past will now be able to do so with the new regulation.
(v) Mortgage-backed Capital Market Instruments: The new Housing Finance Law
introduces two types of new capital market instruments to be issued by ‘housing
finance funds’, i.e. covered bonds and mortgage-backed securities (MBS). The law
defines the covered bonds in detail and identifies the matching principles between
the cover pool and the bonds issued. In addition to the covered bonds, asset covered
bonds – secured by other types of assets which are not qualified for mortgage
covered bonds – are also defined by the law.
(vi) Secondary Market Institutions: Mortgage Finance Corporations are defined in the
New Housing Finance Law as secondary market institutions. These companies can
either function as a conduit for the securitization of the receivables arising from
housing finance and/or provide liquidity.
(vii) Introduction of New Tax Incentives: These incentives are expected to decrease
the overall operational costs of funding mortgage loans through capital markets with
secondary market instruments. Some of these incentives are stamp duty and any
other type of transaction tax exemption.
BRSA became a member to Financial Stability Board (FSB) in April 2009. The FSB
has released its Principles for Sound Residential Mortgage Underwriting Practices
on April 18, 2012. According to the Board, the recommendations issued lately are
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meant to address "problems arising from poorly underwritten residential mortgages,
which contributed significantly to the global financial crisis." As that crisis
demonstrated, the consequences of weak underwriting practices in one country can
affect the global economy through securitization of those poorly underwritten
mortgages. "As such," it says, "it is important to have sound underwriting practices
at the point at which a mortgage loan is originally made."133
In spite of these attempts to develop primary and secondary mortgage markets in
Turkey, there are some internal and external problems limiting the growth of the
Turkish mortgage market. Firstly, issuances of Turkish Treasury still have low credit
ratings from external credit assessment institutions. Therefore, most of the
secondary market products to be issued in Turkey would not get high rating grades
and this in turn limits the growth potential of the secondary and hence the primary
market. Secondly, several governmental institutions such as CMB, BRSA, CBRT and
UT have explicit or implicit responsibilities regarding development of the mortgage
market. This multi-agency regulatory infrastructure may create coordination
problems. Thirdly, although banking sector has shown a robust growth in the last
decade, the capital markets are lagging behind. This is another reason limiting the
product variability and volume of the secondary and hence the primary
market.Lastly, unlike the European counterparts, mortgage lenders in Turkey are
almost totally deposit banks and not investment banks, and finance mortgage loans
133 FSB Issues Principles for Sound Mortgage Underwriting, April 18, 2012, 3:49PM. The principles
span the following areas, some of which proved to be particularly weak during the global financial
crisis: i) Effective verification of income and other financial information; ii) Reasonable debt service
coverage, iii) Appropriate loan-to-value ratios, iv) Effective collateral management; and v) Prudent use
of mortgage insurance.
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through their savings deposit base. Although the target market for mortgage lending
is assumed to be middle-income households, families with some amount of wealth
accumulated for down-payment can be eligible for taking mortgage loans towards
homeownership. Since lenders have to bear high risks caused by mortgage-savings
duration mismatch, they target families with lower risk and high-income profiles.
Thus, a wide segment of the families are left underserved.
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III.E. PRIVATISATION AND THE FINANCIAL SECTOR IN TURKEY
In Turkey, the Özal administration began privatisation plans in 1984 with the aim of
reducing the state’s presence in the economy (OECD 1999: 20). The government first
institutionalized privatisation with Law No. 2983 in 1984 and with Law No. 3291 in
1986. These laws created the policymaking framework and administrative arm to
carry out privatisation in Turkey (notably, the Public Participation Administration to
carry out policy under Prime Minister’s Office). While by 1985 some of the first
privatisations took place, the more significant steps taken by the government were to
begin restructuring major State Economic Enterprises (SOEs) to enhance financial
performance and/or be singled out for later privatisation. To help formalize Turkey’s
privatisation efforts the Özal administration hired an American investment bank to
produce a report – the 1986 Morgan Guaranty Report. 14 objectives were identified in
the Report, however, 6 are significant here: (i) to transfer almost half of the
“economic decision-making process” from the public to the private sphere to
increase the effectiveness of market forces; (ii) to promote efficiency, increase
competition, and improve SOE productivity; (iii) to develop a viable capital market and
encourage the wider distribution of shares; (iv) to reduce the weight of SOE on the
state budget; (v) to reduce the size of the public sector and it monopolistic
FKDUDFWHULVWLFVDQGYLWRUDLVHUHVRXUFHVIRUWKH7UHDVXU\.DUDWDđ2(&'
1999: 119). A significant turn came with the Decree No 32 of August 1989 under the
Law of Protection of the Value of the TL, which completed the liberalisation of capital
account and foreign exchange operations. The government lifted the limits on the
amount of foreign assets that could be owned domestically and the limits on foreign
borrowing by Turkish banks. Moreover, foreign capital was allowed to openly trade in
FRUSRUDWHVWRFNVDQGJRYHUQPHQWVHFXULWLHVLQWKHì6(7KLVDXJPHQWHGWKHFDSDFLW\
of financial capital to enter and purchase SOEs in Turkey.
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The actual receipts from privatisation prior to capital account liberalisation were
relatively insignificant reaching only 29 million USD in the years 1985-8. The first
PDMRU62(SULYDWLVDWLRQRFFXUUHG LQZLWK WKHVDOHRI7HOHWDđ D WHOHSKRQHDQG
communications firm) followed by a few dozen more industrial SOEs sell-offs, which
brought the privatisation proceed to a higher level after 1988 (618 million USD in
1989-90, 667 million USD in 1991-92, 978 million USD in 1993-4, 865 million USD in
1995-6, 465 million USD in 1997 and 1,020 million USD in 1998). The sell-offs
included state-owned primary industries like cement and steel, but also airports,
airline service, and energy. So too were a few small state banks privatised (see
below). The initial privatisation receipts reflect the learning curve of state agencies,
as well as slower economic expansion by the late 1980s.
Around the time of Turkey’s 1994 financial crisis, the Çiller government moved to
better institutionalise the legal bases of privatisation in Turkey. The outcome was the
Privatisation Law No 4046 of November 1994, which remains in force today with
amendments (see Marois, 2012: 103-4).134 The said law names the Privatisation High
Council (PHC) as the main decision body, chaired by the Prime Minister (PM). The
PHC members also include up to two Deputy PMs (with multi-party coalition
governments), a PM-designated Minister, the Minister responsible for the
privatisation portfolio (or alternative PM-designated Minister), the Minister of
Finance, and the Minister of Industry and Commerce. The PHC decides all key SOE
privatisation matters. The PHC can determine strategic sectors or firms wherein
‘preference shares’ should be established if state participation falls below 50%,
134 Prior to the promulgation of the said law, the 1994 crisis unfolded. In response, Turkish
government adopted the April 1994 IMF stabilisation programme, which involved a 14-month stand-by
arrangement that totalled nearly 1 billion USD by April 1995. The 1994 programme called for a
standard neoliberal structural adjustment programme including, among other things, sharp fiscal
adjustment, price increases in SOE products, a public wage freeze, cuts to public spending, a blanket
deposit guarantee to stop bank runs, and, of course, further privatisation of SOEs.
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which give state officials a controlling vote in all issues regarding takeovers and
asset sales. The law also provided state officials with greater legal means to
restructure SOEs in preparation for privatisation (OECD, 1999: 113). ‘Non-economic’
incentives were replaced by market-based cost and price structures as well as
commercial goals. Moreover, the 1994 Law established the Privatisation Fund to help
smooth privatisation processes by helping pay for severance and retirement
payments for redundant employees, cover debts of privatized SOEs, and/or improve
the financial position of SOEs in preparation for sale by increasing their capital and
so on. Finally, the Law of 1994 enabled the transfer of public employees to other
HQWLWLHV LI WKH 3ULYDWLVDWLRQ $GPLQLVWUDWLRQ ì% LQ 7XUNLVK DFURQ\PV EHOLHYHG WKH
labour force needed to be relocated. In terms of banking, the Law of 1994 included
provisions for Ziraat Bank and Halk Bank as strategic firms.
By 1996 the government subjected any SOEs that created heavy fiscal losses to hard
budget constraints and tougher productivity markers. In 1997 the government
established the Turkish Competition Authority to monitor monopoly market
transfers, regulation conflicts among state agencies, and mergers and acquisitions
with privatisation (OECD, 1999: 114). In 1988 privatisation receipts peaked at just over
1 billion USD (or about 0.5% of GDP), largely from the sale of mobile phones leases
DQGWKHVWDWHǢVVWDNHLQWKHSULYDWHGRPHVWLFEDQNìđ%DQNDVí7KH$VLDQ
DQG5XVVLDQFULVHVVORZHGSULYDWLVDWLRQHIIRUWVDQGWKHì%UHDFKHGRQO\KDOIRI
the 2 billion USD target set in the 1998 Memorandum of Economic Policies (OECD,
1999: 69-70). These recurrent crises in emerging markets meant both domestic and
foreign capital remained cautious. In 1999 Turkey earned only 38 USD million from
privatisation. In general, however, global and domestic economic volatility were
restricted by the availability of willing buyers for Turkish SOEs in the 1990s.
At the time, the limited size and depth of the ISEslowed the sell-off of larger SOEs by
SXEOLFRIIHURUIORWDWLRQ.DUDWDđ7KHODUJHU7XUNLVK62(VZHUHGLIILFXOW
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to sell in block sales. However, an ongoing process of privatising SOEs through Initial
Public Offers (IPOs) have enabled the growth of the ISEwhich has in turn enabled
PRUH DQG ODUJHU SULYDWLVDWLRQV $FFRUGLQJ WR ì% WKH SXEOLF VKDUHV RI FRPSDQLHV
LVVXHG WR WKHSXEOLFHQKDQFHG WKH LQVWLWXWLRQDOLVDWLRQRI ì6($VDQRWDEOHH[DPSOH
WKHVHOORIIRIWKHVWDWHǢVVKDUHRIìđ%DQNDVíLQ0D\EHFDPHWKHODUJHVW
public offering in Turkey at that time. Furthermore, the IPOs for companies like
1HWDđDQG7RIDđLQFOXGHGIRUHLJQLQYHVWRUVZKLFKKHOSHGWRLQFUHDVHWKHVL]HRIWKH
ISEand to integrate it with foreign capital markets. The ISEwas also tested with two
partial state bank IPOs in 2005 and 2007, such that it is now better able to manage
larger bank share volumes (Marois 2012: 178).
By 2000, successive Turkish governments had sold over 130 SOEs. The Turkish state
nonetheless retained a substantial presence in many sectors. For example, 44 SOEs
were still within the top 500 major Turkish industrial firms in 1997, including the four
largest overall (OECD 1999, 119).
The AKP government which came to power in 2002 pursued an aggressive
programme of privatisation. In August 2003, a new Law has been put into effect,
setting out some further measures to accelerate privatisation applications within the
scope of Privatisation Law. As illustrated in Figure III.D.1, privatisation receipts
exploded first in 2004, then further in subsequent years. In this context of crisis and
political change, the most important efforts to privatise the financial sector took
place.
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Figure III.E. 1: Privatisation Proceeds in Turkey, 1985-2011
Source: Privatisation Administration, http://www.oib.gov.tr/index_eng.htm.
III.E.1. Privatisation and Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) in Turkey
Prior to the 1980s, if the government delegated public services or infrastructure this
was done by ‘concession’, which is regulated mainly by the Law on Concessions (see
Özeke, 2009). The concession contracts offered privileged status and authority to the
administration and were subject to prior review by the Council of State. During the
1980s, the government began to experiment with new forms of PPPs, notably with
the Build-Operate-Transfer ("BOT") Law No. 3096 (which allowed private entry into
the electricity sector). The intention was to increase investment in infrastructure
especially in areas like electricity by opening it to the private sector. Then in 1994 the
government introduced a new and more widespread BOT Law (No. 3996) to cover all
areas of infrastructure including energy, transportation, communication, and
municipal services.
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The BOT Law and processes, like other privatisation processes, were subject to legal
controversies that delayed and cancelled many projects. A 1999 Constitutional
amendment strengthened the legal footings of the BOT process by making them
subject to private law contract and, in doing so, skip over the Council of State's prior
review and jurisdiction processes while maintaining the arbitration option. Presently,
the BOT model is used for many new infrastructure projects while concessions are
used to transfer of operating rights to existing state-owned infrastructure facilities
(e.g., ports).
Ongoing challenges to the PPP model in Turkey and the government’s intention to
solidify its legal grounds have led preparing a new PPP framework law, which will
supersede and consolidate previous legislation. The public and private sectors' roles
are conceived as ‘equal partners’ while creating a new state administrative unit to
supervise and promote the model in Turkey. As of 2013, a general Draft PPP Law is
still in process but has not yet been passed. However, the government did pass a new
PPP law on 09 March 2013 in the health sector, the ‘Law on Building and Renewal of
Facilities and Procurement of Services through Public Private Partnership Model’
(No. 6428). The new general PPP Law is envisioned to define PPP in the legislation
for the first time and to cover all sub-models such as BOT, Build-Operate, Transfer
of Operation Rights, and hybrid models. At the same time, authorities state that a
new PPP governing unit should also be established in the central government under
the name of the General Directorate of Public-Private Cooperation.
Current investment opening with PPP includes several health projects. The National
Development Plan 2007-13 also emphasizes that the energy sector will be opened up
further to the private sector. Also, the government will pursue more of the BOT
model for passenger airport terminals. In the IMF 2011 Article IV consultation, the
IMF supports expanding PPPs. However, it also notes the need to ensure
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“strengthened, centralized oversight” given the 16 billion USD (1.25% of GDP) of
approved or in-progress PPP-financed infrastructure projects. The IMF (2012: 22)
writes:
“To limit associated risks: (i) an updated legal framework integrating the
various laws covering PPPs is needed; (ii) PPP projects should be subject to
the same cost-benefit criteria as other government investments; (iii) decision-
making should be centralized, with approval of Treasury and the relevant line
ministry being needed before projects can proceed; (iv) the Credit Risk
Management Department of the Treasury should compile a comprehensive
PPP database and regularly report on associated fiscal risks; and (v) the fiscal
impact of PPPs, including contingent liabilities, should be transparently
discussed in budget documents and integrated into debt sustainability
analysis.”
III.E.2. The 2000-1 Crisis, the BSRP, and State Bank Privatisation
From 1999 to 2001 Turkey entered into a period of economic, financial, and political
turbulence (see Marois 2012: 169-77). The crisis of 2000-1 provided an opportunity to
act. In February 2000, the government set a new interest rate mechanism for Ziraat
and Halk to eliminate duty losses accruing from credit subsidies (OECD 2001b: 205).
Then in June 2000 legal changes enabling the privatisation of the state-owned
9DNíIEDQNZHUH SXVKHG WKURXJK3DUOLDPHQW EXW WKH &RQVWLWXWLRQDO &RXUW UHVFLQGHG
WKH UXOHE\GHFUHH ELOO LQ 2FWREHU DQG E\ H[WHQVLRQ WKH 9DNíIEDQN SULYDWLVDWLRQ
GHFUHH2(&'E$9DNíIEDQNSULYDWLVDWLRQ ODZZDVVRRQUHVXUUHFWHGDQG
put into effect again by November 2000, but by now turbulence foreclosed the
possibility of a sell-off. At the same time, a Public Banks bill took effect legally
enabling the commercialization and privatisation of the other three state banks,
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Ziraat, Halk, and Emlak as called for in the 1999 IMF Letter of Intent (OECD 2001b:
207).
The 2000-1 crisis and subsequent BSRP of 2001 had an impact on the state-owned
banks. Notably, the BRSA cited the systemic distortions created by the state banks as
an underlying cause to the 2000-1 crisis. The 2000-1 crisis exposed the accumulated
duty losses and inefficient management such that the state banks became unable
function because of uncompensated duty losses, inefficient allocation of resources,
state intervention, and weak management, which the crisis only made worse (BRSA
2003: 10). To resolve these problems, the BSRP undertook state bank restructuring
in May 2001.
In 2001, the Treasury issued 23 quadrillion TL in special government bonds,
securitizing duty losses while offering capitalization support to state banks. A far
deeper institutional change occurred, however. Nearly 100 regulations, including
Council of Ministers’ Decrees and Laws, that had enabled state bank subsidized
lending and associated duty losses were annulled to prevent any future political
allocation of duty losses. Among the most important changes, the following sub-
paragraph 1(b) of Article 20 of the Banking Law No 4389 of June 1999 was annulled
(see BAT 2001):
Article 20.1.(b): The Council of Ministers shall be authorized to create or dissolve
funds in order to guide loans in accordance with objectives of development plans and
to provide resources required for such funds from accrued interests or otherwise.
The Council of Ministers may delegate its authority stated in paragraph (a) to the
Central Bank.
The state bank operations were professionalized. Managerial control of Ziraat,
Emlak, and Halk was transferred to a Joint Board of Directors. Professional private
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sector bankers were appointed. The Council of Ministers granted the Board all
necessary authority to restructure and prepare the state banks for privatisation.
Regulatory amendments in June 2001 clarified provisions around the privatisation of
Ziraat, Halk, and Emlak. Of note, the banking license of Emlak was cancelled and its
head office and its capital and branches folded into Ziraat Bank and Halk Bank as of
July 2001. The reason behind Emlak’s closure lies in the growing volatility associated
with it original mandate in real estate. The BRSA also oversaw the substantial
reorganization of the remaining state banks under the BSRP. Within 18 months (June
2001 to December 2002), the number of state bank employees and bank branches
were drastically reduced. While remaining state-owned in formal terms, the
government’s reforms before and after the BSRP reforms have qualitatively
privatized the state banks by internalizing market-based efficiency, profit-
maximization, competitive, and financial imperatives.
III.E.3. Privatisation of State-owned Banks
In Turkey, the number of state-owned commercial banks fell from 11 in 1980 to 4 by
1999 and 3 by 2001 where it remains in 2012. The decline in numbers was the result
minor privatisations, mergers, closures, and the sell-off of Turkish state
participations in private banks (see Marois, 2012: 111-2). From 1988 to 1997, state
banking institutions and insurance companies privatisation receipts totaled only 275
PLOOLRQ 86' .DUDWDđ   7KLV LQFOXGHG WKH VDOHV RI 6¾PHUEDQN (WLEDQN
Denizbank, and Anadolu Bank. Minority state participations in private banks were
DOVR OLTXLGDWHG LQFOXGLQJ D  VKDUH LQ ĐHNHUEDQN LQ  DQG WKH IDU PRUH
VXEVWDQWLDOVDOHRIWKHVWDWHǢVVKDUHLQìđ%DQNDVíIRUPLOOLRQ86'%\
RQO\=LUDDW%DQN+DON%DQN(PODN%DQNDQG9DNíI%DQNUHPDLQHGDQGWKH7XUNLVK
state retained full ownership of each bank. The decline in the number of Turkish
state-owned banks was not matched by extraordinary shifts in the control of banking
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assets by ownership. From 1981 to 1997, state bank asset control contracted by
about 6.0% overall and the remaining four state banks preserved a significant share
of the banking sector at just under 40% of all banking assets (BAT 1999).





Sümerbank assets were folded into Halk Bank. In 1998, the failing state bank Etibank
was also absorbed by Halk Bank., The failed private bank, Pamukbank, taken over by
SDIF In June 2002, was merged into Halk Bank in November 2004, having been
recapitalized by the state. While state bank numbers have fallen, three state banks
retain control of about 30% of the banking sector’s assets (see II.B). These three
EDQNV9DNíI%DQN+DON%DQNDQG=LUDDWKDYHEHHQVXEMHFW WRGLIIHUHQWSURFHVVRI





the 3rd largest state-owned bank and the 7thODUJHVWEDQNLQ7XUNH\9DNíI%DQNZHQW
through several failed privatisation attempts prior to the 2000-1 crisis. Turkey’s 31
July 2001 IMF Letter of Intent stated privatisation efforts will resume as soon as
market conditions permit. Three years later, the 15 July 2004 IMF Letter of Intent
again noted delays but set September 2004 as the new benchmark for privatisation.
6WDWHDXWKRULWLHV WKHQFKDQJHG9DNíI%DQNǢVRZQHUVKLSVWUXFWXUH LQSUHSDUDWLRQ IRU
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DQ ,32VDOH ,Q1RYHPEHU D  ,32VROG IRU ELOOLRQ86'RQ WKH ì6(
While only a partial sell-off, the IPO was considered one of the most successful of the
year. About 70% of the IPO shares were sold to institutional investors and about 30%
WR GRPHVWLF FDSLWDO:LWK WKH  ,32 WKH ,0) KDV UHPRYHG 9DNíI %DQN IURPDQ\
loan conditionalities. Presently, there are no concrete government plans to sell-off
the remaining shares.
Halk Bank (meaning “the ‘people’s’ bank”) remains majority state-owned, but under
WKHì%$VVXFKWKHì%UHFHLYHV+DON%DQNǢVSURILWV+DON%DQNLV7XUNH\ǢVVHFRQG
largest state bank and 6th ODUJHVWEDQN/LNH9DNíI%DQNSULYDWLVDWLRQFRPPLWPHQWV
have been made since much earlier but only in March 2005 did the Turkish
government announce plans to have a Goldman Sachs-led consortium advise on its
immediate block sale. Through 2006 and early 2007, signals suggested a full block
sale by May 2007, which the AKP and state managers had promised to the IMF. In
early January 2007, the government passed a law clearing the way for full
privatisation, following the temporary suspension of Halk Bank’s sale via court
challenges. Notably, the same law extended the horizon of all bank privatisations
from having to be completed within five years to within ten years. Nonetheless, a
Halk Bank block sale was again on the table by early 2007. The National Bank of
Kuwait, Spain’s BBVA, Belgium’s Fortis, Turkey’s Garanti, and Akbank all expressed
interest. As a block sale, bidders had to be larger than Halk Bank in size and already
established in Turkey, but both foreign and domestic capital was welcome. Whoever
the successful Halk Bank bidder was, they would become an immediate market
leader. In mid-February 2007, however, and likely due to the upcoming August 2007
QDWLRQDOHOHFWLRQV'HSXW\30ĐHQHUDQG*0RIWKH+DON%DQN$\GíQDQQRXQFHGWKH
end to Halk Bank’s block sale. Instead, an IPO for 21.7% of Halk Bank’s shares were
sold off in May 2007 for 1.9 billion USD. Domestic and foreign banking capital took an
interest; however, other state banks were prohibited from participating. The range of
interest is unsurprising as Halk Bank, like Ziraat, had become very profitable.
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Ziraat Bank (the ‘agricultural’ bank) is the largest of the state banks and remains
fully state-owned by the Treasury. It is also the second largest bank in Turkey. Since
at least 2001, the Minister of the Economy and CBRT Governor have tagged Ziraat for
privatisation in successive IMF Letters of Intent. The discourse around Ziraat
privatisation has varied considerably. Some AKP government statements call for
bank privatisation, but not necessarily Ziraat Bank in the immediate future. Minister
Babacan, however, repeatedly states Ziraat must go. By contrast, BRSA president
Mr. Bilgin, openly opposed the privatisation of Ziraat Bank in August 2006 arguing the
state should keep at least one bank, which given its size and historical importance
confers certain advantages (Dow Jones Report, 2006). In the May 2007 IMF Letter of
Intent, the government emphasized that it had learned from the Halk Bank IPO
experience, which it would draw from to further its preparation for Ziraat
privatisation.
The three other state-owned development banks, Türk Eximbank (Export Credit Bank
RI7XUNH\7¾UNL\H.DONíQPD%DQNDVí$QRQLPĐLUNHWL'HYHORSPHQW%DQNRI7XUNH\
DQG ìOOHU%DQN %DQNRI3URYLQFHVKDYHQRWEHHQVXEMHFW WRSULYDWLVDWLRQ+RZHYHU
when Eximbank came into existence in 1987 (Law No. 3332) (March 1987) it took over
the set up, legal entity, capital and assets of the State Investment Bank and
transformed into a joint stock company subject to private law (i.e., in a sense, the
6WDWH,QYHVWPHQW%DQNZDVSULYDWL]HG&%57ì6(DQG,VWDQEXO*ROG([FKDQJHì$%
in Turkish acronyms) are also state-owned institutions.
The possibility of EU membership plays an ongoing dimension in the privatisation of
state-owned banks. EU candidacy and harmonization has been established as the
‘anchor’ for new policy formation. Aspiring to and harmonizing institutions towards
the EU market-based performance criteria will carry with it similar effects, even if
they emerge in Turkey in unique and complex ways.
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III.E.5. State-Owned Banks and the Recent Crisis
In response to the 2008-9 crisis in Turkey, the CBRT doubled the exports rediscount
loan limit to USD 1 billion for Eximbank (to mitigate crisis impact on industry
sectors). The loan pool widened and eligibility eased (OECD, 2010: 25; BAT, 2009: I-4).
In March 2009, capital of Eximbank increased by TL 500 million.
As discussed in IV.A, the state-owned banks remained relatively stable and highly
profitable during the outbreak of crisis since late 2008. Through such programs as
the Agricultural Credit Cooperatives scheme Ziraat Bank was able to direct
additional loans to farmers.
The IMF has been slightly critical of the state-owned banks arguing that they enjoy
advantages over private sector banks. For example, by preserving their market
share, the IMF suggests the state banks may negatively impact private bank profits.
The state banks arguably benefit from cheaper and more stable deposit funding due
to an implicit government guarantee. The state banks can also offer lower lending
rates because their retail borrowers like civil servants) are lower risk clients. The
state banks also maintain lower loan-to-deposit ratios (LTDs) and perhaps do not
have to rely as much as private banks on more unstable and expensive wholesale
funding to expand loans. The IMF suggests their privilegied position enabled the state
banks to be “market leaders” during the post-crisis credit boom in Turkey (IMF 2012:
35).
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III.F. PENETRATION OF FINANCIAL ACTIVITIES INTO ORDINARY LIVES OF
THE MASSES
This section reviews the developments in the payment technologies that paralleled
the growth in retail banking activities of the commercial banks in Turkey, rising
amounts of individual loans (and their subcomponents) provided by commercial
banks, and the growing indebtedness of the Turkish household sector.
III.F.1. Development in Payment Technologies
In the face of declining interest rates following the 2000-1 crisis, commercial banks,
which throughout most of the 1990s lended predominantly to the government
through investment in low risk, high interest government bonds, preferred shifting
towards provision of individual loans (Aysan et al., 2008). Subsequently there has
been a significant upsurge in credit cards and individual loans directed towards
household consumption. In this respect, one of the most important impacts of post-
crisis financialisation in the Turkish economy has been the transfer of income from
WKHKRXVHKROGVHFWRUWRZDUGVWKHEDQNLQJVHFWRU%DNíUDQGQLđ7KLVWUHQGLV
highly compatible with the phenomenon of “financial expropriation” (Lapavitsas,
2009), identified as one of the most important dimensions of financialised capitalism.
Extensive growth rates in the numbers of credit cards and debit cards issued by
commercial banks, as well as the number of ATMs and POS stations do not only
reveal the extent to which commercial banks extended their retail banking activities
in the post-2000s but also the extent to which their financial activities penetrated the
lives of ordinary people, underlying their daily subsistence (Table III.F.1).
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2001 13.997 12,017 364.6 31.657
2002 15.705 12,081 495.7 35.057
2003 19.863 12,882 662.4 39.564
2004 26.681 13,819 892.9 42.207
2005 29.978 14,836 1,130.4 48.193
2006 32.433 16,513 1,269.6 53.464
2007 37.335 18,815 1,439.2 55.510
2008 43.394 21,953 1,569.0 60.552
2009 44.393 23,952 1,731.4 64.662
2010 46.956 27,604 1,816.7 69.917
2011 51.361 31,662 1,976.8 81.880
6RXUFH,QWHUEDQN&DUG&HQWUHDQG%56$D%DQNDFíOíNWD<DSíVDO*HOLđPHOHU$UDOíN
The cumulative growth rate of the numbers of credit cards over the period 2001-11
has been 265% (BRSA, 2011a:61). Given the fact that over the same period, the
number of employed increased by only 5.0%, this significant growth reveals not only
the agressive strategies of the commercial banks in increasing their market share
and profit rates, but also the changes in the consumption patterns of ordinary
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individuals (BRSA, 2011a: 61). In terms of the numbers of credit cards, Turkey is
amongst the leading countries in the world (BRSA, 2011a: 63). In 2009, it was ahead
of all EU countries with the exception of Britain. In terms of the number of credit
cards per person while USA is the leader with 3.6 credit cards, the corresponding
figure for Turkey is 0.6 which is ahead of all EU countries except, Luxembourg, Spain,
Britain, Finland, and Portugal.
Parallel to the increase in the numbers of credit cards, the numbers of POS stations
also recorded a significant growth in particular over the 2003-5 period, and then
annually with an average 10.0% growth they reached near 2 millions in 2011 (BRSA,
2011 : 58). As such, in terms of the POS numbers Turkey is second in the world just
behind Brazil, and is ahead of all the EU countries (BRSA, 2011: 60).
The numbers of ATMs also increased significantly over the 2001-11 period with a
14.7% growth in 2011 alone (BRSA, 2011a:55). While Turkey is ahead of countries
with more crowded populations, such as China, India, Brazil, and Indonesia in terms
of the numbers of ATM machines, it is behind other G20 countries and other EU
countries (BRSA 2011a:57). While average population per ATM machine in the EU is
1,152 persons, the corresponding figure is 3,000 people per ATM in Turkey.
Parallel to the rising numbers of ATMs, the number of debit cards over the period
2001-11 has been increasing consistenly. Population per bank card in Turkey is 0.9
while the EU average concerning the same figure is 1.0 (BRSA 2011a:66)
III.F.2. The Rise in Individual Loans in the 2000s
Households, especially starting from 2002 onwards, increasingly relied on bank
loans as a means to finance consumption (CBRT 2005). This is observable in the
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rising share of individual loans, consisting of credit card loans and consumer loans,
within total loans provided by commercial banks. The share of individual loans within
total loans provided by commercial banks increased from 15.7% in 2002 up to 32.8%
in 2011 (Table III.E.2). As such individual Loans became one of the fastest growing
sectors within the banking system (BRSA 2011b: 28).
Table III.F. 2: Individual Loans As % of Total Bank Loans, 2000-11
% of Total Bank
Loans
2000 2002 2003 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Individual Loans 21.3 15.7 20.0 31.1 32.3 34.4 31.9 33.1 32.8 32.8
Credit Cards 6.8 9.1 10.9 11.8 10.4 10.1 9.3 9.3 8.3 8.1
Consumer 14.5 6.6 9.1 19.3 21.9 24.3 22.6 23.8 24.5 24.7
Housing 8.4 10.6 11.4 10.6 11.4 11.6 10.9
Automobile 4.2 3.1 2.2 1.5 1.1 1.1 1.1
Necessitites &
Others
6.7 8.3 10.7 10.5 11.2 11.9 12.7
Source: BRSA (2004a; 2004b; 2006; 2007; 2010; 2011b).
Consumer loans under individual loans consist of three subcategories, i.e. housing
loans, car loans, and loans for necessities. Loans for necessitities include loans
taken by individuals for their professional objectives, education, holidays, food and
clothing requirements (CBRT 2005:19) The consistent rise in necessities loans
component which increased from 6.7% of total loans provided by commercial banks
in 2005 up to 12.7% of total bank loans in 2011 indicate that working people are
increasingly becoming more dependent on financial loans to meet their basic needs.
As of 2011, credit card loans constitute about 8.1% of total bank loans and about one
fourth of individual loans (BRSA 2011b: 33). As such, credit card loans continue to be
one of the most important markets for the banking sector. Between 2000-6, credit
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card loans recorded a significant growth, during which their share within total bank
loans increased from 6.8% up to 10.4%. Over the 2007-11 period, however, there has
been a declining trend, whereby their share in total bank loans declined from 10.1%
down to 8.1% (Table III.F.2).
While at a lower rate, share of housing credits within total bank credits has also been
on the rise, which increased from 8.4% of total loans provided by commercial banks
in 2005 up to 10.9% in 2011. In 2011, housing credits constituted about one third of
individual loans.
Meanwhile a declining trend is observed in the car loans. One important reason for
this trend is the measures taken in 2004 and 2005 to reduce the rising trend in
consumer loans, through eliminating the tax incentives which were applied in new
car purchases. In April 2004, tax incentives implemented in purchasing of new cars
was halved, and at the beginning of 2005 it was eliminated completely. Moreover in
August 2004, the rate of Resource Use Support Fund, a special tax imposed on
consumption credits was increased from 10% to 15% (BRSA 2011b).
When the distribution of consumer loans on the basis of individual income is
analysed, it is seen that 50% of the consumer loans are used by the lowest two
income groups. The largest share of 26% is used by those whose income is between
1,000-2,000 TL, which is followed by those in the lowest income group of 0 to 1,000
TL, who use 24% of the total consumer loans (CBRT 2011a). As income levels
increase, reliance on consumer loans also decline (ibid.). When the age distribution
of individuals who use consumer loans is analysed, the dominance of middle aged
individuals is observed. Half of the consumer loans are used by individuals who are
between the ages of 36-55, while 28% of consumer loans are used by individuals who
are between 26-35 years of age (CBRT 2011a). As provision of student loans by
commercial banks is not widespread in Turkey, financial access of individuals
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between the ages of 18-25 is limited, with only 6% of the total consumer loans being
used by individuals in that age group (CBRT 2011a).
CBRT (2009: 30) states that despite the rising amount of consumer loans, including
the housing loans, the exchange rate risks involved with these loans are low
compared with some of the East European countries, as the share of foreign
currency loans within total consumer loans was 4.9% in 2008 which further declined
to 3.9% in 2009, while the share of foreign currency housing loans within total
housing loans declined from 9.1% in 2008 to 7.4% in 2009. Moreover, in 2009 through
a change in regulation (i.e. via a change in Decree No. 32 on the Protecting the Value
of Turkish Currency), households are prevented from borrowing in foreign currency
or indexation of their debts to foreign currency, which further reduced the exchange
rate risks involved with household debts (CBRT 2009). Further, interest rate risks of
consumer loans is also lower in the Turkish case, because of a policy of fixed as
opposed to volatile interest rates on consumer loans with the exception of housing
loans whereby interest rates may be indexed to changes in Consumer Price Index
(CBRT 2009: 30).
As of June 2011, the share of individual loans within total bank loans was 33%, which
is the second largest behind commercial loans (which constitute the 43% of total
bank loans) and ahead of loans for small and medium enterprises (which is 24%)
(BRSA 2011c). The ratio of non-performing loans increased significantly for all loan
types in 2009, as a result of the financial crisis. Non-performance ratio for individual
loans in 2009 was above 6%, while it was close to 8% for loans to SMEs (BRSA 2011c:
21). Since then there has been a consistent decline in the ratio of non-performing
loans. As of June 2011, the ratio of non-performing loans in individual loans, which is
3.3%, is second highest closely following the non-performance ratio on loans to
small and medium enterprises, which is 3.4%. Within the individual loans, the highest
non-performing ratio belongs to credit card loans with 7% (down from 8% in 2010),
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followed by car loans which is 4.2% (down from 6% in 2010), and finally with
necessities and other loans, which is 2.8% (down from 3.7% in 2010). Meanwhile the
share of non-performing individual loans within total non-performing loans is 37.4%.
As such, individual loans category has the highest share within non-performing
loans, ahead of loans to commercial enterprises (which has a share of 34.8% within
total non-performing loans) and of loans to SMEs (for which the relevant figure is
27.8% within total non-performing loans) (BRSA 2011c:20).
III.F.3. The Indebtedness of the Household Sector
Another indicator of financialisation in the Turkish economy is the growing extent of
household debt. The sharp increases in household debt not only reveals that
households have become increasingly dependent on debt for meeting their
consumption needs, but also that domestic consumption has become the primary
GULYHURIHFRQRPLFJURZWK%DNíUDQGQLđ+RXVHKROGGHEWRIFUHGLWFDUGVDQG
consumer loans expressed as the percentage share within household disposable
income has been increasing rapidly since 2003 from 7.5% in 2003 up to 51.7% in 2011
(Table III.F.3). Ratio of household debt to GDP has also been rising, which increased
from 7.9% in 2005 to 13.6% in 2008, and further up to 15.4% in 2009 (CBRT 2009: 30;
2010: 19).135
135 It is highly likely that household disposable income series appearing in Table III.E.3 underestimates
the true values, and hence the debt burden of the households is overestimated. Such as a result does
not invalidate the assessment that household indebtedness has risen spectacularly 2003-11.
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Table III.F. 3: Household Debt and Disposable Income 2003-11
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Household
Obligations(TL Billion)
13.4 28.3 48.8 73.4 99.5 128.9 147.1 191.1 251.9
Household Disposable
Income (TL Billion)
180.3 218.8 233.4 404.7 466.0 352.8 408.9 463.9 487.2
Obligations / Household
Disposable Income,%




422.9 506.5 566.5 647.6 733.5 830.6 844.1 952.6 1,100.0
Source: (CBRT, 2006; 2008; 2011b; 2012) and Ministry of Development Annual Programmes
(for the last line).
*N.B. Starting with 2010, CBRT uses the results of Income and Living Standards Survey 2008
for identifying household disposable income, hence there are different values for 2008 and
2009 values in reports before 2010. The household disposable income and obligations values
for 2008, 2009, and 2010 are taken from CBRT (2011b). The values for 2011 are based on the
results of Income and Living Standards Survey 2010, and are taken from CBRT (2012).
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III.G. INEQUALITIES AND THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM
This section aims to study inequality within the financial sector as well as inequalities
related with the development of financialisation. One of the main shortcomings of the
analysis in this section has been the inaccessibility of the data on pay differentials
within the financial sector in Turkey. The section briefly notes the wage differentials
between the financial sector and other sectors in the Turkish economy, as well as
gender pay gaps within the financial sector itself. It then provides details on the
inequalities in access to and use of financial services in Turkey on a regional basis. It
highlights that despite the widespread inequalities in access to and use of financial
services across geographical regions in Turkey, there is also some (albeit restricted)
flow of funds through bank loans from resource-rich to resource-poor regions.
Finally, it aims to highlight the impact of financialisation on inequalities in a broader
context with reference to income distribution in Turkey. This is carried out through
an analysis of the impacts of the neoliberal policies, which underpinned the
financialisation of the economy, on the Turkish labour market.
III.G.1. Inequalities in Relation to the Financial Sector
An analysis of the developments in the Turkish labour market, as the main income
generating institution, can reveal the impacts of financialisation on broader
inequalities in income distribution. Neoliberal policies underpinning the
financialisation of Turkish economy generated important destabilizing developments
in the operation of the Turkish Labour market. Amongst the most important of these
developments are: a) the phenomenon of jobless growth, defined as the weakening of
the relationship between economic growth and employment creation, b) the process
of deagrarianisation and the subsequent reduction in agricultural employment within
total employment, c) further declines in the already low levels of employment and
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labor force participation rates, d) spread and growth of informal employment,
DORQJVLGH WKH VSUHDG RI IOH[LELOLW\ RI DUUDQJHPHQWV 0¾WHYHOOLRßOX DQG ,đíN 
Yeldan 2010; Onaran 2009).
Almost of all of the development patterns listed above can be related with the
impacts of the neoliberal policies and financialisation of the Turkish economy. As
mentioned earlier in this report, the phenomenon of jobless growth has become an
important component of the economic growth model dependent on short-term
capital inflows, which has been in force in Turkey since the late 1980s. Tight
monetary and fiscal policies implemented in the post 2001 crisis, which merely
aimed at price stability by an independent CBRT, and the high interest rate and
overvalued Turkish lira components of these policies significantly undermined the
production structure of real sector by shifting investment away from the real towards
the financial sector (Yeldan 2010). This resulted in significant contraction in
employment creation by the manufacturing sector. “Over 2002-2007 manufacturing
industry as a whole grew at an annual rate of 8.9% while rate of manufacturing
employment growth was a meager 1.3%” (Taymaz and Voyvoda 2009 cited in Yeldan
2010). Moreover, as mentioned earlier in this report, the creation of surplus offered
to the financial sector and transferred through the high interest rates was generated
through a significant suppression of the real wages. “Over the period between 2000-
2006 when the year 2000 is taken as the base year, real wages declined by 25%”
GHVSLWHHFRQRPLFJURZWK 0¾WHYHOOLRJOXDQG ,đíN:KHQWKH\HDU LV
taken as the base, over the 1997-2006 the real wage index declined from 100 to 83
0¾WHYHOOLRJOXDQG,đíN
In effect, suppression of real wages has been a dominant pattern across different
phases of the liberalization. Over the 1983-7 period which was characterized by the
implementation of structural adjustment with export promotion under a regulated
347
This project is funded by the European Union under
the 7th Research Framework programme (theme SSH)
Grant Agreement nr 266800
foreign exchange system and controls on capital inflows, severe repression of wage
incomes sustained domestic accumulation and export surge (Boratav, Yeldan and
Köse 2000). Over this period ‘the share of wage labour in private manufacturing value
added receded from 27.1% to 17.1% while in public manufacturing from 25% to 13%’
(Boratav, Yeldan and Köse 2000: 4). This period ended with wage explosion in the
organized private manufacturing industry. The period 1988-1991 also marks the
onstart of financialisation in the Turkish economy. Deregulation of financial markets
in 1989, and the high real interest rates resulted in the prevalence of a short term
capital led growth pattern. When this model erupted in 1994 following a sudden
drainage of funds, the economy switched back once again to a mode of surplus
extraction whereby export performance for industrial sectors became dependent on
savings on wage costs (Boratav, Yeldan and Köse 2000:7). The index of real wage rate
in private manufacturing industry fell by an aggregate of 29.0 percentage points
between 1993-QIV and 1996-QII. “Between 1990-2006 (1990: 100) when the Turkish
economy was opened up to international markets, the increases in exports were
sustained by significant declines in unit labour costs in dollars (on average 22.0%)
DQGWKHULVHLQODERXUSURGXFWLYLW\WLPHVǥ0¾WHYHOOLRßOXDQG6D\íP
The crisis prone nature of the financialised growth model implemented since the late
1980s, cemented the downward pressure on real wages and further aggravated the
distributional outcomes. Following the crises of 1994 and 2001, real wages continued
to decline for three consecutive years and the rate of decline over three years
reached 30.0% and 24.5% respectively after each crisis. Despite some recovery after
2004, as of 2007 real wages were still 21.5% lower than their level in 1979 (Onaran
2009: 251). Financial crises and the ensuing repression in real wages also result in
significant declines in wage shares. After the crisis of 1994 the fall in wage share
continued also in 1995 with a cumulative decline of 24.8% compared to 1993.
Following the 2001 crisis, the wage share has continued to decline for consecutive six
years including 2006. The initial decline of 13.7% reached finally to a cumulative fall
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of 30.2% in 2006 compared to 2000 (Onaran, 2009: 249). “Another indicator of the
developments on relations of distribution is the share of payments made to
production factors within national income. The share of labor within the national
income declined over the period 2000-6 from 29.2% down to 26.2%. Meanwhile the
share of capital income over the period 2000-6 was stabilized around 50%
0¾WHYHOOLRJOXDQG,đíN
The inability of financialised growth model to generate employment mentioned
earlier, should be assessed jointly with the impacts of one of the most unsettling
transformations in the Turkish economy over the 2000s, that of deagrarianisation in
the agricultural sector. The latter, which have been implemented with increasing
vigor since the early 2000s under the auspices of the WB, and the IMF, resulted in
LPSRUWDQWUHGXFWLRQVLQDJULFXOWXUDOHPSOR\PHQW$\GíQ'XULQJWKHVDW
least until the financial crisis hit the economy, declining agricultural employment can
be detected both in the relative share of agricultural sector in total employment and
the total number of people employed in the sector concerned. Over the period 1999-
2007, the relative share of agriculture in total employment declined by 13 points from
 LQGRZQ WR LQ 6HH7DEOH ,,,*DQGDOVR0¾WHYHOOLRßOXDQG
,đíN  0HDQZKLOH WKH LQFUHDVHV LQ WKH VKDUHVRI LQGXVWULDO DQGVHUYLFHV
sector within total employment were negligible compared with the decline in the
share of agriculture. The relative share of industrial employment which was 18.5% in
1999 increased to 20.8% in 2007, while the share of construction employment over
the same period declined from 6.7% to 5.8%. The share of services employment over
the same period increased 12 percentage points from 38.0% to 50.0%. Parallel
declines can also be detected over the same period in the number of people
employed in the agricultural sector. Over the 1999-2007 period, total number people
employed declined by 3.6%, the number of people employed in agriculture declined
by 38% while the people employed in the construction sector declined by 15%. Slight
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improvements in the number of people employed in the industrial and services
remained at 8.0% and 26.0% respectively.136
Since 2008, however, “the return migration of job losers” (Ercan 2010) during the
crisis lifted up both the relative share of agriculture within total employment from
23.6% in 2008 to 24.5% in 2012 while over the same period the no of people employed
in agriculture increased 21.5% (See Table III.G.1).
A related corollary of deagrarinization process is the declining income of the
agricultural labor. While the share of agricultural subsidies in national income in
ZDV LQ WKLV ILJXUH IHOO WR 0¾WHYHOOLRßOXDQG6D\íP
Over the period between 1998-2006 (when 1998 is taken as the base year) the
decrease in the income of agricultural labor is 35%. Poverty associated with the
process of deagrarianisation thus emerge as an important source of social exclusion
LQWKH7XUNLVKFRQWH[W<¾NVHNHU$\GíQ
Over the 2000s, deagrarinization policies and the jobless growth pattern emerge as
the main causes underlying the further declines in the already low levels of labor
force participation and employment. While deagrarianisation policies implemented
under the auspicies of the IMF and the World Bank reduce agricultural employment,
non agricultural sectors trapped in a model of economic growth dependent on flows
136 TURKSTAT introduced a new series based on new census projections and revised labour force data
since 2004, a result of which comparisons across the new and old data sets may not always be
reliable. However the declines in agricultural employment and dismal performance of the economy at
job creation is also visible at different intervals based on compatible data sets. Over the 1999-2003
period, total number of employed declined 1.6%, the number of people employed in agriculture
declined 9.0%, the number of people employed in industry and construction sectors declined 3.8% and
33.6% respectively, while the number of people employed in the services sector increased a mere
12.0%. Over the 2004-7, there has been a slight increase in the total number of employed of 5.6%, with
number of people employed in industry, construction and services increasing to 9.8%, 27.0% and
14.0% respectively. Over the same period the decline in the number of people employed in the
agriculture was consistent at 15%.(see Table III.G.1)
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of short term finance capital and high interest rates undermine industrialization
policies, reduce public investments and sustain jobless growth patterns
0¾WHYHOOLRßOXDQG6D\íPǤ2YHUWKHSHULRGZRUNLQJDJHSRSXODWLRQ
increased by 48%, labour force increased by 25% meanwhile employment increased
E\0¾WHYHOOLRßOXDQG,đíN+HQFHGXULQJWKHVDQGVWKHUH
has been a constant decline in both labour force participation rates and employment
rates (see Table III.G.2). Labor force participation rate, which was 57.6% in 1990,
declined down to 50.0% in 2012, which effectively means that half of the labor force is
out of labor market. Low levels of female labor force participation, which declined
rapidly as a result of migration from rural to urban centers subsequent to
deagrarinization, is the most important source of low levels of labour force
participation. As such female labour force participation, which was 35.0% in 1990,
declined consistently until 2007 when it reached 23.6%. Then onwards, with some
improvement due to the “added worker effect” (Ercan 2010) it increased consistently
and reached 29.5% in 2012. While current male labour force participation rates is
closer to EU15 rates, a consistent declining trend is also observed in male labour
force participation which declined from 80.0% in 1990 to 71.0% in 2012.
Meanwhile a declining trend is also observed in employment rates, which declined
from 53.0% in 1990 to 45.0% in 2011. Over the 2002-6 period during which the Turkish
economy recorded significant growth in terms of GDP, employment rate declined
from 44.4% to 41.5%. Unemployment rate started to increase especially from 2002
onwards. Over the strong growth period of 2002-6, unemployment rate was stable
around 10.0 to 11.0%. Non agricultural unemployment rates were higher than total
unemployment rates and over the 2002 -6 period there has been a volatile and
negligible decline from 14.5% to 12.7%. A closer analysis of labor force data indicates
that the levels of unemployment may be higher than official unemployment rates. As
of 2012, the ratio of people who are ready to work but is not searching work (due to
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being discouraged from searching a job or due to other reasons) within the working
age population not in labour force is 7.3%. In 1990, this ratio was only 2.1% (See
Table III.G.3).
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Table III.G. 1: Distribution of the Employed Across Sectors (thousand persons, 1990-2012)
New
Series
Thousand Persons 1990 1992 1995 1996 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
TOTAL 19030 19561 20912 21548 21507 21580 21524 21354 21147 19632 20067 20423 20738 21194 21277 22594 24110 24821





45.90 44.43 44.02 44.21 36.70 36.00 37.58 34.93 33.88 29.10 25.68 24.03 23.47 23.67 24.63 25.15 25.48 24.56
INDUSTRY 3031 3408 3309 3475 3996 3810 3774 3954 3846 3928 4183 4283 4314 4439 4079 4496 4704 4751
% OF IND
EMPLOYMENT
15.93 17.42 15.82 16.13 18.58 17.66 17.53 18.52 18.19 20.01 20.85 20.97 20.80 20.94 19.17 19.90 19.51 19.14
CONSTRUCTION 926 1114 1291 1386 1453 1364 1110 958 965 966 1107 1196 1231 1241 1249 1431 1676 1709
% CONS.
EMPLOYMENT
4.87 5.70 6.17 6.43 6.76 6.32 5.16 4.49 4.56 4.92 5.52 5.86 5.94 5.86 5.87 6.33 6.95 6.89
SERVICES 6337 6348 7106 7162 8164 8637 8551 8984 9171 9024 9622 10037 10327 10497 10650 10986 11586 12266
% OF SERVICES
EMPLOYMENT
33.30 32.45 33.98 33.24 37.96 40.02 39.73 42.07 43.37 45.97 47.95 49.15 49.80 49.53 50.05 48.62 48.05 49.42
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Source: Tukstat, Household Labour Force Surveys.
* 1990-1999 values are October values, from 2000 onwards the values are annual averages. For codification of economic activities TURKSTAT
used ISIC Rev 1 between 1988-1999, NACE Rev 1 between 2000-2009, and Nace Rev 2 since 2009. Either using correspondence tables or using
double coding made for 2009, results for 2004 -2008 in the above table were revised by Nace Rev.
Table III.G. 2: Labor Market Indicators, Turkey (thousand persons, 1990-2012)
New
Series
1990 1992 1994 1996 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Population 15+ Years Old 35711 38260 40322 42512 46211 47158 48041 48912 47554 48359 49174 49994 50772 51686 52541 53593 54724
Labor Force 20552 21355 21831 23003 23078 23491 23818 23640 22016 22455 22751 23114 23805 24748 25641 26725 27339
Labor Force Participation
Rate (%)
57,6 55,8 54,1 54,1 49,9 49,8 49,6 48,3 46,3 46,4 46,3 46,2 46,9 47,9 48,8 49,9 50,0
Female Labor Force
Participation Rate (%)
35,3 32,6 30,2 31 26,6 27,1 27,9 26,6 23,3 23,3 23,6 23,6 24,5 26 27,6 28,8 29,5
Male Labour Force
Participation Rate (%)
80,5 79,4 78,6 77,6 73,7 72,9 71,6 70,4 70,3 70,6 69,9 69,8 70,1 70,5 70,8 71,7 71.0
Rural Labour Force
Participation (%)
67,8 67,3 63,7 67 58,7 58,7 57,6 55,5 54,4 52,1 51,1 50,8 51,4 52,7 53,5 54,9 53,6
Employment 19030 19561 20026 21548 21581 21524 21354 21147 19632 20067 20423 20738 21194 21277 22594 24110 24821
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Source: TURKSTAT, Household Labour Force Surveys.
*1990- 1996 are October values, from 2000 onwards, the values are annual averages. From 2009 onwards, new population projections are used
by TURKSTAT. To facilitate comparisons, starting with 2004, TURKSTAT formed new series through revisions based on 2008 census
projections. Therefore while the two distinct data sets between 1990-2003 and 2004-2012 are internally consistent and comparable,
comparisons across these two data sets may not be reliable.
% Employed 53,3 51,1 49,7 50,7 46,7 45,6 44,4 43,2 41,3 41,5 41,5 41,5 41,7 41,2 43 45 45,4
Rural 64,6 64 60,3 64,9 56,4 56 54,3 51,9 51,4 48,8 44,7 47,4 47,7 46,8 49.6 51,8 50,7
Unemployed 1522 1794 1805 1455 1497 1967 2464 2493 2385 2388 2328 2376 2611 3471 3046 2615 2518
Unemployment Rate (%) 7,4 8,4 8,3 6,3 6,5 8,4 10,3 10,5 10,8 10,6 10,2 10,3 11 14 11,9 9,8 9,2
Non Agricultural
Unemployment Rate (%)
12,4 14,0 13,2 10,6 9,3 12,4 14,5 13,8 14,2 13,5 12,7 12,6 13,6 17,4 14,8 12,4 11,5
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Table III.G. 3: Reasons for not Participating in the Labour Force (thousand persons, 1990-2012)
New
Series
1990 1992 1994 1996 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Total population not in
the labour force
15,159 16,905 18,491 19,507 2,3133 23,667 24,223 25,272 25,527 25,905 26,423 26,879 26,966 26,938 26,901 26,867 27,385
Those ready to work
but not looking for a
job
324 270 318 266 1,139 1,060 1,020 945 1,101 1,563 1,909 1,742 1,850 2,061 2,013 1,945 1,994
Discouraged workers 212 97 104 95 132 108 73 84 311 486 624 612 612 757 716 678 691
Other 112 173 214 171 1007 952 947 861 790 1077 1285 1130 1238 1304 1297 1267 1303
Those ready to work /
Total population not in
labour force
2.1 1.6 1.7 1.4 4.9 4.5 4.2 3.7 4.3 6.0 7.2 6.5 6.9 7.7 7.5 7.2 7.3
Source: TURKSTAT, Household Labour Force Surveys.
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Informal employment forms another important feature of Turkish labor market. Even
though informal employment has long been a characteristic of Turkish labour
markets, there has been an intensification of this process especially in the era of
financial liberalization in the aftermath of 1989 (Boratav, Yeldan and Köse 2000).
Real wage progression in the aftermath of 1988 in the organized segment of Turkish
labour in private manufacturing corresponded to an increase in the spread of
informal employment. The aftermath of 1994 crisis in particular saw increased
marginalization and labour shedding. in the private manufacturing sector. Ratio of
informal employment in the manufacturing industry increased from 41 percent in
1980 up to 49 percent in 1994 while in the private manufacturing sector ratio of
informal employment was recorded as 49 percent in 1995 (Boratav, Yeldan and
Köse, 2000).
Over the 2000s, the rapid reduction in agricultural employment continued to feed
informal employment. The large majority of migrants who arrive into urban areas
failed to find regular employment and thus were obliged to work in irregular
temporary works mostly in the informal sector. As a result the share of atypical
HPSOR\PHQW LQ WKH LQIRUPDOVHFWRU LQFUHDVHGZLWKLQWKHZDJHODERXU 0¾WHYHOOLRßOX
DQG6D\íP(UFDQ
“In 1995, 46.9% of those in employment were in the unregistered sector, and the
share of agriculture within unregistered sector was 70.1% while 29.9% of those in
unregistered sector were in non-agricultural sectors. In 2006, the share of
unregistered employment within employment increased to 50.5%. Over the period
1995-2006, the share of agriculture in unregistered employment declined to 52.0%
ZKLOH WKH VKDUH RI QRQDJULFXOWXUDO VHFWRU LQFUHDVHG WR ǥ 0¾WHYHOOLRßOX DQG
,đíN
As of 2012, the share of unregistered employment in total employment is 39.0%,
which represents a decline of 16 percentage points compared to its 1990 level of
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55.0%. This decline is largely attributable to the decline in agricultural unregistered
employment, which is reduced from 41.4% in 1990 to 20.5% in 2012. However equally
noteworthy over the same period is the rising trend in unregistered employment in
non-agricultural employment over the same period, which rose from 13.8% to 18.5%
(Table III.G.4).
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Table III.G. 4: Unregistered Employment According to Sectors and Gender, Turkey (thousand persons, 1990-2012)
New Series
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Total Unregistered Employment 10,494 9,679 8,822 11,307 11,306 10,925 11,382 11,133 10,943 9,843 9,666 9,593 9,423 9,220 9,328 9,772 10,139 9,686
Agricultural Unregistered
Employment
7,869 6,826 5,722 8,370 8,250 6,887 7,422 6,723 6,531 5,136 4,547 4,307 4,290 4,406 4,503 4,857 5,151 5,098
Non Agricultural Unregistered
Employment
2,625 2,853 3,100 2,937 3,056 4,038 3,959 4,409 4,411 4,708 5,119 5,285 5,132 4,814 4,825 4,915 4,988 4,589
% of Unregistered Emp. in Total
Employment
55.1 49.5 44.1 52.5 50.6 50.6 52.9 52.1 51.7 50.1 48.2 47.0 45.4 43.5 43.8 43.3 42.1 39,0
% of Agricultural Unregistered Emp. in
Total Employment
41.4 34.9 28.6 38.8 36.9 31.9 34.5 31.5 30.9 26.2 22.7 21.1 20.7 20.8 21.2 21.5 21.4 20,5
% of Non Agricultural Unregistered
Emp. in Total Employment
13.8 14.6 15.5 13.6 13.7 18.7 18.4 20.6 20.9 24.0 25.5 25.9 24.7 22.7 22.7 21.8 20.7 18,5
Female Total Unregistered
Employment
4,773 4,504 4,020 4,872 4,774 4031 4,376 4,439 4,200 3,388 3,318 3,310 3,253 3,269 3,426 3,758 4,030 3,959
Male Total Unregistered Employment 5,721 5,175 4,802 6,436 6,533 6,894 7,005 6,694 6,742 6,455 6,348 6,283 6,170 5,950 5,315 5,617 5,679 5,727
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Source: TURKSTAT, The results of Household Labour Force Surveys.
*1990- 1998 are October values, from 2000 onwards, the values are annual averages. From 2009 onwards, new population projections are used
by TURKSTAT. To facilitate comparisons, starting with 2004, TURKSTAT formed new series through revisions based on 2008 census
projections. Therefore while the two distinct data sets between 1990-2003 and 2004-2012 are internally consistent and comparable,
comparisons across these two data sets may not be reliable. For Agricultural-Non Agricultural Differentiation TURKSTAT used Nace Rev 1
between 1990-2008, and from 2009 onwards, Nace Rev 2 was used.
Female Unregistered Employment in
Total Employment
25.1 23.0 20.1 22.6 21.4 18.7 20.3 20.8 19.9 17.3 16.5 16.2 15.7 15.4 16.1 16.6 16.7 16
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Low rates of employment and labor force participation, high levels of unemployment
rates, suppression of real wages, coupled with growth in the informal sector sustain
inequalities in income distribution and generate persistent rates of poverty. As of
2011, percentage of population in poverty, (calculated according to those remaining
below the 50% of the median income using equivalent household disposable
income), is 16.1 which corresponds to 11 million 670 thousand people. When the
same poverty rate is calculated to include those that remain below 60.0% of the
median income, percentage of people living in poverty increases to 22.9%,
corresponding to 16 million 569 thousand people. The data available from TURKSTAT
below show that with the exception of the crisis year 2009 when poverty rate peaked,
there has not been any significant reduction in poverty rates.
Another notable indicator of inequality is the distribution of annual household
disposable incomes by quintiles (See TableIII.G.6 below). As of 2011, the share of
lowest income quintile in national income is 6,5 percent while the highest quintile
receives 45.2% of the national incomes. As the share received from national income
by the highest (richest quintile) is 7 times more than the lowest quintile. Over the
2007-2011 period this difference between the highest and lowest quintiles remains
relatively stable ranging between 6.9-7.1 with the exception of 2009 crisis year when
the difference peaked to 7.4%. Similarly with the exception of the crisis year in 2009,
we see that gini coefficient over the period 2007-2011 recorded negligible
improvement declining by 0.004 points from 0.387 to 0.383.
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Table III.G. 5: Number of Poor, Poverty Rate by Relative Poverty Thresholds Based on
Income (Turkey, 2007-2011)
Risk of poverty Number of poor
(Thousands) Poverty rate (%)
2007
% 50 11 163 16.3
% 60 16 053 23.4
2008
% 50 11 580 16.7
% 60 16 714 24.1
2009
% 50 12 097 17.1
% 60 17 123 24.3
2010
% 50 12 025 16.9
% 60 16 963 23.8
2011
% 50 11 670 16.1
% 60 16 569 22.9
Source: TURKSTAT, Income and Living Conditions Survey, 2006-20111)
*Reference periods of income information is the previous calendar year. Relative poverty
rates are calculated using equivalent household disposable income.
362
This project is funded by the European Union under
the 7th Research Framework programme (theme SSH)
Grant Agreement nr 266800
Table III.G. 6: Distributionof Household Incomes by Quintiles (2007-2010)
QUANTILES 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Total 6.4 6.4 6.2 6.5 6.5
First 20% 10.9 10.9 10.7 11.1 11.0
Second 20% 15.4 15.4 15.3 15.6 15.5
Third 20% 21.8 22.0 21.9 21.9 21.9
Fourth 20% 45.5 45.3 46 44.9 45.2
Last 20% 0.387 0.386 0.394 0.38 0.383
Gini 7.1 7.1 7.4 6.9 7.0
Source: TURKSTAT, Income and Living Standards Survey, 2006-2011
*Reference period of income information belongs to the previous calendar years.
III.G.2. Wage Differentials between Financial and Non-Financial Sectors and
Wage Suppression in the Non-financial sectors
Transfer of the financial surplus would, no doubt, call for repercussions on the
primary categories of income distribution. While the finance and insurance sectors
provides the highest wages amongst all economic sectors, wages were squeezed in
the non-financial sectors. An analysis of wage differentials in the Turkish economy
reveals that annual average pre-tax earnings is highest in the finance and insurance
sector and lowest in the administrative and support services; wage difference
between the highest and lowest sectors is 68.7% (Turkstat, 2010). Gender pay gap is
also one of the lowest in the finance and insurance sector, i.e. 3%, across all the
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economic sectors in Turkey (Turkstat, 2010).137 Meanwhile, creation of such a
financial surplus would directly necessitate a squeeze of the wages in the non-
financial sectors.
It is possible to find evidence of the extend of this surplus transfer from the path of
the private manufacturing real wages. The dynamic of the private manufacturing real
wages is portrayed in Figure III.F.1, denominated both in TL, and also in the USD
terms. The figure further contrasts real wages against labour productivity. After a
brief surge over 1990-1993, real wages had plummeted during the 1994 financial
crisis, and in a sense have borne the brunt of adjustment of the crisis. During 1995-
2000, private manufacturing real wages have kept their momentum in general,
although they could not recover their pre-1994 crisis levels. However, after the
2000/2001 wave of crises, real wages in private manufacturing faced a second cycle
of contraction. This contraction was especially pronounced in USD terms. In the
meantime, productivity gains in private manufacturing accelerated especially after
the first quarter 2002. It is known that this productivity surge is due mostly to labour
shedding, rather than increased labour efficiency originating from advances in
technology. As of 2006, index of labour productivity scored 1.8 - folds higher than
real wages in TL, and 2.3 folds higher than the unit wage costs in US dollars.
137 So far no data was found on wage differences across ethnic groups within the finance sector as
well as between the lowest and highest echelons within the financial sector.
364
This project is funded by the European Union under
the 7th Research Framework programme (theme SSH)
Grant Agreement nr 266800
Figure III.G. 1: Productivity and Real Wages in Turkish Private Manufacturing,
Source: Turkstat
The recent data138 also suggest similar trends. Data on industrial real wages and
productivity indexes reveal the same patterns for the post-2005 period. (See Figure
III.G.2).
138 Note that the Turkstat has recently changed both the format and the coverage of its labour
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Figure III.G. 2: Real Wages and Productivity in Turkish Industry, 2005Q1-2012Q2
Source: Turkstat
A close inspection of Figures III.G.1 and III.G.2 together is especially informative.
This exercise shows very clearly, how in the Turkish economy speculative financial
gains were financed through squeezing of real wages. Each rapid rise in the
financial arbitrage is closely associated with a downward movement of real wages
and involves a direct transfer of labour incomes towards capital, both domestic and
foreign. The real wages contracted severely after the 2000-1 crisis and this
downward trend was maintained throughout 2002 and 2003. Calculated from 2000 to
mid 2003, the decline in the private manufacturing real wages reached to 19.6%. The
decline of wages in the public manufacturing sector was 15.4% during the same
period. Viewed from a longer time horizon, if the index of real wages were assumed
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100 in 1997, it is observed that they fell to 82.2 index points in the private
manufacturing sector.
But there is another important observation one can deduce from the Figure III.G.1.
This is the realized stability of the real wage path following somewhat around 2005.
The real wage rate in manufacturing (the leading industrial sector) was typically
following the business cycle with a lag all over the post 1990 reform age, and yet its
fluctuations seem all of a sudden to be curtailed. What could be the explanation of
this relative stability after 2005?
It is argued that this observation pertains mostly due to the switch to first implicit
(2002-2005), and then to explicit inflation targeting regime starting 2006. With the
advent of explicit inflation targets, almost all contracts started to being offered
against the inflation target set by the central bank. Thus, the objective of price
stability in practice meant wage stability. Under absence of a nominal anchor
elsewhere, the inflation targeting regime enabled the real cost of labour to serve
such an anchor. Searching for price stability under conditions of great moderation
had also meant in the Turkish labour markets de facto wage stability and diversion
of the real wage numerations away from gains in the productivity of labour.
In sum, the “great recession” hit the Turkish labour markets under such conditions
of faltering wage remunerations, persistent unemployment, and over-dependence to
external financing. There was widespread anecdotal evidence on the issue of low
wage growth and opening up of the gap between wage remunerations and
productivity gains.
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III.G.3. Access to Financial Services and the Extent of Their Use
Access to financial services and the extent of their use by individuals in particular
can be taken as an important indicator of financial inclusion and exclusion. In
assessing financial access, the WB (2005) uses indicators such as (i) geographical
distribution of bank branches (bank branch per 1000 sqkm); (ii) distribution of bank
branches per population (per 100,000 people); (iii) distribution of ATMs across the
regions (ATM per 1,000 sqkm); (iv) ATM per population (per 100,000 people).
Indicators for
financial access measure the geographical spread of financial services across the
country. Meanwhile, for assessing the of use financial services, the WB uses the
following criteria: (i) bank loans per person (per 1,000 people); (ii) ratio of loans to
income (i.e. affordability, ratio of average amount of credits to individual income; (iii)
bank deposits per person (deposits per 1,000 people); (iv) ratio of average deposits to
individual income. Financial use indicators reveal the scope and affordability of
financial services (CBRT 2011a).
Macro Access Index preapered by the WB using data from 157 countries aims to
measure financial access and assess the percentage of population benefiting from
financial services. According to the results of this study, the world average macro
access to financial services is 41, while the Turkish macro access level is 49, which
indicates that half of the Turkish population is excluded from the financial system139.
With such scores, Turkey ranks as 26th in access to financial services in the world
139 However, the data given in III.E.1 suggests that the WB study may be somewhat out of date.
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(CBRT, 2011a:19). OECD average in the index concerned is 90. Thus, while Turkey is
above the world average in terms of access to financial services, it is way behind the
advanced capitalist countries and the EU (ibid.). 140
Geographical distribution of bank branches across the country is also a widely
accepted criterion in assessing financial access. As Table III.G.7 shows, there is a
VLJQLILFDQWFRQFHQWUDWLRQRIEDQNEUDQFKHVZLWKLQìVWDQEXOSOXV:HVWHUQDQG(DVWHUQ
Marmara regions with 42.7% of all bank branches in Turkey (BRSA, 2011a:16).
Meanwhile, the share of relatively underdeveloped regions such as the
Southeastern, Northwestern, and Mideast Anatolia within the distribution of total
bank branches are only 4.4%, 1.6%, and 2.0%, respectively (ibid.). There is also a
significant provincial concentration in the distribution of the total number of bank
branches.
ìVWDQEXODORQHKDVWKHRIDOOEDQNEUDQFKHVIROORZHGE\$QNDUDì]PLU
(7.2%), Antalya (4.0%) and Bursa (3.6%). The share of the five provinces mentioned
within the total number of bank branches across the country is 54.5% (BRSA 2011a:
16).
As of 2009, there were 45 banks and 8972 branches across the country. As of
September 2010 the number of bank branches increased to 9870 (CBRT, 2011a). In
WKHWKUHHXUEDQFHQWHUV ODUJHVW LQ WHUPVRISRSXODWLRQ ìVWDQEXO$QNDUDDQG ì]PLU
45, 29 and 29 banks operate respectively. There are no provinces without a bank.
140 WB study is based on the data for 2003. Even though there are comparisons in this study on other
indicators of financial access in relation to Turkey, we refrain from citing these here as the year 2003
in the Turkish case represents the initiation of the strategy by commercial banks towards retail
banking. Instead, we rely on the more recent data provided by CBRT (2011).
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Average population per bank branch in Turkey is 7352. As regards individual
SURYLQFHVWKHORZHVWSRSXODWLRQSHUEDQNEUDQFKLVVHHQLQ,VWDQEXO0XßOD
(4,720) and Ankara (4,755). In the provinces, the largest population per bank branch
ILJXUHVDUHREVHUYHG LQ0Xđ ĐDQOíXUID  DQG9DQ 5HJLRQV
with smaller population per bank branch and hence potentially greater access to
financial services are Western Anatolia (5,706 people per branch), Aegean Region
(6,600) and Western Marmara (7,615 people per branch). The largest population per
bank branch figures are seen in the Mideast Anatolia and in Southeastern Anatolia,
where a bank branch serves 19,561 and 17,601 people, respectively (CBRT, 2011a:
55).
Table III.G. 7: Geographical Distribution of Bank Branches Across Turkey, 2010-1
Number of Branches % Distribution
Level 1 Region* 2010 2011 in 2011
İstanbul 2,994 3,112 29.8 
Western Marmara 416 424 4.1
Aegean 1,454 1,504 14.4
(of which, İzmir)  (718) (748) (7.2) 
Eastern Marmara 867 913 (7.2)
Western Anatolia 1,219 1,284 12.3
Mediterranean 1,100 1,140 10.9
Central Anatolia 383 400 3.8
Western Black Sea 494 513 4.9
Eastern Black Sea 299 313 3.0
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Northwestern Anatolia 158 167 1.6
Mideast Anatolia 188 206 2.0
Southeastern Anatolia 436 454 4.4
TOTAL 10,008 10,430 100.0
Source: BDDK (2011 a:16).
*This regional classification which was based on the criteria derived from EU Regional
Classification (NUTS) has been developed by Turkstat. It has been put into use by Decree
No.2002/4720.
(N.B. There is a minor discrepancy between total number of bank branches given here and
in Table II.B.2 due to differences in sources of data.)
II.G.4. Regional and Provincial Distribution of Bank Loans and Deposits141
Distribution of Bank Loans
Regional and provincial distribution of bank loans is another important indicator of
access to financial services. Similar with the geographical distribution of bank
branches there is a strong concentration of bank loans in the western regions (Table
,,,* ,QRIDOOEDQN ORDQVZHUHH[WHQGHG LQ ìVWDQEXOZKLFKFRQWDLQV
close to 18.0% of the total population and is the centre of industry and financial
services. This was followed by Western Anatolia and Aegean regions, each of which
used 14.2% and 10.4% of total bank loans, respectively. The leading positions of
these regions in the distribution is mainly due to the location in these regions of the
WKUHHPDMRUXUEDQFHQWUHVRI ìVWDQEXO$QNDUDDQGì]PLU0HDQZKLOHWKHFRPELQHG
share of some other regions such as Eastern Black Sea (1.7%), Northwestern
Anatolia (0.9%), Mideast Anatolia (1.2%), and Central Anatolia (2.5%) is merely 6.3%
141 This section and the next freely draw on the data provided by CBRT (2011a).
371
This project is funded by the European Union under
the 7th Research Framework programme (theme SSH)
Grant Agreement nr 266800
of the total loans, while Southeastern Anatolia used 3.5% of the total (CBRT,
2011a:40). A similar outlook emerges when the regional distribution of loans per
SHUVRQ LV REVHUYHG ìVWDQEXO OHDGVZLWK KLJKHVW DPRXQW RI ORDQV XVHG SHU SHUVRQ
(14,962) followed by Western Anatolia (9,836), and Eastern Marmara (5,543). The
lowest loans per person figures are observed in the Mideast Anatolia (1,551) and
North East Anatolia (1,904)







ìVWDQEXO   
Western Marmara 2.8 4.1 2.2
Aegean 10.4 13.8 8.8
Eastern Marmara 7.8 8.9 7.3
Western Anatolia 14.2 13.1 14.8
Mediterranean 9.6 11.0 9.0
Central Anatolia 2.5 3.4 2.1
Western Black Sea 3.4 4.9 2.7
Eastern Black Sea 1.7 2.5 1.3
Northeastern Anatolia 0.9 1.2 0.7
Mideast Anatolia 1.2 1.8 0.9
Southeastern Anatolia 3.5 3.7 3.4
International Branches 1.2 1.9
TURKEY 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: BRSA, cited in CBRT (2011: 42).
* Figures may not sum up to the totals because of rounding.
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Regional distribution of consumer loans (as a component of individual loans) reveals
D VLPLODU SDWWHUQ ZLWK WKDW RI GLVWULEXWLRQ RI WRWDO ORDQV ZLWK ìVWDQEXO :HVWHUQ
Anatolia and Aegean regions as the leading regions that use the highest amount of
FRQVXPHUORDQV ìVWDQEXOKDVWKHKLJKHVWDPRXQWRIFRQVXPHUORDQVZLWKRI
all consumer loans, followed by Aegean Region (14.3%) and Western Anatolia
(13.6%).
Northeastern Anatolia, Central Anatolia and Southeastern Anatolia merely use 1.3%,
1.9%, and 3.4% of total consumer loans, respectively.
Distribution of Deposits
Regional distribution of deposits as of September 2010 reveals a similar pattern with
the distribution of loans. Istanbul leads with 44.3% of all deposits, followed by
Western Anatolia with 17.3% of all deposits, and Aegean region with 10.4% of all
deposits. Regions with lowest share of deposits are Northeastern Anatolia (0.6%),
Mideast Anatolia (0.9%), Eastern Black Sea (1.4%) and Southeastern Anatolia (1.8%).
Loan to Deposit Ratios Across Geographical Regions
Regional and provincial distribution of bank loans and deposits is an important
indicator that underlies the geographical flow of financial sector funds. Here, the
regional and provincial distribution of deposits and loans as well as the regional and
provincial distribution of deposits and loans per bank branch will be considered, in
order to assess the extent to which funds of financial sector flows across the
resource-rich and resource-poor regions.
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:KHQWKHORDQWRGHSRVLWUDWLRVRQWKHEDVLVRIUHJLRQVDUHH[DPLQHGìVWDQEXOZKLFK
has the highest deposit share has one of the lowest loan to deposit ratio, while other
regions with low deposit rates such as Southeastern Anatolia and Northeastern
Anatolia have the highest loan to deposit ratios. Especially the fact that in some
regions such as Southerneastern Anatolia the amount of deposits are much lower
relative to credits show that these regions are net receivers in the flows of loans
(Table III.G.9).
Table III.G. 9: Deposit to Loan Ratio Across Geographical Regions,% (Sept. 2010)
Regions Loans Deposits (Million TL) Loan / Deposit
Ratio,%
ìVWDQEXO   
Western Marmara 14,071 13,883 101.3
Aegean 52,665 57,171 92.1
Eastern Marmara 38,852 35,537 109.09
Western Anatolia 70,344 98,522 71.4
Mediterranean 48,095 39,172 122.8
Central Anatolia 12,790 13,101 97.6
Western Black Sea 16,945 15,190 111.6
Eastern Black Sea 8,560 7,787 109.9
Northeastern Anatolia 4,400 3,409 129.1
Mideast Anatolia 5,876 5,424 108.3
Southeastern Anatolia 17,529 10,370 169.0
International Branches 6,246 19,803 31.5
Source: BRSA, cited in CBRT (2011a: 50).
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When the regional distribution of savings deposits are analysed Istanbul maintains
its leading role with the largest share (39%) of all savings deposits in both Turkish
liras and foreign exchange. Regions with the lowest share of savings deposits are
Mideast Anatolia, Southeastern Anatolia, and Eastern Black sea regions.
Geographical distribution of deposits and loans per bank branch can be taken as the
other indicators for the flow of financial sector loans across regions. Average
amount of deposit per bank branch in Turkey is 56.1 million TL. The regions which
KDYH ODUJHU GHSRVLWV SHU EUDQFK ILJXUHV DUH UDQNHG DV ìVWDQEXO  :HVWHUQ
Anatolia
(81.8) and Eastern Marmara (41.5). At the lower end of the spectrum, Northeastern
Anatolia (22.1), Southeastern Anatolia (24.5) and Eastern Black Sea (26.7) are placed
(Table III.G.4). As regards with the provinces, the largest amount of bank deposits
SHU EUDQFKDUH LQ$QNDUD  IROORZHGE\ ìVWDQEXO   DQG =RQJXOGDN 
The provinces with lowest amount of deposits per bank branch are Kilis (13.1),
followed by Bitlis (13.7) and Mardin (15.5).
The average loans per bank branch in Turkey are 49.7 million TL. Here, the leading
UHJLRQV DSSHDU DV ìVWDQEXO  :HVWHUQ $QDWROLD  DQG (DVWHUQ 0DUPDUD
(45.4) as it is the case in deposits per bank branch. The lowest figures are observed
in Northeast Anatolia (28.6), Eastern Black Sea (29.3) and Mideast Anatolia (31.6). As
far as promises concerned, the largest loans per bank branch figures is seen in
+DWD\IROORZHGE\ìVWDQEXODQG$QNDUD7KHSURYLQFHVZLWKORZHVW
ORDQVSHUEDQNEUDQFKDUH7XQFHOLIROORZHGE\+DNNDULDQG$ßUí
Understandably the figures in Table III.G.10 are less dispersed relative to those in
Table III.G.9, since opening of bank branches are more or less geared to the volume
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of economic activity. Both Tables III.G.9-10 reveal that despite overall regional
inequalities in access to financial services across Turkey, regions with lower
deposits are at the same time net receivers in terms of the bank loans.
Table III.G. 10: Regional Distribution of Bank Deposits and Loans per Bank Branch as of
September 2010 (Million TL)
Regions Deposits Per Branch Loans Per Branch
ìVWDQEXO  
Western Marmara 33.779 34.235
Aegean 39.647 36.522
Eastern Marmara 41.515 45.388
Western Anatolia 81.761 58.377
Mediterranean 36.271 44.533
Central Anatolia 34.843 34.016
Western Black Sea 31.190 34.796
Eastern Black Sea 26.669 29.316
Northwestern Anatolia 22.134 28.574
Mideast Anatolia 29.162 31.592
Southeastern Anatolia 24.458 41.341
Turkey 56.050 49.674
Source: BRSA, cited in CBRT (2011: 58).
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IV. THE CRISIS OF 2008-9 IN TURKEY
IV.A. PHASE ONE: THE US SUBPRIME CRISIS HITS TURKEY, LATE-2008
TO EARLY-2009
In late September 2008 the US sub-prime crisis took a turn for the worse and spread
globally following the collapse of the US investment bank giant Lehman Brothers.
Turkish officials at first responded by arguing the crisis would by-pass Turkey. By
the start of 2009 it became clear that the crisis would spread to the developing
ZRUOG LQFOXGLQJ7XUNH\ VHH<¸U¾NRßOXDQG$WDVR\0DURLV)ROORZLQJD
six-year period of growth, the global financial crisis reached Turkey in late-2008 and
particularly in early-2009.
Inflows of financial capital slowed dramatically and then reversed. Capital inflows
that topped over 60 billion USD in mid-2008 turned into outflows of near 10 billion
USD by September 2009 on an annual basis (CBRT 2010b: 9). According to the CBRT,
the outflows moved Turkey’s private sector into a net creditor position over the long-
term balances in 2009 (CBRT 2010a: 35). Whereas FDI was 3.1% of GDP in 2007 by
2009 it was only 1.1%. Global trade slipped everywhere. In Turkey, industrial output
plummeted. Capacity utilization in 2007 and early 2008 was about 80%. In late-2008
this collapsed rapidly to just over 60% by the end of the year and early 2009, before
beginning to recover (CBRT 2011: 10). This is reflected in the foreign trade deficit,
which fell from 75.8 billion USD annually in the third quarter of 2008 to 38.8 billion
USD by the end of 2009. Correspondingly, the current account deficit on an annual
basis fell from 6.3% as of June 2008 to about 2.3% of the GDP by the end of 2009
(CBRT 2010b: 11). Unemployment hit 11% in 2008 and then jumped to 14% in 2009.
Public sector debt increased from 40% in 2008 to over 46% in 2009. Recession set in
as the Turkish economy could only muster 0.7% GDP growth for 2008, down from
4.7% in 2007, only have it collapse to –4.7 in 2009. Private domestic demand had
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already fallen from 5.0% of GDP growth in 2007 to -1.8 in 2008 only to collapse
further to -8.3 in 2009 (Table IV.A.1).
Table IV.A. 1: Main Macroeconomic Indicators, 2007-12
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
GDP Growth 4.7 0.7 -4.8 9.0 7.5 2.0
Contributions to GDP growth
 Public Spending 0.8 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.4
 Net exports -1.2 1.9 2.7 -4.4 -2.6 1.0
Public sector debt as% of GDP 39.9 40.0 46.1 42.2 39.1 36.2
PSBR as% of GDP -- -2 -6 -4 -3 --
Interest rates (annual, compound,
average)
 Government securities -- 19 9 8 10 --
Unemployment rate 10.3 11.0 14.0 11.9 - -
Public sector debt 39.9 40.0 46.1 42.2 39.1 36.2
Current account balance -5.9 -5.7 -2.3 -6.5 -10.2 -7.8
Foreign direct investment (net,
billion USD)
19.9 17.0 6.9 7.8 12.6 16.2
Portfolio flows (billion USD) 6.5 -0.4 4.9 20.9 25.2 23.9
Medium- and long-term debt
financing (billion USD)
61.1 56.5 37.3 35.8 39.9 43.4
Short-term financing (billion USD) 42.9 56.6 50.4 83.3 91.2 102.0
Official transfers (billion USD) 0.8 0.7 1.2 0.6 0.7 0.7
Other (errors, omissions, and other
liabilities) (billion USD)
2.1 5.1 7.0 5.1 9.0 --
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Gross foreign reserves (CBRT); USD
billion (p. 49)
76.2 74.0 73.8 86.6 90.1 86.3
Tax revenue (% of GDP) 18.1 18.1 18.5 19.6 20.5 20.4
 Individual 4.0 4.0 4.0 3.7 3.6 3.6
 Corporations and other
enterprises
1.8 1.8 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9
 Goods and services 9.4 9.4 9.5 11.0 11.4 11.4
 International trade and
transactions
0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4
 Not elsewhere classified 2.6 2.6 2.8 2.8 3.2 3.0
Source: IMF, 2012: 47-55; BAT, 2012: vi-vii
IV.A.1. Banks: the “best story of Turkey”
Amidst the overall unfolding of crisis in Turkey, the banks have been singled out as a
source of financial, economic, and even political stability. According to the BAT
repeatedly, the banking sector is ‘the best story of Turkey’. A July 2010 Deloitte
Turkey report praised the banks’ seemingly unshakable resilience, as they have
continued to post record profits while earning an upgrade in credit ratings (‘Turkish
Finance Proves Resilient’, Hurriyet, online, 8 July 2010.). The IMF 2010 Article IV
Preliminary report states that the banking sector proved remarkably resilient during
the crisis due to the banks’ “large capital and liquidity buffers, little direct foreign
currency exposure, and reliance on deposit-based funding”, which helped to protect
the banks from global deleveraging. Turkish officials claim BSRP reforms since the
2001 crisis and more effective supervision has ensured that the banks maintain
sound balance sheets and undertake successful risk diversification and
PDQDJHPHQW VWUDWHJLHV %$7  , <íOPD]  ,PSRUWDQWO\ WKH EDQNV
required no coordinated state rescue in this crisis and therefore did not contribute to
weakening the state’s financial position.
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The banks have remained profitable before and after the immediate crisis in 2009.
Returns on assets in 2007 were 2.6%. This fell to 1.8% in 2008, which is still nearly
double the OECD average. In 2009 ROA rebounded to 2.4% and in 2010 2.2% followed
by a contraction to 1.6% in 2011 (IMF 2012: 57). As the BAT reports, the banks’ strong
profits resulted from lower official interest rates (BAT 2010: 1-45). More
specifically, the CBRT cut interest rates by 10.3% thus enabling a widening of
interest rate margins for the banks. The banks’ interest expenses fell by 22.0% in
2009 and net interest income grew by 36%. At the same time, income from fees and
commissions grew by 10 %. Both increases occurred with only limited increases in
operating and staff expenses. Consequently, the banks’ net income exploded by 52%
to 19.5 billion TL in 2009 (BAT, 2010 (1963–2010): 1-46). However, although maturing
loans were generally rolled over, net credit expansion (especially by private banks)
was weak for most of 2009 (IMF, 2010 IV).
IV.A.2.Policy Responses
While the policy response of Turkish government and state officials have not closely
resembled the ‘Keynesian resurgence’ seen in other developing countries (QLđDQG
Güven 2011), Turkey’s policy response has been consistent with an interpretation of
Turkey’s current strategies of development as being subordinate to neoliberal and
financial imperatives (Marois 2012; Yeldan 2009). Turkey’s response to the ongoing
global crisis can be broken down into three interrelated phases: first, the immediate
response and containment from late-2008 until late-2009; second, an exit strategy to
crisis, which involved responding to a rebound in capital inflows and an overheating
economy from late -2009 and during 2010; and third, responding to renewed global
instability and global stagnation in Turkey from 2011 onwards.
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The first phase beginning in mid-October 2008 involved Turkey’s immediate
response to the impact of the US-triggered global financial crisis. The AKP
government and state managers, notably the CBRT, aimed to first and foremost
quell financial instability within Turkey’s borders and to restore the confidence of
foreign financial capital in Turkey’s political economy (Özatay 2010). The CBRT
undertook a range of measures and actions to increase liquidity and smooth
continued lending in Turkey. On 09 October the CBRT resumed intermediary
activities in foreign exchange deposit market. The CBRT also began its long
systematic cut of its policy rate from 16.75% in October 2008. The CBRT doubled its
transaction limits to 10.8 billion USD (23 October 2008) and then extended lending
maturity from 1 week to 1
month in the foreign exchange deposit market (21 November 2008). The CBRT began
selling foreign exchange reserves to support the banks’ foreign exchange liquidity
needs. To support the banks’ foreign exchange liquidity needs, foreign exchange
buying auctions were suspended between October 2008 and August 2009 and
additional foreign exchange liquidity was injected via foreign exchange selling
auctions. While the CBRT kept the TL liability reserve requirement ratio at 6%, the
CBRT reduced foreign exchange liabilities from 11.0% to 9.0% on 28 November 2008.
These measures stretched into 2009 as the global crisis persisted. The CBRT also
took some additional new steps. In February 2009, the CBRT further extended its
lending maturity from 1 to 3 months in foreign exchange deposit market and then
reduced the lending interest rate from 7% to 5.5% in USD and from 9.0% to 6.5% in
EUR (BAT, 2010: I-4). In October 2009, the CBRT cut the Turkish lira required reserve
ratio from 6.0% to 5.0% to further support liquidity and lending.
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In terms of banking regulations and measures, the BRSA retained the right to limit
profit payouts in 2008 to increase paid-up capital in banks. The BRSA allowed banks
to reclassify some securities and loans in their balance sheet in 2008. Circumventing
established laws, the government offered a two-year period of unlimited deposit
insurance backed by the Treasury’s direct guarantee given that the SDIF lacked
sufficient resources to insure financial capital. Tighter regulations on consumer and
corporate FX loans were established. Then in early 2009, Law No. 5834 (the amnesty
of records Law) enabled the CBRT to delete a person’s record of bad debts if paid in
full or restructured within 6 months. In July 2009, the government introduced a
program for restructuring non-performing credit card loans.
The stimulus response was largely market-based, consumption-oriented, and
involving tax breaks for certain sectors and market actors. As the OECD writes,
“government demand” played a limited role in Turkey’s recovery with countercyclical
stimulus of 2009 withdrawn in 2010 and 2011 (OECD 2012: 14). In early 2009 the
crisis deepened and a shift in policy took place in mid-March 2009.
In 2008, the Finance Ministry enabled certain sectors to defer payment of taxes due
before 1 September 2008 to December 2008 and to be paid via 18 installments. To
encourage money to flow back into Turkey, a new law on 21 November 2008 (Law on
Repatriation of Capital or Tax Peace and Asset Repatriation Programme) allowed
individuals and corporations to repatriate foreign assets subject to a minimal tax of 2
%. Likewise, those in Turkey who had failed to register certain assets and securities
in Turkey as of 01 October 2008 would be allowed to do so by paying a tax of 5 %. In
July 2009, the government extended this Law until September 2009 and then until
the end of 2009. As the crisis took a turn for the worse in Turkey in March 2009, the
government reduced consumption taxes on automobiles, consumer durables, heavy-
duty machines and equipment, information technologies, and office furniture as well
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as the VAT applied to real estate reduced from 18.0% to 8.0% and the initial three-
month window extended until October 2009 (BAT 2009: 1-5; BAT 2010: 1-3).
Stimulus for industry and business initially involved the CBRT doubling the exports
rediscount credit limit to 1 billion USD for Eximbank while the government widened
credit pool and eased eligibility for loans. As the crisis worsened in early 2009, the
government unrolled a range of measures on March 13th, 2009. For one, the capital
of Eximbank increased by 500 million TL. The government widened the eligibility for
SME status widened, enhanced SME loan insurance via the Credit Guarantee Fund,
and opened a new public loan scheme for SMEs through KOSGEB for 2.5 billion TL to
100 thousand of commercial enterprises. The intention behind the government
covering credit risks was to decrease the perceived risks of the banking sector by
guaranteeing repayment of a considerable portion of loans extended to SMEs (Özatay
2010). An additional subsidy of 75 million TL was extended to SMEs (BAT 2009: I-5).
The government extended the maturity of agricultural loans offered by Ziraat Bank
followed up in June 2009 with the government transferring additional cash
resources of up to 2.6 billion TL to the Agricultural Products Office. The March 2009
measures included extending discounted electricity night tariffs for industry to
weekends and public holidays. These measures were followed up in June 2009 with
new supports given to the Credit Guarantee Fund (CGF). The government also
announced a new government subsidies system valid until the end of 2010. The
intention was to support major investments in twelve sectors and to grant sector-
and region-based government subsidies in four separate regions.
Support for the general populace and workers came slowly and initially involved
extending unemployment benefits to 6 months from 3 months and raising the sum of
compensation was raised by 50.0%. A series of other measures supported temporary
and part-time employment incentives, many of which targeted charitable
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organizations and projects as well as the renewal of existing subsidies for women
and youth employment. The government unrolled a new program for temporary
public employment, public internship, and vocational training with the aim of
employing 500,000 persons. The government also set out that given the crisis no
seizure could be levied on retirement wages.
In summary, the policy response to the crisis aimed at responding to the crisis via a
range of expansionary measures that were predominantly monetary and secondarily
fiscal stimulus. Arguably, the intention was to first respond to the needs of the
financial markets and secondarily to domestic popular concerns.
The cost of the fiscal stimulus from 2008 to 2010, according to the OECD, averaged
2.2% of GDP, peaking at 3.4% in 2009 (see Table IV.A.2). QLđDQG*¾YHQSXW
the cost at 4.5% of GDP from 2008 to 2010.
Table IV.A. 2: Turkey’s Fiscal Stimulus Measure, 2008-10 (billions TL)
2008 2009 2010 2008-10
Revenue Measures 0.0 4.1 1.8 5.9
Personal income taxes* 0.0 -0.5 -0.7 -1.1
Corporate taxes 0.0 0.7 1.2 1.9
Indirect taxes 0.0 2.6 0.1 2.7
Other 0.0 1.3 1.1 2.4
Expenditure Measures 7.9 17.2 21.1 46.2
Government investment 5.1 6.4 6.1 17.6
Government consumption 0.9 2.5 5.3 8.7
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Contributions to social security
funds
0.0 4.6 5.5 10.2
Transfers to households 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2
Transfers to business 0.0 0.5 0.5 1.0
Transfers to sub-national
governments
1.3 2.5 3.1 7.0
Other 0.5 0.5 0.5 1.5
Revenue and Expenditure
Measures Total
7.9 21.3 22.9 52.1
Guarantee and insurance schemes
for financial institutions
0.0 6.8 0.0 6.8
Loans to enterprises 1.5 4.5 0.0 6.0
Total 9.4 32.6 22.9 54.9
Percentage of GDP in given year or
period
1.0 3.4 2.2 2.2
Source: OECD, 2010: 25
*Negative figures associated with personal income taxes reflect additional revenues
generated by the voluntary disclosure, tax peace and asset repatriation programme.
IV.B. PHASE TWO: EXITING CRISIS, MANAGING INSTABILITIES, LATE-
2009 AND EARLY-2010 TO PRESENT
IV. B.1. The Recovery
The combination of government stimulus, temporary tax cuts, an unprecedented
reduction in policy interest rates, fiscal conservatism and discipline, the availability
of cheap money from the US (quantitative easing), and low growth rates in most
advanced capitalisms renewed inflows of capital into Turkey. As a result, Turkey
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HQMR\HG D VWURQJHU WKDQ H[SHFWHG HFRQRPLF UHFRYHU\ ,0)  <íOPD]  
Turkey’s GDP grew by 9% in 2010 led by private consumption and investment, with
economic activity increasingly skewed toward domestic demand and imports.
Renewed inflows of capital eased financing constraints in Turkey, which facilitated a
domestic-demand led expansion. Net capital inflows, which had fallen to 727 million
USD in 2009, increased to 15.4 billion USD in the January-October 2010 period
(BRSA, 2010: 9). Consequently, the IMF suggests Turkey is one of the countries most
exposed to the risks of capital flight since 2009 (IMF 2012b: 52). This is because most
of the capital inflows are composed of volatile short-term debt (interest-sensitive
portfolio flows and short- term borrowing) channeled through the banks and other
“unidentified financing” (IMF 2012: 6). By contrast, prior to the crisis Turkey’s capital
inflows were composed more of FDI and medium- and long-term debt. Thus, despite
the government increasing CBRT foreign reserves by over 17 billion USD since 2009
the reserve cover of short-term debt declined to about 70% by October 2011, which
is comparatively low according to the IMF (IMF 2012: 6).
With renewed growth in 2010 the current account deficit widened from -2.3 in 2009
to -6.5 in 2010. This was due to a rapid increase in domestic consumption and
investment demand driven imports and prevailing patterns of domestic production’s
high dependency on imported intermediate goods. Falling demand in Turkey’s key
export markets due to the ongoing global crisis also contributed to the increasing
current account deficit in 2010.
In contrast to the early phase of the crisis, in late-2009 and 2010 the banks expanded
loan by about 30% per year enabled largely by historically low-cost external
financing (linked to quantitative easing and slow growth elsewhere). At this time the
banks’ average loan-to-deposit ratio jumped from 76% at end 2009 to about 95% by
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mid 2011 because domestic deposits had fallen, typically the banks’ main funding
source. The number of loans also increased because the banks began to
compensate for narrowing interest rate margins by increasing loan volumes. The
banks were also responding to mounting competition in the sector for loans. By late-
2010 private sector loans had grown by 40% over the previous year to reach 48% of
GDP (IMF 2012: 6). Household (general purpose and housing loans) and SME lending
increased particularly fast because of strong demand and potentially higher profit
margins for the banks. However, intensified competition for loan share into 2011
began to erode the banks’ record profits. As a result, the banks responded by
passing along the higher intermediation costs via higher lending rates, which began
to come into effect as the global economy took another turn for the worse in 2011
(IMF 2012: 14).
The ISE continued to make gains in 2010 (after being the fifth fastest growing stock
market globally in 2009). These gains were driven by capital seeking higher and
more secure returns than possible in the advanced economies. By late-2010, the ISE
was the sixth highest earning stock market with over 45% growth over the previous
year. The government’s repeal of the withholding tax on the stock market
transaction gains in April 2010 and the Treasury bill trade were key factors behind
this growth. Then in December the government also removed the withholding tax on
private bills with a maturing of over five years.
Government finances did not suffer as in past crises. In part this is attributable to the
higher amounts of tax paid by the banks due to their profit boost from the sharp
decline in the CBRT policy rate in 2009-10. Government finances also benefited from
their tax amnesties, which temporarily boosted revenues (IMF 2012: 12-13). Strong
economic growth in 2010 also positively affected public sector revenues and the
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public sector borrowing requirement. The government also ended the 2009
expansionary policies implemented in response to the initial crisis (BRSA 2010: 13).
Public debt fell from 46.1% of GDP in 2009 to 42.2% in 2010 while the public sector
borrowing requirement fell from 6% of GDP in 2009 to 4% in 2010 (Table IV.A.1).
Public finances also benefited from a credit rating upgrade to “favorable for
investment” (from BB+ to BBB-) with a revised outlook of ‘positive’. The increase in
capital inflow relaxed interest rates, too, which reflected positively on the debt
servicing of the Treasury (BRSA, 2010: 13).
In 2011 Turkish GDP growth rate reached 7.5%, however, this was marked by
renewed instabilities. For example, in the first quarter of 2011, GDP grew by 10%.
This phase of rapid growth, however, continued to be shaped by domestic demand
and imports in a globally volatile context. In mid-to late-2011 Turkey had to deal with
renewed volatility in global capital flows and persist concerns over stalled global
growth. Such ongoing troubles encouraged TL depreciation, which in turn triggered
inflationary pressures (OECD 2012: 21). Turkey overshot its 5.5% inflation target in
2011 due to currency depreciation, commodity and food price changes, and tax
adjustments (OECD 2012: 21). Core inflation would hit over 8% in 2012 due to
increased import prices (especially energy) and the sharp nominal depreciation. The
current account deficit topped 10% in 2011, a historically high level, before falling
somewhat throughout 2012. Yet throughout 2011 the general government deficit sat
at 2.1% of GDP, adding to the perception that government finances were stronger in
Turkey than in most OECD countries (OECD 2012: 22).
One of the notable changes over the course of the crisis has been in the FX open
positions of corporations, which rose from about 80 billion USD in 2008 to nearly 120
billion USD in 2011 (IMF 2012: 15). This opens the companies (and Turkish society) to
currency depreciation risks. On the other hand, the FX positions of households
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remained fairly stable (58 and 56 billion USD respectively in 2008 and 2011). At the
same time, Turkey’s large current account deficit means any currency appreciation
would increase concern over a mounting boom-bust cycle (IMF 2012: 22). This is
exacerbated by ongoing global instability and weak economic activity that may spill
over into Turkey in 2011 and 2012. Still, given Turkey’s commitment to fiscal
austerity, relatively higher growth, and commitment to a friendly business climate,
financial capital may likely continue to flow into Turkey, though there remains the
great risk of European banks deleveraging. This could constrain external sources of
finance and cause further depreciation, put pressure of banks and corporations to
source foreign exchange funding, and impact imports and credit (IMF 2012: 18).
IV.B.2. Policy Responses
From late-2009 to mid-2010 or so Turkey’s policy response involved crafting an exit
strategy to the 2008-9 crisis and responding to the expansionary monetary policies
of advanced countries that had encouraged rapid short-term capital inflows. This
meant increasing the costs of loans to slow domestic demand, reducing interest
rates to diminish returns to short-term capital inflows, and trying to mitigate the
associated risks of short-term inflows. The IMF signals that since mid-November
2010, the CBRT pursued financial stability alongside price stability (IMF 2012: 10). In
mid- to late-2011 policy shifted to cope with renewed international volatility in
capital flows and to avoid excessive currency depreciation (which fed through
inflation).
To begin to reduce liquidity in Turkey, in April 2010 the CBRT began repo auctions
and then on May 18 switched to the 1-week repo auction rate as the policy rate, set
at 7% (which fell to 6.5% by mid-December). The CBRT also increased the reserve
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requirement on foreign exchange deposits from 9.0% to 9.5% in early-2010. Between
late-September and December 2010, the CBRT increased the banks’ TL reserve
requirements from 5% to approximately 7.5% and the foreign exchange reserve
requirements from 10% to 11%. These increases were intended to reduce domestic
demand. The CBRT increased foreign reserves to match capital inflows after 2009,
reaching over 86 billion USD by end-2010. In mid-November 2010, the CBRT stopped
paying interest on TL reserve requirements.
At this time, in mid-November 2010, CBRT policy began to focus on exchange rate
developments, loan growth, and moderating domestic demand. The CBRT widened
its interest rate corridor, delineated by overnight borrowing and lending rates, to
moderate interest rate uncertainty and as a way to limit capital inflows (notably
short-term) when needed (OECD 2012: 20). The CBRT decides the size of daily repo
auctions in ways that can allow for flexibility in moving market interest rates. From
November 2010 to October 2011, the focus was on limiting short-term capital inflows
while letting the exchange rate depreciate. The CBRT widened the interest rate
corridor by lowering the borrowing rate to increase interest rate volatility and
uncertainty and thereby discourage short-term inflows. Specifically, on 11 November
2010 the CBRT brought the overnight borrowing interest rate down to 1.75% (from
6.3%) and the late liquidity window borrowing rate to 0% (from 1.75%). On December
16, 2010, the CBRT reduced the policy interest rate to 6.5% from 7%. In general, the
CBRT reduced borrowing interest rates for various different maturities and
transaction types and increased its lending interest rates. Since mid-November
2010, the CBRT began to pressure the banks to target a maximum 25% increase on
annual loan growth. Since mid-November 2010, the CBRT scaled back FX purchases
to 40-50 million USD per day. Overall, the CBRT applying higher reserve
requirements on shorter-term liabilities, lowering the policy interest rate, and
pressuring banks to reduce lending growth was undertaken in order to help
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discourage short-term carry-trade flows of capital, to encourage longer-term bank
lending, and restrain domestic loan growth (IMF 2012: 10).
In mid- to late-2011 the CBRT shifted strategies to cope with renewed international
volatility in capital flows and to avoid excessive currency depreciation (OECD 2012:
21; IMF 2012: 12). The CBRT suspended foreign exchange buying auctions and began
sustained foreign exchange sales. The CBRT widened the interest rate corridor at
the higher end and provided less liquidity through one-week repos. The CBRT
lowered the policy rate by another 0.5%. This caused short-term market rates
to jump. However, the CBRT also started to provide longer-term liquidity via one-
month repo auctions. The CBRT increased flexibility in terms of the currency
composition of Turkish lira reserve requirements (for example, banks could hold
part of their URR on lira liabilities in foreign exchange). The intent was to contain
exchange rate volatility.
In the second phase, banking regulation likewise underwent some modifications to
help manage mounting financial instabilities. On December 16, 2010, the BRSA
limited bank loans for housing and consumer loans using housing collateral to
75.0% of the value of the real estate and bank commercial real estate loans to 50.0%
of the value of the real estate. On December 18, 2010, the BRSA increased credit
card minimum payments from 20% of the outstanding debt to between 25.0% to
40.0%. In June 2011, the BRSA increased the banks’ reserve ratios for consumer
loans where such loans were more than 20% of the bank’s total loans and for banks
whose non-performing loans were above 8.0% (excluding automobile and housing
loans). The BRSA continued to require consent prior to the distribution of the banks’
profits in 2011 to help boost paid-in capital adequacy levels. Announced in August
2011, the BRSA sought to further contain interest rate risk through capital charges
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on large maturity mismatches in order to discourage duration gaps by lenders. The
SDIF announced changes to deposit insurance in September 2011 by introducing a
premium surcharge for large financial institutions, amendments in the profitability
and insured deposit ratio thresholds, and a new factor to calculate the bank’s score
for the deposit premium determination. The BRSA announced changes to the banks’
capital adequacy requirements in September 2011 (but applies to banks with foreign
strategic shareholders as of January 2012). Interestingly, the new minimum capital
requirements depend on several factors like the CDS spread of the parent banks and
sovereign country, EBA stress test results, and the public debt ratio in the bank’s
country of origin. As of late-2011, the BRSA is preparing draft regulations on the
banks’ loan risk management, which should help to limit un-hedged borrowing by
corporations. In June 2012, the AKP passed a new Law to offer incentives for long-
term saving, such as in private pension schemes, which will be leveraged by public
subsidies (OECD 2012: 16). Also in June 2012, the BRSA placed new restrictions on
increasing individual credit card limits and on limiting cash advances (IMF 2012: 14).
Finally, in terms of industrial supports, the only measure was by a Decree of the
Council of Ministers, which increased the rate of discounts for resource utilization
support fund by 5 percentage points to 15% (BAT 2011: I-3).
Conclusion
The Turkish financial system still portrays the characteristics of a bank-based
system, notwithstanding a process of market oriented reforms of the last three
decades. The initial attempts in constructing the financial system dates back to the
1930s with the establishment of the Central Bank along with special purpose banks
DQGDSULYDWHEDQNìđ%DQNDVDQDWLRQDOLQVWLWXWLRQZLWKWKHPLVVLRQWRFRQWULEXWHWR
the economic development of the country. Many other private banks have been
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established although several of them would be liquidated in different cycles of
banking and/or balance of payment crisis since the end of the II World War.
A distinguishing feature of the Turkish business community has been the centrality
of family-owned and managed groups holding a wide range of firms in diversified
sectors. These big capital groups intensified their activities in the banking sector in
the post-1980 era which further complicated the analyses of relations between
financial and non-financial sectors. Due to this institutional form, financial and non-
financial sectors cannot be easily isolated with distinct and conflicting interests and
requires a particular focus on the size of enterprise in the Turkish context.
The role of IFIs in the Turkish political economy has always been a constant of the
post-war period having gained further significance in the process of financialisation.
These institutions have become an integral part of the economic policy-making
process especially from the late 1970s onwards. However, their involvement did not
preclude the cyclical nature of the crises experienced by the Turkish economy.
Indeed in certain intervals such as the turn of the century when Turkish economy
has experienced the so-called twin crises while trying to implement a three-year
stand-by agreement with the IMF.
It has also been the case that strong implementation of a series of structural
reforms initiated in the wake of 2001 crises entrenched a regulatory structure the
elements of which had been put in place since the mid 1990s. The acceleration of the
financialisation process has also brought along a variety of non-bank financial
institutions. This in turn was perceived as an important factor which prevented the
Turkish financial sector from experiencing the adverse impact of the 2008 global
crisis in contrast to many other “emerging markets”. However, while the so-called
prudent regulations have shielded the financial sector from the global economic
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crisis, they socialized the risk thus increasing the vulnerability of SMEs and
households in times of crises.
The SMEs and households have been diversely affected by the ebbs and flows of the
Turkish economy as it has undergone periodic changes in its mode of articulation
with the world economy. In the early 1980s, big business groups bought out the
assets of a number of SMEs consolidating the above mentioned anatomy of the
Turkish business community. The banking regulation in 2001 curtailed the SMEs’
access to bank loans more than the big-sized firms, as several banks belonging to
Turkish holding groups were acquired by international financial corporations.
Meanwhile the process of financialisation in Turkey brought along worrying levels of
household indebtedness coupled with high rates of unemployment. Particularly after
2002, households overwhelmingly relied on bank loans as a means to finance
consumption causing a hike in household debt of credit cards and consumer loans.
High levels of unemployment rates and suppression of real wages, coupled with
growth in the informal sector have worsened inequalities in income distribution and
generated persistent rates of structural poverty. Thus, in the eve of the 2008 global
crisis, situation of SMEs and households had already been worrying.
The prudent regulations in the aftermath of the 2001 crisis functioned to eliminate
the toxic elements within the financial sector owing to which the banking sector
remained relatively unscathed by the 2008 global crisis. Although, banks remained
profitable before and after the crisis, considering the growth levels and alarming
levels of unemployment it should be noted that the macro-economic stability has
been upset. The major policy responses of the policymakers to the 2008 global crisis
were minimizing volatility of interest rates as well as exchange rates to assure the
business as usual for corporate firms and financial sector.
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Currently, the Turkish economy still manifests symptoms of its structural
vulnerability as current account deficits tend to increase at times of economic
growth and could be curtailed at the expense of the latter. As a reflection of this
tendency, its dependence on foreign savings continues to prevail while the financing
of its current account deficits depend heavily upon inflows of hot money. Thereby,
the policymakers still seem to be in search of policy measures to deal with the
structural causes of this vulnerability.
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APPENDICES











1888. Pursuant to the Law enforced in 1937, obtained
State Economic Enterprise status and with new name
RI 7¾UNL\H &XPKXUL\HWL =LUDDW %DQNDVí 7KH EDQNǢV
state bank status was terminated in 2000 which was
given corporation status subject to private law
provisions undergoing a restructuring process. The
%DQN WRRN RYHU 7¾UNL\H (PODN %DQNDVí $Đ LQ 
The entire capital of the Bank belongs to the Treasury.
Türkiye Halk
%DQNDVí$Đ 1938
Entitled to open branches and extend loans directly
DIWHU  7KH %DQN WRRN RYHU 7¾UNL\H ßUHWPHQOHU
%DQNDVí7$Đ LQ6¾PHUEDQNLQ(WLEDQNLQ
  EUDQFKHV RI 7¾UNL\H (PODN %DQNDVí $Đ LQ
DQGHYHQWXDOO\3DPXNEDQN7$ĐLQ







Established in 1954 by a special law. 25.18% of stocks
of the bank were put in public offering in 2005 in ISE.
RIWKH%DQNǢVFDSLWDOEHORQJVWR9DNíIODU*HQHO
0¾G¾UO¾ß¾  WR *URXS $ DQG  WR *URXS %




The Bank was monitored by the BRSA, according to the
Article 14/1 of the Banks Act Nr. 4389; a new
Administrative Board was assigned to the bank
pursuant to the resolution dated July 25, 2003 Nr. 1102.
As a result of the bidding conducted by the BRSA in
July 3, 2006, it was given out by contract to the Kuwait
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originated “The International Investor Company”.
However, pursuant to the Resolution of the BRSA dated
July 26, 2007, transfer of shares to The International
Investor Company was rejected.
Akbank
7$Đ 1948
Stocks of the bank began to be traded in ISE in 1990.
Furthermore, some of bank’s stocks were issued in
international markets and sold as American Depository
Receipt and ordinary stocks in 1998. In 2005, Ak
8OXVODUDUDVí%DQNDVí$ĐZDVWUDQVIHUUHGWRWKH%DQN
In 2006, 20% of the Bank’s capital was taken over by
Citibank Overseas Investment Corporation (COIC). The
share of the US Treasury having 33.6% shares of
Citigroup Inc. decreased to 27.2% because Citigroup
Inc. increased capital but the US Treasury did not
participate in the mentioned increase. Shares of
$NVLJRUWD$ĐDQG([VD([SRUW6DQD\L0DP¾OOHUL6DWíđ
YH $UDđWíUPD $Đ ZLWKLQ $NEDQN 7$Đ ZHUH
WUDQVIHUUHGWR+DFíPHU6DEDQFí+ROGLQJGLUHFWVKDUH
RI+DFíPHU6DEDQFí+ROGLQJLQWKH%DQNǢVFDSLWDOZDV
increased to 40.75% from 32.28%. The remaining share




The Bank’s shares have started to effect transactions
within ISE in 1995. The Bank had passed over to
Anadolu Group subsidiaries in 1996. 77.08% of the




In 1997, the Turkish Privatization Administration
GLYLGHG(WLEDQN$Đ LQWR WKUHH DQGPDGH LW VXEMHFW WR
WKUHHVHSDUDWHSULYDWL]DWLRQSURFHVVHVDV(WLEDQN$Đ
'HQL]FLOLN %DQNDVí 7$Đ DQG $QDGROX %DQNDVí 7$Đ
$V D UHVXOW WKH UR\DOW\ RI $QDGROX %DQNDVí 7$Đ LV
WXUQHGRYHUWR$QDGROXEDQN$ĐRIWKH%DQNǢV
FDSLWDO EHORQJV WR +DEDđ 6íQDL YH 7íEEL *D]ODU ìVWLK
(QG $Đ  RI LW EHORQJV WR 0HKPHW 5¾đW¾
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moved to Ankara and it undertook the name of
ĐHNHUEDQN7$ĐLQ7KHVKDUHVRIWKH%DQNKDYH
started to be traded in the ISE in 1996. In 2006, the
shares corresponding to 33.98% of the paid-up capital
of the bank were taken over by Turanalem Securities
JSC. 31.96% of the remaining share of the bank is




 RI WKH VKDUHV RI 7HNVWLO %DQNDVí $Đ ZKLFK
began to be traded in ISE since 1990 are publicly




The Bank started to operate in Istanbul in 1982, as the
,VWDQEXO PDLQ EUDQFK RI WKH 7¾UN %DQNDVí /LPLWHG
previously established in Cyprus. In 1991, Turkish Bank
$ĐZDV IRXQGHGDQGWKH%DQN WRRNRYHU WKH ,VWDQEXO
PDLQ EUDQFK RI 7¾UN %DQNDVí /LPLWHG $JDLQ LQ 
the bank received the permission to perform banking
transactions and accept deposits. 40% of the bank
capital belongs to the National Bank of Kuwait, 53.77%







7$Đ FKDQJHG VWDWXV LQ  DQG LWV WLWOH EHFDPH
.RFDHOL %DQNDVí 7$Đ 7KH WLWOH RI WKH %DQN ZDV
FKDQJHGRQFHPRUH LQDV7¾UN(NRQRPL%DQNDVí
$Đ DQG LWVKHDGRIILFHZDVPRYHG WR ,VWDQEXOGXULQJ
the same year. The shares of the Bank started to be
traded in ISE in 2000. 49.83% of the Bank’s capital
EHORQJVWR7(%0DOL<DWíUíPODU$ĐEHORQJVWR





7KH EDQN MRLQHG 'RßXđ +ROGLQJ LQ  LWV VKDUHV
started to be traded in the ISE in 1990, and issued
shares to abroad in 1993. In 2001, the bank took over
2VPDQOí %DQNDVí $Đ ZLWKLQ LWV FRQVWLWXWLRQ ,Q 
the shares corresponding to 25.5% of the bank were
sold to General Electric Group. 48.62% of the Bank’s
FDSLWDO LVSXEOLFO\ RZQHGDQGEHORQJV WR'RßXđ
Holding.
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7¾UNL\H ìđ
%DQNDVí$Đ 1924
The 12.3% share of the bank belonging to the Treasury
was offered to domestic and foreign investors by public
offerings on May 1998. Presently, 32.43% of the Bank is
publicly owned. 39.29% of the Bank’s capital belongs to
7¾UNL\H ìđ%DQNDVí$Đ0HQ0XQ6RFLDO6HFXULW\DQG
28.09% to Republican People’s Party.
<DSíYH.UHGL
%DQNDVí$Đ 1944
Joined Çukurova Holding in 1980 and its shares have
started to be traded in ISE in 1987. As of 2005, 57.43%




debts and liabilities ending its legal entity in 2006. Also
LQWKHVDPH\HDU.R©EDQN$ĐZDVWUDQVIHUUHGWR<DSí
YH .UHGL %DQNDVí $Đ ZLWK DOO RI LWV DVVHWV DQG
liabilities, by ending its legal entity without liquidation.
81.8% of Bank’s capital belongs to Koç Finansal






Established in 1977, this bank is a joint venture of Arab
(62.37% of it belongs to Libyan Foreign Bank and 1.62%
to Kuwait Investment Co.) and Turkish (20,58% of it
EHORQJV WR 7ìđ %DQNDVí DQG  WR 7& =LUDDW
%DQNDVíVKDUHKROGHUV
&LWLEDQN$Đ 1980
Citibank N.D. started to operate in 1980 as a foreign
EDQN RSHQLQJ EUDQFK LQ 7XUNH\ ,Q  &LWLEDQN $Đ
was founded as a subsidiary company which belongs to
&LWLEDQN1'&LWLEDQN$Đ UHFHLYHG WKHSHUPLVVLRQ WR
accept deposits and to carry out banking transactions
in 2004. Also in the same year, Citibank N.D. was
WUDQVIHUUHG WR &LWLEDQN $Đ 7KXV %DQN ZDV
transformed into joint stock company from foreign
bank branch. All of the Bank’s capital is owned by
Citibank Overseas Investment Corporation.
Denizbank
$Đ 1997
With a tender in 1997 by Privatization Administration,
VKDUHV RI 'HQL]FLOLN %DQNDVí 7$Đ ZHUH ERXJKW E\
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=RUOX+ROGLQJ$IWHUZDUGVLQVKDUHVRI0LOOL$\GíQ
%DQNDVí 7$Đ ZHUH WUDQVIHUUHG WR WKH %DQN 7KH
VKDUHVRI'HQL]EDQN$ĐKDYHVWDUWHGWRWUDGHLQ,6(LQ
2004. In 2006 Zorlu Holding sold its 74.9% shares in the
bank to Dexia Participation Belgique S.A., with
Belgium-France capital. Presently, 99.83% of Bank’s
capital belongs to Dexia Participation Belgique S.A.
Deutsche
%DQN$Đ 1988
Starting its operations in 1988 under the title Türk
0HUFKDQW %DQN $Đ WKH EDQNǢV WLWOH ZDV FKDQJHG WR
%DQNHUV7UXVW$Đ LQDQGWR'HXWVFKH%DQN$Đ
in 2000. In 2004, the Bank received permission to





transferred to the Fund in 1998, bought by Tekfen
Holding in 2001. Afterwards, Tekfen Group transferred
7HNIHQ <DWíUíP YH )LQDQVPDQ %DQNDVí $Đ LQ  WR
%DQN(NVSUHV$Đ DQGPHUJHG WKH WZREDQNV:LWKLQ
the same year, the title of the bank was changed to
7HNIHQEDQN $Đ ,Q  (XUREDQN ()* +ROGLQJ
/X[HPEXUJ 6$ WRRN RYHU  RI 7HNIHQEDQN $Đ
VKDUHV &RPPHUFLDO WLWOH RI 7HNIHQEDQN $Đ ZDV
FKDQJHGDV(XUREDQN7HNIHQ$ĐLQRIWKH
capital belongs to Eurobank EFG Holding, the




The first public offer of the Bank’s shares was realized
in 1990 in ISE. The Bank’s shares have started to trade
also in London Stock Exchange in 1998 as Global
Depository Receipts. In 2003, the Bank took over Fiba
%DQN$Đ,Q1DWLRQDO%DQNRI*UHHFH6$ERXJKW
RI WKHVKDUHVRI)LQDQV%DQN$ĐGLUHFWO\DQGE\
buying remaining shares by public offering in the




)RXQGHG LQ  XQGHU WKH WLWOH $PHULNDQ7¾UN 'íđ
7LFDUHW %DQNDVí $Đ FKDQJHG LWV WLWOH LQWR 7¾UN 'íđ
7LFDUHW %DQNDVí $Đ LQ  7KH VKDUHV RI WKH %DQN
have started to be traded in ISE in 1990. 89.34% of the
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SDLG FDSLWDO RI 7¾UN 'íđ 7LFDUHW %DQNDVí $Đ ZDV
transferred to Fortis Bank NV-SA in 2005. As of this
date, the bank was excluded from the group of private
deposit banks and was classified within the group of
foreign banks established in Turkey. As of November
LWVWLWOHZDVFKDQJHGDV)RUWLV%DQN$Đ$VD
result of the rescue operation made for Fortis Group by
Belgian Government after the financial crisis in 2008,
99.93% of Fortis Bank SA/NV was transferred to
“Société Fédérale de Participations et
d’Investissemant” (SFPI). Accordingly, SFPI indirectly
owned 94.03% of the Bank 94,11% capital of which
belongs to Fortis Bank SA/NV. In this process, share of
Fortis Brusseles in Fortis Bank SA/NV which directly
owns 100% of Fortis Bank SA/NV decreased to 0.07%,
shares of Fortis NV and Fortis SA/NV in Fortis Bank
SA/NV which indirectly owns 50% of Fortis Bank SA/NV
decreased to 0.04%, share of Fortis which indirectly
has 100% of Fortis Bank SA/NV in Fortis Bank SA/NV
decreased to 0.07%. Furthermore, Fortis Brusseles
and Fortis shares in the Bank decreased to 0.07% and
share of Fortis NV and Fortis SA/NV decreased to
0.03%. In addition to this, BNP took over 74.94% of
Fortis Bank SA/NV which caused the indirect share of
SFPI in the Bank to decrease to 30.43% from 94.04%,
BNP to indirectly acquire 70.52% of the Bank, share of
SFPI in Fortis Bank SA/NV which had 99.93% of
ownership of FortisBank SA/NV to decrease to 24.99%,
share of SPPE in Fortis Bank SA/NV to indirectly
increase to 11.39% and SPPE to indirectly acquire
10.72% of the Bank. Following the mentioned
transactions, As a result of the capital increase made
by BNP in order to purchase BNP shares belonging to
633( LQGLUHFW VKDUHRI633( LQ)RUWLV%DQN$Đ WKH
Bank) decreased to 9.63% from 10.44% and following
this BNP purchased its own shares under the
possession of SPPE, therefore SPPE does not have
indirect share in the Bank anymore. The remaining
stocks are publicly owned.
HSBC Bank
$Đ 1990




This project is funded by the European Union under
the 7th Research Framework programme (theme SSH)
Grant Agreement nr 266800
belongs entirely to HSBC Bank PLC.
Millennium
%DQN$Đ 1984
Opened branches in Turkey in 1984 under the title
Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company, starting to
operate as foreign bank; received the title of
0DQXIDFWXUHUV +DQRYHU %DQN $Đ LQ  DQG ZDV
included within the group of foreign banks established
in Turkey. Subsequent to the merger of Manufacturers
Hanover Corporation and Chemical Banking
Association, the title of the bank was changed as
&KHPLFDO %DQN $Đ LQ  7KH %DQN MRLQHG WR
Sürmeli Group in 1997 and its title was once again
FKDQJHG LQWR 6LWHEDQN $Đ $V RI WKLV GDWH LW ZDV
classified within private deposit banks group. Sitebank
$ĐZDV WDNHQ RYHUE\ WKH6',) LQ  ,Q  WKH
shares of the bank were bought by Novabank S.A. As of
this date, the Bank was once again classified among
the group of foreign banks established in Turkey. In
 LWV WLWOH ZDV FKDQJHG LQWR %DQN(XURSD %DQNDVí
$Đ DQG LQ  LQWR 0LOOHQQLXP %DQN $Đ ,Q 
Credit Europe Bank NV which is one of the investments
of Fiba Group in banking took over the share which is
directly equivalent to 95% of the Bank from BCP
Internacional II, Sociedade Unipessoal SGPS LDA.
ING Bank
$Đ 1996
Started its operations under the title of The First
1DWLRQDO %DQN RI %RVWRQ &HQWUDO ìVWDQEXO %UDQFK
$IWHUZDUGV 7KH )LUVW 1DWLRQDO %DQN RI %RVWRQ $Đ
which was established in 1990 pursuant to the Cabinet
took over The First National Bank of Boston Central
ìVWDQEXO%UDQFK7KHWLWOHRIWKHEDQNZDVFKDQJHGDV
7¾UN%RVWRQ%DQN$ĐLQ2\DN*URXSEHFDPHWKH
only owner of the bank by buying all the shares in 1994;
WKHWLWOHRI WKHEDQNZDVFKDQJHGDV2\DNEDQN$Đ LQ
1996, furthermore was transferred into private deposit
bank group from foreign bank status. In 2002,
6¾PHUEDQN $Đ ZDV WUDQVIHUUHG WR 2\DN %DQN $Đ
2\DN%DQN$ĐVKDUHVRIZKLFKDUHKHOGE\WKH$UPHG
Forces Pension Fund and which corresponds 100% of
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Turkland
%DQN$Đ 1986
Founded in 1986 under the name of Bank of Bahrain
and Kuwait B.S.C. In 1991, took the title of Bank of
%DKUDLQ DQG .XZDLW $Đ ,Q  SDVVHG XQGHU WKH
FRQWURORIĐDKHQN)DPLO\DQG'RßXđ*URXSFRQWLQXHG
its activities under the title of Tasarruf ve Kredi
%DQNDVí$Đ,QWKHPHDQWLPHWKHEDQNZDVWUDQVIHUUHG
into from foreign banks group private deposit banks
group. On February 1994, its title was changed as
*DUDQWL<DWíUíPYH7LFDUHW%DQNDVí$Đ)LQDOO\LQ
WKH VKDUHV RI WKH %DQN KDYH WUDQVIHUUHG WR 'RßXđ
Group to MNG Group and its title was changed as MNG
%DQN$Đ LQ7KHFRPPHUFLDO WLWOHRI01*%DQN
$ĐZDVFKDQJHGDV7XUNODQG%DQN$Đ LQ







Established under the title of Holantse Bank Uni. N.V.,
changed its title to ABN AMRO Bank N.V. in 1995. The
capital of the branch belongs entirely to ABN AMRO





Starting its operations in 1911 under the title Banco di
Roma, in 1992 its title was changed into Banca di Roma
S.P.A. The capital of the branch belongs entirely to
Banca di Roma S.P.A., headquartered in Italy.
Commercial title of "Banca di Roma S.p.A." was
changed as "Unicredit Banca di Roma S.P.A." in March
26, 2008.
Bank Mellat 1982
Started its operations on April 16, 1982 with status of
foreign bank branch in Turkey. The capital of the




The Bank received permission to conduct banking
activities and open a head office and four branches
pursuant to the Cabinet Decision in 1982. Continues its
activities since 1983, under the status of foreign bank
branch in Turkey. The capital of the branch belongs
entirely to Habib Bank, headquartered in Pakistan.
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The Commercial title of the Bank was changed as
JPMorgan Chase Bank in 2001 and; JPMorgan Chase
Bank N.A. in 2004, pursuant to the takeover of Morgan
Guaranty Trust Company by The Chase Manhattan
Bank. The capital of the branch belongs entirely to





Started to operate as foreign bank branch in Turkey on
November 16, 1989. The capital of the branch belongs
entirely to Sociéte Générale SA, centered in France. In
2009, preference shares were issued by Societe
Generale S.A. Paris and entire shares were transferred
to the company titled as Societe de Prise de
Participation de l’Etat which is owned by the republic of
France.
WestLB AG 1985
Started to operate in 1985 by opening branch in Turkey
under the title Standard Chartered Bank, title of the
Bank was changed as Westdeutsche Landesbank
(Europe) A.G. in 1990. Afterwards, this title was re-
changed as Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale in
1997 and as WestLB AG in 2002. The capital of the
branch belongs entirely to WestLB AG, centered in
Germany.
State Development and Investment Banks
ìOOHU%DQNDVí 
Founded with public capital within the aim of financing
the construction development activities of the
municipalities in 1933 under the name of Belediyeler
%DQNDVí 0XQLFLSDOLWLHV %DQN ,QFOXGLQJ 6SHFLDO
Provincial Administrations, municipalities and villages,
ìOOHU %DQNDVí LV IRXQGHG RIILFLDOO\ LQ  DOVR
XQGHUWDNLQJ WKH IXQFWLRQVRI%HOHGL\HOHU%DQNDVí 7KH
Bank is a public institution subject to establishment
law and special provisions in all of its operations, and
having legal entity. 82.56% of the Bank capital belongs
to municipalities, 10.39% to Special Provincial
Administrations and 7.05% to villages.
ì0.%7DNYH 1995
The Bank is conducting specialized banking activities
related to financial markets within the framework of
coherent legislation provisions since the beginning of
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32.62% of the Bank’s capital belongs to ISE and the






Pursuant the Act Nr. 3332 dated 1987, the Devlet
<DWíUíP %DQNDVí 6WDWH ,QYHVWPHQW %DQN ZDV
WUDQVIRUPHG LQWR 7¾UNL\H ìKUDFDW .UHGL %DQNDVí $Đ
(Türk Eximbank). The Bank’s capital belongs entirely to
Turkish Treasury and it is the only officially supported







<DWíUíP %DQNDVí '(6ì<$% $Đ ,Q  LWV WLWOH ZDV
FKDQJHG DV 7¾UNL\H .DONíQPD %DQNDVí $Đ 7XUNLVK
Investment Bank). In 1989, pursuant to the Supreme
3ODQQLQJ &RXQFLO 'HFLVLRQ 7& 7XUL]P %DQNDVí $Đ
ZDV WUDQVIHUUHG WR 7¾UNL\H.DONíQPD%DQNDVíZLWK DOO
of its assets and liabilities and consequently the
tourism sector was added to the service fields of the
Bank. The Bank’s shares have started to trade in ISE in
1991. The Act on the foundation of the Bank was
accepted in 1999. The Bank is subject to matters
regulated pursuant to this Act but also to special law
provisions and is a development and investment bank
operating as a joint stock company having legal entity.





Started to operate in 1999. 91.5% of the Bank’s capital
EHORQJV WR DOíN +ROGLQJ $Đ DQG  WR RWKHU
VKDUHKROGHUV &RPPHUFLDO WLWOH RI DOíN <DWíUíP




Started to operate in 1998. After the death of Recep
6DPL<D]íFíZKRRZQVRIWKHEDQNǢVFDSLWDOGLUHFW
share of Fatma Tuba YAZICI, his wife, in the Bank
increased to 26,719% from 0%, shares of Samim
YAZICI, Eren Sami YAZICI and Ömer Mustafa YAZICI,
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their children, increased to %13,430% from 0%,
according to division of estates.
*6' <DWíUíP
%DQNDVí$Đ 1998













Founded in 1950 with the support of World Bank and
the collaboration of CBRT and commercial banks, Bank
is Turkey’s first private development and investment











 7RSUDNEDQN $Đ ZKLFK ZDV WKH ROG PDLQ
shareholder of the Bank was transferred to SDIF. In
2002, 89.92% of the Bank’ shares was bought by C
)DNWRULQJ$Đ:LWK LWVQHZSDUWQHUVKLSVWUXFWXUH WKH
WLWOHRIWKH%DQNZDVFKDQJHGLQWR&.UHGLYH.DONíQPD
%DQNDVí $Đ LQ  DQG WKH%DQN XQGHUWRRN FDSLWDO
injection and went under new organizational re-
VWUXFWXULQJ&RQVHTXHQWO\WKHVKDUHRI&)DNWRULQJ$Đ
in the Bank has reached 99.99%. According to the
contract signed in 2005, the Tarshish-Hapoalim
Holdings and Investments Ltd., which belongs entirely
to Bank Hapoalim B.M., became a shareholder in the
Bank by 57.55%. Thus, the Bank was included within
the group of foreign investment banks. On December
29, 2005, the title of the Bank was changed into
%DQNSR]LWLI.UHGL YH.DONíQPD%DQNDVí$Đ ,Q &
IDFWRULQJ$ĐWUDQVIHUUHGLWVFDSLWDOVKDUHE\WR
Tarshish-Hapoalim Holdings and Investments Ltd.
which is the other partner of the Bank, thus capital
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%DQNDVí
7¾UN$Đ
%DQNDVí$Đ(XURSHDQ-Turkish Investmnent Bank), in
1995 this title was changed into Indosuez Euro Türk
0HUFKDQW%DQN$ĐDQG LQWR&U«GLW$JULFROH ,QGRVXH]
7¾UN%DQN$ĐLQ,Q&UHGLW/\RQQDLV3DULV
Headquartered in France took over all the assets and
OLDELOLWLHV H[FOXGLQJ GHSRVLWV RI ìVWDQEXO 7¾UNL\H
Central Branch. On June 17, 2004, the title of the Bank
ZDVFKDQJHGWR&DO\RQ%DQN7¾UN$Đ$VRI0DUFK








%DQNDVí $Đ ,Q  WKH VKDUHV FRUUHVSRQGLQJ WR
RI WKHFDSLWDORI7DW<DWíUíP%DQNDVí$ĐZHUH
transferred to Merrill Lynch European Asset Holdings
Inc. The title of the Bank was changed as Merrill Lynch
<DWíUíP%DQN$Đ,QLQGLUHFWVKDUHRI%$&LQWKH
Bank reached 100% as a consequence of merger
Merrill Lynch&Co. Inc. (M&L), the majority shareholder
RI 0HUULOO /\QFK <DWíUíP %DQN $Đ %DQN DQG 0(5
Merger Corporation (MER) whose entire shares belong
to Bank of America Corporation (BAC).
7DLE <DWíUíP
%DQN$Đ 1987
)RXQGHG LQ  XQGHU WKH WLWOH <DWíUíP%DQN $Đ LQ
 LWV WLWOHZDVFKDQJHG LQWR7DLE<DWíUíP%DQN$Đ






54.06% of bank’s capital owned by middle-east
RULJLQDWHG $OEDUDND %DQNDFíOíN *UXEX EHORQJV WR
Albaraka Banking Group, 9.38% to other shareholders
and 17.11% is public.
$V\D .DWíOíP
%DQNDVí$Đ 1996
Started to operate in 1996 under the title of Asya
)LQDQV .XUXPX $Đ LWV WLWOH ZDV FKDQJHG LQWR $V\D
.DWíOíP%DQNDVí$ĐLQIEDQNǢVFDSLWDOLV






Founded in 1989 under the status of Private Finance
Institution, in 1999 its title was changed as Kuveyt Türk
.DWíOíP %DQNDVí $Đ  RI .XYH\W 7¾UNǢV FDSLWDO
belongs to Kuwait Finance House, 9% belongs to
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Kuwait Public Institution for Social Security, 9% to







Founded in 18984 under the title Faisal Finans. Dar Al-
0DDO$OìVODPL6$'0,*URXSZKLFKLVWKHRZQHURI
the company’s shares, sold its shares to OLFO S.A.,
domiciled in Switzerland in 1998. In 2001, 38.82% of the
institution’s shares were taken over by Sabri Ülker and
at the same date title of the institution was changed as
)DPLO\)LQDQV.XUXPX$Đ,QWKHVKDUHRI6DEUL
Ülker within the capital structure of the institution has
reached 98.63%. Anadolu Finans Kurumu which
started to operate in 1991 and Family Finans merged in
 DQG XQGHU WKH WLWOH 7¾UNL\H )LQDQV .DWíOíP
%DQNDVí $Đ ZLWKLQ WKH VDPH \HDU RI WKH
Bank’s capital belongs to Suudi Arabistan Ulusal
7LFDUHW%DQNDVí




its status to national bank in 1964. In 1988, pursuant
the Council of Ministers Decision, its permission to
conduct banking activities and to accept deposit was
annulled; in 1990 this permission was re-granted. Its
WLWOH ZDV FKDQJHG LQWR 'HUEDQN $Đ LQ  ,Q 
WKH%DQNSDVVHGWRWKHFRUSRUDWLRQRI%D\íQGíU+ROGLQJ
DQG WDNLQJ WKH WLWOH RI %D\íQGíUEDQN $Đ ,Q  WKH
Bank was transferred to SDIF. Afterwards in 2002, the
(JH*L\LP6DQD\LFLOHUL%DQNDVí$ĐPHUJHGZLWKLQ WKH
FRUSRUDWLRQ RI %D\íQGíUEDQN $Đ 2Q $SULO  
(WLEDQN $Đ ZLWK (VNLđHKLU %DQNDVí 7$Đ DQG
ìQWHUEDQN$ĐZKLFKZHUHWUDQVIHUUHGWR(WLEDQN7$Đ
LQ  ìNWLVDW %DQNDVí 7$Đ DQG .HQWEDQN $Đ
PHUJHG ZLWKLQ %D\íQGíUEDQN $Đ ZLWK DOO WKHLU DVVHWV
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B. A SWOT Analysis for the Turkish Financial System
Investment Support and Promotion Agency (ISPA) under the Prime Ministry is the
official organization for promoting Turkey’s investment opportunities to the global
business community and providing assistance to the worldwide investors. 142
According to the reports published by ISPA, the Turkish financial system and the
recent developments can be summarised as follows:
 Financial system is highly liberalised.
 The regulatory bodies have improved steadily since 2001, and the financial
sector has become resilient to both domestic and external fluctuations.
 CBRT has effective instruments for managing liquidity and flexibility to
provide emergency lending assistance.
 Despite the global financial crisis, Turkey’s banking sector remains robust
and profitable.
 Turkey’s financial institutions were not exposed to “toxic assets”.
 The banking sector had a sound capital adequacy ratio (CAR) of 19% in 2010,
far above the legal limit of 8%.
 The household liability ratio to GDP was 17% in 2010, while it was 66% in the
Euro area.
 7KH ìVWDQEXO6WRFN([FKDQJH ì6(EHJDQ LWV RSHUDWLRQV LQ  EXW LW JUHZ
quickly to become one of the important emerging market exchanges of the
world.
 Foreign and local investors are equally treated and there are more than 20
banks with foreign capital.
142 ISPA operates with a network of local representatives in Belgium, Canada, China, France,
Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Saudi Arabia, Spain, the Gulf states (Bahrain, Kuwait,
Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates), the Russian Federation, the UK, and the USA, offering an
extensive range of services to investors through a one-stop-shop approach, and assists them in
obtaining optimum results from Turkey (www.invest.gov.tr).
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 $FFRUGLQJWRì6(PRUHWKDQRIWKHWRWDOYDOXHRIWKHWUDGHGVWRFNVLVKHOG
by foreign investors as of October 2011.
 The ‘Istanbul Financial Centre’ Project is set to make Istanbul a regional
financial centre within ten years and a global centre in a few decades. Lately,
Istanbul has been upgraded to the ‘Alpha-’ world cities classification by GaWC
 2010. ‘Alpha-’ world cities define world cities that have ‘extensive
globalisation,’ which has been created largely by accountancy and advertising
firms.
 The Turkish government is constantly working to improve legal and fiscal
environment, political and economic stability and regulatory framework in
order to attract financial investments (http://www.invest.gov.tr/en-
US/sectors/Pages/FinancialServices.aspx).
According to the SWOT analysis results of ISPA, the strengths of Turkish financial
system are strong capital adequacy and liquidity of banks, availability of substantial
amount of well-trained workforce, and robust regulatory framework; whilst the
country’s dependence on short-term capital inflows that prevents reduction in
interest rates and low GDP/per capita are the main weaknesses. The introduction of
mortgage loans and derivative instruments, increasing loan-to-deposit ratio, and the
development of insurance sector are the opportunities of the financial system.
Finally, increasing non-performing consumer loans and credit cards, short-term
deposit base, and rising difficulty in the access to syndication and securitisation
credits from international institutions are amongst the threats to the financial
sector.
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